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This dissertation investigates the appropriation of material from one scientific 
field into another in the early Hellenistic period, 300-150 BCE.  Appropriation from one 
science into another led to the emergence of new concepts in a community of scientists.  
Herophilus of Chalcedon’s appropriation of musical rhythms led to the emergence of the 
pulse as a materio-semiotic object for Rationalist physicians.  Archimedes of Syracuse’s 
appropriation of mechanical concepts of weighing led to the emergence of the mechanical 
method as a scientific way of seeing for practicing mathematicians.  But objects and 
concepts emerging from cross-scientific appropriation had ideological consequences for 
scientific methodology within individual scientific communities.  Archimedes prioritized 
a formal Euclidean proof over that offered by the mechanical method because of the 
standards of proof demanded by the community of practicing mathematicians.  The sect 
of Empiricist physicians rejected Rationalist medicine and promoted the individual 
doctor’s role and authority as a medical caregiver.  The dissertation’s sum tells a story of 
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increasing but limited strategies of naturalization within the sciences of the early 
Hellenistic period.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Overview 
This chapter introduces the study of cross-field scientific activity in the early 
Hellenistic period.  It provides a critique of G.E.R. Lloyd’s work on this topic and offers 
hope for an analysis of cross-scientific work in terms of comparative sociology.  An 
overview of the theoretical grounding of this dissertation follows: theories of 
intertextuality and the semiotic study of science developed by sociologist Bruno Latour.  
1.1 THE PROBLEM OF CROSS-FIELD SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY 
The arteries pulsing in looped beats.  Parabolas hung and sliced and weighed on a 
balance.  The divination sieve of the natural numbers.  These are not the images of 
ancient Greek science that first come to mind.  Yet all these examples come from Greek 
science produced in the third century BCE, by the leading doctors and mathematicians of 
the age.1  All these examples involve one domain of scientific activity – the physiology of 
vascular tissue, the calculation of area, the sequence of prime numbers – placed and 
analyzed within the compass of another scientific field – music, mechanics, astrology.2  
What motivated successful Greek scientists in the Hellenistic period to adopt 
cross-field strategies for interpreting the natural world?  After all, the various Greek 
sciences by 300 BCE had at least 120-150 years, if not more, of analysis with their own 
traditions to draw upon.  Medicine had developed qua medicine, mathematics qua 
mathematics.3  They were separate fields with internally driven standards of 
argumentation.  To a great extent, works such as the Hippocratic Ancient Medicine and 
On the Sacred Disease and mathematical treatises by Eudoxus had laid out acceptable 
                                                
1 The examples are from, respectively, Herophilus, Archimedes, and Eratosthenes.  The first two examples 
are discussed in chapters 2 and 3; see Netz (2009a: 150.n24) for Eratosthenes’ sieve as an appropriation of 
astrology. 
2 The crossing of scientific domains (as I will call the separate traditions of the sciences below) in the 
Hellenistic period are not the mixed sciences known from Aristotle’s philosophy of science, in which 
physical sciences are subordinate to mathematical principles, such as optics or meteorology.  For the mixed 
sciences see Lennox (1985: 39-49). 
3 The consequence of Lloyd’s (1991b) thesis is that one speaks more appropriately of ‘sciences’ in the 
Classical period than ‘science’. 
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strategies of argumentation within particular sciences.4  Doctors should not engage in 
unsubstantiated hypotheticals, especially involving supernatural forces; mathematicians 
demanded a formal deductive proof.  But the above examples of arterial pulsation, 
balanced parabolas, and a divination sieve for numbers violate these traditional criteria 
for argumentation.  How could a scientist reject traditional criteria of argumentation and 
still hope to present a successful argument to others in his field?  How could a doctor 
present to other doctors medical arguments that were described and analyzed by the 
theories and standards of musicians? The intellectual success and subsequent fame of the 
Hellenistic scientists who employ non-traditional analysis suggests that these examples of 
cross-field scientific activity are not freakish coincidences.5  This dissertation will argue 
that the scientific strategies involved in all these examples are part of a cultural pattern 
common to Greek science of the Hellenistic period. 
I use the word ‘science’ to indicate the production of knowledge involving the 
theoretical investigation of the natural world and the practical application of knowledge 
drawn from that theoretical investigation.  This definition is adopted from modern 
sociological studies of science.6  In the following pages I will use the term ‘science’ to 
indicate both the production of knowledge and the group of individual fields concerned 
with natural investigation, I will use the term ‘scientist’ to refer to the individuals whose 
work concerned at least one field of natural investigation, and I will use the term 
‘scientific’ to describe the field of natural investigation and the community of individuals 
concerned with natural investigation.  I eschew terms anachronistic to Hellenistic period 
thought such as ‘natural philosopher’, ‘scientific method’, and ‘scientism’.  The terms 
‘science’, ‘scientists’ and ‘scientific’ are largely confined to chapters 1 and 5; the terms 
for the individual sciences and their practitioners replace them in chapters 2-4.  
                                                
4 See Flemming (2000: 80-122) on further division within medicine. 
5 Berryman (2009) argues that mechanical metaphors and technological illustration are common in Greek 
philosophical and scientific thought, particularly in the Hellenistic period.  See also Barton (1994b) on 
astrology, physiognomics, and medicine as prognostic sciences of the Imperial period. 
6 See Barnes, Bloor, Henry (1996: 113): “As far as the specific project of sociology of science is 
concerned, to describe science according to the normal sociological model is to treat it the same as 
knowledgeable activities in other social contexts.”  
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Is it appropriate to talk of ‘science’ within Hellenistic Greek thought?  No single 
ancient Greek word equates precisely to the modern Western concept of ‘science’.  Greek 
investigators into nature variously speak of their investigation as ἐπιστήµη or θεωρία – 
terms stressing “knowledge” – or τέχνη, a term emphasizing skill in “practice” or “craft”; 
they typically speak of the object of their investigation as φύσις, “natural order”.7  It is a 
conclusion of this study that some category of ‘science’ did exist in Greek thought of the 
Hellenistic period, although the full argument must wait until chapter 5, the concluding 
chapter.8  For now let it suffice to underscore two claims: first, that some Hellenistic 
Greeks had a category of ‘naturalized’ physis which crossed several knowledge domains 
and, second, that, although they had no word for it, Hellenistic Greeks had a concept of 
knowledge production that perceived connections between different areas of physis .  
Both these claims allow to some degree the application of models drawn from 
contemporary sociology of science to a knowledge production culturally-specific to the 
Hellenistic world. 
Science by the above sociological definition includes fields such as theoretical 
mathematics, applied mechanics, medicine, astronomy, and astrology, among others; 
these are our terms for knowledge production.  In the Hellenistic world knowledge 
production was known under various Greek terms such as µαθήµατα, µηχανικά, 
ἰατρική, ἀστρολογικά, and so on.  For the most part these Greek terms correspond to 
their translations in modern scientific domains, but in some cases there is not a complete 
mapping of ancient to modern.  For instance, to speak of ἀστρολογικά is to speak with 
historical actors’ terms; to speak without qualification of ‘astronomy’ or ‘astrology’ is to 
privilege our observers’ terms.9  Knowledge production over a certain area is defined 
within a cultural framework: ἀστρολογικά by the above sociological definition is 
knowledge production involving the stars culturally-specific to the ancient Greeks, 
namely, the stars’ distances from each other and from earth, and their powers over life, 
                                                
7 See LSJ ἐπιστήµη II.2; LSJ θεωρία III.2.b; LSJ τέχνη III; LSJ φύσις III.  
8 Chapter 5.1-2 discusses the methodological choices of historians of science during the Greco-Roman 
period for or against the English term ‘science’ and its derivatives. 
9 See Lloyd (1992) for the anthropological distinction between actors’ and observers’ terms. 
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health, and character on earth.  It may be an open scholarly question to what extent the 
domains of the terms ‘astronomy’ and ‘astrology’ (knowledge production terms specific 
to our culture) were seen as united or different in Greco-Roman antiquity, but it is not 
disputed that ἀστρολογικά as a knowledge production concerning the stars was 
considered a ‘science’ within their culture.   
The study of the sciences in the Hellenistic world is not limited to the production 
of knowledge in various domains.  Philip van der Eijk (2005b) has described the study of 
medicine in ancient Greece in a way that encompasses the many cultural and social 
aspects of that particular science: 
The focus of medical history is on the question of how society and its individuals 
respond to pathological phenomena such as disease, pain, death, how it 
‘constructs’ these phenomena and how it contextualises them, what it recognises 
as pathological in the first place, what it labels as a disease or aberration, as a 
epidemic disease, as mental illness, and so on.  How do such responses translate 
in social, cultural and institutional terms: how is a ‘healthcare system’ organised? 
What status do the practitioners or ‘providers’ of treatment enjoy? How do they 
arrive at their views, theories and practices? How do they communicate these to 
their colleagues and wider audiences, and what rhetorical and argumentative 
techniques do they use in order to persuade their colleagues and their customers 
of the preferability of their own approach as opposed to that of their rivals?  How 
is authority established and maintained, and how are claims to competence 
justified?10 
 
In van der Eijk’s view, medical historians investigate how society constructs phenomena 
of pain and disease and how such responses are translated in cultural terms.  In this 
formulation science is part of the ‘discourse’ of culture and analyzable as such.  Science 
in the Greek world is thus one of the many activities and cultural productions that Greeks 
engaged in. 
 My study embraces the notion of science as a cultural activity as well as 
knowledge production.  I use the many elements of cultural analysis – cultural 
discursivity, sociological analysis – to understand the development and spread of science 
in Hellenistic Greece.  Indeed, the notion of traditional criteria in scientific argumentation 
                                                
10 Van der Eijk (2005b: 6). 
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that I sketched above is fundamentally a sociological notion.  The Euclidean deductive 
proof, for example, is a standard of argumentation embraced by the Hellenistic 
community of mathematicians: no other type of argumentation – e.g. appeal to authority, 
illustrative diagrams, mechanical analysis – was sufficient on its own for the community 
of practicing mathematicians to accept the conclusion reached.  To speak of standards of 
proof and argumentation is to speak sociologically, in terms of the shared agreement of 
the scientific community. 
 This dissertation will focus on cross-field appropriations between the sciences in 
the early Hellenistic period, roughly c. 300-150 BCE.  The heart of my analysis is a series 
of three case studies: chapter 2, Herophilus of Chalcedon’s analysis of the pulse in terms 
of musical rhythms; chapter 3, Archimedes of Syracuse’s treatise Ephodos which 
analyzes mathematical objects by weighing them on an imaginary balance; and chapter 4, 
the debate between the rival medical schools of Empiricist and Rationalist physicians in 
the 3rd and 2nd centuries BCE.  I am interested above all in the how and why of the 
interaction of the sciences across fields.  
This study is therefore partly concerned with the emergence of new objects and 
concepts into a particular community of scientists.11  Emergence is a coming-to-be, 
innovation, discovery – in short, the label of newness.  The new concepts and objects 
within one science can develop from the appropriation of materials and ideas from 
another science.  In chapter 2 Herophilus’ appropriation of musical rhythm will lead to 
                                                
11 Daston (2000: 13) similarly describes ontology revived for scientific historians: “Reality for scientific 
objects instead expands into a continuum, just as degrees of probability opened up between the poles of 
true and false in seventeenth-century philosophy.  Scientific objects may not be invented, but they grow 
more richly real as they become entangled in webs of cultural significance, material practices, and 
theoretical derivations.  In contrast to quotidian objects, scientific objects broaden and deepen: they become 
ever more widely connected to other phenomena, and at the same time yield ever more layers of hidden 
structure.  The sciences are fertile in new objects, and the objects in turn are fertile in new techniques, 
differentiations and associations, representations, empirical and conceptual revelations.  The participle [sic] 
‘in the becoming’ is a more than quaint rendering of Aristotle’s Greek (genesis).  It captures the distinctly 
generative, processual sense of the reality of scientific objects, as opposed to the quotidian objects that 
simply are.  But what can be ontologically enriched can be also be impoverished; scientific objects can pass 
away as well as come into being.  Sometimes they are banished totally from the realm of the real, as in the 
case of unicorns, phlogiston, and the ether.  More often, they slip back into the wan reality of quotidian 
objects, which exist but do not thicken and quicken with inquiry.” 
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the emergence of a materio-semiotic object, the pulse.  In chapter 3 Archimedes’ 
appropriation of mechanical tools will lead to the emergence of a scientific way of 
seeing, the mechanical method.  Cross-scientific appropriation led to new objects and 
concepts within a particular scientific community. 
How scientists appropriate theoretical material from different fields will be 
indicative of a particular scientific community’s willingness to accept standards of 
argument and proof different from their own traditional standards.  While my argument 
focuses on the standards of the medical and mathematical communities, I do not believe 
that these trends are unique to mathematics and medicine; I intend it to be considered 
within the context of studies of all sciences in the Hellenistic world.  Chapter 2 considers 
how Herophilus’ appropriation of musical theories of rhythm successfully provides a new 
ideology to the Greek medical community; chapter 4 considers how the debate between 
competing medical sects demonstrates the limits of acceptance of new standards within 
the medical community.  Chapter 3 on Archimedes’ treatise Ephodos is a case of both the 
emergence of a new mathematical way of seeing and a demonstration of the limited 
acceptance of cross-scientific appropriation within the mathematical community. The 
dissertation’s sum total tells a story of increasing but limited strategies of naturalization 
within the sciences of the early Hellenistic period. 
1.2 LLOYD’S GREEK SCIENCE 
The study of cross-field scientific activity in the Hellenistic period is not wholly 
new territory.  G.E.R. Lloyd has written on some of this material and Lloyd’s work is 
central for a historical understanding of the aims and practices of Greek scientists.  
Lloyd’s (1991) Methods and Problems in Greek Science, a collection of earlier essays, 
strongly attacked a stationary concept of Greek science in favor of individual problems in 
individual sciences.  His later work continued this line of investigation, concentrating on 
the biological, zoological, and medical fields in Science, Folklore and Ideology (1983) 
and optics, acoustics, and physics in The Revolutions of Wisdom (1987).  He proposed 
that Greek scientists worked in a highly competitive atmosphere that promoted individual 
polemics against their predecessors and sometimes contemporaries.  He further proposed 
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that, in spite of competition, scientists usually tended to privilege individual results using 
common methods of inquiry rather than innovate new methods.12  
Lloyd’s work has had the salutary effect that scholars no longer speak in broad 
and overly-generalized terms about Greek science but now emphasize the diversity of 
opinions on scientific questions in various fields.  As a consequence Lloyd’s work has 
had the effect of promoting the study of individual sciences alone, with lesser attention to 
the wider contemporary scientific context, so that connections between fields are 
neglected.13  In this introduction I will consider Lloyd’s work against the case studies 
developed in later chapters in order to argue first in 1.2.1 that the methodological aim of 
Hellenistic Greek science is not always greater certainty and second in 1.2.2 that Lloyd’s 
thesis cannot encompass a reading of Hellenistic scientific methodology which promotes 
some other aim at the expense of a formalist justificatory methodology.  To do so I first 
present a short summary of my arguments of chapters 3 and 4.14 
In chapter 3 I argue that Archimedes’ Ephodos15 both presents an innovative 
mathematical argument and yet rejects the conclusiveness of that argument.  The treatise 
presents an innovative kind of mathematical argument about the area and volume of 
geometrical objects involving their decomposition into infinite sets of constituent line 
segments and their weighing around their centers of weight; in modern scholarship this 
argument is commonly known as the mechanical method.16  Nevertheless, Archimedes 
claims that the mechanical method is insufficient as a formal proof, that is, the new 
argument is not conducted in the manner of the Hellenistic mathematical community’s 
                                                
12 See further contextualization of Lloyd in Barton (1994b: 11-12). 
13 Daston (2009) notes the trend of ever-more specialized monographs in the discipline of the history of 
science.  Naturally, the better historically contextualized a treatment is, the more narrow and specialized it 
appears.  To his credit Lloyd’s scholarship actively seeks breadth in addition to specialization.  
14 Since in chapter 2.1.1 I show that the aim of Herophilus’ pulse theory is greater certainty about physis in 
accordance with Lloyd’s claims, I do not consider chapter 2 here.   
15 I refer to this treatise as Ephodos, conventionally called Method, for reasons described in 3.1.1. 
16 Dijksterhuis (1987: 313-22). 
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standard Euclidean proof.  (The mechanical method is also not an acceptable 
mathematical proof according to contemporary twenty-first century CE mathematics.17) 
[Τ]τοῦτο δὴ διὰ µὲν τῶν νῦν εἰρηµένων οὐκ ἀποδέδεικται, ἔµφασιν δέ τινα 
πεποίηκε τὸ συµπέρασµα ἀληθὲς εἶµεν· διόπερ ἁµὲς ὁρῶντες µὲν οὐκ 
ἀποδεδειγµένον, ὑπονοέοντες δὲ τὸ συµπέρασµα ἀληθὲς εἶµεν, <ἐ>τάξοµες τὰν 
γεωµετρεοµέναν ἀπόδειξιν ἐξευρόντες αὐτοὶ ̣τὰν ἐ<κ>δοθεῖσαν πρότερον. 
 
So this was not proven by what was now said but still creates a certain impression 
that the conclusion is true.  Wherefore I, seeing that <the conclusion> is not 
proven but nonetheless suspecting that the conclusion is true, will test [it] in 
respect to the geometrized proof, which was published earlier after I myself 
discovered it.18 
 
Archimedes gives priority to the formalized Euclidean proof, “the geometrized proof”, 
over the proof offered by the mechanical method, “So this was not proven but still creates 
a certain impression that the conclusion is true”: Archimedes justifies his rejection by a 
hierarchy of the formalization of proof.  Archimedes seems to have not provided a formal 
proof for his most sensational mathematical results in the Ephodos, namely the volume 
encompassed by two intersecting cylinders and the volume encompassed by a cylinder 
and a certain planar parabola inscribed in a square prism.  The treatise argues in the 
mechanical fashion and leaves each problem with the result attained via the mechanical 
method, with no formal proof appended (although such a proof is possible). 
In chapter 4 I argue that the Empiricists and Rationalists, two competing medical 
sects (αἱρέσεις), attack each other for asymmetrical reasons.  The Rationalists attack the 
                                                
17 Deductive proof was, for the most part, the priority for Greek mathematics.  This does not imply, 
however, that the foundations of Greek mathematics are still accepted today by professional 
mathematicians.  While there are still some acceptable uses for Euclidean geometry in contemporary 
mathematics, modern mathematicians consider Greek Euclidean geometry logically incomplete and limited 
by naïve intuitions about geometric space and mathematical sets; see for example Mueller’s (1981) critique 
of Greek standards of geometric proof set out in chapter 3.3.1.  Although it is an exaggeration to say that 
modern mathematicians consider ancient Greek Euclidean geometry as equally suspect as modern doctors 
consider ancient Greek humoral theory, we must remember that ancient Greek mathematics and medicine 
are historical sciences with aims and methodologies different from our own sciences.  The reader should 
not infer that any ancient scientific result or methodology is accepted by the modern scientific community. 
18 I print the text from Appendix B, Archimedes Ephodos lines 276-85. All translations are mine unless 
otherwise noted. My translation practice distinguishes between nouns and adjectives implied by the 
grammatical gender but unexpressed by the Greek text, which I mark by the angular brackets < >, and other 
words unexpressed by the Greek text but necessary in English translation, which I mark by the square 
brackets [ ]. 
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Empiricists for their rejection of causality and dissection and anatomical knowledge; the 
Empiricists on the other hand attack the Rationalists for ignoring the person of the patient 
and the personalization of the healing arts.  What was an argument about knowledge and 
reason for the Rationalists was for the Empiricists instead an argument about the role of 
the practitioner of medical science.  The Empiricists rejected Rationalist dissection and 
other elements of new medical research for both epistemological reasons – the 
‘knowledge’ gained from dissection is founded on a category error between living and 
dead – and for cultural reasons – the research scientist did not fill the role of traditional 
medical caregiver. 
1.2.1 The Rejection of Innovation 
My thesis, then, in the present section is that conclusions from these case studies 
show that Lloyd’s reading of Greek science cannot account for cross-field activity in 
Hellenistic science whose methodological aim is not greater certainty.  I contend that 
Archimedes’ rejection of the mechanically devised style of argument and the Empiricist 
reassertion of the healing role of the physician against the Rationalist ought to be seen as 
culturally similar phenomena: they both concern the rejection of an innovative 
methodological approach in science for a more traditional approach.  There are two levels 
at which to consider the phenomena: first at the level of each science, mathematics and 
medicine, and second at the level of the science as a cultural paradigm. 
Since in antiquity mathematics held a social claim to greater certainty than the 
other sciences and the certainty mathematics offers is central to Lloyd’s claims, I 
consider first the mathematical methodology of Archimedes’ Ephodos.  In the Ephodos 
Archimedes valued the formal Euclidean proof above mechanical arguments.  Knorr 
(1986), discussing late ancient mathematical commentators who reject earlier solutions 
that are based on assumptions foreign to Euclid’s methods, proposed a general solution 
about the classification of mathematical modes of argument and construction: 
The explicit restriction to one or another mode of construction is by its nature 
primarily a formal move, motivated by the urge to divide and classify the 
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collected body of established results.  Until the geometric corpus had attained a 
size and diversity meriting such efforts, there could hardly be much sense in 
engaging in these formal enquiries.19 
 
While it is unclear whether in Archimedes’ lifetime the geometric corpus included 
enough results to separate and classify them by construction method, Knorr’s important 
point is the idea of the development of mathematics.  Knorr proposes to see the logical 
moves of formal classification as a historical and not a technical issue, consequently 
demanding a historical solution.  If we were to apply Knorr’s argument to Archimedes’ 
Ephodos, we would see a scientist attempting to classify proper and improper solutions.  
But we ought to reject the applicability of Knorr’s argument to Archimedes’ Ephodos.  
Archimedes’ work aims to apply new techniques or a high-order version of older 
techniques to expand the size of the geometric corpus; in the Ephodos itself Archimedes 
proudly records his ability to determine new results, namely three-dimensional planar 
objects commensurable with objects bound by cylinders and cones.  These are not the 
types of proofs born of late-antique formalist motivations which divide up already-
existing solutions. 
A different solution is hinted at in the work of Netz (2009a), who reads the 
Ephodos with the narrative expectations of Greek mathematicians.20  Seen from this 
perspective, the Ephodos has an interest in generalized mathematical enunciations but 
lacks mechanically accurate schematics, features which tell against the expectations of 
engineers but for the expectations of mathematicians.  (In 1.2.3 I will suggest that 
engineers and mathematicians are separate social groups and that they work in largely 
separate scientific domains.)  Although Archimedes’ intentions are impossible to know, 
the reading I argue for in chapter 3 suggests that Archimedes is not reaching out to 
engineers but rather expanding the space of investigation for mathematicians. 
From both Knorr’s point of view and my argument it is clear that the central issue 
in Archimedes’ Ephodos is the notion of proof.  The development of the idea of proof in 
                                                
19 Knorr (1986: 40). The late-ancient commentator Pappus in his Collectio (c. 300-350 CE) will often reject 
a Hellenistic solution on the grounds that it violates some standard of geometrical argumentation and will 
present a new solution employing ‘proper’ argumentative techniques. 
20 Netz (2009a: 75-79, 129-57). 
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Greek mathematics is somewhat controversial but Lloyd (1990) draws attention to the 
political environment in which early Greek mathematics developed, the argumentative 
fifth-century city-state democracies.21  Lloyd suggests that the shared vocabulary of 
demonstration – such as ἀπόδειξις and ἐπίδειξις from the root δεικνυµί “show” – in the 
5th century BCE, shared by oratory, philosophy, medicine, and mathematics, evidences an 
ongoing concern for the precision of argumentation, whether in the forms of ad hominem, 
elenchus, or reductio ad absurdum.  In the case of mathematics, Lloyd points out that in 
Simplicius’ report of Hippocrates of Chios’ quadrature of the lunes, our earliest extant 
work of specialized mathematical interest (c.425 BCE), where Hippocrates is concerned 
to demonstrate that the quadrature of the lunes proceeds from the proposition that 
segments of circles are in proportion to the squares on their bases (itself founded on the 
proposition that circles are to each other as the square on their bases), there is a lack of 
specialized terminology for proof.22  If there is already the recognition of the manner in 
which mathematical propositions are dependent on other proposition, there is not yet a 
clear attempt to enunciate all formal a priori principles.  In general Lloyd aims to argue 
that circa 400 BCE there is an increasing differentiation in the notion of formal and 
informal proof, recognized already in Plato’s insistence that the demonstration of 
mathematics (i.e. formal proof) was vastly different from that offered in the law-court 
(i.e. informal proof).  All the same, it is not until late in the 4th cen. BCE that Aristotle 
first enunciated the syllogistic rules of deductive logic.  Thus for Lloyd, following 
Knorr’s famous rejection of the notion of a Grundlagenkrisis in 5th century 
mathematics,23 the progress toward the explicit notion of formal proof was a long 
                                                
 
21 See especially Lloyd (1990: 73-97).  Lloyd (1987: 74-78) is less developed, but instead of concentrating 
on the political context is embedded inside a discussion of the role of literacy in the development of Greek 
science.  Netz (1999b) argues strongly for the fundamental role of literacy in the development of the Greek 
geometrical corpus.  
22 For more on Hippocrates of Chios see Netz (2004c), who extends Lloyd’s (1990) argument by arguing 
that Hippocrates’ discursive and non-Euclidean treatment of mathematics is part of early development of 
geometrical terminology. 
23 The so-called Grundlagenkrisis was mathematicians’ discovery that not all numbers can be represented 
as the ratio of two integer numbers, i.e. the doctrine of incommensurability.  (For example, a square of side 
unit 1 will have a diagonal of unit square root 2, which cannot be expressed rationally.)  This discovery was 
said to have given rise to related problems about the definitions of magnitudes and the types of ratio 
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development made with increasing specificity over the 5th and 4th centuries BCE.  The 
aim of Greek mathematics was not to define or reflect from a second-order position on 
explicit formal proof but rather to use formal proofs on mathematical objects.  Thus by 
circa 300 BCE, the traditional date of the canonical text of Greek geometry, Euclid’s 
Elements, mathematics had standardized its procedures and structure of proof, ἀπόδειξις. 
Lloyd’s (1990) second point concerns the subsequent universalizing of geometric 
proof after Euclid’s Elements.  He argues that, when Greeks argue more geometrico, they 
do not do so as part of a universal program to understand the natural world in a purely 
mathematical way but that specific features of their examples are used to produce results 
to specific to those phenomena.24  For example, Archimedes’ Floating Bodies considers 
how mathematical shapes float based on a number of assumptions about hydrologic 
forces and the shape of the liquid surface: the text offers no argument that these 
assumptions correspond to the physical world but provides only the mathematical 
conclusions that follow the assumptions. 
We can say that the development, in Greece, of the demand for certainty sprang in 
part from dissatisfaction shared by a variety of individuals with the merely 
persuasive.  But it is also clear that the way in which the concept of proof was 
actually deployed corresponds to those individuals’ responses to specific 
scientific problems as they arose in connection with the various philosophical and 
scientific issues they investigated.  But the important facts we need to study – and 
that constitute our problem in attempting to understand these developments – are, 
in the latter case, the specificities of those responses, and in the former, the 
polemic in which, as a means of outbidding the competition, the claim to certainty 
was preeminent: it could be denied, but it could not be surpassed.25 
 
The sober argument of specific issues serves Lloyd very well when he considers the 
features of idealization in various mathematizing authors from different periods in 
                                                
manipulation possible and hence problems about certain sorts of proof; it was supposedly solved by 
Theatetus and Eudoxus’ discoveries, preserved in Euclid Elements 10.  But this so-called crisis is an 
invention of early 20th century scholarship.  In addition to the literature criticizing the scholarly invention of 
the Grundlagenkrisis cited by Lloyd (1990: 84), see also Knorr’s historicizing of the 1930s literature on the 
Greek Grundlagenkrisis within the modern meta-mathematical debate about mathematical foundationalism 
in the posthumously published Knorr (2004). 
24 Lloyd (1990: 90-95), a very good argument about the distance between scientific authors, who solve 
specific problems, and the (often late ancient) philosophers who expound a program of universal 
mathematization. 
25 Lloyd (1990: 95).  All emphasis is in the original. 
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antiquity.  Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Iamblichus are shown to share certain interests in exact 
argumentation and proof without committing them to the same philosophical aims.  
Given the standardization of mathematical proof by 300 BCE and the subsequent 
development of mathematization, it is all the more surprising that Lloyd finds 
Archimedes, c. 287-212 BCE, vitiating his arguments.  For Lloyd Archimedes figures 
both as someone whose work shows that “the insistence on rigorous demonstration could 
and did have certain inhibiting effects”26 (in reference to Archimedes’ Ephodos and 
Quadrature of the Parabola) and as someone whose idealizations in his mathematizing of 
physics in On Floating Bodies and On Equilibria of Planes indicated “the investigation 
will cease to be a contribution to physics and will become (just) geometry.”27  Thus 
according to Lloyd, Archimedes’ work is too precise for physics but not precise enough 
for mathematics.  I suggest that Lloyd has been misled about Archimedes’ work, which, 
as I argue in chapter 3.3, often concerns the idea of proof in mathematics.  If my 
arguments above are correct, Archimedes’ intentions in his mechanized mathematics are 
meant to expand the domain of the mathematician both in a methodological way – as in 
Ephodos – and in considerations of specific problems – as in On Floating Bodies.  Lloyd 
recognizes that one cannot speak generally of a Greek view of mathematization of nature 
but his concern about the phenomena of mathematization as a whole leaves him open to 
the usual criticisms against cultural arguments drawn from multiple historical periods; 
and Archimedes simply does not fit the pattern Lloyd proposes.  An individual outlier 
does not invalidate Lloyd’s larger point, but it is important to underline that Lloyd’s 
argument about the development and employment of geometric proof does not seem to fit 
the aims of Archimedes’ mechanized mathematics. 
In the domain of medicine the sects of the Rationalists (founded c. 300 BCE) and 
Empiricists (founded c. 250 BCE) are the main medical methodologies of the early 
Hellenistic period.  Empiricism is often portrayed as a purely negative reaction to 
Rationalism.  But as I argue in 4.2, the Empiricists have a positive doctrine of sign-
                                                
 
26 Lloyd (1990: 89). 
27 Lloyd (1990: 90). 
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association and of the primacy of vision.  They do reject Rationalist accounts of causality 
and Rationalists, such as Hegetor and Ps.-Dioscorides, criticize and deride the Empiricists 
for this rejection.  But Rationalists do not doubt that the Empiricists are worthy of the 
name ‘doctor’.  Galen, in fact, in a famous passage indicates that Rationalists and 
Empiricists reach the same therapy from different methodologies. 
τοιαῦτα µυρία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀµφισβητοῦσιν ἐµπειρικοί τε καὶ δογµατικοὶ  
τὴν αὐτὴν θεραπείαν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν παθῶν ποιούµενοι, ὅσοι γε νόµῳ καθ’  
ἑκατέραν τὴν αἵρεσιν ἤσκηνται. 
 
The Empiricists and Rationalists dispute numerous things of this type with each 
other, although they apply the same therapy in the case of the same afflictions, at 
least those who have been trained rightly in each sect.28 
 
At least for Galen, disagreements over methodology end where therapy begins.  Mudry 
(1982) too argues that in most diseases the treatments employed by each sect would be 
the same; only in the case of new diseases would they differ.29  But the claim that the 
sects held therapy in common is an over-simplification: first, Galen’s proviso indicates 
many doctors worked outside of the guidelines of their sect and, as we see in chapter 
4.3.4, Hegetor the Rationalist and Apollonius the Empiricist disagree about even the 
possibility of treatment of the dislocated hip.  As to why the Empiricists rejected 
Rationalist attempts to explain causality, I argue in 4.2.3 that the Empiricists thought that 
the Rationalists had strayed from the traditional role and practices of the physician.  To 
the Empiricists, advances in theoretical medical knowledge were not as important as and 
could impede the effective care and treatment of patients. 
We encounter the same problems in medicine with our sources as in mathematics 
when we treat scientific thought from the whole of antiquity rather than individual 
periods.  Rationalism in particular was the construction of the Empiricists to name their 
opponents; but Rationalists themselves went under a variety of names: Herophilean, 
Erasistratean, Pneumatist.  Frede (1987) has emphasized the variety of positions and 
                                                
28 Galen de sectis ad eos qui introdunctur 1.79K = 12.5-8 Helmreich.   
29 Mudry (1982: 97). 
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voices in both Empiricism and Rationalism.30  We have much to gain from restricting our 
examination of evidence within medicine to specific issues at certain times. 
The basic problem we have been considering is the rejection of innovative 
methods in science. On the one hand, Archimedes’ works explores the nature and 
conditions of mathematical proof.  That some sort of proof is necessary for formal 
mathematics is not in doubt, although Archimedes seems to believe that only formal 
Euclidean proof sufficed.  On the other hand, the debate between Empiricists and 
Rationalists demonstrates that, at least in Hellenistic medicine, an understanding of 
causality is still not the prerequisite of medicine.  The differences between 
methodological issues in Hellenistic medicine and Hellenistic mathematics show that 
there are strong specific considerations at play in the methodology of Hellenistic science.  
One cannot say that there are formal demonstrative prerequisites for ‘science’ as a whole.  
To what extent each science determines its own methodological requirements remains an 
important question.   
Yet there are reasons to suppose that there are strong similarities across sciences 
between our test cases in chapters 3 and 4; and here we must consider science as a 
cultural phenomenon in the Hellenistic period.  First, the methodological disputes of 
Hellenistic science are disputes within science, set apart from broader cultural concerns.  
Archimedes is concerned with how mathematical proof occurs and whether a plane figure 
can be reanalyzed into a set of its constituent parallel lines.  The Empiricists and 
Rationalists are debating about causality, anatomy, and the role of the physician in 
medicine. These are issues germane to individual sciences, the first-order questions of the 
science: what counts as knowledge within a science and the structure by which results are 
achieved.  The Hellenistic debates we have been considering are much more isolated in 
culture than the debates of, say, the Hippocratic On the Sacred Disease, which engages 
other scientists, philosophers, and magicians.31   
                                                
30 Frede (1987: 96-7).  Empiricism, unlike Rationalism, was a self-identified sect.  Von Staden (1982, 
1997a) has even cautioned against attributing a cohesive, collective identity to individual sects within 
Rationalism. 
31 For the cultural position of Sacr. Morb. see Lloyd (1979: 37-48). 
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Second, the rejection of the innovative methodology is accomplished on one level 
by a rhetorical call to the traditional aim of the science.  Archimedes accomplishes a sort 
of result but it must be completed with a formal Euclidean-style argument.  What counts 
in mathematics is the formal proof of a result: the result itself is not enough.  The call of 
traditionalism is even more clearly seen in the debate between Empiricists and 
Rationalists.  The Empiricist critique of Rationalist principles uses the features of fifth-
century intellectualism to call for a style of medicine in which the doctor is a caregiver, 
not a researcher.  Medicine aims to care for patients, the Empiricists say, and superfluous 
knowledge of causality and anatomy has no place in healing medicine. 
1.2.2 Critique of Lloyd 
The rejection of innovative methodology is not simply a rhetorical trope: the 
claim of tradition within a science is an assertion of a particular kind of intellectual 
investigation by a particular community.  Lloyd (1990) argues that these phenomena hold 
true according to the community of scientists themselves, a social explanans.  I agree 
with the most basic version of this thesis; but I have already suggested that Lloyd’s 
argument is open to the criticism that all arguments collapsing multiple historical periods 
into one culture suffer, since Lloyd develops historical theories about all Greek science 
from the Classical period evidence.  Again, I wish to pursue this criticism with the aim to 
improve and better specify Lloyd’s conclusions in the case of Hellenistic science 300-150 
BCE.   
In Lloyd’s view, in contrast to the intellectual culture of ancient China roughly 
contemporaneous with ancient Greece, Greek intellectual culture is very occupied with 
foundational issues, i.e. justification.32  Moreover, Greek intellectual culture is more 
occupied at the level of theory than Chinese intellectual culture.  Lloyd connects both of 
these – the drive for theory and the drive for theoretical justification – with the agonistic 
political environment of ancient Greece.33  The divergent political and resulting social 
                                                
32 See Lloyd’s (1990) concluding remarks, especially (1990: 118-122, 124, 133-134, 142-144).  
33 This has been a theme in nearly all of Lloyd’s work, especially in light of comparative material from 
other ancient civilizations: see Lloyd (1979: 246-264), Lloyd (1987: 78-108), Lloyd (1990: 130-144).  But 
also compare Lloyd’s (1987: 78-83) important qualification that “not the whole of Greek science and 
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contexts in which ancient Greek and Chinese scientists worked is placed even more to the 
center as the explanans in Lloyd’s more recent comparative work on ancient science in 
Greece and China, Lloyd (1996), Lloyd (2002), and Lloyd and Sivin (2002).  Historians 
of ancient Chinese science have been hesitant to accept Lloyd’s conclusions for areas 
outside of deductive mathematics.34  I will consider only Lloyd’s treatment of Greek 
science.  Naturally comparative work on ancient Chinese and ancient Greek science has 
the effect of flattening the changes within a culture over time and in Lloyd’s comparative 
treatment Hippocratic works, Archimedes, and Ptolemy are all broadly part of the same 
Greek culture.  
Lloyd’s thesis is this: in the Classical period Lloyd argues that the democratic 
ideology of openness35 builds an agonistic environment in which scientists, following the 
                                                
philosophy … can be so characterized [to depend on the openness of public debate]” and its accompanying 
footnote Lloyd (1987: 78.n106) with reference only to classical period works. 
34 See Hart’s (1999) larger critique of twentieth century scholarship’s project comparing China and the 
West.  Hart praises Lloyd’s (1996) attention to the particulars of the sciences but finds, after Lloyd’s 
caveats, little difference between ancient Greece and China apart from deductive geometry.  He points out 
that it is difficult to say just what sort of justification is appropriate in another sciences, especially in the 
life sciences.  It is some support to Hart’s criticisms that even the locus classicus for the deductive 
achievement of Greek science, Euclid’s Elements, ignores certain foundational issues: the opening 
geometric books presuppose certain notions of continuity, of space, etc. and the arithmetic books, a closed 
system to themselves, presuppose basic notions of measurement, counting, etc, all without articulating 
them.  On Euclid’s implicit assumptions see Mueller (1981: 14-16, 58-63), especially (1981: 63): “If one 
makes allowance for the difference between numbers and geometric objects and hence for the somewhat 
different sense attaching to such notions as addition and equality, [Euclid’s] arithmetic assumptions are 
basically generalizations of his geometric ones.” 
35 Lloyd (1990: 8): “The thesis of my first two studies develops a well-known argument [in a footnote 
Lloyd refers to the work of J.-P. Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought and Myth and Thought among the 
Greeks; Lloyd refers to his own (1979) and (1987) works as further explications of Vernant’s thesis applied 
to Greek science], that the key factors at work are to be found in the political circumstances of ancient 
Greece in the classical period, most notably in the nature and intensity of involvement in political life in the 
autonomous city-states of that period.  In the law-courts and assemblies many Greek citizens gained 
extensive first-hand experience in the actual practice of argument and persuasion, in the evaluation of 
evidence, and in the application of the notions of justification and accountability.  This experience is all the 
more relevant to their expectations in other contexts because so much philosophical and scientific 
discussion too was cast, precisely, in the form of similar debates between opposing points of view.  
Moreover even when the Greek political practice can be seen to diverge from the image it presented of 
itself – its ideology – that does not make the image any the less significant as an indication of what was 
believed or at least held up as an ideal – a point that has special relevance, as we shall see, in connection 
with the ideology of democracy in particular.”  Lloyd is arguing that the social context of debate in the 5th 
and 4th centuries becomes the social context of later Greek intellectual activity.  Particularly, Lloyd is 
arguing that the ideology of democracy, the “propaganda of openness” (Lloyd (1990: 63)), which makes 
debate and judgment available for all, leads to a social context of accountability, evidence, and proof. 
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practice of sophists,36 wage polemic against their rivals; the polemic in turn creates a 
scientific drive for secure demonstration and an emphasis on justification. In the Classical 
period Lloyd’s thesis explains both the evolution of scientific debate and the movement 
in research toward sure methodological footing.  In the Hellenistic period Lloyd argues 
that polemic remained the social environment of science, fostering the scientific drive for 
secure demonstration and justification. Within the Hellenistic period, Lloyd’s thesis 
explains the Classical period genesis of agonistic scientific debate and thus the continued 
movement toward justification.  In Lloyd’s view there are few differences in the agonistic 
environment of science in the Classical and Hellenistic periods; the agonistic 
environment, first developed out of the democratic ideology of the Classical period, 
continues to drive the direction of scientific research in the Hellenistic period.  
Lloyd’s argument leads to a focus on aspects of second-order notions associated 
with science, namely explanation, investigation, argument.  But a focus on second-order 
material about the nature of science can obfuscate the proliferation of first-order theories 
of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods’ investigation into nature.  As Lloyd has shown, 
science and scientists in the Classical period are constantly engaged in polemic against 
other scientists and philosophers and magicians and, to a lesser extent, traditional 
mythologies.  Science as an intellectual phenomenon is part of the broad panorama of 
                                                
36 In a long and important discussion Lloyd (1987: 83-102) considers the many persons of the classical 
period who illustrated sophia by public declamation or generally in front of audiences: these social 
occasions magnify the role that is given to innovation, to authorial egotism, and to criticism of the 
speaker’s intellectual opponents.  Although most of Lloyd’s evidence concerns philosophy and the sophists, 
there is evidence for its relation to science too.  In particular the medical writers tried to distinguish 
themselves from other sophists, even as their work shows affinities with sophistic epideixeis. Lloyd’s point 
is that debate in science itself came to be emphasized under the influence of the agonistic display of 5th 
century intellectuals of sophists, rhetoricians, and philosophers.  Lloyd (1987: 101-02) concludes his 
argument: “Yet overt innovativeness in speculative thought and corresponding self-distancing from 
tradition stem not only from the spread of literacy (itself no guarantee that such attitudes will be adopted), 
but also from a complex, pluralistic social and cultural situation.  What may be particularly important there 
is the development of new modes of rivalry and competition, calling for new styles of self-justification.  In 
philosophy too, as in medicine, the individual often thought of himself as participating in – and sometimes 
literally participated in – a debate in which the personal contribution of each participant was clearly marked 
as his, even when he did not go out of his way (as so many did) to stress his originality explicitly.  When 
we speak of Greek writers needing to win and hold an audience, audience is often the apposite term, and it 
may be to that interaction with audiences, and to the development of contexts for that interaction, that we 
have to look for the chief clues to the understanding of the particular positive and negative modalities of 
innovativeness in ancient Greece.” Emphasis in the original. 
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critical investigations of the world in the 5th and 4th centuries BCE: philosophers and 
scientists are sometimes, perhaps even often, the same people.37  The physikos who is 
both philosopher and scientist easily moves between investigating types of explanations 
and the explanations themselves.  Yet, in the later periods, few philosophers after Plato 
and Aristotle – i.e. few Hellenistic philosophers – concerned themselves with the first-
order questions of science.38  Further, very few scientists concern themselves with 
second-order questions about their investigations.39  But Lloyd (1987) claims that certain 
features about the accumulation of data constrict later scientific thought.40  For example, 
since Lloyd considers the Greek achievement in axiomatic mathematics the locus 
classicus of the desire for certainty in face of the agonistic debate, those works of applied 
mathematics which post-date Euclid’s Elements Lloyd therefore contends are best seen as 
attempts to achieve the desired certainty and avoid debate.  Lloyd sees a lack of second-
order questions in the discussion of Archimedes referenced in 1.2.1.  But Lloyd’s claim 
that later Greek science is more constricted and thus less concerned with second-order 
questions privileges the observers’ investigation of second-order questions in science.  It 
is better for a historical study to follow the actors’ interests: the sheer proliferation of 
names of scientists in the Hellenistic and Imperial periods is indicative of interest in first-
                                                
37 The exception – Socrates – proves the rule that nearly all philosophers had scientific interests and many 
‘pure’ scientists (e.g. Archytas, Eudoxus) had philosophical interests. 
38 The rising philosophical tides of Epicureanism and Skepticism were notably hostile to scientific 
investigation, attacking respectively the second-order claims about the value inherent in nature and 
causality; see the papers collected in Barnes (1982).  Nonetheless there are important exceptions.  Older 
schools of philosophy still had sway; see von Staden (1997b) on Peripatetic influence in the early life 
sciences at Alexandria.  A few Epicureans and Stoics pursued science: among the Epicureans Philonides of 
Laodicea-on-the-sea was a geometer; among the Stoics Posidonius of Apamea was notable for his interests 
in physical geography and mathematics, for which see White (2007).  Nussbaum (1994) shows the 
importance of the cultural figure of the doctor to Hellenistic philosophy but does not engage specifically 
with medical authors. 
39 Galen almost proves the rule by being a notable exception.  The silence of the Hellenistic 
mathematicians about their metaphysical views on the ontological status of mathematical objects is 
notorious. 
40 Lloyd (1987: 104-05) explores Thomas Kuhn’s essential tension between tradition and innovation in 
science and maintains in general that there is a certain degree of dogmatism to post-classical science, 
including the Hellenistic period. He argues (1987: 288-99) that three phenomena – regression of the 
explanandum, suspension of data, and denial of data – illustrate the constricting effect of the accumulation 
of ideas in science.  
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order questions of science.41  Hellenistic and later scientists are concerned with specific 
issues and problems within their science, not the features of explanation as a whole: 
Hellenistic scientific debate has shifted primarily to first-order questions.  
Lloyd’s thesis further assumes the desire for certainty does not change between 
the Classical and Hellenistic periods.  Yet if we attempt to apply Lloyd’s thesis to the 
case studies of chapters 3 and 4, problems develop on this very issue of historical 
continuity.  As I have said, Lloyd’s argument about agonistic debate leads him to expect 
justification in Greek science, a sort of negotiation of the cultural anxiety about the 
validity of scientific reasoning in the face of social criticism.  But as I argue in the case 
studies, neither Archimedes nor the Empiricists are concerned purely with justification 
for its own sake.  In fact, both adopt methodological strategies which increase the 
uncertainty of the scientific result.  The Empiricist critique of the Rationalists’ causal 
chain is an application of skeptical arguments about the indicative sign; in its place the 
Empiricists employ the commemorative sign which is more associative than 
demonstrative.  Archimedes’ mechanical method depends on a series of undemonstrated 
arguments about the composition of infinite sets and their summation.   
Lloyd’s thesis about the development of scientific debate in ancient Greece shows 
that the direction of research remains broadly constant and thus leads us to expect a 
continued progression and development toward apodeictic demonstration and rational 
justification in the Hellenistic period.  But the methodology of both Archimedes and the 
Empiricists vitiates this thesis.  For Lloyd, therefore, these problematic elements must be 
read within the context of his thesis.  Lloyd reads Archimedes and the Empiricists as 
negotiating the anxiety of scientific culture about the increasing strictness of 
methodological formalism: that is, as the move toward justification intensifies, so too 
must methodological dogmatism within science.42  For Lloyd, Archimedes and the 
Empiricists reject the trend toward formalism for their own reasons.  Insofar as 
Archimedes and the Empiricists avoid the methodological emphasis on justification, 
                                                
41 See Keyser and Irby-Massie’s (2008: 4, 937-89) remarks on statistically significant stability in the 
number of scientists (judged by name alone) from 300 BCE-150 CE and the sudden decline afterwards.  
42 Lloyd (1987: 158-67) on the Empiricists (in a chapter titled “Dogmatism and Uncertainty”); Lloyd 
(1990: 89-90) on Archimedes, cited above. 
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Lloyd’s argument may be correct.  But my reading of these texts is a deeper challenge to 
his view: Lloyd’s argument cannot explain why Archimedes’ and the Empiricists’ 
rejection of methodological formalism takes the form it does. 
I argue that it is meaningful, when science is considered as a cultural 
phenomenon, that both Archimedes and the Empiricists ultimately reject new 
methodologies in a certain way.  If my reading is correct, Archimedes and the Empiricists 
embrace their particular methodologies and reject others in the name of the aim of their 
science.  If I am correct in arguing that both Archimedes and the Empiricists polemicize 
against their opponents about the aim of their science rather than certainty or justification, 
then there is a common direction to certain intellectual currents in the Hellenistic period 
across mathematics and medicine worthy of consideration as a cultural phenomenon. My 
claim that the aim and methodology of a science are distinct entities within Hellenistic 
science is a direct challenge to Lloyd’s thesis, in which the formalist methodology and 
the aim of the scientific practitioner are an intertwined consequence of success in 
agonistic debate: in Lloyd’s thesis the aim of science is the increasing movement toward 
research grounded in axiomatic justification.  Lloyd’s thesis cannot encompass a reading 
of Hellenistic scientific methodology which promotes some other aim at the expense of a 
formalist justificatory methodology. 
In sum, the critique I have offered of Lloyd is based on a disjunction between the 
Classical and Hellenistic periods: I see difference where Lloyd sees continuity in his 
presentation across historical periods.  I do not want to reject Lloyd’s insight that the 
agonistic polemic of Classical Greek science starts a trend toward apodeictic 
demonstration.  Rather, as we have seen, this argument is not sufficient to explain other 
features of Hellenistic science.  All the same, I wish to be more suggestive than 
dogmatic: the material we will be considering seems at odds with Lloyd’s thesis, but I do 
not want to claim that all Greek scientific material of the Hellenistic period is so.43  
Readers will note that I have concentrated exclusively on a narrow sense of scientist – 
formal mathematics and trained physicians – to the exclusion of scientific technicians – 
                                                
43 I show in chapter 2.1.1 that Herophilus’ pulse theory aims for greater certainty by its methodological 
investigation of physis. 
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root-cutters, midwives, builders.  I do not wish to place one group inside science and the 
other outside in the old way; Lloyd has done much to restore rightfully the members of 
this latter group to an integral place within the continuum of the ancient scientific 
community.44  All the same, I think it is clear that the authors we have been considering 
associate intellectually with other scientific actors in a narrow sense of scientist – if not 
exclusively actors of their own science – and I believe it is worthwhile to follow the 
actors’ interests. 
Therefore, let us say that there is a group of Hellenistic scientific authors whose 
scientific traditionalism does not stem from the pursuit of certainty of foundational 
issues.  As I argue in chapter 4, the Empiricists are as equally concerned with the 
physician’s cultural role of healer as with methodological epistemology. And as I argue 
in chapter 3, Archimedes’ Ephodos intends to expand the domain of geometricians while 
reinforcing the priority of Euclidean deductive structures.  What these two case studies 
seem to have in common is an interest in results: Archimedes with results within 
geometry and the Empiricists with results within healing medicine.  To (re)state a general 
principle – made most famous by Thomas Kuhn – results in science are not necessarily in 
conflict with scientific traditionalism.   
1.2.3 A Social Explanans 
Now the historical problem we confront comes more sharply into focus.  For 
several consequences follow once the distinction between aim and methodology in 
science is in place.  First, we need to separate historical explanantia for the aim of the 
science and for its justificatory methodology.  Lloyd has identified the explanans for the 
formalist methodology; we must identify the explanans for the cultural aim of a 
Hellenistic science.  The type of explanans we are looking for must explain not only the 
rhetoric but the shape of the research of Hellenistic scientists. 
 Consider first that Lloyd’s thesis is broadly social: the explanans for the ethos of 
scientific debate and polemic is the democratic ideology of Classical Greek society.  If 
we remove the democratic ideological element from Lloyd’s explanans, two possibilities 
                                                
44 Lloyd (1983) is a good example. 
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seem to remain: first, that the explanans of the debate of Hellenistic science is in fact 
political, but not necessarily democratic; or two, that the explanans of the debate of 
Hellenistic science is not political, but still social.  We must remember that we are 
looking for an explanans that is explanatory of the research positions of Hellenistic 
scientists. 
 I am skeptical that there is a successful reading showing that the explanans of the 
aim of Hellenistic scientists is operative on a political plane.  Certainly there is much 
evidence of political patronage of science during the Hellenistic period: monarchs 
supported Herophilus and Erasistratus materially in their research; Archimedes too may 
have had direct support from his patron.  Hellenistic monarchs gave materials, financial 
support, and cultural opportunities for research.45  At least a priori a political explanans 
would seem to allow a cultural space for investigations of a certain kind without 
                                                
 
45 Scholarship on science and patronage in Greco-Roman antiquity has focused on the Imperial period and 
centers around the figures of Galen in medicine (see Mattern (1999), Nutton (1979, 2004: 216-29), Hero in 
technology (see Cuomo (2002, 2007), Tybjerg (2005)), and Ptolemy in astrology (see Barton (1994a, 
1994b)).  The issue of patronage in the Imperial period is of course tied to the Roman cultural practice of 
patronage in general, not only around the figure of the emperor.  In contrast to the Imperial period, 
patronage in the Hellenistic period seems to have centered on the Hellenistic courts; see Herman (1997).   
The question of patronage in Hellenistic science has interested only a few scholars who, strikingly, 
are general historians rather than historians of science.  Fraser (1972: 1.305-479) compiles an enormous 
amount of material relating to Ptolemaic Alexandria but tries to situate all types of knowledge production –
medicine, mathematics, engineering, literature, philology – within the institutional context of the Museion.  
Green (1993: 453-96) locates scientific investigation thoroughly in the attitude of ivory-tower intellectual 
theoria, contrasted with banausic trades; in his view science proper was limited, not motivated, by 
Hellenistic monarchic authoritarianism.  Against Fraser, Geus (2002: 26-30) argues that Eratosthenes of 
Cyrene, polymath in science and literature, was called to Alexandria as librarian in recognition of his 
poetry, implying that the Ptolemies did not seek to institutionalize science in the Museum.  In medicine in 
particular von Staden (1989: 1-31, 35-50) argues that Herophilus was never a member of the Museion and 
cautions (1996: 106.n76) that patronage may take many forms, not only institutional support.  
Future consideration of Hellenistic science within a court environment might start from the 
impetus of Biagioli’s (1993) Galileo, Courtier: this path-breaking work argues for a thick social description 
of a court environment that considers in tandem political courtiers, poets, and scientists.  Biagioli argues 
that the cultural practices of politics, art, and science at court can be understood within an anthropology of 
gift exchange; scientific knowledge thereby becomes a cultural product honoring the patron in exchange for 
higher social status and financial support for the scientist.  Intellectual polemic between scientists is thus 
read in the context of social jousts and exchanges between scientists’ patrons.  Since Netz (2009a) has 
shown that Hellenistic mathematics participates in the literary aesthetics of Hellenistic court poetry, it is 
therefore conceivable that Hellenistic science (not just scientists) participates in the social life at the courts 
of Hellenistic monarchs.  Important among the numerous studies of the place of Hellenistic poetry at court 
are Wilamowitz (1924), Griffiths (1979), Cameron (1995), and Stephens (2003). 
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predeterming the outcome of those investigations.  And I would not want to discourage 
an investigation along these lines: there is much serious historical scholarship to be done 
here.46  Wickkiser (2008), a recent classics monograph, argues that the sudden spread of 
the healing medicine of Asclepius in the late 5th BCE century is directly correlated with 
Athenian imperial policy during the Peloponnesian War;47 and Shapin and Schaffer 
(1985), one of the most famous case studies in the discipline of the history of science, is 
dedicated to the idea that the same social forces motivate both the politics and science of 
a period.  But can political patronage explain the scientific positions that scientists take? 
For science of the Hellenistic period I consider a social explanans more promising and 
will pursue it for the rest of this dissertation.  
 Therefore I maintain that the explanans of the debate between Hellenistic 
scientists is operative on a fundamentally social level.  The social group I appeal to will 
be, variously, those interested in science or scientific practitioners.  (I mean that the first 
group – those interested in science and natural phenomena – will include scientific 
technicians, e.g. nurses, engineers, philosophers, and will be a larger group than the 
second, more narrowly defined as practicing scientists.)  I noted above that the material I 
am considering was more isolated in Hellenistic culture: the audience tended more 
                                                
46 Another important contextualization largely unexplored in scholarship on Hellenistic science is the 
relationship of science to its political context (beyond the motivation of patronage; see footnote 45), 
namely the possible discourses of imperialism and colonialism.  Scholars are of course divided on attempts 
to model scholarship on Hellenistic literature and history on studies of modern European colonialism; here 
most work in the discipline of Classics has focused on Ptolemaic Egypt.  For important scholarship on 
imperialism and colonialization dealing with textual sources in Hellenistic literature and history see 
Stephens (2003) and Manning (2010) for positive assessments and Bagnall (1997) for a negative 
assessment.  For scholarship in the history of science see Flemming (2003) for a positive assessment 
reading Hellenistic medicine in the context of imperialist projects of knowledge; see von Staden (1989: 1-
31) for a negative assessment of Egyptian influences on Greek medicine in Ptolemaic Alexandria, a claim 
further supported by Lang’s (2004) investigation of medicine in the Egyptian chora (an interpretatio 
graeca for science), the lack of royal institutional support for Alexandrian medicine apart from vivisection, 
and the consequent implication that Greek medicine was not part of a top-down hegemonic project of 
knowledge.  I thank Professor Jennifer Gates-Foster for providing bibliographic help and discussing these 
issues with me at length. 
47 See especially Wickkiser (2008: 90-105, 107). 
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toward practicing scientists than lay people.  These are elite texts, written by elites and 
for an elite audience.48 
The direction of authorial moves is also indicative of a certain composition of 
audience.  I will not be able to show in the coming readings of the works of Herophilus’ 
pulse theory, Archimedes’ Ephodos, and the fragments of the Empiricists that doctors and 
mathematicians attempted to reach out to sciences beyond their own.  Herophilus’ 
appropriation of musical theories, Archimedes’ use of mechanical ideas, and the 
Empiricists’ appropriation of contemporary skepticism were not overtures meant to bring 
musicians, mechanics, and philosophers into discourse with doctors and mathematicians.  
Instead, the appropriated theory was turned inward, back toward the narrow group of 
practicing doctors and mathematicians.  So when we talk of scientific practitioners, we 
mean narrowly ‘doctors conversing with doctors’ and ‘mathematicians conversing with 
mathematicians’.  Each science becomes its own social network and group.  Thus, to 
speak of the social level at which the explanans of the debate in Hellenistic science 
operates is to speak of the debate within the community of a particular science. 
We see the idea of a domain developing.  For each science – mathematics, 
medicine, geography – there is a group of scientists studying it.  The science is a well-
defined cultural practice in a particular area of knowledge production, a domain or field.  
                                                
48 To put it in a more Foucauldian theoretical frame (I mean the postmodern Foucault of Discipline and 
Punishment and History of Sexuality), we struggle to find a nexus of power and knowledge in the scientific 
material of the post-Classical world.  Broader culture is little impacted by the categories of scientists. In 
mathematics, Netz (2002) suggests that need to earn a living prohibited all but the wealthy from attempting 
to learn mathematics, much less become practicing mathematicians.  For the gap between those with 
minimal numeracy and the theoretical mathematics represented in our extant texts see Asper (2009).  In 
medicine, Flemming has argued in a series of articles (2003, 2007, 2009) that Hellenistic and Imperial 
period medicine can be read as part of the discourse of empire.  These are top-down models, imposing on 
medical texts a structure either of colonializing successor kingdoms (2003) or of the Rome/periphery 
dichotomy of the Imperial period (2007, 2009).  To my mind, Flemming’s articles are unconvincing 
attempts to find a nexus of power and knowledge in scientific texts of the Hellenistic period; at best they 
are a contextualization of cultural categories on science, not of scientific categories on culture that 
Foucault’s thesis requires.  (It ought to be remembered that Foucault was particularly dependent on 
‘technologies’ as an expression of power.  In a series of articles Forman (2007, 2010) has forcefully 
maintained that the primacy of technology over theoretical science is a postmodern ideology.)  The failure 
underscores my larger point that broader culture in the Hellenistic period was for the most part disinterested 
in science.  (I would not endorse the view of Green (1993: 453-96) that scientists were equally disinterested 
in society.)  Future scholarship to find a bottom-up approach to the nexus of power and knowledge might 
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As the definition of a domain becomes increasingly well-defined, with its own 
methodology and problems, it creates specialization and isolation for its cultural 
practitioners.  There is a cultural symmetry to the natural elements studied and those 
studying them.  Thus, to speak of Herophilus, Archimedes, and the Empiricists as 
engaging in “isolated debates” is to describe simultaneously the scientific question and 
scientific community as culturally “isolated”.49 
To speak of domains and scientific communities is perhaps to speak analogously 
to Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigms.  Famously, Kuhn (1996, first ed. 1962) argued 
that there are two stages in the development of science: normal science and revolutionary 
science.  This study’s interest is Kuhn’s normal science.  According to Kuhn, during 
normal science scientists operate with a paradigm example of how to conduct a study 
within their field.50  Doing science is to follow the example of a solved problem, the 
paradigmatic case.  Kuhn uses paradigm in two senses: (1) the example of puzzle-solving 
that scientists operate with in their daily investigations, and (2) the metaphysical 
commitment that accompanies the puzzle-solving exemplar.51  Now Netz (1999b) has 
criticized the discussion that followed Kuhn’s (2) sense of paradigm:  
[T]his is a misguided debate: it starts from the least useful sense of ‘paradigm’ (as 
metaphysical assumptions) – least useful because much too propositional. To 
explain: Kuhn has much of interest to say about normal science, about the way in 
which a scientific community is united by a set of practices. But what Kuhn failed 
                                                
utilize the best scientific texts for a project to find disciplinary technologies, namely mechanical treatises 
and therapeutic texts, which are a small part of the extant scientific corpus from these periods. 
49 Further prosopography of Greco-Roman scientists would lend credence to my schematization.  The 
prosopographical tables of Greco-Roman scientists in Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 991-1020) are a 
massive collection of data in a single place.  There is not as much overlap between disciplines as accounts 
usually imply.  In a smaller data sample of doctors from the third century BCE listed in Appendices C and 
D only five physicians – Erasistratus of Ceos (Erasistratean, App. C footnote 62), Andreas of Carystus 
(Herophilean, App. C footnote 66), Neileus (App. D no. 21), Nymphodorus (App. D no. 33), and Perigenes 
(App. D no. 42) – out of eighty-three have interests in non-traditional domains of medicine (that is, outside 
of pharmacology), a ratio of 1:16.  That the final four apart from Erasistratus flourished around 240-210 
BCE and worked on the intersection of medicine and mechanics is suggestive of a strong cultural 
explanation.  For Erasistratus’ mechanical interests, see von Staden (1997b); for Andreas’ mechanical 
interests, see von Staden (1998). 
50 See especially Kuhn (1996: 10-91), the account of normal science. 
51 Kuhn (1996: 174-191) and Barnes, Bloor, Henry (1996: 101-105). 
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to articulate is that practices are just that – practices.  They need not be, in 
general, statements in which scientists (implicitly or explicitly) believe...52 
 
Netz further argues that the debate about metaphysical assumptions obscures the role that 
practices have in uniting a scientific community and that the goal of a historical study of 
science should be to illuminate those practices of normal science.  For Netz’s The 
Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics this takes the form of the shared cognitive 
process of deduction in Greek mathematics.  The present work follows Netz’s suggestion 
that studies in the history of science should aim to articulate the practices uniting ‘normal 
science’.  I am therefore concerned with questions about the composition of groups and 
the common practices that unite those groups.   
1.3 LITERARY TOOLS 
1.3.1 Systems of Allusivity and Reference 
One of the main areas this dissertation will focus on is the appropriation of the 
sciences of the Hellenistic period.  This is problem in a type of intellectual influence – 
engagement of sources, of theories, of results.  Several theoretical models may help in 
this area: Quellenforschung, allusion, intertext.  Although these models are mostly from 
the provenance of literary studies, there is no reason why they should be not applied to 
questions of intellectual influence.  I conceive of particular Hellenistic scientists as 
creative thinkers in treating problems in their sciences who employ theories or results of a 
different science for their own ends and purposes; we will therefore be concerned with a 
dynamics of appropriation of the historical actors, to borrow from Hinds’s (1998) title.53  
The theoretical way in which this study will talk of a dynamics of appropriation will be as 
intertext.   
Intertextuality is, broadly speaking, the referential employment of cited authority 
outside of the immediate context.  Kristeva (1980) invented the concept of intertextuality 
and defined it as an ahistorical phenomenon: 
                                                
52 Netz (1999b: 2). 
53 Hinds (1998), Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry. 
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[A]ny text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and 
transformation of another.  The notion of intertextuality replaces that of 
intersubjectivity, and poetic language is read as at least double.54 
 
For Kristeva, these phenomena of the absorption of one text into another may be 
unrecognizable to an author or a reader: they are a precondition of a text qua text.55  
Intertextuality in Kristeva’s formulation has no particular literary function; it is simply a 
condition of a text’s existence. 
 Since Kristeva’s original formulation, intertextuality has become one of the most 
important tools in Classics for determining the relationship of a text to its predecessors.56  
Unlike Kristeva’s ahistorical formulation of intertextuality, classicists have extensively 
debated whether the referencing of another work is an act of the author or of the reader.  
Since all texts that can be referenced as intertexts must be chronologically prior to some 
vantage point from which the act of reference originates, the scholarly debate is whether 
the historical point of view on predecessor texts emanates from the author or reader 
(where we imagine a continuum of historical readers beginning from the author’s 
contemporaries, to several generations later in antiquity, to Byzantine and Renaissance 
readers, and so on to twenty-first century readers).57  In accordance with the 
anthropological distinction between actors’ and observers’ categories enunciated in 1.1, 
this study will treat intertextuality sometimes as the act of the ancient scientific author 
and sometimes as the act of the reader, conceived of as the modern historian.  I will mark 
the ancient scientific author’s ability to allude to predecessor texts as intertextualityA 
(actors’ category); I will mark the ability of the reader figured as the modern historian to 
collate and compare predecessor texts as intertextualityR (observers’ category).  This 
methodological stance reinscribes authorial intent within anthropological analysis, 
                                                
54 Kristeva (1980: 66). 
55 See Edmund’s (2001: 8-14) discussion of Kristeva’s work.  
56 For up-to-date guides to bibliography and further references see Levene (2010: 82-84) and Polleichtner 
(2010). 
57 For studies in Classics concerned with intertextuality as an act of the author see chiefly Thomas (1986); 
for intertexuality as an act of the reader see Edmunds (2001). 
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namely the actor’s intention as an interpretation of the ethnographic observer; 
correspondingly, the anthropological informant this study interrogates is the ancient text. 
Both intertextualityA, the category of authorial intent, and intertextualityR, the category of 
reader-response, are useful theoretical tools for the study of cross-scientific appropriation.  
IntertextualityA and intertextualityR will occur in chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5. 
I discuss intertextualityR first.  IntertextualityR is the reader’s experience of the 
text’s allusive references to other works; the reader constructs these allusive references 
from her knowledge of other texts with what she perceives to be prompts from the text at 
hand.  Since the reader’s experience of the text’s perceived allusions may or may not 
correspond to the author’s allusive intent, authorial intent is not the category 
intertextualityR specifies.  Instead intertextualityR specifies a unique reader-response to 
phenomena in the text.  The type of reader this study envisions is the modern historian, a 
reader trained in historical knowledge about the Hellenistic world and the history of 
science.  While some individual historians are more broadly knowledgeable about social 
history or literary history or other aspects of historical phenomena, enough similarities 
between unique readers exist to classify the modern historian’s experience of reading 
Hellenistic scientific texts as the act of single typologized reader. 
IntertextualityR is this typologized reader’s strategy of arranging the similarities 
and resonances between different historical texts.  The word ‘historical’ guides the 
conceptual application of intertextualityR.  Consider, for example, several scientific texts 
from the same ancient author which lack precise chronological order but treat a similar 
topic.  (We will encounter this problem with both Herophilus in chapter 2 and 
Archimedes in chapter 3.)  Surely the ancient author knew that he wrote text A before 
text B; he cannot therefore have possibly referred to text B in text A.   But if the modern 
historian lacks dated evidence, she will not know whether text A precedes text B or vice 
versa.  She may read text A and perceive an allusive reference to text B; she may 
therefore think that text B precedes text A chronologically.  Yet our well-trained historian 
knows that to argue for a chronological sequence based on her perceptions alone is an 
unconvincing argument.  She cannot solve the problem of chronological sequence 
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between texts; therefore she suspends the issue of chronological priority between text A 
and B.  And now, since she knows that both text A and text B precede her (although she 
claims not to know whether text A precedes text B or vice versa), she can treat both texts 
as possible intertexts of each other from her historical vantage point as a reader.  
Historically of course her argument is false; yet by treating text A and B as possible 
intertexts for each other she gains how the texts allude to each other, that is, she gains 
how text A and B are similar.58  IntertextualityR is therefore a historiographical strategy 
of perceiving similarities between different scientific texts at the expense of establishing 
a chronology between them.  
I now discuss intertextualityA.  Hinds (1998) presents an influential version of 
intertextualityA focused on the author’s referencing of other texts.  According to Hinds 
intertextualityA runs the gamut from a conscious referral by the author of the audience to 
another text or work, to the author’s unconscious referencing of familiar literary tropes.  
In its most narrow form intertextualityA is a move of authorial intent: we may speak of a 
                                                
58 I am concerned with a typologized reader’s experience of past texts to which they profitably apply 
intertexts impossible for the author.  Consider Edmunds’ (2001: xiv-xv) analysis of Pearcy’s BMCR 
review: “A reading of the Aeneid at the end of the twentieth century will inevitably find meanings that 
Vergil’s first readers would not have found.  Lee T. Pearcy provides a good approach in a review of 
Catharine Edward’s Writing Rome: Textual Approaches to the City: ‘At his village on what will become 
the site of Rome, the Arcadian chief Evander names for Aeneas places that do not yet exist, in a city not yet 
founded (Aen. 8.347-48) 
hinc ad Tarpeiam sedem et Capitolia ducit,  
aurea nunc, olim silvestribus horrida dumis. 
Augustan present and imagined Augustan past coincide; furthermore, as James Zetzel suggested in his 1993 
Jackson Knight Memorial Lecture, olim may look ahead to an imagined Augustan future, when the center 
of Rome will once again be overgrown with wild vegetation, like the monuments of Janus and Saturn 
which Evander points out.  Rome is eternal, and eternally in ruins.  Yet is nearly impossible for us to read 
the past, present, and future of Rome and its ruins simply through Augustan eyes, even when we encounter 
them in Augustan literature.  A dozen lines later, Evander takes Aeneas onto the Palatine, and they gaze 
over the pastoral scene: passimque armenta videbant / Romanoque foro et lautis mugire Carinis (Aen. 
8.360-61).  For anyone who has seen or read early modern depictions of the Campo Vaccino, these lines 
have a penumbra of transhistorical reference that they could not have had for Vergil or his Augustan 
readers and hearer.  There is nothing we can do to silence this additional resonance.  Time has added it to 
our Vergil, transforming him in the process – and is it possible that a Prianesi print or a remark in Gibbon 
predisposed Zetzel to call our attention to the multiple valences of olim, and predisposes us to accept his 
suggestion?’ Pearcy’s testimony to the resonances of reading appears here not in some argument for a 
reader-response approach to literature but as a commonsense observation, elegantly stated, on the 
experience of a sophisticated reader.”  Edmund’s analysis of Pearcy’s review shows that the reader gains 
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game, whose rules the author defines, in which the author makes moves, all to direct the 
reader’s attention to an intended meaning by way of comparison.  Narrow 
intertextualityA, traditionally called allusion, is a game of appropriating another’s work 
for one’s own meaning.  The author directs his reader to another text by a correspondence 
of diction and situational context between his own work and the other text.  In its broader 
form, the act of reference to another text may not be consciously in the author’s mind and 
yet recognizable to a reader.  At some point the act of referral ceases to be an act of the 
author and becomes an act of an intelligent reader who generates new meaning other than 
the author’s intent.  
While Hinds concerned himself almost exclusively with Latin poetry, recent 
important treatments of prose intertextualityA come from Latin historiography.  Levene 
(2010) has argued that the intertextual references in historical writing, for instance, are 
constrained by the considerations of the genre within which historical authors are writing: 
history presupposes “a representation of real events”.59 
Events in real life may show striking resemblances to other historical events, and 
people in real life may deliberately choose to model their behaviour or public 
image on earlier figures.  Both can be true whether or not those resemblances 
happen to be recognized by the historians describing them.  Moreover, even if the 
historian wishes to draw attention to parallels, that can be done in different ways.  
It can appear in the form of a direct citation of the parallel without reference to 
any single source, for example, or the description of one set of events may be 
reworked in order to highlight features specifically associated with the other set—
though again without any single source.  In addition, many historians draw much 
of their data closely from relatively small numbers of source texts, and these may 
or may not have alluded to the resemblances between different past events and 
their representations in still earlier writers.60 
 
Levene’s argument is that historians write self-consciously within a tradition of 
identifiable sources and patterns which are constrained on the one hand by the realia of 
the events to which they refer and on the other hand by the small number of sources 
                                                
something that the author did not intend.  And as long as we do not confuse reader-response with authorial 
intent, there are historiographical uses to which scientific historians can apply reader-response intertexts. 
59 Levene (2010: 85). 
60 Levene (2010: 85). 
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available to the (later) historian and his readers.  Reference to things outside the 
immediate historical text is particularly limited; that is, the reader does not have to work 
hard to see the “mosaic of quotations” from which the text is assembled. 
 Levene’s argument is, to some extent, also applicable to Greek prose of 
Hellenistic period science.  Certainly Hellenistic period science is constrained by the 
realia to which words refer.  Medical texts refer to anatomical parts such as arteries and 
the heart and to physiological processes such as dilation and contraction of the arteries 
(although whether these named physiological processes are isomorphic to contemporary 
Western biomedical physiological processes is sometimes nebulous).  Mathematical texts 
too refer to objects drawn on the papyrus page, such as the triangle ΑΒΓ of Euclid 
Elements 1.1.  There is active scholarly debate about the extent to which mathematical 
objects were mental or physical objects for Greek mathematicians61 but it is clear at least 
that Greek mathematical authors expected their audience to refer vocabulary for 
mathematical objects to the diagrams present on the page. 
Furthermore, Hellenistic scientists often write self-consciously within the 
tradition of their science.  Archimedes in the Ephodos will explicitly refer to 
mathematical results proven elsewhere, both by himself in another named work and in an 
elementary treatise on conics in common circulation; Hellenistic physicians commented 
on Hippocrates’ works and cited other physicians’ drug recipes in pharmacopia.  These 
are citations of works within the tradition of a particular science, that is, within the 
expected knowledge and reading of the mathematical or medical audience, respectively.  
In these instances, authors of a scientific domain write to an audience of the same 
domain. 
On the other hand, Levene’s argument does not fit other aspects of Hellenistic 
scientific prose; in particular, the phenomena of appropriation from one science into 
another does not commit an individual science to be constrained by its tradition.  As we 
will see in chapter 2.2.1, Herophilus adopts a theory of musical rhythm into his analysis 
of pulse rhythms.  Music is not part of the tradition of medicine; indeed, only those 
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doctors already of sufficiently high class would have been educated in theoretical 
µουσική “music” as part of a liberal elite education before training to become physicians.  
The adaption of one science into another is thus a problem for audience expectation in 
both literary and cognitive terms.  How successful a scientist’s appropriation of material 
outside of his tradition is depends therefore on his audience’s recognition of the new 
material and, correspondingly, his ability to mark the new material and integrate it into 
the old.   
Nonetheless, because of the narrowness of training in individual sciences in 
antiquity, it is not apparent that a general audience would understand the appropriation as 
science; rather, perhaps, a general audience would receive the appropriation as a display 
of spectacle, the social performance of science.  An ancient audience that understands 
appropriation as science is a narrow audience, a scientific elite educated in multiple 
sciences and capable of appreciating direct and perhaps indirect allusions to other 
scientific traditions.  Therefore, as I suggested above in 1.2.3, phenomena of 
appropriation in science are aimed at a very high level of historical actors, elite scientists 
in the narrow sense. 
1.3.2 Technical Terminology 
One aspect of an analysis of appropriation is as a social analysis, as will be shown 
below in 1.4; the other aspect of the analysis of appropriation is as a literary 
phenomenon, as has been argued.  How might an appropriating scientist mark new 
scientific material within his own domain?  Since theories of intertextualityA depend on 
notions of diction and situational context, it is appropriate to consider dictional content 
and situational context specific to science.   
The language of science and its domains is effectively a technical language.  The 
question of technical language in medical Latin is treated well by Langslow (2000), 
whose results are generalizable to discussions of ‘technical language’ in other sciences of 
Greco-Roman antiquity.62  Langslow notes that technical language is effectively a variety 
                                                
61 See the discussion of ‘seeing-as’ in mathematical imagination in chapter 3.2.3. 
62 His most important remarks are Langslow (2000: 1-28) with reference to further literature. 
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of a language, a sociolect, whose community of speakers/writers is also a speaker/writer 
of at least one other sociolect (determined by sex, age, dialect, class, etc.) both of which 
may be considered subsets of standard language.  To speak of technical language is to 
include deliberately both the grammar and lexicon of the sociolect.  The grammar of a 
technical language is marked by nominalizations, the frequent use of nouns, and the 
emphatic preference of nouns in conjunction with weak, copulative verbs.63  Since the 
grammar of technical languages emphasizes nouns, it is therefore not surprising that the 
foremost feature of technical languages should be their lexicons.   
Discussion of technical language thus becomes a discussion about technical 
terminology. 
Technical terms – and their collectivity, terminology – are referring expressions 
which label the objects of a classification within the relevant techne. They are not 
in themselves abnormally precise expressions, but the items that they label are 
more precisely defined and classified than is usual in everyday language. The 
language supplies not the classification but merely the nomenclature for the things 
classified.  The elements of this nomenclature are technical terms and their sum is 
the technical terminology.64 
 
Technical terminology is composed of individual lexemes, the terms, and the hierarchical 
structure to which they belong, the classification.  The specificity of technical 
terminology, Genauigkeit, is as much a product of its situational context (the 
classification, in Langslow’s terminology) as it is a property of the term.  Langslow 
argues that the ideal technical language “consist[s] of a set of referring expressions, each 
occurring once only, each labeling an item or a class of items that has a well-defined 
place within a classification of the set of objects of study of the technical discipline”.65 
On this ideal account polysemy of a single lexeme is avoided. The ideal technical 
language would be easy to identify and catalogue because each lexeme would be used 
only once and employed within a systematic class which could lay bare the semantic 
relationships between terms.  Yet as a matter of fact Langslow finds that medical Latin at 
                                                
63 Langslow (2000: 23-24).   
64 Langslow (2000: 7). 
65 Langslow (2000: 9). 
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least is polysemous, with a single word often referring to separate items within a class or 
to items within different classes.66 
 Due to the polysemy of ancient technical language we are forced to consider other 
criteria which identify technical terminology.  Langslow argues that two criteria for 
deciding what constitutes technical terms are Fachbezogenheit, “the extent to which a 
word is related to a particular specialist or technical discipline,” and Normung, “the 
extent to which a word is normalized or standardized in its usage”.67  With 
Fachbezogenheit we again see the need for the idea of a domain or field: technical terms 
become fachbezogen when there are speakers of that domain and terms related to that 
domain.  With Normung we see again the implicit idea of a domain: the frequency of the 
term’s use and its consistency in meaning are the means to effect key concepts of the 
domain; the less frequently a term is used and the less consistent its meaning, Langslow’s 
‘referring expressions’, the further we have moved from the central focus of the domain. 
In a study of a scientist’s appropriation of theories and terms from one scientific 
domain to another, it is therefore imperative to consider Langslow’s criteria to determine 
the extent of appropriation from one domain to another.  First we must ask: how 
standardized is the meaning of the term within its original domain, its Normung?  Second, 
to what degree is this term related to a particular domain, its Fachbezogenheit?  When a 
term, e.g. ῥυθµός, is used by musicians, its meaning depends on a well-defined sense of 
understanding (Normung) among musicians that the term refers to a series of musical 
beats in sequence (its contextual Fachbezogenheit).  Thus the specificity and 
contextualization of a technical term refers both to a specific object and the place of that 
object within a larger language system, and finally, from a larger language system as a 
sociolect to the broader community of Greek speakers.  The technical term is therefore a 
marker of the linguistic phenomena of a particular sociolect as well as a marker of the 
social group of speakers of that sociolect, social phenomena.  Effectively, technical terms 
can serve as guides to social groups. 
                                                
66 Langslow (2000: 11-12). 
67 Langslow (2000: 13). 
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My argument then is that the most important literary feature that an appropriating 
scientist considers in the appropriated technical term is Langslow’s criterion of Normung, 
the standardized specificity of the term.  Suppose, for example, that the technical term of 
one social group, e.g. ῥυθµός, is used within a different sociolect of the same language.  
The speaker transfers the specific reference of the term to a different contextual setting, 
preserving the Normung but changing the Fachbezogenheit.  A medical author using 
ῥυθµός might apply the specificity of meaning (“beats in sequence”) within a different 
contextual structure to produce a different sense of Fachbezogenheit: the doctor 
Herophilus of Chalcedon uses ῥυθµός in reference to the beats of the artery in sequence, 
thus defining pulse rhythm.  Whether this new meaning will survive and become 
established within its new context depends on the community’s reception of the 
appropriating scientist’s theories in which the appropriated term exists.  If the community 
accepts it, the technical term may gain a new Fachbezogenheit. 
We will find that there is a cluster of terms drawn from one science which the 
appropriating scientist will apply to his own science.  In the case of Herophilus in chapter 
2, the vocabulary of musical rhythm and proportionality will be central to Herophilus’ 
new object of arterial pulsation.  In the case of Archimedes’ Ephodos in chapter 3, the 
vocabulary of balance and weight will be central to Archimedes’ mechanical way of 
seeing. 
1.4 SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND THE SEMIOTIC TURN 
History of science studies take inspiration from two different and sometimes 
competing sets of academic traditions, philosophy of science and sociology of science.68  
G.E.R. Lloyd’s work has been extensively informed by philosophy of science disputes.  
Most famous in philosophy of science are the works of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre 
Lakatos, Hilary Putnam, and Paul Feyerabend.  Except for Kuhn and Feyerabend, these 
                                                
68 It seems that philosophy of science is well-developed in English-language scholarship whereas sociology 
of science is better established in French and German scholarship.  Rheinberger (2010) is a helpful 
summary of the twentieth-century tradition of continental European scholarship in the history and 
sociology of science.  See Daston (2009) for a summary of recently divergent trends between sociology of 
science and history of science in English language scholarship. 
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philosophers emphasize the theoretical aspects of science: its methodology, structure, and 
overarching goals.69  The works of Kuhn and Feyerabend, on the other hand, emphasize 
the practice of scientists.  While not entirely appropriating the work of Kuhn and 
Feyerabend, many sociologists of science drew inspiration from them.  Timothy Lenoir 
(1998) for instance has written: 
If there are any “origins” of the recent turn [to semiotics], I would trace them to 
Paul Feyerabend’s seminal work, Against Method. Those of us who were moved 
by Feyerabend read his work as an injunction to move away from theory-
dominated accounts of knowledge production in science and toward an account 
sensitive to actual scientific practice, in which theory was simply one of the many 
important games in town, with experimenters and crafters of instruments and 
techniques being crucial but silenced laborers in the production of knowledge. 
The rehabilitation of skill and craft knowledge (even in the domains of theory and 
mathematical and computational practice), concerns about tacit knowledge and 
unarticulable skill, experimenter’s regress, interpretative flexibility, and 
negotiated close of debate all contributed to newer accounts of science as a 
disunified, heterogeneous congeries of activities.70  
 
Sociologists of science embraced Feyerabend’s advocacy of the proliferation of 
perspectives on the practice of science.  If sociology of science has a goal, it is to 
describe the practice of science in all its forms without regard for scientists’ own 
theoretical claims for their practices. 
One of the leading practitioners of a semiotics study of science is the sociologist 
Bruno Latour.  His work has been very influential in contemporary science studies 
scholarship but has been little appropriated by historians of ancient Greco-Roman 
science.71  On the one hand, the reason is easy to see.  Latour is concerned with modern 
science and technology, whose hybridized combination he calls ‘technoscience’.72  His 
                                                
69 The famous philosophers listed were physicists or interested in physics and all come from the period in 
philosophy of science when one philosophized about ‘science’ as a whole, instead of individual sciences.  
More recent philosophy of science literature considers individual sciences and has paid more attention to 
the biological sciences, instead of solely the physical sciences. 
70 Lenoir (1998: 2). 
71 Biagioli (1999) is a helpful selection of important literature in the discipline of science studies. 
72 Latour (1987: 29) claims to have invented the term ‘technoscience’ but Forman (2007: 75.n22) shows 
that it was already widespread in continental scholarship.  The word ‘technoscience’ has become a primary 
ideological marker of a postmodern orientation toward scientific history; see Forman (2010: 169.n20) with 
further reference to Barnes (2005).  That science has always been ‘technoscientific’ (i.e. that the study of 
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writings are full of sociological analyses of machines and ethnomethodologies of 
laboratories.  Analyses of computer debuggings, of geographical strata displays, of the 
instrumentation of biochemical laboratories would prima facie seem little applicable to 
science in the Greco-Roman world.  But Latour offers many analyses good to think with 
for historians of pre-modern science too.  He describes sociologically how knowledge 
emerges and circulates in science, the very problem we wish to address in a study of 
cross-field scientific activity in the Hellenistic period. 
Latour’s major work, Science in Action (1987), pursued the idea of science as 
semiotics.  In Science in Action Latour is a certain type of constructivist about science.  
He is both a realist and a relativist because he believes that it is his sociological duty to 
follow scientists in action: scientists themselves are relativists when engaged in a 
controversy about the construction of a fact; scientists themselves become realists after 
accepting a fact.  The constructed fact Latour calls a black box. “The word black box is 
used by cyberneticians whenever a piece of machinery or a set of commands is too 
complex.  In its place they draw a little box about which they need to know nothing but 
its input and output.”73  (Latour writes “black box” as two words but I will hereafter refer 
to Latour’s concept as the single world “blackbox.”)  When a blackbox is constructed and 
thus assumed as part of established science, scientists act as realists about the blackboxed 
fact.  When a blackbox is deconstructed in an attempt to rewrite established science, 
scientists act as relativists and claim that the ‘fact’ is not established. 
The blackbox is in effect a sociological semiotic device, whose working are 
consistent but irrelevant, which is evaluated solely on its in-going sign and out-going 
sign.  The in-going sign is transformed into an ontologically stable output, the “fact”.  If 
we take the in-going signs to be signs of Nature, the object of science, the blackbox 
becomes the liminal point between scientific relativism and realism.  In Latourian 
                                                
nature has always been intermediated variously by machines and other artificial human technology) is an 
ideological claim of Latour (1993), who has largely framed the debate of historical investigations into 
technology.  While I do not know of any use of the term ‘technoscience’ by a historian of science in 
classical antiquity, recent scholarship in Classics has undermined the traditional ontological distinction 
between physis and techne in line with broader trends in history of science and technology studies: see 
Schiefsky (2007), Cuomo (2007), and Berryman (2009); von Staden (2007) is an exception to this trend. 
73 Latour (1987: 2-3). 
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dualism the ontology of the Nature has moved from the relativist ingoing sign – Nature is 
the consequence of the blackboxed fact – to a realist outgoing sign – Nature is the cause 
of the blackboxed fact.74  Therefore, Latour argues, we can never take Nature to be the 
explanans for the development of a scientific fact.  Science-in-the-making is always 
epistemologically under-determined.75  By scientists’ own logic, science-in-the-making is 
a relativist affair. 
The blackboxed fact becomes incorporated into a network of associations which 
is used to tie or associate the blackboxed fact into an older group of blackboxed facts.  
For example, a blackboxed claim about electrolysis of water – that running an electrical 
current through water produces oxygen and hydrogen gas – depends on older blackboxed 
claims about Lavoisier’s isolation of oxygen and hydrogen, about Faraday’s discussion of 
electrical current, etc.  From the realist side of science, Lavoisier’s claims about the gases 
and Faraday’s claim of the nature of electricity are established facts which explain the 
electrolysis of water.  By scientists’ logic, science-already-made is a realist business.   
As Latour envisions the network of science, the ‘facts’ and objects upon which 
new research is founded can be understood in a Nietzschean genealogy.76  Any 
established fact was, at one time, not an established fact.  Once it has become a fact it is 
blackboxed into the network, where only input and output are known from the blackbox.  
Scientists form a linkage between a new idea and an established blackboxed fact.  In this 
way science is a very open and clear assemblage of claims which have an established 
history.  (We should avoid the sense that facts are hierarchically dependent on each other: 
they are a network, not necessarily an ascending chain.)  Each claim individually became 
a fact at a historical moment.  One could write a genealogy of an individual claim or of 
                                                
74 Latour (1987: 98-100). 
75 Latour (1987: 260.n4): “The notion of under-determination is also called the Duhem-Quine principle. It 
asserts that no one single factor is enough to explain the closure of a controversy or the certainty acquired 
by scientists. This principle forms the philosophical basis of most social history of sociology of science.”  
76 I use the adjective Nietzschean in this paragraph to include works in the methodological spirit of 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals; most famous are the intellectual and cultural archaeologies of Michel 
Foucault.  Latour (1987: 92): “The point is that the new object emerges from a complex set-up of 
sedimented elements each of which has been a new object at some point in time and space.  The genealogy 
and the archaeology of this sedimented past is always possible in theory but becomes more and more 
difficult as time goes by and the number of elements mustered increases.” 
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several.  One could relatively easily show that the entirety of science is historicized, that 
it was created by people at certain points in time.  Latour does not mean that the 
Nietzschean genealogical project would not be philosophically valuable.  But from his 
perspective as a sociologist, scientists in fact use historicization as a defense, not an 
attack on their domain: the historicized claim is blackboxed.  ‘Cantor showed the one-to-
one correspondence of transfinite numbers’ is intended as ‘Cantor showed this; so you 
cannot deny it’.  To Latour this sort of claim ought to be read as, ‘We mathematicians all 
agree with what Cantor showed and our work depends on his established fact’.77  Thus 
when scientists invoke the historicization of their discipline they intend to demonstrate 
their shared agreement of its correctness for their domain; but to Latour the 
historicization maps out clearly the dependency of the networked claims and blackboxes.  
Since the claims of historicization take place only on the realist half of science, a 
Nietzschean genealogy of scientific claims is only half a description of the process by 
which claims become facts in blackboxes. 
To return to science in action, Latour argues, we must consider science in the 
process of blackboxing facts.  To consider science before a fact is established is to enter 
into controversy between potentially competing claims.  Often a claim is made and lays 
unchallenged or uncited, a phenomenon that demonstrates how later users can give or 
withhold meaning for a claim.  This phenomenon indicates most broadly that meaning-
making in science is a collective process; more specifically Latour believes that later 
users can refuse to associate previous blackboxed claims with a new one.   
A reader may draw a conclusion different from the conclusion that the scientific 
author intends.  The phenomenon of reader mis-reading in science can take several 
different types of readers: the lay reader, who knows nothing about the science, and a 
spectrum of persons increasingly familiar with the type of claims made in a scientific 
paper.  Scientific literature constantly pushes away the lay reader, Latour writes.78  Such 
                                                
77 Latour (1987: 90). 
78 Latour (1987: 44): “I do not say that because the literature is too technical it puts people off, but that, on 
the contrary, we feel it necessary to call technical or scientific a literature that is made to isolate the reader 
by bringing in many more resources. The ‘average man who happens to hit the truth’, naively postulated by 
Galileo, will have no chance to win over the thousands of articles, referees, supports and granting bodies 
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a reader will not be able to argue against the claims drawn in a paper that references data 
from expensive machines, the authors’ institutional credentials, and many other papers 
from other credentialed people with expensive machines.  (Thus Latour’s description of 
the act of reference in a scientific paper is intertextualityA.)  Only a reader sufficiently 
familiar with the background literature would be able to drive the interpretation of the 
scientific paper in a direction different than intended. 
Therefore, Latour asserts, a scientific paper is constantly trying to force a single, 
dominant interpretation upon the reader, even against her will.  A paper will employ not 
only references to other literature – that mass of background information that keeps out a 
lay reader – but also a number of charts and graphs.  “Belief in the authors’ word is 
replaced by the inspection of ‘figures’.”79  Far from being superfluous, charts and graphs 
are the essence of scientific papers.  It is impossible to disentangle pictograms and 
ideograms from the scientific text: the entire product is textual.  Thus the entire scientific 
paper has a clear literary goal; the real question is now how to evaluate the claims of the 
paper. 
 Since the process of meaning-making in science in action is collective, Latour 
argues, in evaluating the paper we should consider the connections drawn by the 
scientists who argue for their claims.  These connections are an assembled network drawn 
from a variety of sources: facts, machines, data points on a graph, citations in scientific 
literature.  We readers are never presented with Nature directly, but only indirectly at 
best.  We are really presented with a chain of weaker and stronger associations which the 
scientist has compiled into an assembled network; and the development of a scientific 
‘fact’ is the movement from weaker to stronger rhetoric.  From Latour’s sociological 
perspective, unless we readers are scientists ourselves, our only ability to evaluate the 
claims made in a scientific paper is to evaluate the strength of its assembled associations. 
From the observer’s point of view none of these people ever think illogically or 
logically, but always sociologically; that is they go straight from elements to 
                                                
who oppose his claim. The power of rhetoric lies in making the dissenter feel lonely.  This is indeed what 
happens to the ‘average man’ (or woman) reading the masses of reports on the controversies we so 
innocently started from.”  
79 Latour (1987: 47). 
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elements until a controversy starts.  When this happens they look for stronger and 
more resistant allies, and in order to do so, they may end up mobilizing the most 
heterogeneous and distant elements, thus mapping for themselves, for their 
opponents, and for observers, what they value most, what they are most dearly 
attached to. ‘Where thy treasure is, there will be thy heart also.’ The main 
difficulty in mapping the system of heterogeneous associations is in not making 
any additional assumption about how real they are. This does not mean that they 
are fictitious but simply that they resist certain trials – and that other trials could 
break them apart. A metaphor would help at this point to give the observer 
enough freedom to map the associations without distorting them into ‘good’ ones 
and ‘bad’ ones: sociologics [the mapping of associations] are much like road 
maps; all paths go to some place, no matter if they are trails, carry the same 
traffic, do not cost the same price to open and to maintain. To call a claim 
‘absurd’ or knowledge ‘accurate’ has no more meaning than to a call a smuggler 
trail ‘illogical’ and a freeway ‘logical.’ The only things we want to know about 
these sociological pathways is where they lead to, how many people go along 
with what sort of vehicles, and how easy they are to travel; not if they are wrong 
or right.80 
 
To get our bearings in a scientific paper we have to consider the different types of 
connections drawn from very different sources.  Claims from other scientific papers 
appear different than data from machines, different from human sources, etc.  And yet to 
make this distinction presents a distinct problem: what matters is the move from weaker 
to stronger associations, not the types of heterogeneous elements which compose the 
assemblage.  Scientific facts and technologies which incorporate scientific facts do not 
disseminate themselves incorporeally but are always accompanied by people: “the black 
box moves in space and becomes durable in time only through the actions of many 
people; if there is no one to take it up, it stops and falls apart however many people may 
have taken it up for however long.”81  Facts may be intellectually stubborn things but 
facts as blackboxes without allies force their interpretation on no-one. 
The assemblage of the blackbox moves in two directions: who it is designed to 
enroll and what it is tied to in order to make the enrollment inescapable.  The system of 
alliances knitted together by the blackbox means that it has become the obligatory 
passage point for people and facts.  The obligatory passage point is a sociological notion 
                                                
80 Latour (1987: 205). 
81 Latour (1987: 137). 
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drawn from Callon (1986).82  The obligatory passage point is a cultural space through 
which a social group must pass to reach its desired end.  In the earlier example of the 
electrolysis of water, the interests of environmentalists and engineers and investors who 
want to produce an automobile running purely on the water in fuel cells align: for these 
groups, desired success passes through water electrolysis blackboxed into a fuel cell.  The 
ability of the fuel cell itself – its efficiency, its manufacture – thus becomes the cultural 
point through which the aims of these social groups must pass, their obligatory passage 
point.  The example of the fuel cell makes clear both those that the assemblage enrolls – 
the investors and the environmentalists – and its blackboxing to make their enrollment 
inescapable.  All groups are tied to the statement the fuel cell electrolyzes water into 
hydrogen and oxygen, a statement networked by Lavoisier’s and Faraday’s work on 
oxygen, hydrogen, and electricity.   
Notice that agency and intention have now entered into Latour’s account of 
science.  Moreover these agents and intentions are not only those of the scientists 
themselves, they are those of the allies enrolled in the assemblage.  Technoscience is thus 
also a system of control, populated by various groups.  Various kinds of groups are linked 
together in the example of the fuel cell: facts, such as Lavoisier’s discovery of oxygen; 
machines, such as the fuel cell itself; and human social groups, such as the potential 
investors.  The fuel cell knits together these semiotic and material elements from different 
backgrounds because it has become the cultural space through which these elements must 
pass, their obligatory passage point.  As a point of control then, whoever controls the 
obligatory passage point controls the assemblage.  Latour speaks of “spokesmen” in this 
regard: elements that are represented by other elements Latour calls ‘actants’.83  Actants 
include other people, materialities, semiotic elements.  The spokesman for these actants is 
always trying to control their behavior and keep the assemblage together.  
If the interpretation of a claim is dependent on both author and reader of a 
scientific paper, how then can the author consistently drive a single interpretation upon a 
reader?  As we saw above, the reader is referred first to other texts produced by other 
                                                
82 Callon (1986) is a paper key to establishing Actor-Network Theory, described more below.  
83 Latour (1987: 84). 
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sciences, which themselves are or contain blackboxed facts; the reader is then referred to 
figures and diagram in the paper at hand.  Figures, diagrams, and data sets are 
inscriptional products of laboratory machines, which are physical blackboxes enclosing 
facts.84  Yet the assemblage of blackboxed facts – both physical and semiotic – does not 
simply lie open for the reader’s unhindered inspection; the paper’s author constantly 
speaks for the assemblage and its elements as the spokesman of these actants.  The 
rhetoric of the paper presents the spokesman as an objective representative of the 
actants.85  The spokesman claims to represent accurately the intent of the actants: the 
intent of the blackboxed inscriptional machines, of the other scientists’ papers, of the 
scientist’s own team.   
Consider the engineer of a particular fuel cell, who claims that it is two times 
more efficient than previous cells.  His presentation to potential investors refers to the 
work of researchers of electrical circuitry at academic institutions as well as charts with 
peaks and valleys of his cell’s performance.  The engineer has constructed his fuel cell as 
the obligatory passage point for those researchers’ claims about the electrical 
conductivity of rare metals and his own particular configuration of electrical circuitry.  
The engineer serves as the spokesman for these actants.  Moreover, the fuel cell is 
networked in to older claims; the fuel cell blackboxes older ‘facts’, such as the 
electrolysis of water and Lavoisier’s and Faraday’s chemical elements.  The engineer has 
enrolled these facts as allies in his network; at the same time he claims to represent them 
objectively as ‘actants’.  Callon (1986) calls the spokeman’s strategy to knit together the 
assemblage of the actants by the French term ‘interessement’: the engineer has made an 
interessement of social groups and natural elements.86 
                                                
84 See Latour and Woolgar (1986: 51, 89.n5) for the analysis that machines and their signifying systems are 
sociological inscriptions devices: an inscription device “allows one to describe a whole set of occupations 
in the laboratory, without being disturbed by the wide variety of their material shapes.  For example, ‘a bio-
assay for TRF’ [a biochemical compound] counts as one inscription device even though it takes five 
individuals three weeks to operate and occupies several large rooms in the laboratory.” The sociological 
observer notes the common interaction between people for a single purpose and the purpose, inscription, is 
thereby described without need to reference the materialities of the machines or communication systems: 
what matters is the semiotic traces produced and their signifying the system from which they come.  
85 Latour (1987: 78). 
86 Callon (1986). 
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The investors want to put the engineer’s claims to the test before they invest their 
money.  They want to know whether the engineer represents his fuel cell accurately, that 
is, do the actants enrolled in the assemblage of the fuel cell act as the engineer claims?  
The examination of the spokesman’s representation of his actants Latour calls a trial of 
strength.87  Notice that what is put to the test (however it is achieved) is not Nature but a 
chain of association and the rhetorical claim of the engineer.  For the test the engineer has 
enrolled as many allies as possible on his side: the control he has over the assemblage is 
valid only as long as his allies behave as he claims.  That his actants act as claimed 
implies that natural elements – oxygen molecules, electrons, rare metals – possess agency 
as much as the human actants the engineer speaks for. 
Thus Latour maintains a symmetrical description over both Nature and Society: 
the formation and construction of natural elements and natural order and societal 
elements and societal order are described by the same ontology.  That Latour maintains 
that non-human actants have agency is the result of the failure of previous theories of 
sociologies of science.88  The ‘Strong Program for the Sociology of Knowledge’ 
proposed to explain both successful and unsuccessful science by societal factors.89  But 
Latour argues that this argument presupposes the society that is supposed to come from 
science and technology, effectively making the privileging of the social element a 
circular argument.90  Therefore, Latour argues, both societal and natural factors must be 
                                                
87 Latour (1987: 78). 
88 Lenoir (1994: 124-25): “The semiotic turn enters in Science in Action with the introduction of ‘actors’ 
and ‘actants.’ Latour proposed this new ontology, you all recall, in order to get out of the apparent 
asymmetry of the symmetry principle in the original Strong Programme for the Sociology of Knowledge. 
The first symmetry principle proposed to apply the same sorts of explanation to good and bad science. 
Rather than attributing the cause of closure of debate to nature in the case of truth, and to social factors in 
the case of error, both debates were to be conducted in light of the same sociological investigation of 
negotiation, interpretive flexibility, problems of replicability, etc. The problem with this, according to 
Latour, is that the only actors are human actors. Nature and other nonhuman actors, such as machines, 
never enter in as coparticipants and allies in the debates. The second symmetry principle, the generalized 
symmetry principle due to Michel Callon, overcomes this problem by not privileging the social; nature and 
society are explained in the same terms through some well-known and entertaining Janus-faced acrobatics. 
Debates are closed through enrolling allies and extending links in networks, and some of the allies are 
nonhuman actants.” 
89 See Barnes, Bloor, Henry (1996) for an introduction to the Strong Program, originally developed in the 
1970s. 
90 Latour (1987: 132-144) contains a version of this argument, but the best place for Latour’s extended 
argument against the Strong Program is Latour (1988). 
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treated symmetrically with the same ontological description.  This ontology is Latour’s 
actors and actants and their process of enrolling allies in assembling a network 
constitutive of both Nature and Society.  Actors are constantly in the process of 
translating, enrolling and binding claims into a networked assemblage of actants. 
In summary Latour’s Science in Action presents a picture of science as an 
assemblage drawn together from various networks.  Networks and assemblages are the 
business of translating, enrolling, and binding semiotic and material elements.  The nodal 
points of the networks are allies enrolled in the network whose durability is their ability 
to resist various trials; the nodal points may also be obligatory passage points for 
networked claims.  Science-in-the-making is the process of enrolling allies and extending 
the network by the strategy of interessement; made science is the existing networked 
structure.  Scientists defend their networked claims by pointing to its historicized 
elements, which serve as obligatory passage points for historically subsequent claims.  To 
disassemble the network is to dissect, analyze, and read the constructed elements of the 
network.  Latour considers how a skeptic might dissect the semiotic and material 
assemblage of a scientific claim: 
What is behind the claims? Texts. And behind the texts? More texts, becoming 
more and more technical because they bring in more and more papers. Behind 
these articles? Graphs, inscriptions, labels, tables, maps, arrayed in tiers.  Behind 
these inscriptions? Instruments, whatever their shape, age and cost that end up 
scribbling, registering and jotting down various traces. Behind the instruments? 
Mouthpieces of all sorts and manner commenting on the graphs and ‘simply’ 
saying what they mean. Behind them? Arrays of instruments. Behind those? 
Trials of strength to evaluate the resistance of the ties that link the representatives 
to what they speak for. It is not only words that are now lined up to confront the 
dissenter, not only graphs to support the words and references to support the 
whole assembly of allies, not only instruments to generate endless numbers of 
newer and clearer inscriptions, but, behind the instruments, new objects are lined 
up which are defined by their resistance to trials.  Dissenters have now done all 
they can do to disbelieve, disaggregate and disassociate what is mustered behind 
the claim.91 
 
This network can be reduced to its systematic elements in such a way that produces a 
                                                
 
91 Latour (1987: 79). 
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sociological analysis of the strategy of enrollment; for Latour sociological analysis 
proceeds from following the actor’s development of the network.  
 Science in Action was criticized on several accounts.  Sociologists criticized 
Latour’s Machiavellian view of politics he ascribed to scientists; for sociologist critics 
Latour described a society similar to Thomas Hobbes’ bellum omnium contra omnes, a 
description of society which sociologists often take as their foil.92  Others criticized 
Latour’s increasing reliance on the semiotics theory of A.J. Greimas in his more recent 
publications: “Latour also points out that the semiotics he is using has a certain 
ontological weakness; he just never specifies what that weakness is—namely, its reliance 
on a structural ontology of the world homologous to the stories scientists tell.”93  Despite 
the criticisms, Latour’s work in Science in Action is the major theoretical statement of 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT).  This sociological theory has continued to attract the work 
of other scholars.  A short introduction to other important works of this type of sociology 
of science include works by Latour (1988, 1993, 2005), Law and Hassard (1999), and 
Law (2009).  Much of the debate about ANT since Science in Action has moved away 
from its application to science studies towards its philosophical consequences and its 
view of social phenomena.  Many studies which now employ ANT or elements of its 
sociological approach are sometimes called after-ANT studies. 
 My study too may be called ‘after-ANT’ because I employ many ANT concepts 
without embracing its broader critique of sociology.  ANT provides a useful sociological 
tool for this dissertation because it describes the circulation and emergence of 
information within organizational systems in a sociological way.  The foremost question 
we confront is how and why Hellenistic scientists adopted theories from other sciences to 
their own: the very question regarding the circulation and emergence of information ANT 
claims to be able analyze.  
                                                
92 See the strident criticism of Amsterdamska (1990) and the more muted critique of Barnes, Bloor, Henry 
(1996: 114-116).  Forman (2007: 75.n19) has a complete list of reviews of Latour (1987).   
93 Lenoir (1994: 129.n29). 
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1.5 SYNTHESIS 
The theoretical tools at the disposal of this study are now clear: (1) a notion of the 
particular domain of a science; (2) a philological orientation to words adapted from one 
domain into another; (3) a sociological account of the circulation of ideas between 
domains, guided by the Normung of domain-specific words.  We are ready to proceed to 
our case studies in detail. 
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INNOVATION 
Chapter 2:  Herophilus’ Pulse Theory 
In this chapter I argue that Herophilus adopted elements from musicians and 
musical theorists to describe anatomical phenomena that led to the emergence of a 
materio-semiotic object, the pulse.  I show that Herophilus’ account of pulse rhythms 
depends on the concept of the primary time-unit, developed by Aristoxenus of Tarentum.  
I show that Herophilus measured the frequency of the pulse by using a Greek concept of 
normative time via an Egyptian in-flow water-clock.  Herophilus’ conception of the pulse 
proceeds by a strategy of naturalization.  The ideological consequence of Herophilus’ 
pulse theory is Rationalist medicine. 
2.1 HEROPHILUS’ PULSE THEORY 
2.1.1 Problematizing Scientific Novelty 
Herophilus of Chalcedon, ca. 325-255 BCE, a Greek colonist from Bithynia to 
Egypt, was the first Greek doctor to isolate pulsation to the arteries and to use the pulse as 
a diagnostic tool.1  Herophilus’ pulse system could have been an isolated system, without 
connection to other elements, and might soon have been ignored and fallen apart.  
Latour’s (1987) description of scientific networks as presented in chapter 1.4 stressed 
how new concepts, objects, or ideas in science draw their strength from their association 
with known concepts: they are networked into the assemblage of scientific concepts.  The 
reality of the object or usefulness of the concept is the relative strength with which it is 
tied to objects recognized or concepts shared by the group of fellow scientists.  Like any 
new science then, Herophilus’ work on arterial pulsation is problematic: he was working 
with objects unused by previous physicians.  To say that Herophilus was the first to 
                                                
1 See von Staden (1989: 26-29, 36-50) for a biography of Herophilus.  Herophilus frr. 144-188b vS contain 
doctrines on the physiology of the vascular system and pulse theory.  I use the term ‘fragment’ in a loose 
sense: von Staden’s (1989) collection assembles testimonia concerning Herophilus’ writings and doctrines 
and only a few testimonia quote verbatim Herophilus’ own writings. 
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identify that pulsation is unique to the arteries is therefore a recognition that at the time of 
his discovery Herophilus’ idea needed support from other concepts used within his social 
group of doctors.  Novelty is always problematic within Kuhn’s (1996) “normal 
science”.2  To address how Herophilus’ work on arterial pulsation take its form and why 
it does not fall apart we must consider Herophilus’ strategies of interessement: these are 
the strategies to interlace and bind new concepts with social goals of individuals (so as to 
produce allies) and with the known concepts and objects of nature.3  In accord with the 
ANT’s principle of a double symmetry, we are looking for an account operative on both a 
social and a natural level. 
First, let us consider the social phenomena.  The theory of arterial pulsation links 
the arteries with the heart, since the pulsation of the arteries is perceptible but the action 
of the heart is not.  But if arterial pulsation is a consequence somehow of the timing of 
the beat of the heart, the physiology of a hitherto unobservable organ is perhaps 
observable by examination by arterial pulsation.  More broadly then, arterial pulsation 
reveals the status and condition of the interior of the body.4  Herophilus’ work on arterial 
pulsation consequently belongs in (what the Empiricists would later name) the Rationalist 
tradition, as I will argue in 2.4.3. To investigate arterial pulsation is therefore part of the 
broader research program of Herophilus to open the body. 
Opening the body may be socially useful for physicians.  The promise of research 
medicine is a therapy of disease grounded in a theoretical understanding of physis which 
underlies pathological phenomena.  The Empiricists reject this promise of research 
medicine because it promotes the researcher’s aims at the expense of the actual treatment 
of the patient.  Since the early Empiricists were often former Herophileans, it seems 
likely that they rejected the Herophilus’ vision of medicine, his belief in better therapy 
                                                
2 See chapter 1.2.3 for discussion of Kuhn (1996). 
3 See chapter 1.4 for discussion of Callon’s (1986) concept of interessement within ANT. 
4 In chapter 4.3.2 I will read the debate between the Rationalists and the Empiricists as, from the Empiricist 
perspective, a debate over the role of the physician, and, from the Rationalist perspective, a debate over the 
interior of the body, where the Rationalist goal was to break down the divide in the Empiricist claims 
between a knowable outside and an unknowable inside.  Latour’s (1987) blackbox can be understood either 
as a fact to be constructed or deconstructed, as shown in chapter 1.4.  By opening the body the Rationalists 
rejected the Empiricist claim that the workings of the body are essentially unknowable: the Rationalists 
thereby deconstruct the blackboxed ‘fact’ of the Empiricists. 
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through improved understanding of physis.  If the promise of research medicine can be 
attained, the physician will have justified his methodological approach to medicine.  
Since the cultural aim and methodological investigation of physis are aligned, the 
promise of research medicine conforms to Lloyd’s thesis about the interrelation of aim 
and method in Greek science.  Therefore, also in accord with Lloyd’s thesis, the promise 
of research medicine is socially useful for physicians because it allows them to avoid the 
social polemic on second-order questions of Greek science.  It is therefore to the social 
benefit of the community of doctors to invest in theories of the body that support a 
therapy based on physis. 
The twin legs of useful therapy and the investigation of physis undergird the 
social advancement of research physicians.  If other physicians can employ the theory of 
arterial pulsation for therapeutic purposes, Herophilus will be able to tie his research to 
the social advance of medical research.  The social group Herophilus can attempt to enlist 
as allies is therefore broader than the social group of research physicians, a fairly small 
and narrow group: by making arterial pulsation useful for therapy, Herophilus can 
increase the number of physicians invested in his methodological model of medical 
research.  If everyday medical practitioners, nurses, and many other medical technicians 
employ a therapy based on arterial pulsation, they too become invested in the 
investigation of physis.  Therefore it is to Herophilus’ personal social advancement and 
that of his model of research that he detail a therapeutic purpose for his construction of 
the vascular system which isolates the pulsating faculty to the tunics of the arteries alone.  
Second, let us consider Herophilus’ strategies for interessement with natural 
phenomena, or naturalization.  I use ‘naturalization’ in two senses.  First, in the parlance 
of genealogical scholarship, natural objects are called “givens” and assumed as a priori 
facets of the world.5  Insofar as the phenomena of time or anatomy (Herophilus’ chosen 
natural phenomena) were natural and thus givens for Herophilus, any attempt to 
undergird the reality of pulse by using them is a strategy of naturalization.  Second, 
naturalization is a strategy of extending the domain of nature, physis proper.  In an 
                                                
5 Flemming (2000: 5).  See also chapter 1.4 for discussion of Nietzschean geneaologies. 
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important essay G.E.R. Lloyd (1991b) has argued that ‘nature’ was invented by 
intellectuals of the Classical period, the philosophers and scientists who argued against 
magicians.6  For these thinkers physis was the collective of material objects (as opposed 
to the category of the supernatural).  Consequently, Hellenistic period scientists’ appeal 
to physis is an appeal to a unified conception of nature whose attributes under one science 
might be recognized in another science. 
Herophilus’ interessement strategy of naturalization might therefore appeal to 
existing phenomena recognized both within the science of medicine and within other 
contemporary sciences of the Hellenistic period.  Herophilus intertwined the pulse in 
anatomical terms with the physical phenomena of artery: its expansion, dilation, 
hardness, and other properties.  Herophilus also attempted to link pulse to the phenomena 
of time measured both by musical rhythm and by water-clock.    
2.1.2 Herophilus’ Arterial Motions 
The pulsating artery stands at the center of Herophilus’ vision of pulse theory.  
Herophilus distinguished two arterial motions. The artery moves outward toward the 
physician’s touch in a motion called διαστολή, “dilation”; it moves inward again away 
from the touch in a motion called συστολή, “contraction”.7  (Contemporary Western 
biomedicine uses the transliterated terminology of diastole and systole in reference to the 
movement of the artery, but uses the meanings of dilation and contraction in reference to 
the heart’s pumping motion.)  In contrast to contemporary Western biomedicine, there 
                                                
6 Lloyd (1991b) is a published account of Lloyd’s inaugral lecture at Darwin College in Cambridge and, 
unfortunately, is consequently published without footnotes or references.  Much of Lloyd’s discussion 
implicitly references his previous works. 
7 Appendix A shows that our knowledge of Herophilus’ pulse theory is largely filtered through Galen’s 
treatises on pulse; I will therefore occasionally distinguish Galen’s view of pulse theory from Herophilus’ 
in the footnotes of this chapter.  For example, while Herophilus identified only two arterial motions in the 
cycle of arterial pulsation, Galen and later Greek physicians identified two further pauses associated with 
the cycle of arterial dilation and contraction: the pause or rest following dilation was called ἡ ἐκτὸς ἠρεµία 
“external rest” (because it happened at the peak of the artery’s outward expansion toward the touch of the 
physician); the pause or rest following contraction was called ἡ ἐντὸς ἠρεµία “internal rest” (because it 
happened at the nadir of the artery’s inward contraction away from the touch of the physician).  Not all 
physicians agreed that contraction, the inward movement of the artery, was perceptible to touch; Galen only 
learned to feel it after many years of practice (cf. Herophilus frr. 159, 160 vS), but Herophilus and the 
Herophilean sect (αἵρεσις) believed that contraction was readily perceptible to touch.  Due to differences in 
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was no attempt in Greek pulse theory to correlate the heart’s pumping motion with 
arterial motion.  Herophilus thought only of the artery, not the heart. 
Praxagoras, Herophilus’ teacher, was the first Greek to discover that only arteries 
pulse.  “To pulse” in Greek, σφύζειν, was originally used to indicate violent motion and 
“pathological symptoms associated with, for example, fear and fever, not the normal vital 
function of the pulse”.8 Praxagoras and Herophilus applied the word exclusively to the 
involuntary motion of the arteries and most other doctors followed, even as σφύζειν 
retained its original sense for several centuries in ordinary language.9  But Praxagoras 
conflated several types of involuntary movement, claiming that “tremor” τρόµος, 
“spasm” σπασµός, and “palpitation” πάλµος, as well as “pulse” σφυγµός were likewise 
involuntary movements of the arteries and differed only by size, not kind.10  Herophilus 
refined Praxagoras’ discovery and attributed Praxagoras’ other involuntary motions to the 
muscular and nervous systems; for Herophilus then “tremor” τρόµος, “spasm” σπασµός, 
and “palpitation” πάλµος became involuntary pathological motions of the muscular and 
nervous systems. Consequently, Herophilus was the first to identify σφυγµός as an 
involuntary and natural movement unique to the arteries; thus Herophilus was the first 
Greek physician to determine that arteries alone pulsate naturally. 
While Praxagoras held that the arteries pulsate of their own accord, Herophilus 
maintained that the arteries pulse from two sources: from some connection to the heart 
and from a faculty flowing to them through their tunics.  Galen recorded two important 
testimonia regarding Herophilus’ views on the source of the pulsation of the arteries. 
ἐνίων δὲ σφύζειν µὲν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ χιτῶνος αὐτῶν διαστελλοµένου τε καὶ 
συστελλοµένου, καθάπερ ἡ καρδία, τὴν δύναµιν δὲ οὐκ ἐχουσῶν σύµφυτον ᾗ 
τοῦτο δρῶσιν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ καρδίαν λαµβανουσῶν. ἧς γνώµης ἔχεται καὶ 
Ἡρόφιλος.  
 
Others [sc. against the opinion of Praxagoras that the arteries pulse from their own 
innate faculty] held that [the arteries] pulse, as their tunic itself dilates and 
contracts, just as the heart, although not by having an innate faculty do they do 
                                                
their views about the parts of the cycle of arterial pulsation, Galen often struggled to understand 
Herophilus’ theories; see Appendix A. 
8 Von Staden (1989: 268). 
9 See LSJ σφύζω 3. 
10 Von Staden (1989: 271). 
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this but by taking pulsation from the heart.  Herophilus too held this opinion.11 
 
Herophilus thought that the tunic of the arteries is the source of the perceptible dilation 
and contraction of the arteries; they do not pulse from their own faculty but from a 
faculty that they draw from the heart.  Galen elsewhere recorded that Herophilus believed 
that the tunic of arteries is six times as thick as that of the veins.12  It is a speculative but 
possible conclusion that Herophilus supposed that the composition of the arterial tunic 
allowed pulsation drawn from the heart.  (If so, the thinner and less visible venal tunic 
may have offered Herophilus a reason why the veins do not pulse too.)  Galen recorded a 
slightly more informative testimonium in another passage: 
τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἡρόφιλον ἀρέσκει τὰς ἀρτηρίας συνεχεῖς οὔσας τῇ καρδίᾳ διὰ 
τῶν χιτώνων ἐπιῤῥέουσαν ἔχειν τὴν παρ’ αὐτοῖς δύναµιν, ᾗ χρώµεναι 
παραπλησίως αὐτῇ τῇ καρδίᾳ διαστελλόµεναι µὲν ἕλκουσι πανταχόθεν, 
ὅθεν ἂν δύνωνται, τὸ πληρῶσον αὐτῶν τὴν διαστολὴν, συστελλόµεναι δὲ 
ἐκθλίβουσι. 
 
Herophilus and his followers hold that, since the arteries are continuous to the 
heart, they have a faculty to them flowing through their tunics.  By employing this 
faculty similar to the heart itself, when in dilation they draw from everywhere 
they can that which fills their dilation, and in contraction squeeze it out.13  
 
So Herophilus believed that the faculty of arterial pulsation is transmitted through the 
tunics of the arteries.  Later Herophileans’ definitions of the pulse explicitly included the 
heart with the arteries in dilation and contraction,14 but it is unclear whether Herophilus 
too believed that dilation and contraction appeared in the heart.  Galen’s testimony states 
that the faculty of pulsation was “similar to the heart”, presumably a reference to a 
similarity in the timing of the beat of the heart with the pulsation of the arteries.  
Herophilus did not consider the heart a pump and so did not maintain that the movement 
of the blood, pneuma, or whatever is contained in the arteries was responsible for 
                                                
11 Galen de pulsuum differentiis 4.2, 8.702-3K = Herophilus fr. 155 vS.  
12 Galen de usu partium 6.10, 3.445K = 1.325 Helmreich = Herophilus fr. 116 vS. 
13 Galen de pulsuum differentiis 4.6, 8.733K = Herophilus fr. 144 vS.  While τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἡρόφιλον is 
an ambiguous phrase that could mean only “the followers of Herophilus” and thus exclude Herophilus 
himself, the opinion in this passage is parallel with the opinion ascribed to Herophilus in Herophilus fr. 155 
vS.  Hence I follow von Staden (1989: 322) in translating τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἡρόφιλον as “Herophilus and 
his followers”. 
14 Herophilus fr. 157 vS; see also von Staden’s (1989: 447) list comparing the theories of Herophileans on 
the pulse. 
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transmitting the arterial pulse.  Furthermore, in Herophilus’ theory the muscular tissue of 
the heart cannot produce the same involuntary motion as the arteries, because the 
involuntary motions of the heart must be specific to the muscular system, namely tremor, 
spasm, or palpitation.15  Galen elsewhere suggested that Herophilus conceived of the use 
of the pulse for diagnosis and prognosis without requiring pulse in any other body part 
except the arteries.16  Therefore, for Herophilus the faculty of pulsation was specific to 
unique organs of the vascular system – the arteries – and not to any fluids they may carry. 
 Herophilus ascribed four generic differentiae to the pulsating artery.  Galen, in the 
midst of an argument that Herophilus did not use the later generic differentia ‘fullness’ 
among his descriptions of the pulsating artery, quotes Herophilus’ description of arterial 
motion from Herophilus’ treatise On Pulses: 
πρῶτον µὲν ἐπιφέρων εὐθύς φησιν ὡδί – γράψω γὰρ τὴν ῥῆσιν ὅλην … καθ’ 
ὅλου µὲν οὖν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν σφυγµὸς σφυγµοῦ πλήθει, µεγέθει, τάχει, 
σφοδρότητι, ῥυθµῷ. ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ ταῦτα διαφέρειν φανερὸς γίνεται ἐνίοτε ὅ τε 
οἰκεῖος καὶ οὐκ οἰκεῖος. φαίνεται δὲ διαφέρειν καὶ ἐπιγινώσκεσθαι καθόλου µὲν 
ἕτερος ἑτέρου σφυγµὸς, ὡς εἴρηται, ῥυθµῷ, µεγέθει, τάχει, σφοδρότητι. εἰ δὲ 
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ῥυθµῷ φαίνεται διαφέρειν ἕτερος ἑτέρου σφυγµὸς σφυγµοῦ τάχει, 
µεγέθει, σφοδρότητι. 
 
First introducing the subject [Herophilus] says as follows – for I will write down 
the entire passage … “In general pulse seems to differ from pulse in amount, size, 
speed, vehemence, and rhythm.  From their differences in these respects pulse at 
times appears proper and [at times] not proper.  One pulse seems to differ and be 
recognized generally as different from another, as was said, in rhythm, size, 
speed, vehemence.  If in the same rhythm one pulse seems to differ from another 
in speed, size, and vehemence.”17 
 
Later doctors added more differentiae of the pulse to Herophilus’ initial assessment, but it 
appears that Herophilus analyzed the movement of the artery in terms of four categories.  
Herophilus’ first sentence does indeed list five differentiae but two sentences later 
Herophilus lists only four differentiae: size, speed, vehemence and rhythm.  Galen 
believed that Herophilus only used these four,18 but it is possible that Herophilus intended 
                                                
15 Galen de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 6.1 = Herophilus fr. 153 vS. 
16 Galen de pulsuum differentiis 4.2, 716K = Herophilus fr. 148 vS. 
17 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 4.3, 8.959-60K = Herophilus fr. 162.77-86 vS. 
18 In Herophilus frr. 163a, 163b Galen transmits the view of Archigenes, a leading theoretical physician fl. 
100 CE, that Herophilus uses other specific differentiae between pulses – regularity, irregularity, evenness, 
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the fifth differentia, “amount”, to have some connection to frequency, which Herophilus 
measured with a water-clock, as described in 2.2.2 below, rather than with fingers alone. 
Herophilus developed normative pulses for four different age-groups: newborns, 
children and teenagers, adults, and the elderly.19  Von Staden (1989) points out that the 
implication of several Herophilean fragments is that Herophilus measured pulse in terms 
relative to that of the age-group.20  The age-groups determine the normative differentiae 
of the pulse.  Herophilus’ differentiae of pulses are therefore limited to his classification 
of age-groups.  Thus, a newborn has a normative pulse described in terms of size, speed, 
vehemence, and rhythm; a teenager has a normative pulse described in separate terms of 
size, speed, vehemence, and rhythm; and so on for each group.  The Herophilean 
physician first placed the patient into an age-group before the determining the generic 
characteristics of his pulse. 
Given that Herophilus believed pulse to be composed of two arterial motions, 
dilation and contraction, which did Herophilus mean to be measured by his differentiae? 
Herophilus’ procedure for constructing a normative pulse rhythm, analyzed in chapter 
2.2.1, begins from the dilating artery.21  Let us therefore proceed by assuming that 
Herophilus thought the dilation was the most important movement. 
We imagine Herophilus feeling the forearm of a patient, already placed in one of 
the four age-groups, in order to classify the four differentiae of the patient’s pulse.  He 
felt how much the artery moves outward to him; this is the size of the pulse.  Herophilus 
classified pulse sizes as ‘sufficient’, ‘good-sized’, and ‘remarkable’.22  Herophilus felt 
                                                
and unevenness – although without treating them as generic differences between pulses as size, speed, 
vehemence, and rhythm. 
19 Herophilus fr. 177 vS. 
20 Von Staden (1989: 285): “Compared to the pulse of an adult, the child’s pulse might be small but 
relatively speaking, i.e. in relation to the circumference of a child’s artery, it is as ‘adequate in size’ or 
‘good-sized’ as the adult’s pulse.” 
21 Herophilus fr. 183.8-9 vS: πρῶτον χρόνον αἰσθητὸν ὑποθέµενος ἐν ᾧ διαστελλοµένην εὕρισκε τὴν 
ἀρτηρίαν … “Supposing that the perceptible time-unit in which he found the artery dilating was primary 
…”  Yet Galen was not entirely sure whether Herophilus thought dilation or contraction was more 
important: in Herophilus frr. 157, 158 vS Galen at last decides that Herophilus meant contraction to be the 
active motion.  Herophilus fr. 183 vS shows that Galen is likely mistaken. 
22 See von Staden (1989: 285-86).  Three different testimonia show these descriptions. (1) Galen de 
dignoscendis pulsibus 2.3, 8.869K = Herophilus fr. 184 vS: µικρόν γ’ οὖν λέγουσι τὸν τοῦ παιδὸς 
σφυγµὸν, Ἡροφίλου µηδεπώποτε µικρὸν εἰρηκότος, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ µὲν ἱκανὸν τῷ µεγέθει, ποτὲ δὲ 
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how quickly the artery dilates toward his touch; this is the speed of the pulse.  Herophilus 
classified pulse speeds as ‘regular’, ‘fast’, and ‘slow’.23  Herophilus felt the strength of 
the artery’s motion in dilation; this is the vehemence of the pulse.  There is no evidence 
how Herophilus classified pulse vehemences, although later physicians classified them as 
‘strong’ or ‘weak’.24  Finally, Herophilus felt the length of time of the dilation and 
compared it to the length of time of the contraction; this is the rhythm. 
Clearly the most important factor in Herophilus’ analysis of the pulse is his ability 
to perceive by touch.  The Herophilean physician must use his fingers alone to sense and 
analyze four charateristics in the motion of the pulsating artery, as well as to distinguish 
between the artery’s dilation and contraction.  This ability requires time and training.  
The skill necessary in the doctor’s touch was almost certainly part of the repetoire of 
clinical procedures and knowledge taught in situ by physicians to their students: there is 
no record in the surviving fragments of Herophilus’ On Pulses of written instructions for 
feeling the pulsating artery.25  It remains unclear how Herophilus himself acquired this 
sophisticated ability to perceive arterial characteristics by touch. 
                                                
ἀξιόλογον, ἤ πως οὕτως ὀνοµάζοντος. “Well they at any rate call the pulse of a child small, but 
Herophilus never called it small, but sometimes named it sufficient in size, sometimes remarkable, or 
something similar.”  (2) Galen synopsis de pulsibus 8, 9.453K = Herophilus fr. 180 vS: τὸν γοῦν τοῦ 
παιδὸς σφυγµὸν ὁ µὲν Ἡρόφιλος ἱκανὸν τῷ µεγέθει φησὶν ὑπάρχειν, ὁ δ’ Ἀρχιγένης µικρόν. “The pulse 
of the child at any rate Herophilus says is sufficient in size, but Archigenes [says it is] small.” (3) Galen de 
dignoscendis pulsibus 2.2, 8.853K = Herophilus fr. 181 vS: Ἡρόφιλος γοῦν ποτὲ µὲν εὐµεγέθη τὸν 
σφυγµὸν τοῦτον ὀνοµάζει. “Herophilus at any rate calls this pulse [sc. a child’s pulse exceeding Galen’s 
moderate pulse] good-sized.” 
23 See von Staden (1989: 284-85).  Pliny NH 11.89.219 = Herophilus fr. 186 vS: arteriarum pulsus in 
cacumine maxime membrorum evidens, index fere morborum, in modulos certos legesque metricas per 
aetates, stabilis aut citatus aut tardus, discriptus ab Herophilo medicinae vate miranda arte. “The pulse of 
the arteries is clear chiefly at the end of the limbs; it is nearly a marker of diseases and was divided into 
fixed meters and metrical laws by age, <as> regular or fast or slow, by Herophilus a prophet of medicine 
with wonderous skill.”   
24 Von Staden (1989: 274-75).  See also Galen’s description of vehemence at de pulsuum differentiis 1.3, 
8.501K: καὶ µὲν δὴ καὶ τόνου πὼς αὐτὴν ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, ὥστε ἢ µόγις καὶ ἀρρώστως, ἢ ἑτοίµως τε καὶ 
εὐρώστως ἐνεργεῖν. “It is further necessary that it have tension, either weak and faint, or readily and 
strongly active.”   
25 Strikingly there is no explicit discussion in any work of Greek pulse theory about the clinical procedure 
for feeling a patient’s pulse.  The closest an ancient author comes to discussion of a clinical procedure 
occurs in Galen de pulsibus ad tirones 8.454K: he merely states that the doctor best determines a patient’s 
pulse by feeling the arteries in the temples, wrist, or the instep of the foot.  Galen does not explain essential 
aspects of the clinical procedure, such as how the physician ought to use his fingers or where the physician 
ought to place them on the artery.  Skills of touching were almost certainly passed from teacher to pupil in 
bedside training. 
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2.2 TIMING ARTERIAL PULSATION  
Since the differentiae of size, vehemence, and speed are given subjective 
measurements and descriptions, the more objective criterion in Herophilus’ treatment of 
the pulse is the timing of arterial pulsation.  The differentia ‘rhythm’ certainly covers 
pulse timing and it is possible that ‘amount’, the fifth differentia Herophilus mentioned, 
also covers pulse timing.  Herophilus appears to have approached the measurement of 
pulse timing in two different ways: through appropriating Aristoxenus’ theory of musical 
rhythms and by employing a water-clock to measure pulse frequency.  We thus have two 
separate traditions of Herophilus’ application of time measurement to pulses.   
A historian faces two problems here.  First, which ‘solution’ to the measurement 
of the pulse by timing did Herophilus intend to be correct?  This is a problem of authorial 
intent.  Second, which ‘solution’ did Herophilus develop earlier?  This is a problem of 
historical chronology.  We might collapse the two problems into one and argue that 
Herophilus’ treatment of the problem of pulse rhythm underwent a progressive 
development: those Herophilean fragments which show conceptual problems and 
technical difficulties must date earlier than those Herophilean fragments which show 
superior handling of the technical material; and Herophilus intends his latter, more 
technically competent material to be the correct solution.  But the suggestion lacks 
evidence to support it and is open to criticisms of Whiggish historiography. 
Whiggish historiography was an influential view of progress in thought and 
society.26  Originally a historiographical strategy of eighteenth-century British Whig 
political historians, it became a popular method to write the history of science in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.  Whiggish historiography using modern science 
as a benchmark takes present thought to be the culmination of tradition; historical science 
is correspondingly read for how close those past theories and ideas approximate present 
                                                
26 The locus classicus for discussion of Whiggism is Butterfield (1931).  See Jardine (2003) for a realist 
discussion of the reception of Butterfield and the historiography of science.  See Barton (1994b: 8-17) for a 
relativist discussion of the trend of presentism in ancient science historiography.  Chapter 5.2 discusses the 
historiographical question of realism and relativism in ancient science.  
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theories and ideas, which are assumed to be correct.27  In a broader sense Whiggism is 
any historiographic principle by which historians give or explain chronological sequence 
to undated historical material according to its ‘scientific progress’ or, conversely, 
explaining a known dated sequence on the assumption that ‘scientific progress’ is 
occurring. 
In the case of Herophilus’ work on pulse rhythms, the appropriation of 
Aristoxenian concepts of musical rhythms better fits all phenomena relating to the timing 
of the pulse.  The water-clock, on the other hand, is limited to the relative quantification 
of the pulse’s dilation.  Applying the scientific progress of Whiggish historiography to 
these results, we might insist that Herophilus’ water-clock was an earlier (and failed) 
attempt to use the pulse for diagnosis, an aim better effected by Herophilus’ later work 
with Aristoxenus’ theory.  Reading Herophilus’ pulse timing with Whiggish 
historiography collapses the two problems of authorial intent and historical chronology: it 
assumes that Herophilus rejected his earlier solution of the water-clock for his later 
‘correct solution’ of appropriating Aristoxenian musical rhythms.  The flaws of this 
historiographical strategy are clear. 
A different historiographical strategy comes from comparing the case of the 
fragments of Herophilus’ pulse theory with the situation of Archimedean material to be 
discussed in chapter 3.2.2, where Archimedes had solved the same mathematical problem 
two times in the same treatise.  Netz (2009a) has argued that our understanding of the 
Archimedean material gains more from the intertext of the technical details; and 
correspondingly he treats the ostensibly earlier half of the treatise as an intertext of the 
second half of the treatise, its presumably main, later version: this is a version of 
intertextualityR as described in 1.3.1 where the reader is figured as the modern historian.  
Using intertextualityR chapters 2.2.1-2 will consider Herophilus’ fragments relating to the 
appropriation of Aristoxenian rhythms and to the report of Herophilus’ water-clock as 
intertexts of each other.  Hence intertextualityR is a historiographical strategy: the 
                                                
27 Whiggish historiography using modern science rapidly becomes to be writ in the dichotomy of realism 
versus relativism.  Consequently one historical idea triumphs over another because it is the right idea (that 
is, it is the present idea).  History’s winners are the prophets of the present.   
 
 60 
question of chronological priority between Herophilus’ fragments relating to the 
appropriation of Aristoxenus’ theory and Herophilus’ fragments relating to the water-
clock is put into abeyance.  By holding the chronological question in abeyance, 
intertextualityR offers instead a sense of the continuity and contrast between the two 
different sets of fragments.   
The contrast between Herophilus’ different theories will focus on the role of the 
quantitative measurement of time.  I will show that Herophilus’ timing of the pulse – 
whether analyzed by appropriated Aristoxenian rhythms or by water-clock – employs a 
normative concept of time, that is, measuring an event by discrete units of elapsed time. 
2.2.1 Rhythms in Herophilus’ Pulse-Theory 
While Herophilus’ innovative description of the timing of arterial motion as a 
system conforming to musical and metrical rhythm remained part of popular imagination 
until the end of antiquity,28 there is scholarly debate about what sort of rhythm 
Herophilus used to describe pulsations.  Wellman (1895) long ago suggested that 
Herophilus adopted his terminology and theory of rhythm from Aristoxenus of Tarentum, 
a late fourth-century student of Aristotle, who wrote influential accounts of harmonic 
theory and rhythmical theory.29  Heinrich von Staden’s opinion seems to have changed on 
this issue: in his (1989) collection of Herophilean fragments he doubts that Aristoxenus 
influenced Herophilus but in his (1996) article considers it possible.30  I believe that 
Wellman is correct and will reargue the case.  
First, Galen remarks that Herophilus’ statements on pulse rhythms are difficult to 
understand because they presuppose the readers’ heavy acquantaince with rhythm in 
musical contexts. 
διὰ τοῦτο γοῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν ῥυθµῶν ὅσα µὲν ἐχρῆν αὐτοὺς ἔτι παῖδας ὄντας ἐν 
τοῖς τῆς µουσικῆς διδασκαλείοις ἐκµαθεῖν, ταῦτ’ οὐδόλως εἰς τὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς 
συγγράµµατα φέρουσι, τὸ τῶν ὀψιµαθῶν πάθηµα πάσχοντες, οὐδὲ σιωπῆσαι 
δυνάµενοι, κᾂν ἑτέρας ᾖ τέχνης. πῶς δ’ ἀπὸ ῥυθµοῦ δεῖ σηµειοῦσθαι, οὐκέτ’ 
οὐδεὶς ἔγραψεν αὐτῶν. ἀλλ’ Ἡρόφιλός γε τὴν ἐναντίαν ὁδὸν ἰὼν αὐτοῖς 
παραλείπει µὲν ἃ παρὰ τοῖς µουσικοῖς ἐχρῆν µεµαθηκέναι τὸν ἀξίως τῆς τέχνης 
                                                
28 See the reports of Censorinus and Martianus Capella in Herophilus frr. 187, 188a vS. 
29 I have not seen Wellman’s (1895) account.  See von Staden (1989: 278.n134) for further bibliography on 
the question of Aristoxenian influence. 
30 See von Staden (1989: 278-79) and von Staden (1996: 89). 
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πεπαιδευµένον, ὡς ἐπισταµένοις δ’ αὐτοῖς διαλέγεται, τὸ χρήσιµον εἰς τὴν 
ἰατρικὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν λαµβάνων. οἱ δ’ ὅταν τὴν θαυµαστὴν ταύτην, ὡς αὐτοὶ 
καλοῦσι, τεχνολογίαν τὴν περὶ τῶν ῥυθµῶν διεξέλθωσιν, οὐκέτ’ αὐτοῖς µέλει 
δεῖξαι, πῶς ἄν τις ἱκανὸς προγνῶναί τι δι’ αὐτῶν, ἢ σηµειώσασθαι γένοιτο. 
 
For this reason anyway whatever about rhythms of music they ought to have 
learned while they were still children in the schools they in no way bring to 
treatises of medicine, suffering the ill-effect of their late learning, nor can they 
keep silent, even if [the subject] belongs to another art.  No one of them wrote 
how one ought to make meaning from rhythm.  But Herophilus at least, going a 
route opposite to them, leaves out what someone worthily educated of the art 
should have learned from musicians, and speaks to them as if they understand, 
since he takes what is useful from them into medicine.  But they, whenever they 
detail this amazing system [τεχνολογίαν31] – as they call it – about rhythms, they 
no longer care to show how one might sufficiently make prognoses or interpret 
through these things.32 
 
The Galenic topos is the stupidity and poor education of his opponents; its form in the 
present passage is Galen’s medical opponents’ lack of knowledge about music.33  Music 
is a different techne than medicine and Herophilus brought music into medicine to 
produce a system of medical rhythm.  Galen’s further point is that Herophilus’ followers 
are so enchanted with his medical rhythms system that they cease to bother with 
predicting the course of diseases, the very purpose for which the system was developed.  
To understand Herophilus’ medical rhythms system one needs to understand the technical 
language of both medicine and music. 
 This passage is one of many where Galen explicitly states that Herophilus’ 
rhythmical language is drawn from ἡ µουσική, the techne, and οἱ µουσικοί, the 
practitioners of the techne.  There are other parallels of diction between Herophilus’ 
medical rhythm and musical rhythm.  For instance, Herophilus compared dilation and 
contraction to the up-beat (ἄρσις) and down-beat (θέσις), respectively, of musical 
rhythm.34  By Langslow’s (2000) criteria of Fachbezogenheit and Normung as argued in 
                                                
31 The word certainly does not mean its cognate, technology. Rather it seems to be a word associated with 
the comprehensive rhetorical nature of a techne.  See Mansfeld (1998: 82.n290). 
32 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 2.3, 8.871-2K = Herophilus fr. 184 vS. 
33 Note the key term of second sophistic culture and intellegentsia, πεπαιδευµε ´νος, in τὸν ἀξίως τῆς 
τέχνης πεπαιδευµένον. 
34 Herophilus fr. 183.3-7 vS. 
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chapter 1.3.2, the terms ῥυθµός, ἄρσις, and θέσις are technical language because of the 
specificity of their usage within a certain sociolect, the domain of practicing musicians 
and musical theorists.  The technical terms point both toward the sociolect, the technical 
language of the techne, and the social group employing them, the technitae.  Therefore 
the terms ῥυθµός, ἄρσις, and θέσις are part of the technical vocabulary of practicing 
musicians.35   
Herophilus coopted the language of the sociolect of musicians for some purpose 
by employing these terms in a medical context.  Langslow argues that one of the 
strengths of a technical language is the specificity of its use: the particularity of language 
use (Normung) is an act of categorization, specifying some object by particular reference.  
To compare arsis to dilation and thesis to contraction leads to the comparison between 
dilation and contraction in the manner similar to the comparison of arsis to thesis: the 
artery rises toward the physicians’ touch in dilation like the up-beat, the artery falls away 
from the physician’s touch in contraction like the down-beat.  Thus the new conceptual 
differentia that Herophilus was able to specify by using the terminology of musicians is 
the ratio of dilation to contraction, that is, the rhythm of the pulse.  The category of pulse 
rhythm was therefore founded on an analogy with the terminology of musical rhythm so 
as to describe as exactly as possible the new object. 
But underlying Herophilus’ project of categorization is the standard of 
measurement.  While Herophilus now had physical objects, arterial dilation and 
contraction, to analogize to the elements of musical rhythm, arsis and thesis, he lacked a 
conceptual tool by which to measure the time of dilation and contraction.  Aristoxenus of 
Tarentum’s theory of rhythm offers the ability to solve this problem.  Central to 
Herophilus’ appropriation is Aristoxenus’ concept of the ‘primary time-unit.’ 
Aristoxenus in his Elements of Rhythm aims to provide an analysis of rhythm on 
the basis of empirical phenomena.36  In his terminology, rhythm is composed of time-
                                                
35 See LSJ ῥυθµός I.1; LSJ ἄρσις III; LSJ θέσις VI. 
36 Most scholarship on Aristoxenus concerns his Elements of Harmonics, the major surviving work.  
Pearson (1990) is the best collection of evidence relating to Aristoxenus’ rhythmical theory.  See further 
accounts of Aristoxenus’ rhythmical theory in West (1992: 224-5) and Gibson (2005: 77-98). 
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lengths and things that are capable of assuming rhythm are called ῥυθµιζόµενα, 
rhythmizables.  In rhythm and rhythmizables Aristoxenus thus contrasts the notional and 
material properties, respectively, of rhythm in an Aristotelian manner.  The smallest unit 
of time into which rhythmizables can be broken down is the πρῶτος χρόνος, “primary 
time-unit”.  While book 1 of Aristoxenus’ Elements of Rhythm is lost, book 2 preserves 
an account of the primary time-unit. 
Time is divided by rhythmizables in each of its parts.  There are three 
rhythmizables: speech, song, and bodily motion.  Therefore speech will divide 
time by its parts, such as letters and syllables and words and all things of this 
kind.  Song will divide time by its pitches, intervals, and concords.  Bodily 
movement will divide time by its points and figures and [whatever else] if there is 
some such part of motion. 
Let be called a primary of time-units that capable of being divided by none 
of the rhymthziables, a diseme that measured twice by that <primary time-unit>, 
triseme [that measured] three times, a tetraseme [that measured] four times.  In 
the case of the remaining magnitudes they will get their names in the same way. 
The meaning of the primary time-unit must be understood in the following 
way.  One of the appearances that presents itself readily to perception is that the 
speeds of motions do not increase to an infinite degree, but are somehow fixed in 
arranged time-units, in which the parts of things that are set in motion are made.  
By things-set-in-motion I mean how the voice moves in speaking and singing and 
the body moves in signifying and dancing, moving the rest of such sort of 
movements. 
Since these appearances are so, it is clear that there is need that some of 
the time-units are the smallest [possible], in which the singer makes each note.  
The same account is clear concerning syllables and concerning signs. 
<The time-unit> in which two notes cannot be made in any way, nor two 
syllables, nor two signs, we will call this a primary time-unit [πρῶτον χρόνον].  
How the senses will perceive this will be clear in the case of the schema of feet.37 
 
Now speech, song, and bodily movement define separate elements of the rhythmizables: 
constituent parts are capable of assuming rhythm in relation to each other.  Even these 
smallest parts must take some unit of time.  The primary time-unit, πρῶτος χρόνος, is the 
amount of time coequal with the shortest elements within any rhythmizable.  That is, the 
primary time-unit remains whole and unable to be divided into further rational units (i.e. 
non-fractional) because the elements of the rhythmizables themselves cannot be divided 
                                                
37 Aristoxenus Elementa Rhythmica 2.9-12, 6-8 Pearson.  
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into further rational units.   
In Aristoxenus’ example of speech, for example, the smallest rhythmizable unit is 
the letter.  Since the primary time-unit will be dependent on the smallest rhythmizable, an 
entire sentence could thus be rhythmically analyzed as units of the primary time-unit: the 
rhythmic sequence of the sentence will consist of primary time-units, disemes (double the 
primary time-unit), trisemes (tripe the primary time-unit), and so on.38  The sentence’s 
rhythm exists as the relation of at least two time lengths: e.g. primary time-unit to 
primary time-unit, primary time-unit to diseme, etc.  The units of rhythm, based on the 
primary time-unit, are therefore dependent on rhythmizables, human perceptions of the 
non-divisibile elements of empirical objects: language in this case.39   
The length of time taken to pronounce a letter, a time that varies with each 
speaker, is the primary time-unit of spoken rhythm in Aristoxenus’ example of speech.  
Thus in Aristoxenus’ system the primary time-unit is not an absolute measurement: it will 
vary with the tempo applied to the medium of rhythm.  The primary time-unit is like the 
beat of the tempo: the primary time-unit can be shorter if the speaker speaks quickly, or 
longer if the speaker speaks more slowly.40  The primary time-unit is not an absolute 
length of time, only the time taken for the smallest divisible element of the rhythmizable. 
We can distinguish between two different types of temporal measurements.  The 
primary time-unit functions as what I will call normative time, measuring an event by the 
                                                
38 The example of letters would seem to work better in Greek than in English, where homophones, 
heteronyms, silent letters, and variant pronunciations of vowels abound.  Nevertheless, the example of 
letters assuming rhythm serves a literary point.  Gibson (2005: 78-81) points out that Aristoxenus is at 
pains to distinguish himself from previous theories of rhythm: Plato, Aristotle, and earlier theorists 
assumed that syllables of speech were the primary object capable of assuming rhythm.   
39 Gibson (2005: 92): “The chronos protos [i.e. the primary time-unit] provides a term for a unit of 
measurement which has no particular association to melody, poetry, or dance.  It establishes an atomic 
element from which rhythm can be built, functioning in a similar way as the diesis in some methods of 
harmonic theory.  The difference, of course, is that the diesis is generally assumed to be (at least 
approximately) a quarter-tone, whereas the protos chronos has no standard measure and varies infinitely 
according to the tempo of the rhythm.” 
40 Pearson (1990: 76): “A performer establishes the tempo of what he is going to play by deciding the 
length of the primary chronos, just as a musician today may fix the metronome setting at [quarter note] = 
120, deciding that each [quarter note] will take half a second, a hundred and twenty to the minute.”  A 
modern musician can equally establish a tempo at half the speed: he sets the metronome at a quarter note = 
60 so that each quarter note takes a second.  The protos chronos remains the same but the tempo has 
changed. 
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duration of the primary time-unit.  In Aristoxenus’ example of the sentence, the speaker’s 
spoken letter (the primary time-unit) functions as the normative measurement by which 
other temporal phenomena are counted.  The duration of the protos chronos of the spoken 
letter establishes the norm against which the sentence is measured.  By contrast, the 
length of passing time the speaker takes to say the sentence I will call standardized time.  
(I am deliberately avoiding the misleading terms ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ in describing 
the function of time; ‘normative’ and ‘standarized’ are not synonyms for ‘relative’ and 
‘absolute’.)  Suppose then that two speakers utter the same sentence.  Each speaker will 
use a letter as the same primary time-unit but one speaker will express the sentence faster 
than the other speaker: there is one normative time, the primary time-unit, and thus one 
rhythm, but there are two different standardized times, the passing duration of their 
utterances, and thus two tempos.   
 Herophilus used Aristoxenus’ primary time-unit in his pulse theory.  Several 
Herophilean fragments employ the term of ‘primary time-unit’.41  Moreover, the case for 
Herophilus’ appropriation of Aristoxenus’ rests on more than similar terminology: 
Herophilus appears to have actively employed Aristoxenus’ theory of the ‘primary time-
unit’ in his writings on pulse rhythm.  Galen notes that Herophilus used a unit of 
measurement to measure all parts of arterial pulsation: 
πῶς οὖν Ἡρόφιλος πρῶτός τινα πρὸς αἴσθησιν ὑποτίθεται χρόνον, ᾧ 
τοὺς ἄλλους µετρῶν ἢ δυοῖν, ἢ καὶ τριῶν, ἢ καὶ πλειόνων εἶναι φάσκει, ἤτοι 
τελέων τε καὶ ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοῦσιν ἀπαραύξων, ἢ καὶ ἀπηυξηµένων ἐπ’ ὀλίγον, 
ἢ ἐπὶ πλεῖον, ἢ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον;  
 
How therefore was Herophilus first to establish some time-unit in relation to 
sense-perception, by which he, in measuring the other <time-periods>, claimed 
that they consist either of two or three or more [of these units], or [that these 
units] are both perfect and not-subject-to-increase, as they themselves call them, 
or decreased a little or a great degree or the greatest degree?42 
 
Herophilus constructed some time-unit (Galen identifies this a ‘primary time-unit’, 
πρῶτος χρόνος, later in the passage43) and used it to measure the time of dilation and 
                                                
41 Herophilus frr. 178.2, 183.25 vS. 
42 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.913K = Herophilus fr. 174.1-5 vS.  See Appendix A for more on 
Galen’s disagreements with Herophilus. 
43 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.915K. 
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contraction: a pulse rhythm therefore might consist of two or three primary time-units.  
There is a common temporal measurement to all parts of the cycle of arterial dilation and 
contraction.  The time of other dilations and contractions measured in relation to the 
initial time-unit produce either multiples of two or three, Aristoxenus’ musical disemes 
and trisemes.  The time length of further dilations and contractions measured in relation 
to the initial time-unit produce fractions of varying complications and thus yield the 
rhythm of arterial dilation to contraction.44 
Therefore, the fragments of Herophilus’ theory of pulse rhythms show a 
correspondence of situational context and diction to Aristoxenus’ rhythmical theory. 
Herophilus’ usage of the term ‘primary time-unit’ and his employment of Aristoxenus’ 
theory of the primary time-unit indicate his appropriation of the terminology and theory 
of musicians.  The correspondence of situational context and diction between two texts is 
intertextualityA as shown in 1.3.1.  Herophilus has marked his appropriation of 
                                                
44 It seems clear that the passage must refer to fractions of some sort but what kind precisely is not at all 
clear, since it is difficult to know what Galen’s Greek means here: ἤτοι τελέων τε καὶ ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοῦσιν 
ἀπαραύξων, ἢ καὶ ἀπηυξηµένων ἐπ’ ὀλίγον, ἢ ἐπὶ πλεῖον, ἢ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον.  The terminology of fractions 
is confused.  For instance, τέλεος in arithmetic refers to perfect numbers, that is, a number whose divisers 
sum up to the number (e.g. 6 = 3+2+1); see LSJ s.v. I.5.b.  It may mean that here.  Although a ratio made of 
a numerator of a perfect number and a divisor of a perfect number can always be reduced further (in the 
example of 6:3 this can be reduced to 2:1), there is another testimonium (Herophilus fr. 177 vS) where 
multiple primary time-units yield pulses that are equivalent in ratio yet differ in temporal length.  For 
example, 1:1 of a child’s pulse rhythm is equivalent to 2:2 of an adult’s pulse rhythm but the adult’s pulse 
lasts twice as long as the child’s.  As long as Herophilus talks of primary time-units which measure others, 
one may apparently produce multiples of the time-unit in relation to multiples of the time measured.   
The next term about fractions, ἀπαραύξων, is even more confusing, since it appears only in this 
passage of all of Greek literature.  LSJ s.v. defines it as “not subject to increase” but calls the term itself 
“dubious.”  There is an entry s.v. in the 1831 Stephanus (Thesaurus Graecae Linguae) by Ludwig Dindorf 
as follows, which I refer to bibliographically as Dindorf (1831: 1.2.1193): “Quod ἀπαραυξῶν [note the 
accent] scribendum erit si vera quae de ἄναυξος diximus in Ἀναυξὴς, quae legitima est horum 
compositorum ab αὔξω forma, ut Ἐπαυξὴς etc. Ἀπηυξηµένων autem, quod vertitur Diminutorum, 
scribendum ἐπηυξηµένων, si haec contraria praecedentibus.”  Dindorf would thus rewrite the passage as 
ἤτοι τελέων τε καὶ ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοῦσιν ἀπαραυξῶν, ἢ καὶ ἐπηυξηµένων κτλ.  (My understanding of why 
Dindorf thinks that the text, contrary to what went before, should read ἐπηυξηµένων and the fractions thus 
increase, rather than decrease, is presumably to bring this phrase in line with Galen de dignoscendis 
pulsibus 3.3, 8.916: οὐ δεοµένοις τῶν πρώτων χρόνων ὁλοκλήρων τε καὶ παρηυξηµένων.)   
While we await a critical edition of Galen’s de dignoscendis pulsibus to improve on Kühn’s text, 
von Staden (1989: xxiii) remarks that he has collated five manuscripts of the Galenic text but that in 
general they do not differ much from Kühn’s text.  He notes no changes from Kühn’s text in his apparatus 
(1989: 347), thus giving the impression that the reading of ἤτοι τελέων τε καὶ ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοῦσιν 
ἀπαραύξων, ἢ καὶ ἀπηυξηµένων κτλ is, contra Dindorf, the correct one.  Correct Greek or not, what the 
passage precisely means remains something of a mystery. 
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Aristoxenian rhythmical theory through literary phenomena. 
 Herophilus’ appropriation of Aristoxenian rhythmical theory is a strategy of 
naturalization, since Aristoxenus located his notion of the πρῶτος χρόνος in physis.  
Aristoxenus begins the second book of his Elements of Rhythms with a summary of the 
now lost first book: 
ὅτι µὲν τοῦ ῥυθµοῦ πλείους εἰσὶ φύσεις καὶ ποία τις αὐτῶν ἑκάστη καὶ διὰ 
τίνας αἰτίας τῆς αὐτῆς ἔτυχον προσηγορίας καὶ τί αὐτῶν ἑκάστῃ ὑπόκειται, ἐν 
τοῖς ἔµπροσθεν εἰρηµένον … νοητέον δὲ δύο τινὰς φύσεις ταύτας, τήν τε τοῦ 
ῥυθµοῦ καὶ τὴν τοῦ ῥυθµιζοµένου. 
 
That the physeis of rhythm are many, what each of these is, for what reasons they 
have the same name, and what can be predicated to each of them, has been said in 
the previous sections … Consider the following two physeis, that of the rhythm 
and that of the rhythmizomenon.45 
 
As discussed above, Aristoxenus makes a division between rhythm and rhythmizomenon, 
the medium capable of assuming rhythm, and attributes a physis to both.  Since the protos 
chronos is a descriptive category of rhythmizomenon, it follows that any object described 
in terms of the protos chronos is a rhythmizomenon and therefore part of physis.  The 
pulsating artery is clearly an object capable of producing rhythm, a rhythmizomenon.  
Herophilus’ description of the pulsating artery using Aristoxenus’ protos chronos 
connects the physis of the timing of musical rhythm with the physis of the artery’s 
movement in time, a naturalizing strategy of making connections between previously 
separate areas of physis.  
Galen records an important testimonium about Herophilus’ implementation of the 
primary time-unit to explain Herophilus’ empirical identification of pulse rhythms, “a 
time-unit in relation to sense-perception”.46 
γέγραπται µὲν οὖν καὶ Ἡροφίλῳ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους µετὰ τῆς διαστολῆς τε 
καὶ συστολῆς, ἕνεκα τῶν ἡλικιῶν εἰς ῥυθµοὺς ἀνάγοντι τὸν λόγον. ὥσπερ γὰρ 
ἐκείνους οἱ µουσικοὶ κατά τινας ὡρισµένας χρόνων τάξεις συνιστῶσι 
παραβάλλοντες ἀλλήλαις ἄρσιν καὶ θέσιν, οὕτως καὶ Ἡρόφιλος ἀνάλογον µὲν 
ἄρσει τὴν διαστολὴν ὑποθέµενος, ἀνάλογον δὲ θέσει τὴν συστολὴν τῆς 
ἀρτηρίας, ἀρξάµενος ἀπὸ τοῦ νεογενοῦς παιδίου τὴν τήρησιν ἐποιήσατο, 
πρῶτον χρόνον αἰσθητὸν ὑποθέµενος ἐν ᾧ διαστελλοµένην εὕρισκε τὴν 
ἀρτηρίαν, ἴσον δ’ αὐτῇ καὶ τὸν τῆς συστολῆς εἶναι φησὶν, οὐ πάνυ τι 
                                                
45 Aristoxenus Elementa Rhythmica 2.1-3, 2.1-10 Pearson. 
46 Herophilus fr. 174.1-2 vS. 
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διοριζόµενος ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρας τῶν ἡσυχιῶν.  
 
So the time-units with dilation and contraction have been written also by 
Herophilus, since he drew ratio into rhythms for the sake of his age-groups.  For 
just as musicians establish those <rhythms> in certain defined arrangements of 
time-units by comparing the up-beat and down-beat with each other, so 
Herophilus, supposing that the dilation of the artery was analogous to the up-beat 
and that the contraction of the artery was analogous to the down-beat, made his 
observation beginning from a newly born child.  Supposing that a perceptible 
time-unit in which he found the artery dilating was primary, he claims that the 
<time-unit> of the contraction was at least equal to it, not quite distinguishing 
about either of the rests.47 
 
Herophilus took a newborn to measure its pulse rhythm in dilation and contraction.  He 
felt the dilation of an artery and called its temporal duration the primary time-unit.  The 
time of dilation of the artery of the newborn thus becomes the common temporal 
measurement by which other sphygmological phenomena are measured.  Galen next says 
that Herophilus claimed (φησὶν) that the length of time of arterial contraction is the same 
as the dilation.48  Thus the time-unit of arterial dilation is equivalent to the time-unit of 
arterial contraction in a newborn.  The ratio of dilation to contraction, that is, the rhythm 
of the infant’s pulse, is thus a primary-time unit to a primary time-unit.  The newborn 
child’s pulse rhythm is thus 1:1.  Later in Galen’s testimonium Herophilus calls this pulse 
rhythm proportional (δι’ ἴσου).49 
Herophilus established a normative pulse rhythm not only for infants: each age-
group has its own pulse rhythm.  Probably the most significant passage for our 
understanding of Herophilus’ pulse rhythms, a section of [Rufus of Ephesus]’ Synopsis of 
                                                
47 Galen synopsis librorum suorum de pulsibus 12, 9.463-5 K = Herophilus fr. 183.1-11 vS. 
48 The text is loose with language here.  In ἴσον δ’ αὐτῇ καὶ τὸν τῆς συστολῆς εἶναι φησὶν equivalence is 
between the time-unit of contraction (τὸν τῆς συστολῆς) and dilation itself (αὐτῇ), when it needs to be 
between the time-unit of contraction and the time-unit of dilation, which would be τῷ αὐτῆς in Greek.  Yet 
it is clear that the equivalence between time-units is what is meant, since in the third paragraph  
(Herophilus fr. 183.22 vS) Galen says that the rhythm of the pulse in newborns is equal (δι᾽ ἴσου).  
Moreover, since Galen does not believe that arterial contraction is easily perceptible (see Appendix A), 
perhaps Galen is asserting his own views of what was possible for Herophilus or perhaps Herophilus did, as 
Galen says, assume and not measure that the time of arterial contraction was equivalent to arterial dilation.  
It is clear at least that Herophilus did equate dilation with contraction. 
49 Herophilus fr. 183.22 vS.  The terminology of rhythmical proportionality is mathematical.  See ἴσος 3.b 
in Mugler (1958: 229-231). 
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Pulses, reveals how Herophilus qualified pulse rhythm for all other age-groups.  [Rufus] 
has just explained how Herophilus’ pulse for infants was equivalent in ratio, 1:1. 
προβαινούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦ σώµατος εἰς αὔξησιν ἐρχοµένου, καὶ ὁ 
σφυγµὸς πρὸς λόγον µεγεθύνεται, πρὸς λόγον τὴν διαστολὴν τῆς συστολῆς 
λαµβάνων πλατυτέραν· ὅ τε λοιπὸν ἔστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐφαρµόσαι πρὸς 
ἀπόδειξιν ἐκ τοῦ ποδισµοῦ τῆς γραµµατικῆς· ὁ µὲν γὰρ πρῶτος ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἀρτιγενῶν παίδων εὑρισκόµενος σφυγµὸς ῥυθµὸν λήψεται τὸν τοῦ 
βραχυσυλλάβου· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ διαστολῇ καὶ τῇ συστολῇ βραχὺς ὑπάρχει, καὶ 
διὰ τοῦτο δίχρονος νοεῖται· ὁ δὲ τῶν πρὸς αὔξησιν ὄντων ἀναλογεῖ τῷ τε παρὰ 
ἐκείνοις ποδὶ τροχαίῳ· ἔστι δὲ οὗτος τρίχρονος, τὴν µὲν διαστολὴν ἐπὶ δύο 
χρόνους λαµβάνων, ἐπὶ ἕνα δὲ τὴν συστολήν. ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀκµαζόντων ταῖς 
ἡλικίαις ἐν ἀµφοτέροις ἴσος ὑπάρχει, ἔν τε τῇ διαστολῇ καὶ τῇ συστολῇ, 
συγκρινόµενος τῷ καλουµένῳ σπονδείῳ, ὃς τῶν δισυλλάβων ποδῶν 
µακρότατός ἐστιν· ἔστιν οὖν συγκείµενος ἐκ χρόνων τεσσάρων. τοῦτον τὸν 
σφυγµὸν Ἡρόφιλος διὰ ἴσου καλεῖ. ὁ δὲ τῶν παρακµαζόντων καὶ σχεδὸν ἤδη 
γερόντων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ τριῶν σύγκειται χρόνων, τὴν συστολὴν τῆς διαστολῆς 
διπλῆν παραλαµβάνων καὶ χρονιωτέραν. 
 
As the age-group advances and the body grows, the pulse too enlarges in ratio, 
taking in ratio a broader dilation than contraction.  As for the rest, it is possible for 
them to harmonize as regards the proof from the scansion of grammar.  For the 
pulse found first in recently born children will take for its rhythm that of a short 
syllable: for it is short in dilation and contraction and for this reason is considered 
two time-units.  The <pulse> of those growing is analogous to the foot [called] by 
them trochee.  This is three time-units, taking its dilation for two time-units and 
its contraction for one <time-unit>.  The <pulse> of those prime in their age-
group is equal in both, in both dilation and contraction, and is comparable to the 
so-called spondee, which is the longest of the disyllabic feet.  This is composed of 
four time-units.  Herophilus calls this pulse proportional.  The pulse of those past 
their prime and nearly old people already is itself composed of three time-units, 
offering a contraction twice its dilation and longer.50 
 
Children, as we have just seen, have a pulse rhythm two primary time-units long, one for 
dilation and one for contraction.  When set in ratio, as per musical rhythm, this pulse is a 
1:1 ratio or, in musical terms, a primary time-unit to a primary time-unit and thus a 
metrical pyrrhic.  Youths have a pulse three time-units in length, two for dilation and one 
for contraction; this pulse is a 2:1 ratio or a diseme to a primary time-unit and thus a 
metrical trochee.  Adults have a pulse four time units long, two for dilation and two for 
contraction; this pulse is a 2:2 ratio or a diseme to a diseme and thus a metrical spondee.  
Old people have a pulse three time-units in length, one for dilation and two for 
                                                
50 [Rufus of Ephesus] Synopsis de pulsibus 4, 223-5 Daremberg/Ruelle = Herophilus fr. 177.12-30 vS.  
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contraction; this pulse is a 1:2 ratio or a primary time-unit to a diseme and thus a metrical 
iamb.   
   This passage shows Herophilus establishing normative rhythms for each age-
group.  Although the term ‘primary time-unit’ does not appear in this passage, Herophilus 
employed some similar notion, for the passage talks in terms of χρόνοι or time-units.  
What is the basis of the protos chronos which forms these time-units?  Herophilus 
employed the time of dilation of the artery of the newborn as the time-unit protos 
chronos for all age-groups, for [Rufus of Ephesus] indicates that there is some 
comparison across age-groups: if there is no descriptive mensurandum common to all 
age-groups, it is difficult to see how Herophilus intended to compare pulse rhythms.51   
 Herophilus’ solution in turn leads to two possibilities, both problematic.  (1) The 
first possibility is that Herophilus described the rhythm of the infant’s dilation to 
contraction as 1:1 generically, i.e. that any member of the infantile age-group has a 1:1 
pulse rhythm with a generic protos chronos.  This would imply that the protos chronos 
Herophilus identifies is generic and typologized to some degree: the infant’s protos 
chronos is the fixed time Herophilus identified by perception; this time of the protos 
chronos is taken to stand for the protos chronos of all other infants, and further that this 
protos chronos is the basis of the temporal measurements of the rhythms of all other age-
groups.  This procedure allows Herophilus to compare pulse rhythms across age-groups, 
as [Rufus of Ephesus] indicated.  But in so doing Herophilus has moved the protos 
chronos closer to a set time and thus negated much of the flexibility of the measurement 
of the protos chronos, which can vary with each individual.  (2) The second possibility of 
interpretating the infant’s 1:1 pulse is that Herophilus identified a unique protos chronos 
with each individual patient and that, as the individual grows into new age-groups, the 
                                                
  
51 [Rufus of Ephesus] Synopsis de pulsibus 4, 223-5 Daremberg/Ruelle = Herophilus fr. 177.12-30 vS 
seems to indicate that there is a comparison of time-units across age-groups: the short syllables of the 
infant’s pyrrhic pulse rhythm are comparable to the short syllables of the teenager’s trochaic pulse rhythm.  
Galen’s de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.913K = Herophilus fr. 174.1-10 vS claims that Herophilus 
establishs “some time-unit in relation to sense-perception, by which he, in measuring the other <time-
periods>, claimed that they consist either of two or three or more [of these units]”.   
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patient’s 2:2 rhythm of adulthood is measured on the basis of his childhood protos 
chronos.52  While conforming better to Aristoxenus’ sense of the flexibility of the 
temporal measurement of the protos chronos and allowing a comparison of pulse rhythms 
across age-groups per individual, this possibility seems to destroy the clinical efficacy of 
the measurement of pulse rhythm, since a doctor without knowledge of an individual 
patient’s childhood protos chronos is unable to use the pulse rhythm for diagnosis and 
prognosis.   
And yet it is clear at least that there is a correspondence of diction and situational 
context between Aristoxenus’ theory of the protos chronos and Herophilus’ fragments on 
pulse rhythm, and further that Herophilus has developed a basic unit of measurement in 
accord with Aristoxenus’ procedure for identifying the protos chronos as the smallest 
temporal unit of the rhythmizomenon’s motion apparent to perception.  That is, 
Herophilus has appropriated Aristoxenus’ language and development of the protos 
chronos, but Herophilus’ use of the theoretical concept seems to negate the flexibility of 
the protos chronos.  If we interpret Herophilus’ identification of the infant’s protos 
chronos in sense (2) above, the more our intepretation will assert Herophilus’ 
appropriation of Aristoxenus in all respects of Aristoxenus’ theory and yet Herophilus’ 
pulse theory will be less medically coherent and useful for diagnosis and prognosis.  If 
we interpret Herophilus’ identification of the infant’s protos chronos in sense (1) above, 
the more our interpretation will lessen the effectiveness of Herophilus’ appropriation of 
Aristoxenus’ protos chronos and yet will give medical purpose to Herophilus’ 
comparison of pulse rhythms.  I prefer to give an interpretation which assumes the 
medical purposiveness of Herophilus’ theory at the expense of his appropriation of 
Aristoxenus in all respects.  
Therefore, I argue that we should understand the infant’s 1:1 pulse according to 
interpretation (1) above.  The infant’s pulse is a typologizeed and generic measurement, 
which serves as the basis for the temporal phenomena of the pulse rhythms of other age-
                                                
52 We assume that each individual patient has his own pulse rhythm, which can be measured according to a 
unique protos chronos derived from observation of that individual. 
 72 
groups.  When we compare the infantile age-group’s 1:1 pulse rhythm to the adult age-
group’s 2:2 rhythm, they have the same ratio of dilation to contraction but different 
rhythms; and further, since the infantile protos chronos is the temporal measurement 
common to age-groups, the infant’s cycle of dilation to contraction moves twice as 
quickly as an adult’s 2:2 pulse rhythm.  That is, the protos chronos of the infant is a 
normative time for the infantile age-groups, but a standardized time for the adult age-
group.  Thus what becomes important in this schema is the patient’s classification into 
age-groups, not the individual patient’s uniquely determined protos chronos.  I argue in 
2.4.2 that Herophilus’ therapeutic use of pulse rhythm depends on the patient’s 
classification within a typologized schema of rhythms per age-group. 
Therefore, the time of dilation of the infant’s pulse thus becomes the common unit 
of temporal measurement by which the pulse rhythms of other age-groups are measured.  
By setting the infant’s protos chronos as the norming standard of other age-groups, 
Herophilus is able to measure the duration of the pulse of other age-groups.  Like 
Aristoxenus’ protos chronos, Herophilus’ protos chronos establishes a normative time 
measurement, that is, measuring an event by the duration of the primary time-unit.  
Moreover, just as in Aristoxenus’ example of a spoken sentence, Herophilus’ protos 
chronos remains constant for its rhythmizomenon while the length of standard time 
varies.  [Rufus of Ephesus] explains that the infant’s pulse is 1:1, a primary time-unit to a 
primary time-unit and that the adult’s pulse is 2:2, two primary time-units to two primary 
time-units.  The infant and the adult beat out their individual pulse rhythms using the 
normative measurement of the protos chronos in two different standardized times.  The 
rhythm of dilation to contraction remains the same within age-groups while the rhythm of 
dilation to contraction changes between age-groups.   
In summary, Herophilus employs a protos chronos, the primary time-unit, to 
serve as the standard mensurandum of pulse phenomena.  He identifies this 
mensurandum with his own ability to determine the time of the dilation of the infant’s 
artery.  Herophilus’ adaption of Aristoxenus’ protos chronos to measure pulse 
phenomena consequently utilizes the descriptive attributes of physis in one field, music, 
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and applies that description to another aspect of physis, the expansion of the infant’s 
dilating artery.  As the summary of Lloyd’s (1991b) argument showed in 2.1.1, 
Hellenistic period scientists’ appeal to physis is an appeal to a unified conception of 
nature whose attributes under one science might be recognized in another science.  The 
naturalization of Herophilus’ strategy of interessement in adapting Aristoxenian protos 
chronos is therefore an implicit recognition of the unity of physis across scientific 
domains.  The naturalizing link is made at one point: Herophilus’ identification of the 
time of the infant’s dilating artery with Aristoxenus’ protos chronos. 
2.2.2 Herophilus’ Water-Clock 
Herophilus’ other attempt to measure the timing of pulse phenomena is by means 
of a water-clock.  The one account of Herophilus’ application of a water-clock to pulse 
measurement comes from Marcellinus’ On Pulses, a short second-century CE treatise 
concerned with enumerating differences in the pulse theory of prominent ancient 
doctors.53  Marcellinus’ description of Herophilus’ practice is exciting for several 
reasons: (1) it shows Herophilus’ concern for practice as well as theory;54 (2) it shows 
that some ancient scientists were able to integrate machines into their study of nature, 
yielding Latour’s technoscience;55 (3) it shows that some ancient Greek scientists had an 
interest in quantification to the extent of mathematizing nature.56  I will argue that 
                                                
53 While I believe that Marcellinus’ report about Herophilus’ water-clock is historically accurate, I stress 
two notes of caution.  First, Marcellinus’ is the only report that Herophilus used a water-clock; no other 
source indicates that any ancient doctor applied timing devices to measure pulse frequency.  Second, 
Marcellinus post-dates Herophilus by 400 years and it is striking that so interesting a scientific attempt 
went unrecorded in other extant medical sources interested in either mechanical devices or pulse theory, 
such as Galen and Oribasius.  Despite these caveats, the fact that Herophilus’ water-clock is an Egyptian 
style of water-clock is a strong argument that Marcellinus’ report is historically accurate for Herophilus’ 
context in early Alexandria. 
54 Von Staden (1989: 283): Marcellinus’ report “strikingly demonstrates Herophilus’ desire to bridge the 
gap between theory and practice.” 
55 See chapter 1.4 for this concept. 
56 See Lloyd (1987: 283-4): “[T]here is the evident ambition to make the inquiry an exact one, to construct 
pulse theory on the model of music, the successful mathematisation of harmonics.  If the main concords are 
expressible in terms of simple numerical relationships, why not also the main ratios between dilations and 
contractions of the arteries?”  Lloyd confuses what sort of ‘music’ the ancient sources refer to; in reference 
to Herophilus’ theories of pulse rhythm, it is rhythmical theory not harmonic theory.  
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Herophilus’ application of the water-clock to measure pulses is a Greek use of 
normativized time on an Egyptian style of water-clock.57 
Marcellinus offers first the position (στάσις) of Herophilus on the pulse of those 
with fever and then concludes his description of Herophilus’ theoretical view with an 
account of his practice. 
οὕτω δὲ τῇ πυκνοσφυξίᾳ τὸν Ἡρόφιλον θαρρεῖν λόγος ὡς βεβαίῳ σηµείῳ 
χρώµενον, ὥστε κλεψύδραν κατασκευάσαι χωρητικὴν ἀριθµοῦ ῥητοῦ τῶν κατὰ 
φύσιν σφυγµῶν ἑκάστης ἡλικίας εἰσιόντα τε πρὸς τὸν ἄρρωστον καὶ τιθέντα 
τὴν κλεψύδραν ἅπτεσθαι τοῦ πυρέσσοντος· ὅσῳ δ’ ἂν πλείονες παρέλθοιεν 
κινήσεις τῶν σφυγµῶν παρὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὴν ἐκπλήρωσιν τῆς 
κλεψύδρας, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὸν σφυγµὸν πυκνότερον ἀποφαίνειν, τουτέστι 
πυρέσσειν ἢ µᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον. 
 
The story goes that Herophilus was so encouraged in using the frequency of pulse 
as a secure sign that he constructed a water-clock holding an expressed 
measurement for the natural pulses of each age-group and that on entering in to 
the patient and setting down the water-clock felt the patient with fever <for his 
pulse>. By as much as the greater movements of pulses overshot the <magnitude> 
natural for the filling-out of the water-clock, by so much did he reveal the pulse to 
be more frequent, that is, either more or less feverish.58 
 
Marcellinus recounts that Herophilus constructed a water-clock to quantify the extent of a 
patient’s fever; the clock contained measurements, likely lines drawn inside the bowl, set 
for each age-group.  Frequency, the differentia measured by Herophilus’ water-clock, is 
different from the differentia of rhythm measured by Aristoxenus’ protos chronos.59  The 
                                                
57 Since Herophilus was a Greek colonist to Egypt, colonialism is a potentially important framework for 
understanding Herophilus’ theory of pulsation.  Ancient Egyptian doctors also employ pulse in their 
medicine.  Dynastic Egyptian doctors refer to the pulse in the Ebers Papyrus and the Smith Papyrus; see 
Barton (1994b: 152) for further bibliography.  Von Staden (1989: 9-13) cautions that the structural 
comparison of Greek and Egyptian vascular systems does not result in the same diagnostic use of the pulse 
for the medicine of each culture.  My analysis focuses on Herophilus’ use of native Egyptian technology. 
58 Marcellinus de pulsibus 11, 463 Schöne = Herophilus fr. 182.8-15 vS. 
59 What differentia does ‘frequency’ correspond to in Herophilus’ thought? ‘Frequency’ as a differentia 
occurs only in Marcellinus’ report of Herophilus’ water-clock and discussion of Herophilus’ prognosis of 
patients with fever, discussed in 2.4.1.  Von Staden (1989: 284) discusses how later Greek physicians 
employed ‘speed’ and ‘frequency’ as distinct differentiae.  He concludes that, whatever the relationship 
between ‘speed’ and ‘frequency’ in Herophilus’ thought, Herophilus “did not merely develop ‘speed’ as a 
hypothetical differentia which in practice was abandoned in favour of ‘frequency,’” as Herophilus’ specific 
classifications of ‘speed’ show.  While it is possible that Herophilus intended ‘frequency’ to correspond to 
‘amount’ (the fifth differentia listed at the beginning of his treatise On Pulses) due to ‘amounts’ of water at 
the measurement lines appropriate for the different age-groups in Marcellinus’ report of Herophilus’ water-
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timing device of a water-clock is not the frequency of the individual drops but rather their 
collective accumulation in a bowl or vessel underneath.  When the vessel underneath is 
filled, a set period of time has elapsed;60 the doctor will subsequently compare the 
number of beats he has counted to the number he would expect in the patient’s age-group, 
the frequency of pulse beat.  
The water-clock and sundial were the only time measuring devices available in 
Greco-Roman antiquity; the water-clock was by far the more precise.61  All water-clocks 
operate by allowing gravity to force falling water from one vessel to another.  They differ 
in the amount of water they hold, the rate of the falling water, and whether the falling 
water is measured in the upper or lower vessel.  There are three kinds of water-clocks but 
only two are relevant for Marcellinus’ report about Herophilus: these types are out-flow 
clocks and in-flow clocks.62 
In an out-flow clock gravity forces water to flow from a vessel with a small exit 
hole.  The clock’s timing is measured by the amount of water that flows out from the 
vessel.  An out-flow clock needs only one vessel, since the water could flow out onto the 
ground, although to reuse water a lower catching vessel was often employed. It seems 
that the Greek term κλεψύδρα, translated as ‘water-clock’,63 refers only to the vessel by 
which time was measured: in the case of the out-flow clock κλεψύδρα refers to the upper 
vessel (if there was a second, lower catching vessel). The out-flow clock was known in 
both ancient Greece and dynastic Egypt.  A water-clock from the Athenian agora, shown 
in illustration 1, is the only extant pre-Hellenistic Greek out-flow water-clock recovered.  
                                                
clock, the matter is still not clear to me.  I treat ‘frequency’ as a separate differentia original to Herophilus 
but unenunciated in the catalogue of differentiae in On Pulses. 
60 The modern analogue is the kitchen timer: its buzz at the elapsed time records a length of time rather 
than individual moments, as a stop-watch does. 
61 For scholarship on water-clocks in antiquity see Borchardt (1920) for Egyptian clock capabilities, Pogo 
(1936) for Egyptian material remains, Young (1939) for Athenian material remains, Drachmann (1948) for 
Greek theoretical treatises and typologies, and Landels (1979) for theoretical and practical issues involved 
in the production of water-clocks.  
62 See Borchardt (1920: 6) for out-flow and in-flow clocks; see Drachmann (1948: 16-18) for a constant-
flow clock.  Drachmann’s (1948) third kind is not portable and Marcellinus de pulsibus 11 says that 
Herophilus carried his with him: εἰσιόντα τε πρὸς τὸν ἄρρωστον καὶ τιθέντα τὴν κλεψύδραν “entering in 
to the patient and setting down the water-clock.” 
63 LSJ s.v. II. 
 76 
Holding 6.4 litres, it empties in six minutes; it has no markings on the interior of the 
vessel. 
 
Illustration 1: Athenian Water-Clock.64 
The oldest extant dynastic Egyptian out-flow water-clock dates from c.1380 BCE 
and holds 39 liters of water, roughly six times larger than the extant Athenian clock.65 As 
an astronomical device, the outside of the Egyptian clock is covered in hieroglyphs for 
the twelve months of the calendar.  As shown in illustration 2, the inside of the clock is 
covered by twelve series of vertical markings: set at varying heights, they mark the 
differing length of hours that have passed of the night for any given month.  As the water-
flows out, an observer can mark the passing of an hour at different times of the year by 
inspecting the interior of the out-flowing vessel. 
We can distinguish between how the clock functions and the use to which it is 
put.  The Greek water-clock was used for what I will call normative time, that is, 
measuring an event by the duration of the clock’s emptying.  Greek water-clocks, like the 
clock from the agora, were used to limit the length of the speaker’s time in court cases 
such that different types of legal cases had different time lengths established for the 
prosecution and defense.  Thus the duration of the clock establishes the norm against 
                                                
64 Young (1939: 284). 
65 For an assessment of the Egyptian clock’s capabilities, see Borchardt (1920: 14-19).  For the best 
illustration of the clock’s exterior see Neugebauer and Parker (1969: plate 2); for the illustration of the 
clock’s interior see Borchardt (1920: plate 3). 
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which the event is measured.  Without markings on the inside of the clock it is impossible 
to measure fractions or parts of the time which elapses as the water in the clock flows out. 
 
Illustration 2: Interior of Egyptian Water-Clock.66 
The Egyptian clock, by contrast, is used for what I will call standardized time, 
that is, measuring segments of passing time.  The Egyptian clock measures the hours of 
the passing night for each month, as a way for the astronomer to regulate his own 
position in the night.  Thus the water-clock regulating standardized time measures itself 
against the visual position of the sun, moon, and stars around the earth.  The internal 
markings of the bowl allow the clock’s user to measure standardized fractions of passing 
time. 
The second type of water-clock is an inflow clock, known only from dynastic 
Egypt.  (The inflow clock was not known in classical Greece; the earliest archaeological 
evidence for an in-flow clock in Greece dates from the Roman period.67)  In the in-flow 
clock gravity forces water flowing from an upper container into the receiving chamber; 
the timing device is the amount of water filling-in to the receiving chamber. An in-flow 
clock thus needs two vessels; its measuring bowl, the lower vessel, is called κλεψύδρα in 
                                                
66 Borchardt (1920: plate 3). 
67 See The Athenian Agora: A Guide (1976: 168-69) with reference to the Tower of the Winds. 
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Greek.  Many small Egyptian in-flow clocks survive; some only nine centimeters high, 
they are votive offerings intended to represent larger in-flow clocks but are not marked 
inside their receiving bowls.  Illustration 3 shows a Ptolemaic king, dressed as an 
Egyptian pharaoh, offering to a goddess a votive in-flow water-clock in his outstretched 
left hand.  The one large surviving in-flow water-clock from dynastic Egypt, an 
astronomical device, is marked inside its receiving bowl.68  Due to the interior markings 
of the receiving chamber, the Egyptian in-flow clocks, like Egyptian outflow clocks, 
measure standardized time. 
 
 
Illustration 3: Ptolemaic Pharaoh Offering a Votive Water-Clock.69 
Now Herophilus’ water-clock is a normative use of time, as in the Greek style of 
clock.  Marcellinus recounts that Herophilus constructed a water-clock to quantify the 
extent of a patient’s fever for each age-group.  The measurement bowl of Herophilus’ 
water-clock thus provides a segment of standardized time during which a normative 
number of pulse beats is expected.  Thus Herophilus’ use of the water-clock is a 
                                                
68 Borchardt (1920: plate 6) illustrates both the exterior and interior of the surviving dynastic Egyptian 
large in-flow water-clock. 
69 Pogo (1936: 421-22), who believes that the pharaoh is the Ptolemaic king Ptolemy XII Auletes. 
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normative use of the clock, measuring the pulse against the standardized period of time of 
the clock. 
Herophilus’ water-clock is also an in-flow water-clock, as in the Egyptian style of 
clock.  First, Marcellinus’ noun ἐκπλήρωσιν, meaning “filling up”,70 confirms that 
Herophilus has used an in-flow clock.  The action of the water filling up the measuring 
vessel only takes places in the inflow clock.71  Second, Marcellinus’ phrase χωρητικὴν 
ἀριθµοῦ ῥητοῦ implies that Herophilus has made a receiving bowl capable of measuring 
the amount of water that should flow in for a specified number of beats for each of the 
different ages.  The noun χωρητικὴν literally means “capable of having space”, i.e. a 
capacity for holding or containing, as in the capacity of the bowl of the clock.72  P.Oxy. 
470, an Oxychrynchus papyrus describing how to build a water-clock, employs 
terminology similar to Marcellinus’ description of Herophilus’ water-clock.73  The 
papyrus clock appears to be an out-flow clock on the conic frustrum model of the 
dynastic Egyptian clock.  In particular, the papyrus describes the dimensions of the clock 
as follows: 
τὸν δὲ τῶ[ν ὡ- ρολογίων ἀριθµὸν τῆς [κα- τασκευῆς οὕτως ἀ[πο- διδόασιν, τὸ 
µὲν ἄνω [  ὁλµίσκου δακτύλων [κδ  ποιοῦντες, τὸν δὲ πυθµέν[α  ιβ 
δακτυλων, τὸ βάθος δ[α- κτύλων ιη. 
 
They transmit the measurement of the build of the timing-devices as follows, 
making the upper conic section twenty-four dactyls, the base twelve dactyls, and 
the depth fifteen dactyls.74 
 
The papyrus seems to use ἀριθµὸν, literally “number”, to indicate the dimensions and 
capacities of the measuring bowl.  Applying this sense of ἀριθµὸν to the Marcellinus 
passage, ἀριθµοῦ ῥητοῦ in Marcellinus will refer to the dimension of the clock. Together 
                                                
70 LSJ s.v. I. 
71 Von Staden’s (1989: 354) apparatus records Schmidt’s conjecture of ἐκκένωσιν for ἐκπλήρωσιν.  
Schmidt thus understood Herophilus’ water-clock to be an out-flow clock.  Von Staden’s text should be 
retained. 
72 LSJ s.v. χωρητικός 1. 
73 See Grenfell and Hunt (1903: 141-46) for an edition of the whole and commentary on particular 
passages.  See also Borchardt’s (1920: plates 7-8) edition of the text, which has emendations to bring the 
papyrus clock’s dimensions into harmony with the known material remains.  
74 P.Oxy. 470.31-38. 
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χωρητικὴν ἀριθµοῦ ῥητοῦ will therefore refer to the measurement bowl of the clock, 
“holding an expressed measurement”. Finally, the verb in the Marcellinus passage, 
παρέλθοιεν, meaning “overshoot”, indicates that the measurement bowl will have been 
marked inside with a level appropriate for each age-group.  Suppose then that a line 
inside the measure bowl appropriate for the age-group of adults corresponds to 50 beats: 
if the doctor feels 60 beats in the time period of the bowl’s filling to the measurement 
line, the patient’s pulse overshoots the norm for the age-group.   
 We thus imagine Herophilus entering the house of the patient, setting down an 
apparatus which allows water to flow into an in-flow water-clock at a predictable rate, 
holding his patient’s forearm to feel the pulse, and counting pulse beats as the water fills 
the bowl to the measuring lines appropriate for the patient’s age-group.  Herophilus’ 
attempt to quantify the pulse by water-clock is a new concept: the application of an 
standardized measurement to normal pulse frequency.  The water-clock was an old and 
traditional tool in both Greek and Egyptian culture, of which the in-flow clock with 
interior marking seems to have ben favored in Eygpt, the out-flow clock in Greece.  
Egyptian clocks were used for standardized time, Greek clocks were used for normative 
time.  I therefore suggest that we see Herophilus the Greek colonist using an Egyptian 
tool for a Greek conceptual end. 
Finally, let us conclude by returning to the comparison by intertexualityR of 
Herophilus’ multiple attempts to measure the pulse with some temporal concept. 
Herophilus’ water-clock’s normative use of time parallels Herophilus’ use of 
Aristoxenus’ theory of musical rhythm.  Aristoxenus’ theory of musical rhythm adapts its 
temporal measurement to the smallest divisible element of the mensurandum.  Herophilus 
identified the infant’s dilation as the smallest divisible element of arterial pulsation; he 
constructed the artery’s temporal rhythm by using multiples of the temporal unit by 
which he measured the infant’s dilation.  Since Herophilus’ measurement of the pulse by 
the protos chronos is the measurement of a temporal event against an elapsed time, the 
notion of the primary time-unit is thus also a normative measurement of time, as was 
argued in 2.2.1.  In both his adaption of Aristoxenus’ protos chronos and utilization of 
the in-flow water-clock Herophilus employed foremost Greek conceptual understandings 
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of time.  If historians cannot judge the chronological priority of Herophilus’ multiple 
attempts to measure the timing of the pulse and its constituent parts, we can at least 
emphasize the conceptual continuity between these two attempts.  
2.3 EMERGENCE, OR NOVELTY EMBEDDED 
Herophilus’ new object, pulse, thus results from multiple elements.  I will call 
Herophilus’ pulse a materio-semantic object in order to emphasize different layers of its 
process of coming-into-being.  The new object arose from empirical phenomena such as 
Herophilus’ identification of arterial dilation, the length of time of arterial expansion, and 
the time of filling-in of Egyptian-style in-flow water-clocks.  The new object also arose 
from conceptual categories: Aristoxenus’ primary time-unit, the assumption of 
equivalence between arterial dilation and contraction in the infant’s pulse, the Greek 
mathematics of proportionality and ratio, the Greek notion of normative time, 
Herophilus’ own mental ability to identify arterial expansion, and so on.  The pulse 
therefore has both a material component, the length of time of arterial expansion, and 
semantic ones, derived variously from language, tradition, practical skill, and the cultural 
identification of time.  The discovery of a new scientific object does not come without 
this compound of empirical and mental categories, without phenomena that are 
ahistorical and phenomena unique to a given time and place.  Herophilus did claim that 
only arteries pulsate; that is true.  Herophilus described those pulsations in a way that 
depended on contemporary musical terminology; that is a historical science. 
The philosophical theme of Herophilus’ pulse theory is therefore the emergence 
of new concepts and ideas in science.  We might variously call Herophilus’ pulse theory a 
discovery or invention and thereby signal our philosophical commitment to realism or 
relativism, respectively: if we say that Herophilus discovered the pulse, we mean that the 
pulse is a biological reality, a permanent and enduring object whose existence does not 
depend on human perception and is hence subject to the cultural qualifications of human 
perception; conversely if we say that Herophilus invented the pulse, we mean strongly 
that Herophilus’ concept – whatever it was – was not only not our concept of pulse but 
indeed so solely dependent on the cultural conditions of human perception that it exists 
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outside of the natural realm and only inside the cultural conditions of Herophilus’ Greek 
culture in early Alexandria.  But I want to resist framing the debate about Herophilus’ 
pulse theory in the abused dichotomy of realism and relativism. 
Barton (1994b) and Kuriyama (1999) have each made the strong claim that the 
pulse is not biologically given but is a cultural construct.75  In their explanation, pulse is 
not a natural phenomenon but is socially constructed within a tradition of cultural 
discourse, which serves both to create and reify concepts significant for a social group.  
Herophilus’ pulse rhythm is of course a cultural construct that is subject to genealogical 
scholarship: the notion of pulse came into being, the boundaries of the object were 
contoured by means of textual and ostensive definitions, the object assumed an 
importance for certain social groups.  The semantic parameters within which Herophilus 
developed pulse rhythm are these cultural constructs of language usage and social need.   
Yet it would be a mistake to assert baldly that Herophilus’ pulse rhythm lacks any 
biological content at all: there is some biological phenomenon to which Herophilus refers 
his notional claims, namely the duration of arterial dilation.76  Somatic material is not a 
                                                
75 See Kuriyama’s (1999: 17-108) comparison of Greek and Chinese accounts of the pulse.  Barton (1994b: 
162-3) summarizes Kuriyama’s (1987) dissertation, the basis of his (1999) book: “It is also illuminating to 
set beside Greek pulse lore in general the Chinese art of qie mo, as Kuriyama (1987) has done.  The 
ethnocentric value judgments made on this art by Western physicians and historians of science resulted 
from fundamental misapprehension: they assumed that the two could be seen as variant forms of pulse 
diagnosis, as different interpretations of a common reality.  But, as Kuriyama argues, there is no common 
reality: the pulse is not given in nature, common to all cultures, but is, instead, a cultural artifact, forged in 
historical circumstances.  The mo to which Chinese physicians sensitized themselves required techniques 
and beliefs incompatible with the Greek vision of the pulsating artery.  And the two presuppose different 
conceptions of how words relate to the experiences of the touch.  While the Greeks relied on the capacity of 
the mind to conceive images, qi, ‘like minds,’ could not be seen.  Instead its movements had to be 
apprehended by the reponse of an uncluttered mind; its directions of flow had to be sensed.  Obviously, 
there is more than just another model of the body involved here.”  In the previous paragraph Barton (1994b: 
162) argued that any attempts to understand ancient Greco-Roman pulse theory as “an extremely complex 
empirical differentation of pulses” was doomed to failure “within the paradigm of the modern scientific 
method.”  Barton’s (1994b: 1-25) introduction avowedly embraces a relativist point of view against 
realism. 
76 Biological phenomena seem especially available to sense perception.  Kuriyama’s (1999) book 
excellently explains the different skills of touching, developed from different cultural contexts, of Greek 
and Chinese physicians: he argues that Greek and Chinese physicians are not even feeling the same 
physical phenomena because the ‘physical’ objects to which they referred their touch were different.  
Kuriyama (1999: 35) encourages his readers to test their ability to feel their own pulse and attempt to sense 
the cycle of arterial dilation and contraction.  I encourage my readers to do likewise.  In the interest of 
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blank canvas on which culture is drawn; rather, as ANT argues, natural material 
symmetrically interacts with social phenomena to produce stable scientific objects, both 
naturally and socially constituted.  Since Herophilus’ pulse rhythms lasted as a feature of 
Greek traditions of medicine well into the 18th century in Western Europe thus producing 
a complex reaction between cultural perceptions of rhythm and the biological 
epiphenomena of arterial dilation and contraction, Herophilus’ pulse rhythm would seem 
to constitute as salient or permanent a scientific object as premodern science would 
allow.77  Barton’s (1994b) and Kuriyama’s (1999) accounts are incomplete, at least as 
they apply to Herophilus.  It will not suffice to treat Herophilus’ interest in naturalization 
– that is, naturalization construed as both natural phenomena and cultural givens – only 
as a rhetorical exercise of personal advancement in the face of social polemic, Barton’s 
(1994b) thesis.  Herophilus’ pulse rhythm is a materio-semantic object with complex 
roots in both cultural traditions of knowledge and empirical perceptions.78 
Reading Herophilus’ pulse theory by ANT emphasizes not only its materio-
semantic traits but also the actant allies which Herophilus has enrolled in his assemblage.  
Above in chapter 2.1.1 I discussed Herophilus’ potential strategies of interessement of 
both social and natural phenomena.  We have seen Herophilus integrate many natural 
phenomena into his account of the pulse.  From anatomy Herophilus intertwined the 
                                                
academic honesty, I confess I can feel my carotid artery striking my finger but can make no distinction 
between dilation and contraction nor can I even sense arterial dilation.  If this suggests that I am a poor 
pulse-taker, it also suggests that a high degree of practical skill is needed to make concepts refer 
consistently to biological epiphenomena.  For a corresponding scenario and conclusion see Hacking’s 
(1988) account of the positive philosophical consequences of Bruno Latour’s poor laboratory skills. 
77 For later European traditions of rhythm in pulse theory see Kümmell (1977), which is illustrated with 
several Renaissance charts writing pulse rhythm on Western musical staffs. 
78 Further research on this topic to connect Greek visions of the pulsing artery with the vivisection of 
Herophilus and Erasistratus might proceed with von Staden (1993) in mind.  In a thought-provoking article 
seemingly little noticed, von Staden (1993: 55-6) has advocated a focus on semantics of matter for the 
ancient historian of science: “The chaste tree illustrates the rich repository of cultural signification 
represented by the ‘natural matter’ used, for example, in Greek science and in Greek cults. Attention to the 
meanings of such matter-in-use not only is a curb on decontextualizing readings of texts, it also spurs on 
reconsideration of the very nature of ancient ‘science’ as a theoretical and pragmatic activity that, while not 
a mere epiphenomenon of political, legal, or religious culture, yet is inextricably embedded both in the 
verbal and in the ‘material’ culture of its times. The brilliant, often transformative methodological, 
epistemological, rhetorical, and pragmatic innovations of ancient science, on which much modern 
historiography has dwelt, must be accommodated in any responsible reading of ancient cultures.” 
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natural givens of the anatomical movement of arteries in dilation and contraction through 
the differentiae of arterial size, speed, and vehemence.  Herophilus linked temporal 
phenomena with the pulse by two different means: first, Herophilus’ appropriation of 
Aristoxenus’ concept of the primary-time unit in musical rhythm linked a natural given of 
musical rhythm; second, Herophilus’ measurement of the frequency of the pulse by 
water-clock utilized the filling of a culturally specific Egyptian in-flow water-clock.  It is 
worth underscoring how ‘real’ an object Herophilus has assembled.  His theory of pulse 
is supported naturally by physical and temporal phenomena: the culturally accepted 
existence of the pulse was well established.79  Herophilus’ pulse theory therefore gains its 
scientific objectiveness from its embeddedness inside preexisting networks of natural and 
cultural phenomena.  
2.4 PROGNOSIS, THERAPY, AND IDEOLOGY OF HEROPHILUS’ PULSE THEORY 
2.4.1 Prognosis 
Galen states that Herophilus sought a way to utilize pulse for prognosis of 
diseases.80  We therefore expect Herophilus to have written on diseased patients and their 
types of pulse or, perhaps vice versa, on types of pulse as indicators of disease.  Apart 
from Galen’s testimony, we have only one testimonium from Marcellinus for Herophilus’ 
interest in prognosis using the pulse. 
ὁ δὲ Ἡρόφιλος πυρέσσειν ἀπεφήνατο τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁπόταν πυκνότερος καὶ 
µείζων καὶ σφοδρότερος ὁ σφυγµὸς γένηται µετὰ πολλῆς θερµασίας ἔνδον. εἰ 
µὲν οὖν προαπαλλάξειε τὴν σφοδρότητα καὶ τὸ µέγεθος, ἔνδοσιν τοῦ πυρετοῦ 
λαµβάνοντος· τὴν δὲ πυκνότητα τῶν σφυγµῶν ἀρχοµένων τε τῶν πυρετῶν 
πρώτην συνίστασθαι καὶ συµπαραµένειν µέχρι τῆς τελείας αὐτῶν λύσεως 
λέγει. 
                                                
79 Daston (2000: 1) has attempted to articulate how objects can be both culturally constructed and naturally 
real with what she has called applied metaphysics; her insistence on the Aristotelian world of coming-to-be 
is well placed to deal with features about the emergence, salience, and productivity of scientific objects: 
“[T]he contrast between pure and applied metaphysics is not necessarily just a reformulation of that 
between ontology and epistemology, between what is really real and what is dimly known, noumena and 
phenomena.  Applied metaphysics assumes that reality is a matter of degree and that phenomena that are 
indisputably real in the colloquial sense that they exist may become more or less intensely real, depending 
on how densely they are woven into scientific thought and practice.” 
80 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.911K = Herophilus fr. 173.4-5 vS: αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Ἡρόφιλος 
πολλαχόθι µὲν ῥυθµῶν εἰς τὰς προγνώσεις µνηµονεύει. “Herophilus himself many places mentions 
rhythms for the purpose of prognoses.” 
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Herophilus declared that a patient had fever whenever the pulse became more 
frequent, larger, and more vehement with much internal heat.  If therefore [the 
pulse] should lessen its vehemence and size, the fever is in remission.  He says 
that the frequency of the pulses pops up first when fevers begin and remains so 
until their final resolution.81  
 
Herophilus argued that changes in certain differentiae of the pulse show the onset and 
progress of the fever.  The frequency of the pulse is the first sign (πρώτην) of fever and 
will remain present at its heightened state until the fever is in complete remission. 
Herophilus wrote that physicians should monitor the vehemence and size of arterial 
movement to determine the progress of the fever, that is, the physician can use the pulse 
to make prognoses about the fever.  This is significant support for Galen’s statement that 
Herophilus talked of pulses with a view to prognosis. 
 That Herophilus wrote in On Pulses how to use the pulse to make prognoses 
about the progress of the fever is not surprising, but it is striking that we have no other 
testimonia about his attempts to use pulse for diagnosis or prognosis in other diseases.  
The three extant isagogic pulse treatises all list criteria for pulse prognosis in phrenetic, 
pleuritic, peripneumonic, cardiac, and lethargic patients.82  Not only does von Staden’s 
(1989) collection of fragments of Herophilus’ pulse theory and vascular physiology 
contain no testimonia relating to these diseases, but in the collection of testimonia 
relating to Herophilus’ therapeutics there is evidence that Herophilus never attempted to 
treat these diseases.  Caelius Aurelianus explicitly states that Herophilus did not write 
anything about the diseases phrenitis, pleuritis, peripneumonia, or lethargy.83  There is no 
                                                
81 Marcellinus de pulsibus 11, 463 Schöne = Herophilus fr. 182.1-8 vS.   
82 The three isagogic treatises are Marcellinus’ On Pulses, [Rufus of Ephesus]’ Synopsis On Pulses, and 
Galen’s On Pulse for Beginners.  Isagogic treatises show what is minimally necessary for a discourse in 
Greek pulse theory.  All treatises have the following five categorical contents in common, though they 
often differ in specifics: what pulse is and how it arises, pulse differentiae, pulse differences in age groups, 
pulse in patients with diseases, and certain pulse names.  The treatises discuss phrenetic, pleuritic, 
peripneumonic, cardiac, and lethargic patients at Marcellinus de pulsibus 25, 465-6 Schöne; [Rufus] 
synopsis de pulsibus 4, 223-225 Daremberg/Ruelle; Galen de pulsibus ad tirones 8.477-92K. 
83 Herophilus frr. 239-244 vS.  This is not a chance observation on Caelius Aurelianus’ part; indeed von 
Staden (1999c) shows that Caelius Aurelianus was very well acquainted with Hellenistic medical treatises.  
Von Staden (1999c: 104-05) notes explicitly: “It is noteworthy that, apparently without exception, the 
Herophilean silences to which Caelius takes exception concern therapeutics.  This is conceivably part of a 
Methodist strategy of positioning oneself, vis-à-vis one’s more illustrious predecessors, as concerned above 
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testimonium relating to cardiac patients in von Staden’s collection, and we should 
probably conclude that Herophilus did not write on that disease either.  In light of the 
negative evidence for Herophilus’ therapeutic interest in these diseases, we should 
conclude that Herophilus did not attempt to use pulse for prognosis for those diseases 
typical of Greek discourse on pulse theory, except fever. 
2.4.2 Therapy  
The standardization of pulse rhythms per age-group is half the promise of 
theoretical medicine, which aims to provide therapy grounded in a theoretical 
understanding of physis.  The pulse rhythms attributed to Herophilus by [Rufus of 
Ephesus] are natural:84 rhythm seems to be the only differentia of the four laid out in the 
beginning of Herophilus’ On Pulses (namely size, speed, vehemence, and rhythm) in 
which the extant evidence shows that Herophilus attempted to provide normative 
evaluations in the usual terminology of health and illness in Greek medicine, κατὰ φύσιν 
“according to nature” and παρὰ φύσιν “against nature” respectively.  (If the differentia of 
frequency corresponds to Herophilus’ fifth differentia, ‘amount’, then Marcellinus’ report 
of Herophilus’ prognosis of fever shows another normative evaluation.85)  There is 
further evidence that Herophilus attempted to use the normative basis of rhythm for 
diagnosis.   
ἐν δὲ τῷ παραβάλλειν τὸν χρόνον τῆς διαστολῆς τῷ χρόνῳ τῆς συστολῆς, ὡς 
Ἡρόφιλος ἠξίου, τὸ µὲν ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν ὁ κάµνων ἔχει δυνατόν ἐστι 
γνωσθῆναι, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ γε ὅτι µεγάλως παρὰ φύσιν ἢ µικρῶς. αἱ µὲν γὰρ 
µεγάλαι τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ῥυθµῶν εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐκτροπαὶ µεγάλην 
σηµαίνουσι τὴν βλάβην, αἱ δ’ ἥττους µικροτέραν. 
 
In comparing the time-unit of dilation to the time-unit of contraction, as 
                                                
all with efficacious therapy, not with theories or definitions that are of no immediate clinical utility.  
Caelius accordingly presents himself as never being silent about the paramount purpose of medicine, viz. 
successful treatment of the ill, even where he encountered only silence in his more famous predecessors.  
The silence of the great Herophilus and of various famous Herophileans are thus made to serve as a source 
of the Methodist’s own authority.” 
84 [Rufus of Ephesus] synopsis de pulsibus 4, 223 Daremberg/Ruelle = Herophilus fr. 177.1-2 vS : ἐροῦµεν 
πρῶτον τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν φυσικῶς ἑκάστῃ ἡλικίᾳ παρεποµένων σφυγµῶν “First I will state the 
differentiae of pulses which naturally attend each age-group.”  The discussion of pulse rhythm attributed to 
Herophilus follows this passage. 
85 I am treating ‘frequency’ as a separate authentic differentia unenunciated at the beginning of On Pulses.  
See footnote 59. 
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Herophilus thinks is good, the fact can be recognized that the patient is unnatural 
[παρὰ φύσιν] and moreover unnatural to a large degree or to a little.  For large 
changes of natural [κατὰ φύσιν] rhythm into an unnatural state indicate great 
harm but lesser changes lesser harm.86 
 
The comparison between the time-units of arterial motion is pulse rhythm, the ratio of the 
length of dilation to that of contraction.  Normative rhythm is a measurement of health 
and illness.  The extent of a pathological state is thus the extent of the pulse rhythm’s 
variance from the norm per age-group. 
 Here we have theoretical medicine’s appeal to medical technicians and 
practicioners at large postulated in 2.1.1.  Measuring pulse rhythms against norms is 
Herophilus’ diagnostic technique for pathological states.  The normative categories 
Herophilus provided offer the medical practitioner the standardized physis with which to 
ground his diagnostic practice.  The Herophilean physician stands ready to feel the pulse 
of his patient and rate it against the expected pulse of the patient’s age-group.87 
 Herophilus seems to have given at least one example of his pulse diagnostic 
technique.   
οὐ γὰρ µόνον φλεβοπαλία παιδικὴ γέροντι κακὸν, ἀλλὰ γεροντικὴ παιδί. δέκα 
γοῦν χρόνων τῶν πρώτων, ὡς Ἡρόφιλος ἐµέτρει τοὺς σφυγµοὺς, εἰ παιδίῳ 
γενηθείη88 ποτὲ τὸ µεταξὺ δύο πληγῶν διάστηµα, ψύξεως ἐσχάτης καὶ διὰ 
τοῦτο καὶ νεκρώσεώς ἐστι σηµεῖον· ὡσπερεὶ γέροντι πάλιν παιδίων σφυγµὸς, 
ἐν ᾧ τῆς διαστολῆς ὁ χρόνος ἴσος ἐστὶ τῷ τῆς συστολῆς, ἐκπεπυρῶσθαι 
σηµαίνει τὴν φύσιν. 
 
For not only is the arterial pulsation of children bad in an old man, but an old 
man’s pulse is [bad] in a child.  So if ever the interval between two beats were of 
ten primary time-units, as Herophilus measured pulses, it is a sign of extreme 
chilling and therefore death.  Again just as for an old man the pulse of children in 
which the time of dilation is equal to that of contraction means his nature is 
aflame.89 
                                                
86 Galen Synopsis de pulsibus 14, 9.470-1K = Herophilus fr. 175 vS. 
87 Herophilus’ patients discussed in the fragments of his pulse theory include children (Herophilus frr. 179, 
180, 181, 184.42-44 vS), old men (Herophilus frr. 176, 178 vS), a eunuch (Herophilus fr. 170 vS), and 
patients with fever (Herophilus fr. 182 vS).  
88 γενηθείη De Lacy apud von Staden (1989: 352) : γεννηθείη vulg. 
89 Galen Synopsis de pulsibus 21, 9.499K = Herophilus fr. 178 vS.  There are many strange things about 
the diction used here.  For instance, φλεβοπαλία is a very old term for Galen (seemingly inappropriate 
with the literal meaning vein-palpitation), attested beyond here only as Democritus’ term for the motion of 
the arteries; see LSJ s.v.  Moreover, ἐκπεπυρῶσθαι has Hippocratic roots but, by Galen’s time, one would 
think more readily of Stoic theories of the cosmos; see LSJ s.v. II.1 and II.3. 
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Herophilus has observed an old man with a pulse rhythm of ten primary time-units 
between pulse beats: as von Staden (1989) saw, the length of contraction must be ten 
units long, hence the ratio of dilation to contraction will be 1:10.90  Clearly, this is a 
pathological pulse rhythm.  When the Herophilean physician compares this pathological 
pulse rhythm to the normal pulse rhythm of an old man, which would be 1:2 according to 
[Rufus of Ephesus]’ description, it differs by a factor of 5.  If this pathological pulse 
rhythm occurred in a child and were compared to a normal pulse rhythm of a child, which 
would be 1:1, it would differ by a factor of 10.  Rated against the expected categories of 
pulse rhythm within the normative physis of the patient’s age-group, this ten time-unit 
pulse is very pathological and the patient highly diseased. 
As a diagnostic and prognostic tool, the pulse is capable of sign-inference.  In the 
above passage, the extreme duration of the contraction is the manifestation of a low vital 
faculty of pulsation.  The low vital faculty is in turn a mark (σηµεῖον) of the lack of 
bodily heat and the nearness of death.  The affliction in this case, low internal heat, is 
entirely internal; there are seemingly no outward signs of disease.  In Marcellinus’ report 
of fever discussed above in 2.4.1, the increased frequency of the pulse, implying the 
patient’s increased internal heat, is the primary sign of the fever.  In that passage too there 
was no external mark of disease.  The only visible material propery, arterial movement, 
yields a semiotics capable of describing physis. The semiotics (σηµαίνει) to which the 
pulse’s diagnosis gives rise specify entire conditions of the body, all without opening it 
up as in dissection and vivisection.91  The potential of the pulse as a materio-semiotic 
object to see into worlds unknown is the tool Herophilus used to promote the therapy of 
theoretical medicine.  The unknown world which Herophilus’ pulse theory scouts is the 
interior of the body.  The pulsating artery under Herophilus’ finger correlates to interior 
                                                
90 Von Staden (1989: 281.n147).  By ‘interval between pulse beats’ Galen appears to mean the time from 
one part of the arterial cycle to the next, i.e. either from dilation to contraction or from contraction to 
dilation.  Since in [Rufus of Ephesus]’ discussion of normal pulse rhythms the elderly have a longer 
contraction than dilation, ‘interval between pulse beats’ here must refer to the time from contraction to 
dilation. 
91 Galen Synopsis de pulsibus 21, 9.499K = Herophilus fr. 178 vS. 
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bodily states that neither the physician nor patient can see: the pulse provides a semiotic 
sign of a patient’s interior constitution, his physis, and its changes from normalcy.   
2.4.3 From Object to Ideology 
The most surprising result from the investigation of Herophilus’ pulse theory is 
the lack of evidence about Herophilus’ attempts to use his pulse theory for diagnostic or 
prognostic purposes except in fever.  The failure to find evidence for Herophilus’ interest 
in a therapeutic interest in the pulse beyond fever is all the more surprising in light of the 
sociological model of ANT.  As was stressed above in 2.1.1, new theoretical information 
in science is liable to be ignored without attempts to network older objects into the 
system and to network the aims of disparate social groups.  I suggested that Herophilus 
could have stressed the therapeutic implications of his pulse research in order for his 
theory to be taken up by other medical practitioners.  That we have found so little direct 
evidence of this aim initially suggests that the audience for Herophilus’ On Pulses did not 
include the medical practitioners who would have found Herophilus’ pulse theory useful 
for prognosis.  Consequently, as stated in chapter 1.2.3, phenomena of cross-scientific 
appropriation such as Herophilus’ pulse-theory are the work of historical elite scientific 
actors aimed at elite scientists. 
Herophilus’ pulse theory is the physiological equivalent of Herophilus’ work on 
anatomy.  Herophilus discovered the ventricles of the brain, nerves, the membranes of the 
eye, the epididymis, the ovaries and the fallopian tubes while investigating nearly the 
entirety of the brain, the digestive system, and the reproductive organs.92  Herophilus 
investigated the anatomy of the interior of the body by dissection and vivisection; he also 
investigated the physiology of the interior of the body by pulse theory.  Herophilus 
clearly believed that it is possible to know about the interior of the body, its state and its 
function.  This is the ideology of Rationalist medicine, to use the name given to 
Herophilus and his followers by their later medical opponents the Empiricists. 
In other words, there is an ideological consequence to Herophilus’ pulse theory. 
Galen’s reading of Herophilus’ pulse theory makes this clear. 
                                                
92 Von Staden (1989: 138-81). 
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ἑξῆς δ’ ἐστὶν ἐπί γε τῇ τάξει τοῦ λόγου περὶ ῥυθµῶν διελθεῖν, ὑπὲρ ὧν 
Ἡροφίλῳ µὲν ἐπὶ πλέον εἴρηται τήρησίν τινα καὶ ἐµπειρίαν ἱστοροῦντι 
µᾶλλον ἢ λογικὴν µέθοδον ἐκδιδάσκοντι. τοὺς γὰρ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡλικίαν ὡς τὸ 
πολὺ φαινοµένους ῥυθµοὺς τῶν σφυγµῶν ἔγραψε, πρῶτον µὲν οὐδ’ ἐφ’ ὧν 
τινων φύσεων ἐτήρησεν αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν ἡµῖν εἰπών· εἶτ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν διδάσκει 
δῆλον ὅτι συγκέχυταί τε καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτός ἐστι περὶ τὴν τῆς συστολῆς τε καὶ 
τῶν ἠρεµιῶν διάγνωσιν. 
 
Next in the order of my account it is time to consider rhythms, about which 
Herophilus spoke at length, making an observation and investigating experience 
more than teaching a ‘Rational’ method.  For he wrote the rhythms of pulses as 
they appeared in each age-group for the most part, although not saying at first to 
us in the case of whose natures he observed them; then from what he teaches it is 
clear that he is confused and inarticulate about the distinction of contraction and 
the rests.93   
 
Galen invokes the language of the Hellenistic debate between Rationalist and Empiricist 
sects, a debate we will consider in chapter 4.3.  To Herophilus, the Rationalist, Galen 
gives all the buzzwords of Empiricism – τήρησις, ἐµπειρία, ἱστορία, in Empiricist 
terms, “personal observation, experience, investigation of previous physicians’ reports” – 
while denying that Herophilus taught in a Rationalist way.  This is Galenic irony.  We 
have seen that while Herophilus practiced much observation and personal inquiry, he did 
little healing beyond fevers and had almost no predecessor’s views on the pulse to 
consult.  Indeed Herophilus’ pulse theory is largely de novo.  Galen’s aim is to argue that 
Herophilus is confused about contemporary Rationalist (that is, Galenic) understandings 
of the pulse.94  Herophilus may not have been as clear as Galen wished in On Pulses but 
the theory of arterial pulsation was in no way an Empiricist enterprise.95 
On the contrary, Herophilus’ pulse theory, as we have seen, is a deeply Rationalist 
project, part of the Rationalist investigation of the inside of the body.  The treatise On 
Pulses founds a discourse of bodily semiotics.  Herophilus’ pulse theory is based on new 
distinctions between types of bodily involuntary motions, properties specific to arterial 
                                                
93 Galen de preaesagitione ex pulsibus 2.3, 9.278K = Herophilus fr. 176 vS. 
94 See Appendix A for Galen’s attempts to distinguish his pulse theory from Herophilus’.  In this passage 
Herophilus avoided talk of rests and believed that he perceived arterial contraction, whereas Galen used the 
terminology of rests and believed that not the entirety of arterial contraction could be perceived. 
95 See Galen’s comment on Herophilus’ style in On Pulses: “but as is the custom with Herophilus, in an 
unclear explanation” ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἔθος Ἡροφίλῳ, δι᾽ ἑρµενείας ἀσαφοῦς. Herophilus fr. 150.12 vS. 
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motion, and the creation of a new type of materio-semiotic object.  Pulse theory is 
undergirded by appeal to the natural phenomena of anatomy and musical temporality and 
by appeal to social phenomena of medical therapeutics founded on a theoretical 
understanding of physis.  I therefore suggest that Herophilus’ pulse theory has a distinctly 
cultural aim: the emergence of a new programmatic understanding of ἰατρική “medicine” 
within the community of medical practitioners. 
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INNOVATION AND TRADITION 
Chapter 3:  Archimedes’ Ephodos  
This chapter argues that Archimedes’ Ephodos offers both innovative and 
traditional science; Ephodos 426-438 explains the crucial views of the entire extant text.  
I argue that Ephodos presents a new approach to determining mathematical areas and 
volumes by selectively integrating mechanical objects and principles into mathematics; I 
call this new approach a scientific way of seeing.  I focus on the logical principles and 
repeatability of Archimedes’ procedure.  I show that, despite his innovation, Archimedes 
continues to prioritize Euclidean-style formalism in mathematical argumentation, the 
mathematical community’s standards of logical formalization.   
3.1 INTRODUCTION TO ARCHIMEDES’ EPHODOS  
Since there is no modern critical edition of the text of Archimedes of Syracuse’s1 
Ephodos, I use my own text as the basis of my discussion in this chapter.  Appendix B 
contains a critical edition of the Greek text from the beginning of the treatise through the 
end of the first proposition and a translation with a limited commentary.  For discussion 
of passages of the Ephodos not contained in Appendix B I use the manuscript 
transcription made publically available online by Reviel Netz and his collaborators.2 
But there is no critical edition of the manuscript diagrams of Archimedes’ 
Ephodos and the diagrams printed in this chapter may not reflect manuscript evidence.  
By showing the fundamental importance of diagrams to Greek mathematics Netz (1999b) 
                                                
1 Archimedes of Syracuse, c. 287-212 BCE, was the leading Greek theoretical mathematician of the third 
century BCE.  In his eleven surviving works – On the Sphere and Cylinder, Spiral Lines, Conoids and 
Spheroids, Measurement of the Circle, The Sand Reckoner, Planes in Equilibrium, Quadrature of the 
Parabola, On Floating Bodies, Stomachion, Cattle Problem, and Ephodos – Archimedes undertakes a 
range of mathematical problems, primarily with a focus on areas and tangencies.  The Cattle Problem is 
transmitted separately from the rest of the surviving Archimedean corpus; a mathematical poem, its 
authenticity is doubtful.  For Archimedes’ surviving and non-extant works and their authenticity see Netz 
(2004a: 10-13).  Dijksterhuis (1987) is the best mathematical introduction to Archimedes. 
2 I cite the transcription by folium and line as Netz et al. (2008).  (The xml file publically released online 
must be converted into a pdf file by a LaTex program in order to view page numbers in the transcription.) 
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launched a revolution of mathematical historians editing critical editions of manuscript 
diagrams.3  Netz (2004a) is the first volume of a project to establish critical editions of 
the diagrams for the entire text of Archimedes; we await his critical edition of the 
diagrams of Ephodos and Quadrature of the Parabola, the Archimedean treatises this 
chapter discusses.  Therefore, in the meantime, I reprint Heiberg’s (1913) diagrams from 
his edition of Archimedes: thus I call Heiberg’s diagrams “illustrations” rather than 
“figures”. 
Since Archimedes is concerned with solids of revolution mostly drawn from conic 
sections in the Ephodos, I provide here a brief background on Greek mathematicians’ 
generation and naming of conic sections.   
Greek mathematicians recognized three conic sections: the παραβολή “parabola”, 
ἔλλειψις “ellipse”, and ὑπερβολή “hyperbola”.4  Illustration 4 shows the generation of a 
parabola from the modern mathematical definition of the focus and the directrix.5   
 
Illustration 4: Focus and Directrix Generation of a Parabola.6 
                                                
3 Netz (1999b: 12-88).  For further research on manuscript diagrams in the text of Greek mathematicians, 
see Netz (2004a: 8-10) for Archimedes and Saito (2006, 2009) for Euclid. 
4 Dijksterhuis (1987: 55-108) is a good guide to Greek conic sections; see also Toomer (1976). 
5 In the generation of all conic sections the focus is a fixed point and the directrix a straight line not 
containing the focus whose corresponding conic section consists of all points whose distance to the focus 
equals their distance to the directrix multiplied by a real positive number, called the eccentricity of the 
conic section, where the eccentricity of an ellipse lies between 0 and 1, the eccentricity of a parabola is 1, 
and the eccentricity of a hyperbola is greater than 1. 
6 Lockwood (1961: 5).  The illustration shows a parabola, P, the set of all points equidistant from the focus, 
the point S, and from the directrix, the line M. 
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Greek mathematicians did not define conic sections by the modern definition of focus 
and directrix but rather by the conic sections’ ability to apply figures to a given figure.  
(That is, the conic sections were used like a compass and ruler by Greek mathematicians 
to construct geometric shapes similar to the ones at hand for the mathematician.)  The 
parabola (from παραβάλλειν “to apply”), applies the same figure exactly, the ellipse 
(from ἐλλείπειν “to fall short”) applies a figure falling short of the given figure, and the 
hyperbola (from ὑπερβάλλειν “to exceed”) applies a figure exceeding the given figure.  
The curves were given their present names by Apollonius of Perga in his Conics, written 
around 200 BCE, from their property of application.   
Before Apollonius the curves were named from the process of generation from 
different types of cones: the parabola was called ὀρθογωνίου κώνου τοµή “section of a 
right-angled cone”; the ellipse was called ὀξυγωνίου κώνου τοµή “section of an acute-
angled cone”; and the hyperbola was called ἀµβλυγωνίου κώνου τοµή “section of an 
obtuse-angled cone”.  These were the names used by Archimedes and his contemporary 
mathematicians in the third-century BCE. 
 
Illustration 5: Conic Sections Generated from Right-Angled, Acute-Angled, and Obtuse-
Angled Cones.7 
Each cone was formed by rotating a right triangle about one the sides adjacent to the right 
angle to create the onomastic angle at the cone’s vertex.  The cone then is cut 
perpendicular to its side surface by a plane.  The planar section of the cone cut by the 
plane is one of the three conic sections, depending on the type of cone.  Illustration 5 
shows pre-Apollonian Greek mathematicians’ generation of the conic sections from their 
respective cones. 
                                                
7 Lockwood (1961: 9). 
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3.1.1 Title 
The manuscript title of Archimedes’ Ephodos is περὶ τῶν µηχανικῶν 
θεωρηµάτων πρὸς Ἐρατοσθένην. ἔφοδος, usually translated The Method of Mechanical 
Theorems to Eratosthenes and known under the title The Method.8  Although earlier 
editors did not read the period in the manuscript title, we ought to mark it because it 
separates ἔφοδος from the address to Eratosthenes, implying that the treatise was known 
under two titles.  The only Greek citations to the Ephodos occur in Suda θ 142, as 
ἐφόδιον, and in Hero’s Metrica, where the treatise is referred to as ἐν τῷ ἐφοδικῷ.  No 
one ever refers to Archimedes’ treatise as περὶ τῶν µηχανικῶν θεωρηµάτων πρὸς 
Ἐρατοσθένην, but rather only by a cognate adjective of ἔφοδος.  Therefore, our 
translation of the title ought to be On Mechanical Theorems to Eratosthenes. [or] ἔφοδος 
– the final word I leave untranslated for the moment.  
I argue that ἔφοδος is the original title of Archimedes’ work and that a later editor 
or scribe added the descriptive title περὶ τῶν µηχανικῶν θεωρηµάτων πρὸς 
Ἐρατοσθένην.9  The fact that ancient authors only cite Archimedes’ Ephodos by 
adjectival forms of ἔφοδος suggests that the first half of the title, περὶ τῶν µηχανικῶν 
θεωρηµάτων πρὸς Ἐρατοσθένην, was not part of its original circulation.  Also 
suggestive is the fact that the word ἔφοδος does not appear in the extant text and is 
therefore unlikely to have been chosen as a title later.  Furthermore, some of Archiemdes’ 
works have distinctive and playfully evocative titles, e.g. ψαµµίτης “Sand-Reckoner” 
and στοµάχιον “Stomachion”.  The treatise could well have been titled ἔφοδος in a 
similar jeu d’espirit.10 
Scholars have taken ἔφοδος to mean “method”, a translation promoted by 
scholars’ interest in the methodological purport of the treatise.11  From Heiberg’s (1879) 
                                                
8 Appendix B Ephodos (hereafter referred to as Ephodos) lines 1-3.  Netz et al. (2008: 46r2.1-3) read περὶ 
τῶν µηχανικῶν θεωρηµάτων πρὸς Ἐρατοσθένην. ἔφοδος. Heiberg’s text (1913: 426.1-2) prints περὶ τῶν 
µηχανικῶν θεωρηµάτων πρὸς Ἐρατοσθένην ἔφοδος without comment.  The translation “The Method of 
Mechanical Theorems to Eratosthenes” comes from Dijksterhuis (1987). 
9 The obvious culprit is Theodosius of Byzantium, a 2nd century BCE mathematician who wrote the 
commentary on the Ephodos recorded by the Suda.  See Appendix B. 
10 See Netz (2009a) on playfulness as an aesthetic principle in Hellenistic mathematics. 
11 It is instructive to consider the conception of the contents of the Ephodos before the text of the treatise 
was discovered in 1906.  Since Hero’s Metrica was unknown until 1896, early scholarship had only Suda 
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dissertation onward, scholarship ignored the metaphoric sense of “journey” inherent in 
ἔφοδος. Mugler (1958), the standard dictionary of Greek mathematical terminology, 
offers “methodus, méthode, methode, method” for ἔφοδος and explains “le nom désignant 
l’ensemble des procédés orientés vers la solution d’un problème de mathématiques.”12  
Thus the term in the picturesque part of the title lays stress on the methodic import of the 
treatise; and when combined with the title’s first half, gave an impression of a systematic, 
perhaps even algorithmic, transformation of mechanical results to pure mathematics.  But 
this is a false impression of the systematicity of Archimedes’ work, and also a false 
impression of a simple transformation of results from applied to pure mathematics.   
Netz (2009a) notes that the common translation of ἔφοδος as “method” does not 
capture the resonance of Archimedes’ title.13  This was first pointed out by Eberhard 
Knobloch (2000), who suggested that Archimedes’ title retained the usual sense of the 
word, “approach”.  Knobloch writes, “Whenever he spoke of the method we nowadays 
call [the] ‘mechanical method’ in this treatise, he used the word τρόπος, not ἔφοδος, 
without ever adding the attribute µηχανικός, mechanical.  In my opinion, we should not 
ignore this nuance of meaning.”14  Netz furthers Knobloch’s point by explaining what 
“approach” means in this treatise: “Archimedes’ treatise was not about some method 
whereby results can be gained; it was about the principle that one can find a certain 
                                                
entry θ 142 to work from.  (The Suda has no entry on Archimedes.)  Heiberg (1879: 32) is a good précis of 
older views before the appearance of the Metrica: “ἐφόδιον apud Suidas. Theodosius mathematicus clarus 
traditur scripsisse ὑπόµνηµα εἰς τὸ Ἀρχιµήδους ἐφόδιον. Riualtus hinc fingit, Archimedes singulari libro 
iter suum in Aegyptum descripsisse; sed neque ἐφόδιον hoc sensu accipi potest neque talia Archimedes 
scripsisset aut Theodosius commentariis illustrasset. Potius crediderim, ἐφόδιον esse librum methodi 
mathematicae scientiam complectentem, fere eiusdem generis, cuius erat ψευδαρίων Euclidis (Proclus 
comm. p. 70); ἔφοδος enim post Aristotelem significat methodum.”  Heiberg’s argument against Rivaltus 
(who wrote a life of Archimedes in the 1615 Paris edition of Archimedes’ works according to Heiberg 
(1879: 5)) turns on the meaning of ἐφόδιον, from its literal meaning of ‘travel money’ to Heiberg’s 
understanding of it an adjectival form from the noun ἔφοδος.  Heiberg’s view of the contents of the 
Ephodos is of course correct but so is Rivaltus’s literal translation of ἐφόδιον, despite Heiberg’s protests.  
It therefore seems strange that no one (Adler (1931: 693 θ 142) records no emendation) has suggested the 
obvious correction of the Archimedes’s title in the Suda passage, ἐφοδι<κ>όν, a form which corresponds 
exactly to the Metrica title and is used only to refer to methodological concerns. 
12 Mugler (1958: 211 s.v.).  Contrast this with Mugler’s (1958: 282 s.v.) definition of µέθοδος, which again 
is a group (ensemble) of procedures directed toward “une construction ou un résultat déterminés.”  
13 Netz (2009a: 157) argues that ephodikon is the true Archimedean title by comparing to the titles 
anaphorikon of Hypsicles and okutokion of Apollonius.   
14 Knobloch (2000: 83).    
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approach to a problem, even without solving it in a completely satisfactory way.”15  
What is at stake, then, in the Ephodos is not a methodological heuristic, as it were The 
Method, but rather an approach to problem-solving.  Knobloch’s warning serves to 
prevent a modern translation from predetermining our expectations of a Hellenistic self-
reflective scientific treatise; and therefore I will refer to Archimedes’ treatise in 
transliteration alone as the Ephodos. 
3.1.2 Framing the Ephodos 
The Ephodos opens with an introductory letter to Eratosthenes.16  It seems from 
the introductory letter that Archimedes had earlier informed Eratosthenes about his 
method and now illustrates it to him, and is communicating to the broader Alexandrian 
mathematical community through Eratosthenes.  Formally, of course, the Ephodos is 
addressed to Eratosthenes alone.  But we would be naïve readers with a poor sense of the 
social cachet of novel solutions in the competitive milieu of science in the Hellenistic 
period to believe that Archimedes did not intend his writings to circulate beyond the 
nominal addressee.  The intended audience is clearly wider than Eratosthenes, although 
he is perhaps a sympathetic recipient because of his own work on the integration of 
mechanical principles into mathematics. 
Archimedes writes as though he is the first to use his approach, since he implies 
that it is not known to the broader mathematical community.  Archimedes illustrates his 
approach with individual mathematical propositions alluding to his own mathematical 
publications, to which he occasionally refers explicitly.  In this way Archimedes might 
intend his Ephodos to be a reflection and capstone of his entire mathematical œuvre, 
including his earlier work in mechanics such as Quadrature of the Parabola and 
Equilibrium of Planes.17  The ‘methodological’ focus of the treatise is heightened by 
                                                
15 Netz (2009a: 157). 
16 Eratosthenes is also the named recipient of Archimedes’ Cattle Problem, an intellectual challenge in 
epigram.   
17 Scholarship has taken the internal references in the Ephodos to Archimedes’ other works to indicate the 
historical dating of Archimedes’ work; thus the Ephodos appears usually last in lists of Archimedes’ works.  
For example see Dijksterhuis (1987: 46-47).  Indeed, whether we adopt the ordering of Archimedes’ 
treatises from Dijksterhuis (1987), the older sequence, or Knorr (1978) and Sato (1986-87), the Ephodos 
remains among the last treatises of Archimedes’ career.  
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Archimedes’ passing reference to his previous result on parabolic quadrature in the 
opening letter.  As I will argue in a close reading of the first proposition in 3.2.3, 
Archimedes’ novel presentation of this result in the Ephodos offers up its didactic intent 
only when the mechanical method of his earlier treatise, Quadrature of the Parabola, is 
treated as an intertext.  This is intertextualityA as will be shown in 3.2.2. 
Archimedes claims to have sent an earlier letter to Eratosthenes in the form of an 
intellectual challenge (a common conceit in Hellenistic mathematics).18  The solutions 
that Archimedes challenged Eratosthenes to prove were that the volume of a section of a 
right circular cylinder cut by a plane diagonally through the center of the circle at the 
cylinder’s base, now called a cylinder hoof, is one-sixth of the volume of the 
encompassing prism and to prove that the volume of two intersecting right circular 
cylinders, now called a bicylinder, is two-thirds of the volume of the encompassing cube.   
In addition to the pure mathematical interest in Archimedes’ ability to determine 
the volumes of complex solid figures, the Ephodos is most famous for our glimpse inside 
Archimedes’ “mathematical workshop”:19 novel features include the application of 
mechanics to geometry (paralleled in other Archimedean works), the use of indivisibles 
and actual infinities,20 and Archimedes’ meta-mathematical comments.  Some 
commentators have seriously maintained that Ephodos is a heuristic text.21  Yet given the 
polemic practices of Greek scientists, it makes little sense for a scientist give away his 
determinative procedure.22   Furthermore, reading Ephodos as a treatise revealing 
Archimedes’ hidden knowledge smacks of the obsession of 17th century mathematicians 
for an ancient ars invendi.23  In short, the fantastic reading of the Ephodos as a heuristic 
for broader Archimedean material is not justified by the treatise itself nor the context of 
its publication. 
                                                
18 Ephodos 5-10. 
19 From Dijksterhuis (1987: 315), but the phrase goes back to Heiberg-Zeuthen (1907: 342). 
20 See especially Netz, Saito, and Tschernetska (2001) who claims use of actual infinities is unparalleled in 
Greek mathematics, but Acerbi (2007: 88) disputes this.  
21 See Knorr’s comment in Dijksterhuis (1987: 436): “[I]t provides unique insight into his heuristic 
methods.” 
22 See Netz (2000) for a treatment of mathematical analyses, which were long supposed to be heuristic 
texts. 
23 See Jones (1986: 572) and Netz (2009a: 79.n14). 
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Critical passages of Archimedes’ own views about the aim and purpose of the 
Ephodos appear at the end of the introductory letter to Eratosthenes and later between 
propositions 1 and 2.24   (Heiberg (1913) inserted the numbering of the propositions into 
the critical text and the numbers are useful for reference purposes.25)  Netz (1999b) 
suggests reading this final meta-mathematical passage as part of the introduction – letter, 
first proposition, and final meta-mathematical statement – so that the methodological 
interest of the treatise, its “second-order discourse”, subordinates the mathematics of 
proposition one, which is already proved in Quadrature of the Parabola.26  The first 
proposition proceeds unusually slowly and carefully, and often “looks-backward” to the 
axioms for its justification.27  In Netz’s words, “Proposition 1 is an example of a way of 
proving, not just a proof.”28  This is a very inviting interpretation: the known result, the 
previous use of the mechanical method in Quadrature of the Parabola, and the two-
dimensionality of the proposition 1 – when the rest of the treatise is concerned with three-
dimensional figures – all support Netz’s point.   
Despite the attractiveness of Netz’s interpretation, the absence of a formal 
conclusion to the introductory letter is troubling.  Archimedes’ usual practice is to include 
all his extra-mathematical comments, if any, in the introduction to a treatise.29  The 
introductory letter, if it had a formal conclusion, must end at the gap between the end of 
                                                
24 Ephodos 276-285.  
25 Netz, Saito, and Tschernetska (2001: 11n.5). Also see Netz (1999b: 94) for an explanation of how 
Heiberg’s editorial insertion of numbered propositions affects the natural flow of the language. 
26 Netz (1999b: 213).  Ephodos proposition 1 is Netz’s second example of the compartmentalization of 
mathematical discourse after Arist. Met. 373a; these are the ‘exceptions’ that prove the rule, for both 
authors are trying to embed mathematics within a larger philosophical point.  Netz (1999b: 214) ends this 
section with his dictum “When one does mathematics, one does nothing else”, repeated in Netz (2004a). 
27 See Netz (1999b: 198-204) for the concept of “backward-looking” and Netz (1999b: 212) for his logical 
tree analysis of proposition 1. 
28 Netz (1999b: 213). 
29 All but one of the introductory letters in the treatises addressed to Dositheus (Spiral Lines) ends with a 
word of farewell (εὐτύχει, ἔρρωσο, or ἐρρωµένως) that formally closes the letter before the mathematical 
content.  Netz’s (2009a: 3-4) reading of the narrative aesthetics of Spiral Lines notes the opaqueness of the 
introductory letter; he also notes the absence of a connective particle in the first proposition.  I suggest that 
the absence of a word of farewell is an equally dramatic indication of the speed and discursiveness of 
Spiral Lines.  (The first proposition of an Archimedean treatise usually opens without a connective 
participle to any previous opening.)  Wilamowitz (1894=1971: 50n.1) in analyzing the possibly 
contemporaneous letter of Eratosthenes to Ptolemy seems to confirm Archimedes’ practice from broader 
reading: “Am Schluß ist εὐτύχει oder ἔρρωσο schlechthin obligatorisch für jeden Brief jener Zeit.” 
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the formal letter and the beginning of the postulates.  For there is no space available in 
the transcription of the manuscript to have a formal conclusion between the meta-
mathematical observation and the beginning of proposition 2, 30 which in fact begins mid-
line as ἐ<κ>δοθεῖσαν πρότερον. ὅτι δὲ πᾶ-.31  In general the manuscript only allows for 
breaks between propositions and then only when the text is separated by the 
mathematical diagrams.  Therefore if the introduction had a formal conclusion it could 
not have fallen after the meta-mathematical observation. Archimedes’ preferred closings 
of εὐτύχει, ἔρρωσο, or ἐρρωµένως could fit cleanly into the lacuna read by Heiberg 
(1913) of twelve letters supplemented as <σοι πρότερον> at the end of the introductory 
letter before the postulates.32 
Yet any argument about the formal structure of the opening letter cannot overlook 
the fact that Archimedes includes meta-mathematical observations and a methodological 
focus beyond the opening letter.  The structure of the surviving text of the Ephodos is: 
opening letter, postulates, proposition 1, meta-mathematical observations, mechanical 
propositions 2-11 on individual objects (including mechanical demonstrations of volumes 
of spheroids and paraboloids of revolution proved before in On Conoids and Spheroids), 
and the final extant propositions 12-15 that prove the volume of the cylinder hoof.  The 
final sequence of four propositions is more developed than the earlier, previously-proved 
results: propositions 12 and 13 are proved with mechanics and indivisibles, proposition 
14 with indivisibles alone, and proposition 15 is proved in formal Euclidean style.  It 
seems likely that Archimedes proved the volume of the bicylinder in a similar sequence 
in propositions 16-18; i.e. mechanics and indivisibles, indivisibles alone, and a formal 
Euclidean proof.33  Netz, Saito, and Tchernetska (2001) have suggested Archimedes may 
have included more meta-mathematical observations in the gap of one missing leaf 
between the mid-point of proposition 12 and the beginning of proposition 13, the 
                                                
30 Ephodos 276-285. 
31 Ephodos 285. 
32 Ephodos 131.  It may be too charitable to say that Heiberg read a gap of 12 letters; his apparatus ad loc. 
indicates he supplemented based on Reinach’s suggestion.  See Appendix B footnote 49. 
33 Netz, Saito, and Tchernetska (2001: 11). 
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transition between mechanics plus indivisibles and indivisibles alone.34  This is a 
reasonable proposal and gains strength from the insertion of other meta-mathematical 
observations between propositions 1 and 2.  If Archimedes did include more meta-
mathematical comments later in the treatise, the mathematical flow of the Ephodos would 
be interrupted by extra-mathematical material in a way alien to the vast majority of 
mathematical writing in Archimedes’ corpus.35  Netz’s suggestion to read proposition 1 
as part of the “second-order” discourse of the Ephodos then ought to be extended to cover 
the majority of the mathematics in the treatise, apart from the final sequence of theorems 
on the cylinder hoof and bicylinder.   
Moreover, the transition from mechanical proposition to mechanical proposition 
in the Ephodos often has the manuscript form θεωρεῖται δὲ διὰ τοῦ τρόπου τούτου καὶ 
ὅτι.36  Heiberg (1913) once emended this phrase to θεωρεῖται δὲ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον καὶ 
ὅτι.37  He seems to have understood the manuscript phrase as the adverbial use of 
τρόπος, i.e. “likewise” or “in this way”, and emended accordingly.38  But I would suggest 
that we view the manuscript reading as marked vocabulary: Archimedes is reiterating and 
teaching how to use his method, the τρόπος; the phrase means “It is also seen through 
this manner that.”  The phrase first appears after proposition 1 as if to suggest that 
Archimedes will argue methodically in a manner analogous to the earlier proposition.  
Netz (1999b) has argued that Greek mathematicians’ use of ὁµοίως δεῖξαι in extending 
and, in our sense, generalizing a theorem, is in fact a generalization of the means of proof 
and not a generalization of results: ὁµοίως δεῖξαι means that the proof is repeatable with 
another collection of similar inputs.39  I argue that a similar effect is occurring here, so 
that the “backward-looking” proposition 1 establishes in the above-defined sense the 
proper manner of mechanical argument for Archimedes’ τρόπος.  Therefore the 
introductory letter, postulates, proposition 1, and the first set of meta-mathematical 
                                                
34 Netz, Saito, and Tchernetska (2001: 23-24). 
35 The exception is Archimedes’ Arenarius, for which see Netz (2003). 
36 Netz et al. (2008: 66r2.8, 65r2.20, 58v1.4-5, 45r2.7-8, 160v1.7-8, 48r2.16-17, 41r1.3).  
37 He emends at Heiberg (1913: 438.28) but not at (Heiberg 1913: 446.16, 454.12-13, 458.25-26, 468.25, 
474.8-9, 484.9). 
38 LSJ τρόπος II.2. 
39 Netz (1999b: 242-46). 
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observations become a paradigmatic grouping of didactic instruction to the reader, 
Eratosthenes and the intellectual circle beyond, for understanding the Ephodos.  In this 
chapter I will demonstrate how this grouping outlines the understanding we are to apply 
to the rest of the text. 
3.2 EMERGENCE, OR INTEGRATION 
Archimedes’ Ephodos introduces a novel approach to finding areas of solids of 
revolution, whereby geometric shapes and the lines that compose them are weighed on a 
scale-beam.  Here is the emergence of a new procedure in a science.  ANT, as recounted 
in chapter 1.4, argued that new concepts in science develop from older concepts and 
objects embedded in the networked structure of science.  In the case of Herophilus’ pulse 
theory in 2.3, the networked structure revealed the interaction between historical mental 
concepts, culturally conditioned to third century BCE Alexandria, and ahistorical 
physical phenomena.  We are presented with a similar divide between noumena and 
phenomena in Archimedes’ Ephodos: Archimedes’ approach integrates the sciences of 
mathematics and mechanics. 
The text marks the different sciences while uniting them.  In the opening letter of 
the Ephodos Archimedes immediately introduces a contrast between τῶν̣ ἐν τοῖς 
µαθηµάτεσσιν “mathematics” and τῶν µηχανικῶν “mechanics”.40  He does not call his 
approach a ‘method’ but ambiguously refers to τρόπου τινὸς ἰδιότητα “a characteristic 
of a certain manner.” His tropos – let us simply call it that after Knobloch’s (2000) 
warning – is not identified solely with mathematics or mechanics, but rather is a 
metaphoric road (καθ᾽ ὅν ἐπιπορευοµένωι) and its departure points (ἀφορµὰς) that 
connect those separate groups.  Archimedes does not describe the tropos directly in his 
introductory letter but merely characterizes its heuristic functions and benefits and 
                                                
40 Ephodos 69-80: ὁρῶν δέ τυ, καθάπερ λέγω, σπουδαῖον καὶ φιλοσοφία̣ς̣ προεστᾶτα ἀξιολόγως καὶ τὰν 
ἐν τοῖς µαθ̣ηµάτεσσιν κατὰ τὸ ὑποπίπτον θεωρίαν τετιµηκότα ἐδοκίµασα γράψαι τοι καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ 
βιβλίον ἐφοδιάσας τρόπου τινὸς ἰδιότητα, καθ᾽ ὅν ἐπιπορευοµένωι ἐσσεῖται λαµβάνειν ἀφορµὰς εἰς τὸ 
δύνασθαί τινα τῶν̣ ἐν τοῖς µαθηµάτεσσιν θεωρεῖν διὰ τῶν µηχανικῶν. “Seeing that you, just as I said, are 
learned and remarkably preeminent in philosophy and have appreciated happenstance contemplation in 
mathematics, I thought it good to write to you and to furnish in the same book a characteristic of a certain 
manner, for one traversing along which it will be possible to supply starting points for the ability to 
contemplate some of the things in mathematics through mechanics.” 
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alludes to his earlier results with it. 
In chapter 1.3.2 I argued that there is technical vocabularly associated with the 
domain of each particular science.  Archimedes’ Ephodos mixes the technical 
terminology of the domain of mathematics and the technical terminology of the domain 
of mechanics.  Netz (1999b) has shown that the Greek mathematical vocabularly is 
relatively small.41  He has shown that other varieties42 of mathematical language do not 
have the same consistency of technical diction as the continuous Euclidean-style – 
repetition of diction being the factor in establishing a consistent Greek mathematical 
lexicon. Effectively, then, Netz has shown that Greek mathematicians recognized 
different registers to Greek mathematics: Euclidean-style geometric style is the most 
regulated and therefore formal register; but arithmetic, mechanics, etc. are much less 
regulated and therefore less formal.  Netz divides technical mathematical language into 
object formulae (e.g. triangles, lines, points, etc.), construction formulae (e.g. “let be 
drawn”, “assume”) , second-order formulae (e.g. “I say that”), argumentation formulae 
(“the ratio of X to Y”), and predication formulae (e.g. “X is equal to Y with Z”).43  The 
associated groups of formulaic technical terminology demarcate objects, manipulate 
them, and consider them individually or conjointly in equalities and proportions.  Since 
Netz has shown that the technical terminology of Greek mathematics is therefore well-
regulated and relatively small, the mathematical register of technical terminology is not 
the marked style of the Ephodos; rather, the Ephodos marks the register of the 
mechanical. 
While Ephodos introduces a new tropos to measuring solids of revolution using 
mechanical procedures, Archimedes had already attempted to measure the parabola using 
                                                
41 Netz (1999b: 89-126). 
42 I adopt the idea of register variation from Willi (2003: 226), a comparative study of linguistic registers in 
Aristophanes: “It has become clear that it is feasible to operate with categories of variation which are more 
fine-grained than the well-known ones of ‘foreign dialect’, ‘paratragic style’, or ‘colloquial language’.  The 
universally recognized absence of linguistic continuity in Aristophanes, and above all the lack of 
continuous linguistic characterization, should not discourage us from analysing discontinuous varieties: 
first, because variation is an interesting topic in its own right and secondly because linguistic 
charaterization – if we do want to look for it – is possible even in a discontinuous mode.”   
43 Netz (1999b: 133-44).  For the sake of readability, I write in the modern shorthand of algebraic 
substitution; Greek mathematicians refer only to their formulaic geometric objects. 
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a kind of mechanical procedure in Quadrature of the Parabola and Planes in Equilibrium 
2.  Thus, the first proposition of the Ephodos – the paradigmatic proposition for 
understanding the treatise – is Archimedes’ third attempt to measure the parabola by a 
mechanical procedure.  Just as in the case of Herophilus’ pulse rhythms in chapter 2.2, 
we have multiple attempts by the same scientist to solve the same problem.  However, 
unlike the methodological consideration of the Herophilean material in chapter 2.2, we 
have explicit evidence about the chronological sequence of Archimedes’ treatises: 
Archimedes claims to have proven the result of the area of a parabola before the 
Ephodos; thus Quadrature of the Parabola and Equilibrium of Planes, Archimedes’ other 
mechanical treatises, precede Ephodos.  Therefore, I suggest that we consider 
Archimedes’ other mechanical treatises as possible intertexts for our reading of Ephodos 
proposition 1.  This is intertextualityA as described in 1.3.1 where the author directs the 
reader to relevant parallels, variously to elucidate or contrast the present text: thus 
intertextualityA is a guide to authorial intent.  As a guide to authorial intent 
intertextualityA signposts the scientific author’s sense of the continuity and contrast 
between his multiple attempts to solve the same problem.  The contrast between 
Archimedes’ different treatises will focus on the role and type of mechanical procedure. 
3.2.1 Parabolas and Intertexts  
Ephodos has the narrative shape of Quadrature of the Parabola, not Planes in 
Equilibrium or Floating Bodies, the other Archimedean mechanical treatises.  Hence my 
discussion will focus on Quadrature of the Parabola.  The mathematical aim of 
Quadrature of the Parabola is exclusively to measure the parabola: the treatise has an 
introductory letter, several initial propositions (1-5) whose results will be used later, a 
mechanical argument to measure the parabola using the same parabola ΒΘΓ (propositions 
6-17), and a separate geometrical argument to measure the parabola employing a reductio 
ad absurdum (propositions 18-24).  The aim of Ephodos proposition 1, the exemplar 
proof as argued above in 3.1.2, is to measure the area of a parabola. The comparison to 
the Ephodos then is Quadrature of the Parabola’s mixture of mechanical and 
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mathematical.  I argue that Quadrature of the Parabola functions as an intertext for 
Ephodos: Archimedes invokes the mechanical procedure of Quadrature of the Parabola 
as a cultural discourse of mechanized mathematics. 
Netz (2009a) argues that a central narrative principle of Archimedes’ treatises is 
poikile: he suggests that Archimedes’ “hybrid treatise”, the mixing of mathematical 
genres, is a generic kind of literary work.44  The Archimedean treatises exhibiting 
hybridization are Arenarius, Stomachion, Quadrature of the Parabola, and Ephodos.  
Netz argues that Quadrature of the Parabola as a hybrid treatise engages in a sort of 
mathematical intertextuality.  
Here is a hybrid treatise, obtaining the same result twice via different routes. Each 
of the routes is based on hybrids, on cross-fertilization: abstract conic theory and a 
concrete theory of the balance, in the first route; abstract conic theory and an even 
more abstract summation of geometrical progressions, in the second route. But in 
this sense the hybrids do cross-fertilize and in this way form some kind of organic 
unity. The relationship within each of the segments – propositions 1-18 and 
propositions 19-24 – is that of a single mathematical thought. Putting the two 
segments side by side is a much more radical departure, creating a textured 
treatise whose two parts are to be read alongside, or against, each other. Is the 
presence of a more "classical" geometrical proof designed to undercut the first, 
"mechanical" proof? Or are the two meant to cast light on one another (e.g. in that 
the mechanical line of thought might explain, in some sense, how one obtains the 
geometrical one? This certainly is the experience of reading the second following 
the first). The treatise as a whole throws this kind of meta-mathematical puzzle at 
the reader and, in a sense, ironically undercuts the very notion of a definitive 
proof: it highlights, after all, the multiplicity of mathematical routes.45 
 
Netz highlights the main interpretative problem raised by the parallelism of types of 
proof in Quadrature of the Parabola.  When read as a whole, Quadrature of the 
Parabola offers a solution to the same problem twice; the reader expects a geometric 
proof up until proposition 6 and then remembers the mechanical proof when reading 
propositions 19-24.  Netz suggests that the effect is one of denying the sense of finality 
and completion to either procedure’s solution.  In effect Archimedes directs the 
expectations of the reader away from the immediate proposition: the idealized proof – a 
                                                
44 Netz (2009a: 115-173). 
45 Netz (2009a: 130). 
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final, unassailable sequence of argument about the area of the parabola46 – acts an 
intertext, even though such as text is not present at all.  We readers need not choose 
which of the two methods of proof are ultimately intended in Quadrature of the 
Parabola.47  
In Quadrature of the Parabola Archimedes highlights the mathematical 
expectations for his readers regarding the finality of proof by intertextualityA as described 
in chapter 1.3.1.  It should not seem strange to talk about intertext here: Archimedes is a 
self-referential author and Greek mathematical texts constantly refer to previous written 
works.  Scholars are used to talking about intertext primarily as a literary text or trope, 
which directs the reader’s attention toward other written texts to illuminate further the 
text at hand.48  Yet the reappearance of a mathematical concept can equally be 
intertextual: indeed Netz’s (2009a) reading of Quadrature of the Parabola suggests that 
an Archimedean intertext may not even need to exist as a document for it to be alluded to.  
Here “text” should be understood in an expansive sense: generic expectations, including 
the regimented form of Greek mathematical proof discussed further in 3.2.3, can be 
understood as a kind of textual discourse, with their own codes and references.49  An 
author may mobilize a set of generic allusions which evoke a cultural discourse without 
reference to a particular written text.  The Greek mathematician thus alludes to the 
objects and intellectual codes of his own domain: a geometrical object, such as the 
parabola, or a methodic variation, such as a mechanical procedure, or a concept, such as a 
                                                
46 Archimedes’ criticisms in Quadrature of the Parabola’s opening letter (Heiberg 1913: 262.19) of 
previous geometers’ οὐκ εὐπαραχώρητα λήµµατα, not easily admitted lemmas, in attempting similar 
problems ought to be read as a further part of Archimedes’ games with his readers about the finality of 
proof. 
47 Netz (2009a: 128-29) sees this as a deliberate authoritative strategy by Archimedes, in that he shows 
mastery of both kinds of techniques without explanation: it is the mystique of the superior intellectual 
competitor. Thus Netz’s (2009a) historiographical strategy is a type of intertextualityR as shown in 1.3.1: 
the issue of historical chronology between different solutions is put into abeyance, while the reading of a 
unique kind of reader, the contemporary historian, guides the continuity of authorial thread between the 
scientist’s multiple attempts at solving a problem.  Netz’s interpretation defends the unity of Quadrature of 
the Parabola.  Older Quellenforschung-style commentators saw a historical development in Archimedes’ 
mathematical abilities from the two methods of proof and deemed the mechanical procedure the earlier 
publication; this position is clearly Whiggish historicism. 
48 See the discussion of Hinds (1998) in chapter 1.3.1. 
49 For intertextuality as a schema of generic discourses rather than a particular written text, see Riggsby 
(2006). 
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secure proof.  Furthermore, intertextualityA helps to characterize the intended audience.  
Since it was argued above in 3.1.2 that Archimedes’ writings circulated beyond their 
nominal addressees to the Alexandrian mathematically-literate community, 
intertextualityA implies that in Quadrature of the Parabola Archimedes assumed an 
audience of fellow mathematicians.  
Let us analyze the mechanical procedure of Quadrature of the Parabola for 
measuring the parabola.  In proposition 6 Archimedes enjoins us to “imagine a plane 
perpendicular to the horizontal” and begins to describe a scale-beam ΑΒΓ constructed in 
that vertical plane whose fulcrum is point B as shown in illustration 6.   
 
Illustration 6: Heiberg Diagram for Quadrature of the Parabola Proposition 6.50 
At first glance, a scale-beam (ζυγός) is a crude machine that produces the (in)equalities 
‘equal to’, ‘less than’, and ‘greater than’.  But it is actually a proportional machine which, 
if always forced to yield the equality ‘equal to’ such that the machine is balanced, gives a 
proportion of the sort A : B :: C : D where (A, C) is one of side of the balance and (B, D) 
is the other side.  Illustration 6 shows that the weight Ζ hung at point Α balances the 
triangle ΒΔΓ, whose center of weight is point Θ, hung at point Ε.  Since weights are 
inversely proportion to their distances from the fulcrum by the law of the lever, line ΑΒ : 
line ΒΕ :: triangle ΒΔΓ : rectangle Ζ in Quadrature of the Parabola proposition 6.51  
Archimedes’ mechanical strategy is to balance the machine; his mathematical strategy is 
                                                
50 Heiberg (1913: 274).   
51 The text (Heiberg 1913: 274.18-21) describes the act of weighing and the resulting proportion that the 
diagram illustrates: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἰσορροπέοντι τὸ µὲν Ζ κρεµάµενον κατὰ τὸ Α, τὸ δὲ Β∆Γ κατὰ τὸ Ε, δῆλον 
ὡς ἀντιπέπονθε τοῖς µάκεσιν, καί ἐστιν ὡς ἁ ΑΒ ποτὶ τὰν ΒΕ, οὕτως τὸ Β∆Γ τρίγωνον ποτὶ τὸ Ζ 
χωρίον. 
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to manipulate the various proportions produced by the weights and their distance from 
the fulcrum.   
To set two objects on the scale-beam simultaneously would not be fruitful in 
measuring their ratio.  But if the scale-beam is used as a middle proportion machine by 
balancing the scale-beam, it will determine the ratio between two objects which do not 
hang together.  In Quadrature of the Parabola 6-13 Archimedes proceeds to place 
triangles and trapezoids upon a balanced scale-beam in order to specify geometric ratios 
between them. Finally, in proposition 14 Archimedes introduces the parabola, specified 
via triangles and trapezoids, upon the scale-beam to measure it, as illustration 7 shows.  
Thus in propositions in 14 and 15 Archimedes defines a complex set of equalities 
between trapezoids to weights unique to larger trapezoids and combined against the 
triangle, and trapezoids determined within the larger triangle such that the ratio between 
trapezia remains the same (a geometric series).  Given further that the smaller trapezia are 
encompassed by the larger trapezia, Archimedes is able to define further ratios between 
smaller trapezia and their encompassing larger trapezia.   
 
Illustration 7: Heiberg Diagram for Quadrature of the Parabola 14.52 
Since all figures are now defined in relation to each other, Archimedes is thereby able to 
prove that the area encompassed by the trapezia circumscribing the parabola is greater 
                                                
52 Heiberg (1913: 289). 
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than one third the whole triangle and again the area encompassed by the smaller trapezia 
is less than one third the whole triangle.  This form we recognize as the Archimedean 
limit, which is proved by double reductio ad absurdum; Archimedes does this in 
proposition 16 without the scale-beam.  In proposition 17 Archimedes restates the 
theorem in terms of the inscribed triangle, the familiar form of the thesis: the parabola is 
four-thirds of its inscribed triangle. 
What then is the “intuitively gained insight”53 of the mechanical exposition of the 
Quadrature of the Parabola?  Past scholarship would seem to regard it as the result of the 
theorem itself.  But the essential point is the geometric progression of the measuring 
figures – and this comes from the division of the triangle by the trapezia, not from the 
scale-beam itself.  The scale-beam merely preserves the correct ratio of areas in 
geometric progression.  In this way, the scale-beam is a means to an end and not the 
discoverer of the result.   
In the Ephodos Archimedes can allude to his earlier work on mechanical 
procedures Quadrature of the Parabola and Planes in Equilibrium.  While both treatises 
treat the parabola in a mechanical manner, Quadrature of the Parabola mixes the 
mechanial and mathematical in a similar structure to the Ephodos; the Ephodos merely 
repeats as axioms before the first proposition the proofs about barymetric centers from 
Planes in Equilibrium.  Therefore I argue that Archimedes alludes to his earlier treatises 
for different reasons: he refers readers to Planes in Equilibrium for its proofs about 
centers of gravity and to Quadrature of the Parabola for its mechanical procedure.  Thus 
the mechanical procedure of Quadrature of the Parabola – the physical act of weighing a 
mathematical object in a way that is very schematically similar to the weighing of objects 
in a scale pan against sums of standardized weights – is the mechanical procedure 
Archimedes expects his readers to know in the reading of the Ephodos.  In the Ephodos 
Archimedes marks mechanical discourse and directs his readers to textual codes of 
mechanized mathematics from Quadrature of the Parabola. 
                                                
53 Disjkterhuis (1987: 336). 
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3.2.2 Appopriating Mechanical Discourse  
The historiographical issue in cross-scientific appropriation is how Archimedes 
integrates the mechanical and mathematical elements into a coherent tropos.  To address 
this problem, using the literary tools developed in chapter 1.3 I will describe and analyze 
the mechanical discourse of the Ephodos in 3.2.2.  Next, in section 3.2.3, I will do a close 
reading of Ephodos proposition 1 to demonstrate how Archimedes integrates the 
mathematical and mechanical aspects into a coherent tropos. 
The Ephodos’ domain of mechanics, τὰ µηχανικά, has the Archimedean sense of 
mechanized mathematics, distinct from the modern meaning of applied mathematics, i.e. 
mathematicized mechanics.54  For example, in the treatises Quadrature of the Parabola 
and Planes in Equilibrium Archimedes finds centers of weight of mathematical forms and 
positions those mathematical shapes on an idealized balance to find their volumes.  The 
distinctly Archimedean treatment of τὰ µηχανικά processes mathematical figures 
according to physical principles, such as weight and solidity.  There are three textual 
elements in Archimedes’s discourse of mechanics: the physicalization of mathematical 
objects, the scale-beam, and centers of weight.  The vocabularly of solidity and weighing 
associated with these elements marks the Ephodos’ mechanical treatment of geometrical 
objects. 
 Physicalizing geometric objects endows them with characteristics they do not 
normally possess as τὰ µαθήµατα.  By applying Archimedes’ tropos the Ephodos 
imagines that mathematical objects are balanced on a scale-beam (ζυγός).  Objects must 
have mass and thus weight when balanced in the physical world. For example, the text of 
Ephodos proposition 2 imagines that the sphere ΑΒΓΔ, cone ΑΕΖ, and cylinder ΦΨΧΩ 
have mass, as their cross-section distributed on the scale-beam ΘΑΓ shows in illustration 
8.  The sphere, cone, and cylinder are composed of circles; that is, the figures are solid.55 
                                                
54 Previous scholarship on Archimedes’ mechanics focused on whether his derivation of the law of the 
lever in Equilibrium of Planes 1.6 was correct: see Dijksterhuis (1987: 291-304), Drachmann (1967), 
Palmieri (2008).  In my view this has not been a productive discussion in understanding Archimedes. 
55 Netz et al. (2008: 66v2.9-12) συµπληρωθέντος οὖν τοῦ κυλίνδρου ὑπὸ τῶν ληφθέντων κύκλων καὶ τῆς 
σφαίρας καὶ τοῦ κώνου. It should be understood that “fill”, συµπληροῦσθαι, here is a technical term of 
Greek mathematics indicating the full construction of a figure for a proof, called the κατασκευή: 
συµπληροῦσθαι thus indicates that the figure is completed.  See Euclid Elements I.8 and Mugler (1958: 
392-93). 
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The text states next that the cylinder ΗΕ balances around the fulcrum point Α both the 
sphere ΑΒΓΔ and the cone AEZ when moved to Θ.  But this is not the case: it is 
specifically the cone ΑΕΖ embedded in the sphere ΑΒΓΔ which balances, not the two 
separate objects, for they must have the same center of weight. 
 
Illustration 8: Heiberg Diagram for Ephodos Proposition 2.56 
That is, the sphere ΑΒΓΔ and the cone AEZ when placed at Θ inhabit the same shared 
space but, by balancing, possess their individual (and therefore summed on the scale-
beam) magnitudes.  Only two objects balance in space, not three, since the sphere and the 
cone form a single strange piece of art at Θ.  This fact is not discussed and the text 
continues to operate mathematically as if two separate shapes occupy the same physical 
space at Θ, capable of individual manipulation and unique equalities on the scale-beam.  
In other words, the Ephodos operates as if the sphere and cone are shells, removable from 
one another, possessing only a shared center of weight.  We might be led to think that we 
have imagined wrongly that the objects are solid; but no, the objects are to be imagined 
simply as solids in the sense of surfaces in mathematical space.  These distinctions do not 
occur easily to the Greek reader, since Greek mathematics speaks simpliciter of 
geometrical objects as magnitudes, without reference to area, volume, or even physical 
                                                
56 Heiberg (1913: 441). 
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properties such as mass.57  To summarize: multiple mathematical objects occupy the 
same space as one object; they have magnitude on the scale-beam and thus mass; they are 
solid; yet they are separable and treated individually.  The discourse of physicalization of 
mathematical objects does not go very far in the Ephodos, acting more as a superficial 
veneer than substantive concretization.  Archimedes says that they possess the physical 
properties of mass and centers of gravity, yet they are not limited by these qualities in the 
way real physical objects are. 
The scale-beam is the second element of mechanical discourse in the Ephodos.  
As discussed above in 3.2.1, Archimedes had already used a mechanical method in 
Quadrature of the Parabola. The style of argumentation about the scale-beam is much 
different in Ephodos from that of the Quadrature of the Parabola.  
 
Illustration 9: Heiberg Diagram for Quadrature of the Parabola 14.58 
While both treatises measure the area of a parabola upon the scale-beam, in Ephodos 
proposition 1 Archimedes guarantees that the center of weight of the triangle lies on the 
horizontal of the balance.  Proposition 1 of the Ephodos differs from Quadrature of the 
Parabola 14, where Archimedes hangs the parabola by a terminal chord and locates the 
center of weight underneath the horizontal of the balance.  Illustration 9 shows that in 
                                                
57 Netz et al. (2008: 45r1.3-13) συµπληρωθέντος οὖν τοῦ κυλίνδρου καὶ τοῦ τµήµατος τοῦ ὀρθογωνίου 
κωνοειδέ<ο>ς ἰσορροπήσει περὶ τὸ Α σηµεῖον ὁ κύλινδρος αὐτοῦ µένων τῶ τµήµατι τοῦ ὀρθογωνίου 
κωνοειδέος µετενεχθέντι καὶ τεθέντι τοῦ ζυγοῦ κατὰ τὸ Θ οὕτως, ὥστε κέντρον εἶναι αὐτοῦ τοῦ βάρους 
τὸ Θ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἰσορροπεῖ περὶ τὸ Α σηµεῖον τὰ εἰρηµένα µεγέ̣θη. 
58 Heiberg (1913: 289). 
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Quadrature of the Parabola 14 the parabola ΒΘΓ hangs upon the scale-beam ΑΒΓ.  
Triangle ΔΒΓ (of which parabola ΒΘΓ is part) balances on the scale-beam against the 
combined weights Ρ, Χ, Ψ, Ω, and B (these weights are respectively equal to the triangle 
ΞΙΓ and trapezoids ΥΙ, ΤΗ, ΣΖ, ΔΕ of triangle ΔΒΓ).  In Quadrature of the Parabola 
Archimedes does not ensure that objects are placed upon the scale-beam by their center 
of weight, as the fundamental theorem of the level demands: illustration 9 shows that 
triangle ΔΒΓ, for instance, is not balanced on the scale-beam in its center of weight, 
where the diagonals of the triangle would intersect.  In Ephodos Archimedes appears 
more concerned with adherence to the theoretical principle at stake: as illustration 10 
shows, in Ephodos proposition 1 triangle ΑΒΞ balances on its center of weight X where 
the diagonals of the triangle intersect. 
 
 
Illustration 10: Heiberg Diagram for Ephodos 1.59 
The presentation of the scale-beam is quite different in each treatise.  In 
Quadrature of the Parabola we look at the scale-beam as a plane perpendicular to the 
horizontal, as illustration 9 shows.  Here we readers see each side of the scale-beam and 
can check that the beam ΑΒΓ is balanced along the horizontal.  The diagram encourages 
us to view the mechanical procedure primarily as a weighing procedure.  Thus the 
diagram complements the text, where Archimedes places a sum of weights (Ρ, Χ, Ψ, Ω, 
                                                
59 Heiberg (1913: 435). 
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and B) upon the scale-beam ΑΒΓ and weighs sum by sum the parabola ΒΘΓ hung inside 
the triangle ΔΒΓ. 
In the Ephodos, on the other hand, we view the scale-beam from above the plane 
of the horizontal, looking down upon a flat plane. Illustration 10 shows the scale-beam 
ΘΚΓ balancing at its midpoint Κ in Ephodos proposition 1.  The reader looks down at a 
horizontol plane from above: all the points in the plane appear at the same depth.  From 
this perspective the reader is physically unable to view the fact that the scale-beam ΘΚΓ 
balances.  The reader is forced to assume the balancing of objects on the scale-beam.  
Illustration 10 shows triangle ΑΓΞ balancing the line ΤΗ, as if a single line could balance 
a triangle.  
Moreover, Heiberg’s diagrams for the Ephodos are slightly wrong: in the 
manuscript the arbitrary line ΗΤ of Ephodos proposition 1 is drawn under the triangle 
ΑΒΓ, not at Θ as illustration 10 shows; in Ephodos propositions 6 and 9 no balancing 
object appears at Θ, one end of the scale-beam, although Heiberg drew a balancing object 
at Θ.60  The act of placing a balancing figure at Θ that the text demands, even as slight a 
one as a single line, has no diagrammatic referent in the manuscript.  In the absence of 
visual evidence the weighing procedure of the text exists only as a mental development in 
the mind of the reader.  In addition to differences in the diagrammatic presentation of the 
scale-beam, the Ephodos does not weigh objects against solid weights, in the manner of 
the Quadrature.  The discourse of the scale-beam in the Ephodos is purely conceptual 
and more tied to its theoretical principle rather than physical appearance.  
What does Archimedes gain by drawing the Ephodos diagram so that the horizon 
has vanished?  If the horizon is parallel to the ruling of the page as in Quadrature of the 
Parabola, the figures appear to hang suspended or affixed from the balance: as if a 
physical balancing was occurring.  This might be our view of the process drawn from 
daily life, such as the measuring of purchases of grain by merchants; and inspecting the 
weighing procedure from the side of the balance is an effective attestation of the 
                                                
60 Heiberg (1913: 465, 479).  I thank Reviel Netz for sharing his results with me about the shape of the 
manuscript diagrams from the palimpsest. 
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transparency and justice of the procedure for both the merchant and customer.61  
However, to view the weighing procedure from above at depth to a plane parallel to the 
ground as in the Ephodos, is to deny the observer the visual perspective to check the 
accuracy of the result.  Objects placed at opposite ends of the balance will appear 
stationary when viewed from above, regardless of the balance or inbalance of those 
objects. 
Archimedes’ balancing the parabola on the scale-beam is a potentially 
performative scientific act, the spectacle of science.  In chapter 1.3.1 I suggested that 
phenomena of scientific appropriation could be read either as science by an elite 
historical actor who understood the terminology of multiple sciences or as performance 
by a lay audience who did not understand cross-scientific appropriation.  Quadrature of 
the Parabola invites the lay reader to picture the performance of weighing the parabola: 
the act of weighing is pictured from the side of its vertical plane so that the reader can 
check the accuracy of the scale-beam.  Ephodos, conversely, purposely denies the 
interpretation of the performance of weighing.  Since the scale-beam is pictured from 
above, the reader must assume that the balance of mathematical objects is correct.  
Furthermore, since the diagrams of the palimpsest show objects only on one side of the 
scale-beam, the diagrams show no act of weighing at all.  The Ephodos as a scientific text 
precludes the reader from interpretating the measurement of geometric objects on the 
scale-beam as a performative act. 
I argue that Archimedes sublimates the mechanical schematic of the scale-beam 
to the mathematical diagrammatic need. Archimedes draws the geometrical figures 
before he proceeds to weigh them; there is a narrative need to clarify sufficiently the 
relation of the geometric figures to each other.  Further, as Netz (1999b) has argued, 
Greek mathematical texts underdefine their referents so that the reader must refer to the 
                                                
61 Cuomo (2001: 4-5) argues, following Lloyd (1990) (see chapter 1.2), that public presentation of numbers 
and numerical representations, regardless of the numeracy of the populace, is an attempt to present 
financial or political circumstances openly and transparently.  Scholarly study of mathematical knowledge 
and numeracy among historical societies is now called ethnomathematics.   
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accompanying diagram for further topographic information.62  Several points in the first 
proposition are underdefined by the text so that they must be further specified by the 
diagram; see below in 3.2.3.  The development and use of the scale-beam, on the other 
hand, is intuitively clear from Archimedes’ other work.  In Ephodos mathematical 
diagrammatic referentiality is both narratologically and ontologically prior to 
mechanization. 
The audience of Archimedes’ Ephodos is therefore the narrow audience of elite 
Greek mathematicians.  Mechanization is secondary to mathematics.  Netz (1999b) has 
shown that the diagram chronologically preceded the text in a Greek mathematician’s 
writing of a mathematical problem;63 in the Ephodos that diagram denies the reader the 
spectacle of weighing.  The ancient audience that understood the diagrams of the 
Ephodos was composed of practicing mathematicians, not mechanicians. 
The third element of mechanical discourse is the center of weight.  This concept is 
nowhere defined in Archimedes’s works, but is defined by Pappus:  
λέγοµεν δὲ κέντρον βάρους ἑκάστου σώµατος εἶναι σηµεῖόν τι κείµενον ἐντός, 
ἀφ’ οὗ κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν ἀρτηθὲν τὸ βάρος ἠρεµεῖ φερόµενον καὶ φυλάσσει τὴν ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς θέσιν  
 
I say that the center of weight of each body is some point lying inside [the body], 
from which the weight, once imagined hung, does not move if carried about and 
preserves its initial position.64   
 
Archimedes too seems to operate with this sense of the term in several of his works.  In 
the Ephodos he lists several axioms he has proved in Planes in Equilibrium and On 
Conoids and Spheroids before moving to the propositions, most concerned with how to 
operate with centers of weight as magnitudes and their location in circles and line 
                                                
62 Netz (1999b: 178): “In short: a starting-point may be a diagram starting-point in a strong and weak 
sense.  The weak sense is that the assertion would fail to compel had it not been for the diagram, even 
though the logical grounds for the assertion need not be related to the digram.  The strong sense is that the 
content of the assertion is contained, non-verbally, in the diagram, and the written assertion is an unpacking 
of this information.  In the weak sense diagram starting-points are ubiquitous, but less startling.  In the 
strong sense they are less common, say one or two per prosposition on average (ranging from zero to a 
few).” 
63 Netz (1999b: 84). 
64 Pappus 8.5 (1030.11-13 Hultsch).  Cited by Dijksterhuis (1987: 299). 
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segments.65  It is clear that the center of weight has a complex relation to the perimeter of 
a solid object.  It is only a point but has magnitude by the fundamental theorem of the 
scale-beam: centers of weight are inversely proportional to their distance from the 
fulcrum.  The Ephodos speaks in two ways of the center of weight:  first as a point, a 
location on the diagram, and second as a magnitude by the fundamental theorem of the 
scale-beam.  A discourse about mechanics – a center of weight – is thereby transformed 
into the language of geometry. 
Archimedes’ treatment of τὰ µηχανικά in the Ephodos is therefore primarily 
conceptual and in no way involves physical experiments. Consider how Archimedes 
measures the parabola ΑΒΓ in Ephodos proposition 1: Archimedes’ only supportive prop 
in τὰ µηχανικά is the scale-beam, ζυγός; his only protagonst is the very specific object he 
is measuring.  We enter into the tropos with the specified object, the triangle ΑΓΖ, 
balanced at its center of weight (that is, we only know the conceptual balancing of the 
object on its proper theoretical point), at which moment all other necessary physical 
conditions of the act of balancing – the horizon, the inclination of the beam, the position 
of the fulcrum, the physicalization of the parabola – all disappear: our physical props and 
protagonists have become mathematical again.  The result obtained from this process is 
also mathematical, namely that parabola ΑΒΓ is four-thirds the inscribed triangle.  
3.2.3 Integrating the Mathematical and Mechanical: A Close Reading 
In 3.1.2 I argued that Archimedes’ mathematical practice in Ephodos proposition 
1 is the paradigmatic tropos the Ephodos’ opening letter recommends to Eratosthenes.  
Hence our best understanding of Archimedes’ practice of integrating the mechanical into 
the mathematical will come from considering Ephodos proposition 1 in a detailed close 
reading.  My close reading follows the order of the proposition. 
A Greek mathematical proposition has a well-regulated structure traditionally in 
six parts, explained by Proclus in his commentary on Euclid’s Elements: protasis or 
enunciation, which lists the general theorem to be proved; ekthesis or setting-out, which 
describes the particular instantiation of the general theorem; diorismos or definition of 
                                                
65 Ephodos 132-177. 
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goal, which asserts what holds in the particular case if the enunciation is true; kataskeuē 
or construction, which constructs the particular figure on which the particular case will be 
proved; apodeixis or proof, which proves the particular theorem on the particular figure; 
and sumperasma or conclusion, which restates the general enunciation and asserts that it 
has been proved.66  I mark the distinct parts in the discussion by Roman numerals: I. 
protasis, II. ekthesis, III. diorismos, IV. kataskeuē, V. apodeixis, VI. sumperasma. 
I. Archimedes launches proposition 1 directly with the ekthesis after the 
postulates, avoiding the protasis entirely.  This is surprising, for it indicates that the 
Ephodos is not a mathematical treatise formalized in the usual manner. The first-horizon 
readers of Archimedes’ Ephodos would therefore have expected that the protasis would 
precede the ekthesis and establish the general theorem to be proved, whereas the ekthesis 
sets out the specific mathematical figures to be used.  The formal structure surprises the 
reader with an unexpected moment of specificity. 
Now Archimedes has laid out the protasis to the first proposition in the 
introductory letter: “Therefore I first write what first became clear through mechanics, 
that any segment of a section of an orthogonal cone is four-thirds of a triangle which has 
the same base and an equal height.”67  Archimedes is not avoiding the constituent parts of 
a formal mathematical treatise, but he is violating their order; and by separating the 
protasis so far from its normal position, he highlights its absence from the proposition.  
II. Archimedes begins the ekthesis by drawing the parabola ΑΒΓ and its 
diameter68 ΔΒ, then extends the line segment ΔΒ to an under-specified point Ε.69  The 
point Ε is under-defined in the text – it is beyond Β on the line ΔΒ – but will be 
sufficiently defined by diagram.  “Belief in the authors’ word is replaced by the 
inspection of ‘figures’.”70  The ancient reader might first now unroll the scroll on the 
right and look to the diagram for guidance.  Archimedes continually directs his readers’ 
attention to conceptually important information in his paradigmatic first demonstration.  
                                                
66 See Netz (1999a: 252-54). 
67 Ephodos 119-125. 
68 This would be called the axis of the parabola in modern terminology. 
69 The ekthesis covers Ephodos 191-198.  
70 Latour (1987: 47); see chapter 1.4. 
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First, Archimedes directs that ΔΒ be drawn parallel to the diameter of the 
parabola but, since Δ is the bisection of ΑΓ, the line segment through Δ and Β is the 
diameter: the text orders a construction more general than the text itself gives.  The text’s 
seeming confusion relates to Netz’s (2004a) arguments about the generality of naming 
conventions: Archimedes feigns ignorance of the specific diagram in order to enunciate a 
generalized proposition.71  In Quadrature of the Parabola 1-4 Archimedes also bisects 
the arbitrary straight line bounding the parabola with the phrase ἁ Β∆ παρὰ τὰν 
διάµετρον ἢ αὐτὰ διάµετρος “the straight line ΒΔ parallel to the diameter or the diameter 
itself”, a phrase made formulaic by repetition so that by proposition 5 Archimedes drops 
ἢ αὐτὰ διάµετρος and refers to the specific diameter ΒΔ as if it were an arbitrary straight 
line segment παρὰ τὰν διάµετρον.72  The conclusion of Quadrature of Parabola 
proposition 5 and its equivalent in Ephodos proposition 1 holds in the case of any 
arbitrary line drawn parallel to the diameter of the parabola.  
The phrasing of the mathematics of generality in Quadrature of the Parabola and 
its continuance in the Ephodos has a narratological import.  The text’s move toward 
generality in Ephodos obscures the immediate placement of the parabola on the scale-
beam, which has yet to be introduced.  The text presented mechanical axioms before 
proposition 1: therefore we have been told to expect a mechanical demonstration as if the 
Ephodos is a mechanical treatise.  We expect, from our knowledge of the application of 
mechanics to the parabola in Planes in Equilibrium or Quadrature of the Parabola, that 
Archimedes will place the parabola on the scale-beam so that its center of weight 
coincides with the line of the scale-beam.  (The center of weight of the parabola lies on 
the diameter.)  We might therefore expect that parabola ΑΒΓ is to lie on a scale-beam, 
part of which is ΔΒ, with the point Ε serving as some as-yet-unspecified point on the 
horizontal of the scale-beam ΔΒΕ.  But we are not given the diameter; we are instead 
given ΔΒ.  Archimedes diverts our attention from the place of the center of weight of the 
parabola, as if to downplay the possibility of a mechanical demonstration: the text 
                                                
71 Netz (2004a: 62).  
72 Netz (1999b: 127-167) argues that sheer repetition is the primary force that shapes the formulaic nature 
of the Greek mathematical lexicon. 
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seemingly precludes the possibility of mechanical performance; only mathematical 
readings are welcome. 
Archimedes now joins at Β the legs of the inscribed triangle ΑΒΓ.  He has now 
drawn the two figures of the enuciation, a circumscribed triangle and a parabolic section.   
III. The diorismos makes explicit Archimedes’ mathematical claim about the two 
figures, that the parabola ΑΒΓ is four-thirds of the triangle ΑΒΓ.73 
IV. In the kataskeuē Archimedes constructs the remaining elements of the 
proposition.74  He draws in legs of the external triangle ΖΑΓ from the tangent to the 
parabolic segment and a parallel to the diameter.  He then constructs the scale-beam (“let 
be imagined <as> a balance the ΓΘ”) by extending ΓΒ to Θ so that the fulcrum point K is 
a point on the boundary of triangle ΖΑΓ.  But the story is not so simple as a construction.  
Although νοεῖν “imagine” is a regular verb in Greek mathematical writing, Netz (2009b) 
has pointed out that a change in gender of the articles of Greek mathematical objects 
regularly indicates a shift from their reality in the diagram to their imagined existence.  
Here the line ΓΘ becomes the scale-beam ΓΘ, a shift in gender from ἡ, the feminine 
article, to ὁ, the masculine article.  We the readers, Netz (2009b) suggests, are invited to 
see ἡ ΓΘ, the <straight line> ΓΘ, as the scale-beam ὁ ΓΘ.75  The shift from seeing to 
seeing as indicates how strongly Greek mathematicians feel the diagrammatic reality of 
the mathematical object.  ΓΘ is not even introduced as a line, ἡ ΓΘ; rather the fact of its 
existence as a line is so taken for granted that Archimedes asks us only to “imagine” it as 
ὁ ΓΘ, the scale-beam.  Archimedes has not so much constructed a scale-beam then but 
rather constructed purely mathematical objects; and when we work with the relations 
                                                
73 The diorismos covers Ephodos 198-199. 
74 The kataskeuē covers Ephodos 199-207. 
75 Netz’s (2009b) argument about imagination in Greek mathematics as a seeing as ought to be contrasted 
against some of his earlier remarks on imagination in Netz (2004a): “It seems that imagination is only 
required when it is necessary to furnish a full spatial object, participating in the geometric configuration.  
Imagination is a spatial, not a conceptual act” (2004a: 198); “B’s polygon’s only claim to existence seems 
to be the notice made in Step 3, of its possibility.  One is tempted to say that to assert an object’s possibility 
is tantamount to imagining its existence” (2004a: 95).  It is often because Netz (2004a) sees Archimedes as 
a mathematical realist and literalist that he is tempted to make such fine-grained distinction in the type of 
imagining Archimedes enjoins; on the other hand, it is a strength of Netz (2009b) that Archimedes’ work is 
compared to other types of mathematical imagination.  
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between objects we will deal with the existence of geometric realia, namely their metrical 
and topographic properties. The line ΓΘ has the metrical property that it is divided 
exactly in half so that ΚΘ equals ΓΚ; the scale-beam ΓΘ has the same metrical property 
and it has the mechanically-derived topographic property that it remains stationary.  And 
because the scale-beam ΓΘ remains stationary at Κ, it cannot yet be seen to have 
anything balanced set upon it.76  
What then is the point of seeing ἡ ΓΘ as the scale-beam ΓΘ?  The text does not 
yet clarify it. Nothing has yet been proved; the kataskeuē merely provides the specific 
construction for the proof.  At this point in the kataskeuē the scale-beam has a potential 
function, just as the geometrical object potentially has properties. Yet it would be equally 
wrong to argue that Archimedes’ kataskeuē is only geometrical because the mechanical 
demonstration does not yet function: as if we were to say that, because Archimedes has 
not availed himself of the logically necessary properties of the parabolic segment ΑΒΓ, 
the geometrical argument is thus merely potential and is not geometrical at this point in 
the text too.  We are supposed to see ΓΘ both as a line and a balance; the text directs our 
interest to the multiplicity of possibilities.  The kataskeuē’s simple imperative νοείσθω 
thus invites a seeing-double from the reader: the geometrical interpretation remains while 
the mechanical interpretation is no longer precluded (as it was in the ekthesis). 
Archimedes next selects a line ΜΞ in the triangle, parallel to the diameter of the 
parabola.  This too is a move toward mathematical generality: any line in the triangle 
ΖΑΓ with the property that it is parallel to the diameter of the parabola would suffice for 
Archimedes’ subsequent demonstration.  That is to say, the line ΜΞ is an arbitrary 
(τυχοῦσα) line such that the subsequent procedure is repeatable with a different parallel 
line.  Specifying the line ΜΞ is the final part of the kataskeuē: Archimedes has completed 
the figure drawn in the diagram of triangle ΑΒΓ, which is inscribed in parabola ΑΒΓ, 
which in turn is inscribed in triangle ΖΑΓ, whose side bisector ΚΓ has been doubled in 
length to Θ, all of which is a purely geometrical construction.  There is the potential of a 
                                                
76 This is the primary reason, I suggest, why the diagram of the proposition presents no mechanical 
features: the diagram presents the proposition as it is at the end of the kataskeuē.  If the kataskeuē had 
positioned the scale-beam such that it had something on one arm and was therefore out of balance, we 
should have expected a different diagram. 
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mechanical demonstration when the line ΓΘ is seen as a balance.  
V. The apodeixis, signaled by ἐπεὶ οὖν, concludes several results immediately 
from the mathematics of the kataskeuē.77  Since ΓΒΑ is a parabola, ΕΒ is equal to ΒΔ; 
Archimedes notes that this is proved in the Conic Elements, either Euclid’s or 
Aristeaus’.78  Likewise, all straight lines parallel to ΕΔ are bisected by ΚΓ: therefore ΜΝ 
is equal to ΝΞ and ΖΚ equal to KA.79  Now Archimedes has already proved in a 
geometric fashion in Quadrature of the Parabola 5 that the ratio of the parts of any line 
segment which extends from the ordinate to the tangent of the ordinate, when drawn 
parallel to the diameter of a parabola and so divided by the parabola, will be the same as 
the division that line segment occasions in the ordinate.  Note then how a result from 
Quadrature of the Parabola stands as possible intertext here, although Archimedes does 
not in the slightest way allude to it.  Within the span of three lines he has drawn two 
mathematical conclusions: the one from a previous mathematician’s Conic Elements, the 
other from his own work Quadrature of the Parabola.  Why then does he refer to the 
Conic Elements directly and Quadrature of the Parabola not at all?  Neither theorem is a 
part of the cognitive reference kit mathematicians expect of their readers.80  Archimedes 
downplays specifically the mathematical content of Quadrature of the Parabola.  When 
Quadrature of the Parabola stands as intertext, it stands before all as an intertext for its 
mechanical procedure, not its results.  Archimedes again limits the reader’s interpretative 
possibilities by the authorial intent of intertextualityA. 
In the apodeixis of Ephodos proposition 1, the ordinate’s parts ΑΞ to ΓΞ will have 
the same ratio as ΟΞ to ΜΟ.81  By addition of equal ratios on either side, namely the 
remainder of the ordinate and the remainder of the line segment, we achieve ΓΑ to ΑΞ 
equals ΜΞ to ΜΟ.  By the fact that line segments cut by parallel lines have equal ratios, 
                                                
77 The apodeixis covers Ephodos 208-274. 
78 Ephodos 208-211.  Archimedes is writing before the publication of Apollonius’ Conics, which becomes 
the standard reference for conics the way Euclid’s Elements becomes the standard elementary geometric 
text.  
79 Ephodos 211-214. 
80 In Netz’s (1999b: 216-239) summary, Euclid’s Elements is the sine qua non text that Greek 
mathematicians expect of their readers. 
81 Ephodos 215-220. 
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ΓΑ to ΑΞ equals ΓΚ to ΚΝ (by the parallel lines ΖΑ and ΞΜ).  Since ΓΚ is equivalent to 
ΚΘ, by more substitution we achieve ΓΑ to ΑΞ equals ΚΘ to ΚΝ and thus ΘΚ to ΚΝ 
equals ΜΞ to ΞΟ.  Only the results of these steps are spelled out, since the procedures are 
probably too obvious for Archimedes’ audience.  In general the initial parts of the 
apodeixis are not very explicitly motivated and the development of mathematical thought 
is somewhat obscure.  
By Ephodos line 221 Archimedes has established a complex relationship between 
a line segment of the bounding triangle ΖΑΓ, the ΜΞ, and a line segment of the parabola 
ΑΒΓ, the ΞΟ.  He has shown that the ratio of these two line segments is equal to the ratio 
of ΚΘ, which we recognize as one arm of the potential scale-beam, to KN.  Archimedes 
now begins to speak explicity of centers of weight in the mechanical fashion.  The pace 
of argument slows down, mathematical motivation becomes more explicit, and the proof 
moves inexorably to its conclusion.  This is the heart of Archimedes’ tropos. 
Archimedes first notes that the point N is the center of weight of the line ΜΞ, by 
axiom 4, since its constituent halves are equal.82  Notice how the discourse of the 
mechanical is suddenly foregrounded; for Archimedes could have said, ΜΝ is equivalent 
to ΝΞ, therefore the point N is the center of weight.  But we have moved from seeing 
lines and parabolic segments and triangles to seeing them as weights and centers of 
weight.  Archimedes continues in a mechanical manner by placing a copy of line segment 
ΞΟ at the far arm of the scale-beam so that it balances on its center of weight; therefore 
this copy, the ΗΤ, and MΞ balance by the fundamental theorem of the lever (the line 
segment joining their centers, the ΘΝ, is cut inversely proportional by the weights at 
either end). And if they are balanced weights, their center of weight is the fulcrum of the 
scale-beam, the point Κ.  This balancing is a statement of ratios, ΘΚ to ΚΝ as ΜΞ to HT.   
The motivation of arguing after the mechanical fashion now becomes apparent.  
The ratio of ΘΚ to ΚΝ as ΜΞ to HT is the same ratio as Archimedes had reached by line 
221, MΞ to ΞΟ as ΚΘ to KN, for HT is equivalent to ΞΟ.  Whereas we had earlier not 
seen the purpose of the complex ratio equivalence, we now see it as an individual claim 
                                                
 
82 Ephodos 221-231. 
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about an arbitrary slice of the triangle ΖΑΓ balancing its contituent slice of the parabolic 
segment ΑΒΓ when placed at points Κ and Ν.  The text does not explain how these line 
segments relate to their respective geometric figures.   
In fact no possible intertext of Archimedes’ mechanical treatises could prepare us 
for this result or explain it.  Quadrature of the Parabola balances whole geometric 
objects against each other.  In illustration 9 from Quadrature of the Parabola 14 the 
rectangles Ρ, Χ, Ψ, Ω, and B balance the triangle ΞΙΓ and trapezoids ΥΙ, ΤΗ, ΣΖ, ΔΕ.  
Intuition about the physical world informs the understanding of balance in Quadrature of 
the Parabola: the experience of scale-beams in the market-place offers intuitive 
justification that the geometric representations of bar weights and sacks of grain, 
rectangles and trapezoids, balance each other.  Yet what physical reality corresponds to 
the Ephodos’ balancing of line segments?  No mechanical intuition drawn from physical 
reality explains the balancing of an arbitrary slice of the triangle ΖΑΓ against its 
contituent slice of the parabolic segment ΑΒΓ.  The balancing of line segments in the 
Ephodos is abstraction beyond the physical world. 
Archimedes now moves to perhaps the most innovative part of his tropos.  
Likewise, he says, however many lines in the triangle ΖΑΓ are drawn parallel to the 
arbitrary slice ΕΔ, they will be balanced by their constituent lines of the parabolic 
segment ΑΒΓ when those lines are transferred and centered at Θ.  And thus the center of 
all weights will be Κ, the fulcrum point of the scale-beam.83  The text is not entirely 
clear: does it mean (1) that we can take any such arbitrary pair, a line segment from 
triangle ΖΑΓ and its constituent segment from parabolic segment ΑΒΓ and balance them 
over K?84 or (2) that we take all line segments in ΖΑΓ, as a group, and their constituent 
segments from parabolic segment ΑΒΓ, as a group, and balance them together over Κ?  
That is, is this a sequential procedure, such as (1), or a procedure of sets, such as (2)?   
The next sentence is key for solving this question.  Archimedes concludes  
καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκ µὲν τᾶν̣ ἐν τῶι ΖΑ<Γ> τριγώνωι <τὸ ΖΑΓ τρίγωνον> συνέστακεν, 
ἐκ δὲ τᾶν ἐν τᾶι τοµᾶι ὁµοίως τᾶι ΟΞ λαµβανοµενᾶν συνέστακε τὸ ΑΒΓ 
τµᾶµα, ἰσορροπήσει ἄρα τὸ ΖΑΓ τρίγωνον αὐτοῦ µένον τῶι τµάµατι τᾶς τοµᾶς 
                                                
83 Ephodos 233-242. 
84 Dijksterhuis (1987: 321-22) reads the text in this way. 
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τεθέντι περὶ κέντρον τοῦ βάρεος τὸ Θ κατὰ τὸ Κ σαµεῖον ὥστε τοῦ ἐξ 
ἀµφοτέρων κέντρον εἶµεν τοῦ βάρεος τὸ Κ. 
 
And since first the triangle ΖΑΓ has been composed of the <straight lines> in the 
triangle ΖΑΓ, and second the segment ΑΒΓ has been composed of the <straight 
lines> taken in the segment similar to the <straight line> ΟΞ, therefore the 
triangle ΖΑΓ will balance and remain stationary at the point Κ by the segment of 
the section set around the center of the weight, the <point> Θ, so that the <point> 
Κ is the center of the weight of the <weight> of both.85 
 
In the formulaic language of Greek mathematical language, ἐπεὶ … ἄρα, Archimedes 
makes an inference to reach his conclusion: since (ἐπεὶ) the triangle ΖΑΓ is composed of 
the line segments in ΖΑΓ and the parabolic segment ΑΒΓ is composed of the line 
segments in ΑΒΓ, therefore (ἄρα) the triangle ΖΑΓ balances the parabolic segment ΑΒΓ 
at Θ.86  It seems as if Archimedes has made a jump somehow from his earlier individual 
lines segments, the arbitrary slice of both the triangle and parabolic segment, to the whole 
geometric object.  As the ἐπεὶ clause of the conclusion states, both geometrical objects 
are composed of their individual line segments.  Archimedes makes a claim about how 
individual line segments stand, in a deep sense, for their geometric objects in the 
weighing procedure.  This is the use of what are called indivisibles in modern 
scholarship, after its procedural use by Cavalieri in the 17th century. 
If we construe the representation of line segments for their geometric objects as 
possibility (1) above, Archimedes’ line of argument would imply that the reader must 
take each individual line segment from ΖΑΓ with its constituent part from ΑΒΓ, weigh it 
so that they balance at K, and continue this procedure until he was persuaded inductively 
that all line segments of ΖΑΓ and ΑΒΓ would satisfy the conditions of balance.  Thus 
Archimedes would be making two types of inductive claims: first, that the triangle ΖΑΓ 
and parabolic segment ΑΒΓ are made of line segments; and second, that the weighing 
procedure can be accomplished exhaustively to infinity by induction.  Note how difficult 
it would be to establish an inductive chain of reasoning in the weighing procedure: as if 
there were some way of sequentially classifying all line segments in either geometric 
                                                
85 Ephodos 243-253. 
86 See Netz (1999b: 138, 254-55) on the inference particle ἄρα and its place in the logical form of a Greek 
mathematical proof. 
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figure.  Not only does this reading compel Archimedes to make multiple unsubstantianted 
claims, it also destroys the logical progression of the argument.   
If, instead, we read Archimedes’ representation of individual line segments for 
their geometric objects as possibility (2) above, the text presents us with only one 
inductive claim and lines 243-253 logically follow on lines 221-233 and 233-242.  We 
are required to assume – it is nowhere stated – that a geometric figure is composed of its 
set of individual line segments. In lines 221-233 Archimedes proves that one member of 
the set of elements of individual line segments of ΖΑΓ and ΑΒΓ balance at Κ.  In lines 
233-242 Archimedes extends this result and argues that, since one element of the set 
balances, all elements of the set must balance.  This is not an inductive proof but a 
property of their belonging to the set of elements of ΖΑΓ and ΑΒΓ.  Finally in lines 243-
253 Archimedes concludes that, since the set of elements of ΖΑΓ and ΑΒΓ balance at Κ, 
the geometric figures themselves balance at K.  This reading has the advantage that it 
builds a single logical sequence of thought: from one element of a set, to all elements of 
the set, to the substitution of the object which stands for all elements of the set.  Read in 
this way, the remaining mathematical question is how the triangle ΖΑΓ and the parabola 
ΑΒΓ are composed of the elements of line segments parallel to ΕΔ. 
I argue that Archimedes takes the view that the line segments which compose the 
triangle ΖΑΓ and the parabola ΑΒΓ are elements of sets after axiom 11 in Ephodos.  
χρησ̣̣̣όµεθ̣̣̣α δ̣̣̣ὲ̣̣̣ κ̣̣̣αὶ [ἐν <τῶι> προγεγραµµένωι κ̣̣̣ωνοε̣̣̣ι̣̣̣δῶν̣̣̣] τῶιδ̣̣̣ε̣̣̣ τῶι θεωρήµατι· 
αἴ κα ὁ̣̣̣π̣̣̣ο̣̣̣σ̣̣̣α̣̣̣ο̣̣̣ῦ̣̣̣ν̣̣̣ µ̣̣̣ε̣̣̣γ̣̣̣έ̣̣̣θεα ἄλλο̣̣̣ι̣̣̣ς̣̣ µεγέθεσιν ἴ̣̣̣σ̣̣̣α̣̣̣ τὸ πλῆθος κ̣̣̣α̣̣̣τ̣̣̣ὰ̣̣̣ δ̣̣̣ύ̣̣̣ο̣̣̣ τ̣̣̣ὸ̣̣̣ν̣̣ αὐτὸν 
ἔχη̣̣̣<ι> λ̣̣̣όγον τὰ̣̣̣ ὁ̣̣̣µ̣̣̣ο̣̣̣ί̣̣̣ω̣̣̣ς̣̣̣ τ̣̣̣ετα̣̣̣γ̣̣̣µενα̣̣, ἦ̣̣<ι> δὲ̣̣̣ τ̣̣̣ὰ̣̣̣ π̣̣̣ρῶτα̣̣̣ µεγέθεα <ποτὶ ἄλλα 
µεγέθεα> ἐν λόγοις ὁποιοισοῦν, ἢ τὰ πάντα ἤ τινα αὐτῶν, κ̣̣̣αὶ τὰ ὕστερα 
µεγέθεα ποτὶ τὰ ὁµόλογα ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς λόγοις ἦ<ι>, πάντα τὰ πρῶτα µεγέθεα 
ποτὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόµενα τὸν αὐτὸν ἕξει λόγον, ὃν ἔχει πάντα τὰ ὕστερον ποτὶ 
πάντα τὰ λεγόµενα. 
 
I employ also this theorem: if however many magnitudes equal in multitude to 
other magnitudes when ordered likewise two by two have the same ratio and the 
first magnitudes, either all or some of them, are to other magnitudes in however 
many ratios and the latter magnitudes are to the corresponding <magnitudes> in 
the same ratios, all the first magnitudes will have the same ratio to all the 
<magnitudes> being enunciated that all the latter magnitudes have to all the 
<magnitudes> being enunciated.87 
 
                                                
87 Ephodos 177-191. 
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In axiom 11 Archimedes appears to distinguish classes of enunciated magnitudes – the 
generic word for any kind of mathematical unit88 – by their multitude.  The argument 
about moving between elements of sets is an argument about increasing order of 
multitude, from points, to lines, to areas.  Axiom 11 itself is a theorem about the 
preservation of proportion between elements of sets when the order of multitude of the 
set is increased, the very theorem we need to justify the above reading.   
Netz, Saito, and Tschernetska (2001) have argued that axiom 11 is “based not on 
a simple assumption of indivisibles but on a very sophisticated argument in proportion 
theory.”89  As Netz, Saito, and Tschernetska explain, Archimedes’ argument risks a 
logical fallacy concerning the axiom’s extension to infinite sets.  Triangle ΖΑΓ and 
parabola ΑΒΓ are composed of the set of their respective line segments, but there are 
infinitely many members of this set.  Archimedes proved axiom 11 in Conoids and 
Spheroids 1 but only under the condition of finite members of sets.  How then can 
Archimedes intend his argument in axiom 11 to be valid for infinite sets in Ephodos?  
The answer is not clear and scholarship is divided, 90 but I will argue below in 3.3.1 that 
Archimedes’ procedure satisfies the standards of repeatability and thus generality in the 
community of Greek mathematicians.  At any rate, Archimedes has not argued in any 
way for the elementization of geometric figures into sets of lines; the analysis of ΖΑΓ and 
ΑΒΓ into their constituent lines happen simpliciter, as if there was nothing unusual about 
it for Archimedes or his readers.   
From this point in the apodeixis of Ephodos proposition 1 Archimedes’ argument 
is conceptually much easier and the mathematical motivation very clear.91  Archimedes 
first constructs the center of weight of triangle ΖΑΓ, the point Χ.  By a result proved in 
Equilibria, this must be the point which divides a side-bisector of the triangle into a 3:1 
ratio.  And if the triangle ΖΑΓ balances the parabolic segment ΑΒΓ when placed at Θ, 
then the distances of their respective centers of weight, ΘΚ and ΧΚ, must be in inverse 
                                                
88 Mugler (1958: 280-82) s.v. 
89 Netz, Saito, and Tschernetska (2001: 21).  
90 Netz, Saito, and Tschernetska (2001: 17-19) lay out the main positions and offer a critique of each based 
on their reading of Ephodos 14. 
91 Ephodos 253-267. 
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ratio.  Stated with substitution, ΖΑΓ is to ΑΒΓ as 3:1.  Further, since the triangle ΖΑΓ is 
fourfold of the triangle ΑΒΓ, then by substitution triangle ΑΒΓ is to parabolic segment 
ΑΒΓ as 3:4.  Thus the parabolic segment ΑΒΓ is four-thirds of its interior triangle ΑΒΓ.   
VI. Here is the result we were promised in the protasis of the opening letter.  But 
the proof ends without any restatement of the protasis above into generalized terms in the 
sixth traditional element of a Euclidean proof, the sumperasma: here a sumperasma 
might be therefore any parabolic segment is four-thirds of its interior triangle.  The proof 
is concluded only in the specifics of parabola ΑΒΓ to triangle ΑΒΓ.  The proof ends in 
specificity just as it began in the ekthesis. 
3.2.4 A New Approach   
The integration of mechanical and mathematical procedures and tools creates the 
emergence of a new mathematical approach that finds the areas of planar and solid 
figures, Archimedes’ tropos.  I will call Archimedes’ tropos a ‘scientific way of seeing.’  
Just as was argued in the case in Herophilus’ pulse theory in chapter 2.3, the analysis of 
the emergence of new objects and approaches in science ought not to be located along the 
ideological axes of scientific realism and social constructivism.  Rather, as ANT argues, 
scientific emergence depends on the networked structure of pre-existing science.  
Archimedes’ tropos comes into being as a scientific way of seeing, whose existence is 
strengthened by the networked existence of the objects in the different ontologies of 
mechanics and mathematics and by ways of seeing in those separate ontologies. 
 First, the objects that Ephodos proposition 1 considers are mechanical only in one 
respect.  The property of centers of weight is the only mechanical property mathematical 
objects possess in the tropos’ way of seeing: solid mathematical objects can occupy the 
same position in mathematical space although solid physical objects cannot, as was 
argued in 3.2.2; the mathematical objects, a line segment and a line segment, weighed 
against each other on the scale-beam balance as mathematical objects, although no 
physical intuition makes sense of this procedure, as was argued in 3.2.3.  The tropos 
considers only the physical property of centers of weight. 
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Furthermore, the text strongly invokes the mathematical potential of mechanical 
objects.  The apodeixis of Ephodos proposition 1 depends on tools which preserve 
mathematical proportions: the scale-beam and the indivisibles argument.  The indivisibles 
preserve proportion when sets increase in multitude, as was argued in the apodeixis of 
3.2.3; the scale-beam preserves geometrical proportions.  Balancing is thus a 
mathematical act, not a physical one, as was argued in 3.2.2: there is no physical or 
mechanical spectacle in the Ephodos’ tropos. 
Archimedes directs the reader’s attention to the mathematical aspects at all but 
one point in Ephodos proposition 1.  The kataskeuē of Ephodos proposition 1 is the only 
formal section of the argument where Archimedes does not limit the reader’s 
interpretative possibilities of a mechanical demonstration.  The ekthesis limited the 
possibility of a mechanical demonstration when Archimedes directed that ΔΒ be drawn 
parallel to the diameter of the parabola.  The apodeixis limited the possibilities for 
mechanical demonstration by alluding to textual codes of mechanization drawn from 
Quadrature of the Parabola as an intertext for its mechanical method.  As the summary 
of Latour (1987) in chapter 1.4 showed, a scientific paper is continually trying to drive a 
single interpretation upon its reader.  The reader sees the mathematical as mathematical; 
the reader also sees the mechanical foremost as mathematical.  Only the kataskeuē’s 
imperative to see the line ΓΘ as a scale-beam invokes the mechanical property of the 
centers of weight of the constructed figures. 
Archimedes’ Ephodos pushes the mathematical reader toward a new approach, 
the integration of the mathematical ‘way of seeing’ mechanical objects into a 
mathematical analysis of linear sets which comprise geometric figures. Archimedes 
exerts authorial control through intertextualityA: the text alludes to expectations of the 
cultural codes of mechanized mathematics while deliberately passing over in silence any 
direct allusions to Quadrature of the Parabola.  The tropos emerges from the selective 
integration of mechanical properties into mathematical imagination.  Archimedes’ tropos 
in the Ephodos thus emerges from a networked structure of the mathematical reader’s 
knowledge of the formal structure of proof in Greek mathematics; the textual codes of 
physical mechanization; the law of the lever and the mathematical consequences of the 
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balanced scale-beam; the mathematical assumption that individual line segments 
compose their geometric objects as members of sets; and all the numerous unmarked 
mathematical tools of diagrams, manipulation of ratios and proportions, ellipsis of 
technical formulae, and so on.  
3.3 THE REJECTION OF IDEOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES  
3.3.1 Generality in Greek Mathematics   
A recurring theme in my reading of Ephodos proposition 1 is Archimedes’ 
aversion to certain formalist features in lieu of specific ones, while he is at the same time 
attempting to establish a repeatable and invariant pattern of argument in the mechanical 
process.  Mueller (1981) has questioned the conditions by which Greek mathematicians 
tacitly argue for the generality of their conclusions.  He argues his case on the basis of 
Euclid’s Elements, which is to be taken as the normative style of ancient Greek 
mathematics.  His arguments are worth considering in detail, especially because they 
highlight the formalist aspects of the Euclidean style.  
In Euclid’s proofs of theorems the transition from the end of the apodeixis to the 
sumperasma looks very much like a compressed representation of this kind of 
inference [Hilbert’s abstract claim that certain relationships hold given properties 




A ≠ C→∃D  
€ 
∍ A is between D and C)A, C, D are 
points] in which one moves directly from the conclusion based on the ekthesis to 
the fully universalized proposition which has been proved.  The step of 
conditionalization is so natural that it is difficult to know whether or not to count 
it as an inference of which the Greeks were conscious.  The evidence from their 
logical writings suggests that they did not grasp very clearly the difference 
between an inference and a conditional proposition … Thus in a Euclidean 
proposition what is proved is stated three times, first generally in the protasis, 
then in terms of a particular example in the ekthesis-diorismos, and then in the 
summary in the sumperasma.92  The explanation for this logical redundancy 
would seem to be connected with the difficulty of grasping the idea of 
generalization … It is natural to ask about the legitimacy of such a proof.  How 
can one move from an argument based upon a particular example to a general 
conclusion, from an argument about the straight line AB to a conclusion about any 
                                                
92 Netz (1999b: 253): “The first thing worthy of notice is that Mueller is very untypically wrong [here].  He 
asserts that the demonstrandum is repeated three times in different forms; he also asserts that ‘the 
sumperasma repeats what was insisted upon in the diorismos.’ In fact, the demonstrandum is repeated four 
times, and the sumperasma repeats the protasis, not the diorismos.” 
 131 
straight line?  I do not believe that the Greeks ever answered this question 
satisfactorily, but I suspect that the threefold repetition of what is to be proved 
reflects a sense of the complexity of the question.  The prostasis formulated 
without letters to make the generality of what is being proved apparent.  The 
ekthesis starts the proof, but, before the proof is continued, the diorismos insists 
that it is only necessary to establish something particular to establish the protasis.  
When the particular thing has been established, the sumperasma repeats what was 
insisted upon in the diorismos.  Of course, insisting that the particular argument is 
sufficient to establish the general protasis is not a justification, but it does amount 
to laying down a rule of mathematical proof: to prove a particular case is to count 
as proving a general proposition … The statement of the logical rule involved 
includes a precise specification of the conditions under which generalization is 
permitted.  Although these conditions are stated formalistically, they have a 
justification which makes clear that universal generalization is permitted only 
when no special assumptions have been made about the particulars in terms of 
which the proof was carried on.  In the case of Hilbert’s theorem 3, the 
permissibility of such generalization is made clear by the fact that the conditional 
to which generalization is applied depends upon no assumptions in which the 
letters A and C occur as “free” variables.  Since no such assumptions are made, 
there is a sense in which A and C are not particular points at all … Thus logic and 
the structural interpretation of mathematics make it possible to give a clear and 
reasonable account of ordinary mathematical reasoning.  However, there is no 
reason to suppose the Greeks to have had anything like modern logic to represent 
actual mathematical argument, and the Euclidean style makes it look as though a 
proof is thought of as being carried out with respect to a particular object, but in a 
way assumed to be generalizable.  In the absence of something like the rules of 
logic there is no uniform procedure for checking the correctness of this 
assumption in individual cases.  Rather one must rely on general mathematical 
intelligence.93 
 
Mueller argues that Greek mathematicians improperly claim to have proved a generalized 
result (e.g. that any parabola is four-thirds of its inscribed triangle) but, in fact, they have 
only proved a specific result (e.g. that parabola ΑΒΓ is four-thirds of the inscribed 
triangle ΑΒΓ).  Mueller’s argument does more to establish a modern critique of the 
particularism of Greek mathematics than explain it.  Certainly from the modern 
perspective, Greek geometry cannot claim a general result without recourse to broader 
definitions of elements, sets, and classes.  Mueller’s explanation for the Greek 
mathematicians’ false claim of generality is more or less the ritualized structure of the 
Euclidean style proof according to Proclus’ classification of protasis, ekthesis, diorismos, 
                                                
93 Mueller (1981: 12-14). 
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kataskeuē, apodeixis, sumperasma: Greek geometers accept general claims for the proof 
because they repeat the demonstrandum in a structured way.94 
 Netz (1999b) has the best response to Mueller likely to be offered for a while.95  
At issue, Netz thinks, is not the logic of generalization of Greek mathematics but the 
social willingness of ancient Greek mathematicians to be satisfied with the results of 
Euclidean style.  To Netz, this must be a cognitive claim about the shared practices of 
Hellenistic Greek mathematicians.  Netz argues that the cognitive practices his book 
identifies – a formulaic lexicon and diagrammatic conventionality – make the cognitive 
edifice of the proof repeatable and invariable and so necessitate that the mathematicians 
check only their proper application.96  (In the language of this study drawn from the 
summary of Latour (1987) in chapter 1.4, Greek mathematics is a networked structure 
whose intellectual archaeology is identifiable for any given problem.97)  In essence then, 
Netz’s theory is that Greek mathematics is linguistically performative on a specific 
object: the mathematician asserts and persuades his readers that certain things obtain on 
the diagram at hand.  The current proof can be re-done by another later mathematician; 
the present mathematican can redo the previously-proved theorems on which his current 
proof is dependent.  The implicit suggestion is that if a theorem obtains for triangle ΑΒΓ 
it will obtain for triangle ΔΕΖ and triangle ΗΘΙ and so on.  Netz argues that because the 
                                                
94 Mueller (1981) is willing to ascribe generality as the intention of Greek mathematicians even when they 
fail to use this ritualistic structure.  In his discussion of the arithmetic books of the Elements, 7-9, he notes 
(1981: 68) the usual absence of a sumperasma: “There would be not seem to be any philosophical or 
mathematical reason for its absence since Euclid’s arithmetic proofs are as general as his others.  The 
problem of generality is, however, much more explicit in the arithmetic books.”  The formal structure of 
proof in the arithmetic books of the Elements is thus identical with the formal structure used in in Ephodos.  
Mueller nonetheless argues that generality does not obtain in the arithmetic books of the Elements on other 
grounds than the absence of the sumperasma. 
95 Netz (1999b: 240-270). 
96 I offer a metaphorical description to illustrate Netz’s theory: a Greek mathematician trusts that another 
mathematician’s bricks and mortar will fasten and that his schematics are sufficiently illustrative; the Greek 
mathematician believes that structural integrity results from the proper use of these tools. 
97 The scientific dissenter who wishes to dissect and un-tie the chain of associated proofs in Greek 
mathematics finds blackboxes of results readily identifiable through the networked structure which 
mathematics formalizes in proof: at the bottom, of course, the dissenter reaches down to Euclid’s Elements.  
Latour (1987: 92): “The point is that the new object emerges from a complex set-up of sedimented 
elements each of which has been a new object at some point in time and space.  The genealogy and the 
archaeology of this sedimented past is always possible in theory but becomes more and more difficult as 
time goes by and the number of elements mustered increases.” 
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entire sequence is not laid out, argument in Greek mathematics is different from 
mathematical induction; rather, Greek mathematics is deductive.  The theorem obtains in 
other triangles because the proof is repeatable.  In this way Greek mathematics is a chain 
of specific performative moments, some part of which the community of professional 
mathematicians accepts as sufficiently proven to need no further instantiation.  
 What we gain from Netz’s answer to Mueller is the insight that the interplay of 
repeatable procedures on specific objects to necessitate a general conclusion is a 
characteristic of normative Greek mathematical style.  But the first proposition of the 
Ephodos lacks an integrated protasis and entirely lacks a sumperasma.  If we accepted 
Mueller’s arguments about the conditions by which Greek mathematics achieve the 
generality of their conclusions, Archimedes could not claim that the argument was valid.  
For Mueller Ephodos 1 cannot achieve generality since the proposition lacks the 
ritualized structure of by which mathematical generalization is obtained: Ephodos 
proposition 1 lacks a sumperasma.98  What is at stake in Ephodos proposition 1 is 
something different than assuring the generality of the mathematical argument about the 
parabolic segment ΑΒΓ and the triangle ΑΒΓ, that is to say, different from a proof of the 
generality of the enuciation that a parabolic segment is four-thirds of its inscribed 
triangle.  Archimedes seems not particularly interested in the generality of that 
enunciation but rather in the generality of his tropos, a results-oriented mechanical 
argument about the sets of indivisibles composing two geometric objects.   
  I argue therefore that Archimedes aims to give an innovative methodic procedure 
that satisfies Greek mathematicians’ expectations about logical necessity and 
mathematical generalization.  We must accept the following conditions: that objects are 
analyzable as sets of elements; that a mechanical route is available to the imagination of 
the reader; that the text underdefines topographical qualities of mathematical necessity; 
that mathematical diagrammatic referentiality takes precedence to the mechanical.  The 
mechanical argument is then executed in the mind of the reader, without visual 
                                                
98 A case can be made, however, that Mueller would be willing to grant Archimedes’ intention of having a 
generalized proof, even if Mueller would deny that generality obtains because of the lack of specification of 
the conditions of generality.  See footnote 94 above. 
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accompaniment.  Mathematical necessity is grounded in the repeatability of the solution 
to the proposition starting from different specific objects, in accord with Netz’s response 
to Mueller. 
3.3.2 Formalism in Archimedes’ Introductory Letter 
If, therefore, Archimedes has successively produced a methodic tropos that 
satisfies Hellenistic mathematicians’ demands of mathematical necessity and 
generalization, we should expect that Archimedes employs the principles demonstrated in 
proposition 1 through the rest of the Ephodos.  I have argued above in 3.1.2 that this is 
the case.  But to what end has Archimedes devised the tropos’ methodic connection 
between τὰ µαθήµατα and τὰ µηχανικά?  Since the close reading of the proposition only 
makes clear Archimedes’ implicit practice, we must return to the opening letter of the 
Ephodos for Archimedes’ explicit observation on its use. 
The introductory letter of the Ephodos identifies a formal division between the 
mechanical way, in which things are seen or contemplated (θεωρεῖν, φαίνεσθαι), and the 
geometrical manner, in which things are proved (ἀποδεικνύναι,ἐπιδείκνυναι).  Two 
papers independently argue that Archimedes intends to show a chronological 
development of discovery and proof.  Cambiano (1992) points out that in Quadrature of 
the Parabola the contrast between discovery and proof is between the matrix of 
εὑρίσκειν / θεωρεῖν, always in the aorist, and ἐπιδεικνύναι / ἀποδεικνύναι, always in 
the present tense.  The implication of the verbal similarities of Ephodos and Quadrature 
of the Parabola between discovery and proof, he argues, is that discovery precedes proof 
via the mechanical method, so that the difference between the mathematical method and 
the mechanical method is primarily one of veridical value of a similar process.99  
Knobloch (2000) also constructs a verbal matrix from the Ephodos of εὕρεσις, 
ἀπόφασις, ἀπόδειξις.100  Apodeitic proof, he argues, proceeds by analogy to the 
mechanical method, that is, from the triple of “action, operator, and result” whose parts 
are θεωρεῖν, θεωρία, θεωρῆµα.101   
                                                
99 Cambiano (1992: 22-23). 
100 Knobloch (2000: 84). 
101 Knobloch (2000: 92). 
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Now Cambiano’s (1992) and Knobloch’s (2000) claim that discovery proceeds 
proof in chronological sequence is undoubtedly true according to the opening letter. As 
Archimedes presents it, the mechanical way offers a certain understanding (γνῶσις) of 
the problem at hand, so that it is easier to proceed in the formal proof.  Historical 
evidence shows this is the case: Democritus claimed certain results and Eudoxus proved 
them.102  Cambiano (1992) argues that Archimedes’ description of the move from 
Democritus’ declaration of discovery (ἀποφηναµένωι) to Eudoxus’ proof (ἐξηύρηκεν) 
presages Archimedes’ own chronological move from discovery to proof.103  Without 
access to the palimpsest, Cambiano (1992) simply follows Heiberg’s (1913) reading of 
ἐξηύρηκεν, a word usually indicating “discovery of a solution”.  Cambiano’s (1992) case 
is improved with Netz et al.’s (2008) reading of ἐξήνεγκε, a word more in line with 
Cambiano’s (1992) intended sense of “publication of a proof”.   
Concern to uncover the development of Archimedes’ thought drives the readings 
of Knobloch (2000) and Cambiano (1992).  Both publications concern themselves almost 
exclusively with Archimedes’ explicit claim about the use of his tropos.  This style of 
reading, when extended to include the propositions, will seek to expand on the observed 
distinction between the mathematical and mechanical and will aim to determine the 
                                                
102 Knorr (1996: 74) cites the introductory letter in Sphere and Cylinder 1 (Heiberg 1910: 4.2-13) and takes 
this fact to be indicative of developments in the chronology of Archimedes’ writings.  But Netz (2004a: 
34), in comparing the same passage, Archimedes’ only other historical review, sees not a historical 
development but a literary strategy: “The comparison is worrying in two ways.  First, the Method passage 
concerns, once again, the same relation between cone and cylinder, i.e. it seems as if Archimedes kept 
recycling the same story.  Second, the Method version seems to contradict this passage (SC [i.e. On the 
Sphere and Cylinder]: no knowledge prior to Eudoxus. Method: no proof prior to Eudoxus, however 
already known to Democritus.) Was Archimedes an old gossip then?  A liar?  More to the point: we see 
Archimedes constantly comparing himself to Eudoxus, arguing for his own superiority over him.  This is 
the best proof we have of Eudoxus’ greatness.  And as for the facts, Archimedes was no historian.”  
Knobloch (2000: 85-7) goes in a different direction, arguing that Democritus was concerned with physical 
and not mathematical practicalities; he sums up, “Apparently, Democritus and Archimedes are 
representative of two types of reasoning: of physical and non-rigorous reasoning on the one hand and of 
mathematical reasoning on the other.” 
103 Cambiano (1992: 23) “Qui la distanza cronologica tra i due autori è inequivocabile e corrisponde a 
un’antecedenza della’ἀποφαίνειν privo di dimonstrazione, assimiliable a momento della scoperta, rispetto 
alla dimostrazione data da Eudosso. Che anche nel caso di Archimede la scoperta sia presentata da lui come 
cronologicamente anteriore alla dimonstrazione mi pare confermato dalle parole conclusive della premessa, 
quando dice γράφοµεν οὖν πρῶτον τὸ καὶ πρῶτον φανὲν διὰ τῶν µηχανικῶν. Se il primero πρῶτον 
riguarda l’ordine espositivo, il secondo sottolinea la priorità cronologica della scoperta.  Il problema che 
allora si pone è quello della relazione tra i due momenti cronologicamente distinti della scoperta e della 
dimonstrazione.” 
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Ephodos’s pivot point between the mathematical and mechanical, as if to determine 
Archimedes’ developmental priority of one mode of mathematics.  But a reading which 
seeks to divide the mechanical and mathematical is ultimately mistaken.  Archimedes’ 
explicit claims in the opening letter about his innovative connection between the 
mathematical and mechanical precludes reading the text with the sole purpose of 
distinguishing them.  As we have seen in the close reading of Ephodos proposition 1 in 
3.2.3, Archimedes’ tropos is a selective integration of the mechanical into the 
mathematical. 
In his opening letter Archimedes claims that his methodic tropos provides 
ἀφορµαί, starting points, for seeing things in the formal proof of mathematics.  What 
these might be are not clear: is it (1) simply the result of the argumentation? or (2) the 
mathematical kataskeuē required for the indivisibles argument? or something else?  In the 
absence of direct evidence from Ephodos, our best evidence is comparative: Archimedes 
has already given a formal proof of the area of the parabolic segment in propositions 18-
24 of Quadrature of the Parabola.  We therefore proceed with an analysis of this formal 
mathematical proof. 
Archimedes begins his proof that the area of a parabola is four-thirds its inscribed 
triangle in his usual, indirect fashion.  He establishes in proposition 18 that the diameter 
of a parabolic segment is the longest perpendicular in the segment; he establishes in 
proposition 19 an important result that, based on a result from proposition 3, the diameter 
of a parabolic segment is four-thirds the diameter of a half-segment.  Proposition 20 
establishes an inequality between half of the parabolic segment and the entire segment’s 
inscribed triangle.  Archimedes can use the procedure of Elements 10.1 to make the 
inequality ever-smaller, tending toward equality.  Proposition 21 establishes that, once 
the large triangle is inscribed in the segment, triangles inscribed in the area remaining 
inside the segment are one-eighth of the large triangle; further inscribed triangles, had 
Archimedes drawn them, would be one-eighth of their respective triangles, thus creating 
a geometric series of progressively smaller triangles.  Proposition 22 again creates an 
inequality condition building on the results of propositions 20 and 21: the summed 
sequence of inscribed triangles is shown to be less than the whole segment.  Proposition 
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23 is a result from proportion theory, showing that the sum of a certain geometric series 
(the geometric series described in proposition 21) is four-thirds of its largest member.   
 
Illustration 11: Heiberg’s Diagram for Quadrature of the Parabola 24.104 
Finally, in proposition 24 Archimedes triggers the inequality condition as shown in 
illustration 11: the sum of the geometric series of inscribed triangles starting with ΑΔΒ, 
ΒΕΓ, and ΑΒΓ and approaching ever closer to the parabolic curve is shown to fail to be 
greater than the hypothesized area of the parabolic segment ΑΒΓ and shown to fail to be 
less than that area; therefore it must be equal, four-thirds of the inscribed triangle ΑΒΓ. 
Archimedes formally resolves the proof by a reductio ad absurdum, although 
Archimedes’ use of a summed series of inscribed figures which yields an inequality 
condition trending toward equality is often called the method of exhaustion.105  The 
reductio, for all its celebrated strength,106 is a very indirect logical claim: it rejects the 
correctness of any other possible answer.107  The typical reductio ad absurdum argument 
therefore begins with its conclusion in mind.  Note that in Quadrature of the Parabola 
                                                
104 Heiberg (1913: 312). 
105 Dijksterhuis (1987: 130) is critical of this name: “We will characterize briefly rather than correctly by 
the expression ‘indirect passage to the limit’. We will avoid the widely used term ‘exhaustion method’; for 
a mode of reasoning which has arisen from the conception of inexhaustibility of the infinite, this is about 
the worst name that could have been devised.” The method of exhaustion receives its name from the 
successive application of areas ever nearer the full area of a given figure.  Elements 12.2 demonstrates the 
technique: that a circle’s area is relative to given rectilinear area is shown by the ratio of the area of 
successive polygons inscribed in the circle. Strikingly Elements 12.2 is proved with only an inscribed 
polygon, not a circumscribed one.  Knorr (1986: 79) argues that one-sided exhaustion (in his words, 
“convergence”) is a characteristic of the older Eudoxean method. 
106 Hardy’s (2000: 94) metaphor is famous: “[Reductio ad absurdum] is one of the mathematician’s finest 
weapons.  It is a far finer gambit than any chess gambit: a chess player may offer the sacrifice of a pawn or 
a piece, but the mathematician offers the game.” Emphasis in the original. 
107 Indeed, this must be the case whatever the number of truth values, whether a two-valued or a three-
valued or multi-valued logic. 
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18-24 Archimedes argues with the conclusion in mind – that the parabolic segment is 
four-thirds of its inscribed triangle – but that no algorithm determined in what way that 
conclusion could be applied.  Archimedes could have inscribed trapezia, as in 
Quadrature of the Parabola 6-17, instead of triangles; he could have used circumscribed 
figures instead of inscribed figures; he could have used both inscribed and circumscribed 
figures as in Spiral Lines 18.  The reductio ad absurdum is a logical technique but not an 
algorithmic one because it in no way determines the methodological character or form of 
the mathematical argument. 
Yet what better starting point could there be for a reductio ad absurdum argument 
than the theorem’s result?  In fact, that initial starting point (ἀφορµή) is the only thing 
Archimedes promises of Ephodos proposition 1 and needs for the formal proof of 
Quadrature of the Parabola 18-24.  The result alone, I argue, is the obvious candidate to 
satisfy Archimedes’ claim τοῦτο δὲ πέπ<ε>ισµαι χ̣ρ̣ήσιµον εἶµεν οὐδὲν ἧσσον <ἢ> καὶ 
εἰς τὰν ἀπόδειξιν αὐτῶν τῶν θεωρηµάτων “This, I am persuaded, is useful for nothing 
less than for the proof of the theorems themselves.”108  Archimedes claims his tropos aids 
in apodeictic proof, the formal mathematical demonstration.   
3.3.3 Traditional Formalism, or The Rejection of Innovative Practice 
We should not posit a divide between Archimedes’ claims in the opening letter of 
the Ephodos and his practices in the propositions without due cause.  In this case, there is 
good reason to see a divide between the types of methodological commitments offered in 
the proposition and the opening letter.  In Ephodos proposition 1, Archimedes practices 
mathematical argument according to Greek standards of proof in a generalizable and 
repeatable way: its re-performativity assures its methodic self-reflection in the normative 
manner of Greek mathematical argumentation.  In the opening letter, Archimedes claims 
that his tropos offers starting points and the ability to contemplate mathematical things, a 
very limited claim about his formal accomplishment in his science.  So Archimedes 
offers more “good mathematics” in his practice than his claims.  Now Archimedes is 
                                                
108 Ephodos 80-83. 
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hardly shy in his other works – or even in Ephodos109 – about claiming the primacy of his 
achievement.  Therefore, we should expect him to claim honors for his accomplishment 
in a new methodic approach to mathematics.  
There is an unexpected gap then between Archimedes’ claims in the opening 
letter about his scientific achievement and his accomplishments in practice in the 
propositions.  That Archimedes does not boast of the primacy of his achievement for his 
methodic accomplishment indicates something else is happening here.  As Archimedes 
intimates in the opening letter, a sequential move from mechanical method to geometrical 
method, Cambiano’s (1992) chronological and Knobloch’s (2000) analogical 
development, is a movement toward communally accepted forms of rigor.  Traditional 
community standards of argumentation ultimately supersede innovative science. 
The meta-mathematical observation after the first proposition further explains the 
primacy of formal mathematical argumentation. 
[Τ]τοῦτο δὴ διὰ µὲν τῶν νῦν εἰρηµένων οὐκ ἀποδέδεικται, ἔµφασιν δέ τινα 
πεποίηκε τὸ συµπέρασµα ἀληθὲς εἶµεν· διόπερ ἁµὲς ὁρῶντες µὲν οὐκ 
ἀποδεδειγµένον, ὑπονοέοντες δὲ τὸ συµπέρασµα ἀληθὲς εἶµεν, <ἐ>τάξοµες τὰν 
γεωµετρεοµέναν ἀπόδειξιν ἐξευρόντες αὐτοὶ ̣τὰν ἐ<κ>δοθεῖσαν πρότερον. 
 
So this was not proven by what was now said but still creates a certain impression 
that the conclusion is true.  Wherefore I, seeing that <the conclusion> is not 
proven but nonetheless suspecting that the conclusion is true, will test [it] in 
respect to the geometrized proof, which was published earlier after I myself 
discovered it.110 
 
This is not the usual text or translation of this passage.  Heiberg (1913) offers 
“demonstrationem per geometriam a nobis ipsis inuentam suo loco proponemus, quam 
eandem antea edidimus,” taking τάξοµεν in an extended sense of “order”, “arrange in its 
proper place”.111  He appends a note arguing that Archimedes placed this proof at the end 
of the book.112  Dijksterhuis (1987) too translates “we shall mention the previously 
published geometrical proof, which we ourselves have found for it, in its appointed 
                                                
109 See Ephodos 57-65, Archimedes’ boast about his successful comparison with conic sections with 
rectilinear and planar figures. 
110 Ephodos 276-85. 
111 Heiberg (1913: 439). 
112 Heiberg (1913: 439n.4). 
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place,” and goes beyond Heiberg to suggest that Archimedes published regular proofs of 
all propositions covered in the Ephodos at the end of the book.113  Indeed, the number of 
times Archimedes makes references to his own previous work in the Ephodos is 
remarkable.  But it seems very unlikely that, as proud as Archimedes is of his result on 
parabolic quadrature, he would repeat the proof again.  And if Heiberg’s suggestion is too 
much, the view of Dijksterhuis is simply fantastic.114   
The problem, then, is that commentators have expected Archimedes to resume 
talking about the geometrical proofs but no common sense solution allows Archimedes 
the space necessary at the end of the treatise for the full geometrical proof.   Following 
Arendt (1914), I suggest that what is at issue is still Archimedes’ tropos.  Therefore I 
diagnostically conjecture <ἐ>τάξοµες, the Doric future of ἐτάζειν.115  The change has the 
advantage of continuing the text’s focus on the methodic tropos following the reading of 
proposition 1 as a manner of proof. 
Despite its appearance – συµπέρασµα “conclusion”, ἀπόδειξις “proof” – the 
passage is not full of technical mathematical vocabulary.  In fact, συµπέρασµα 
“conclusion” here cannot have the sense of the final repetition of the generalized result in 
the Euclidean-style, because there was no συµπέρασµα in the text of the first proposition.  
Rather, συµπέρασµα must have a logical sense, simply the result of an argument.  The 
text therefore concerns the comparison of a result of the tropos to formal result.  It is a 
shift in category and to claim one formal result in another forum is a category error.  
Archimedes prefers the interpretative category of formal mathematics, τὰ µαθήµατα, as 
the final arbiter of the correctness of proof.   
                                                
113 Dijksterhuis (1987: 318). 
114 Arendt (1914: 293), following on his remark (see Appendix B footnote 45) about the unexpected plurals 
of Ephodos 83-87 καὶ γὰρ <τινα τῶν> πρότερον µοι φανέντων µηχανικῶς ὕστερον γεωµετρικῶς 
ἀπεδείχθη διὰ τὸ χωρὶς ἀποδείξιος εἶµεν τὰν διὰ τοῦ τρόπου θεωρίαν: “Es wäre ferner sehr merkwürdig, 
wenn Archimedes in dieser Schrift eine ganze Anzahl von bisher unbekannten oder doch unbewiesenen 
Sätzen durch die mechanische Methode herleitete, aber nur für die beiden unter ihnen, die von den den 
Mathematikern seiner Zeit geläufigen Sätzen am weitesten ablagen (die Sätze über den Zynlinderhuf und 
die beiden sich durchdringenden Zylinder) außerdem den exakten Beweis gäbe; daß er gerade disese beiden 
Sätzen früher an Eratosthenes gesandt hat, wäre doch schwerlich ein hinreicheneder Grund.  Dagagen wird 
alles klar, wenn eben diese beiden Sätze die einzigen von allen in der Schrift erwähnten waren, für die der 
exakte Beweis noch ausstand.” 
115 See Appendix B for a discussion of the intent of a diagnostic conjecture. 
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Now this introduces a strange paradox.  For in spite of his claims for its heuristic 
power, Archimedes denies the formal demonstrative power of the mechanical method: 
[Τ]τοῦτο δὴ διὰ µὲν τῶν νῦν εἰρηµένων οὐκ ἀποδέδεικται “So this was not proven by 
what was now said.”116  Scholars have debated what Archimedes objects to: Knorr (1996) 
suggests that it was the use of physical considerations; Dijksterhuis (1987) maintains that 
it was the use of indivisibles in the mechanical arguments.  Archimedes himself says only 
that the tropos is without proof (χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως).117  Archimedes had clearly 
distinguished between Democritus’ and Eudoxus’ contributions to the volume of cones 
and pyramids.  His admiration for Democritus’ contribution (οὐ µικρὰν µερίδα) contrasts 
with other statements on this problem, in which he mentions only Eudoxus.  Thus, 
although both Democritus and Eudoxus have contributed to the solution of the problem 
of the volume of the cone and pyramid, only Eudoxus has finished the argument by 
providing proof.  And so the moment of discovery or the process of discovery is not what 
Greek mathematicians are searching for; rather, the final formal proof has priority in the 
hierarchy of mathematical achievement.  Thus despite his claim of heuristic usefulness, 
Archimedes presents Eratosthenes and us with a logic not of discovery – which we would 
associate with heuristics – but of formalization.  
Archimedes rejects the novelty of the tropos’ approach because of the standards 
of proof of the mathematical community.  Archimedes’ tropos is an innovative 
integration of mechanical aspects into mathematical argument but the resulting 
conclusion offers only starting points for a proof in formal mathematics.  The 
paradigmatic section of the Ephodos text, Ephodos 426-438, thus demonstrates a 
formalization of traditional methodological criteria over innovative ones. 
  
                                                
116 Ephodos 276-77. 
117 Ephodos 103-04. 
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TRADITION 
Chapter 4:  The Empiricists 
In this chapter I suggest that Empiricism can be seen as a re-assertion of the 
doctor’s role of caregiver, rather than as a formal researcher into nature.  I offer a re-
reading of the debate between select Empiricists and Rationalists of the third and second 
centuries BCE with examples drawn from pharmacology, surgery, and Hippocratic 
exegesis. 
4.1 EMPIRICIST HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The Empiricists were a Greek medical sect (!"#$%&') of the Hellenistic and 
Imperial period.  The word ‘sect’ refers to a group of individuals with common beliefs 
and practices, not necessarily an institution or a school building.  The Empiricists doctors 
came from Alexandria, Antioch, Cyrene, Tarentum, and other cities, and practiced 
medicine all over the Greek eastern Mediterranean.  As their name suggests, they valued 
experience ((µ)$&#*!) above all else in medical practice. The sect seems to have had 
wide success and been as long lived as other Hellenistic medical schools; Appendix C 
presents a chronological prosopography of the three main Hellenistic medical sects: 
Empiricists, Herophileans, and Erasistrateans.1 
So the Empiricist sect began in the Hellenistic period, founded by Philinus of Cos, 
a student of Herophilus.2  But we at once face textual problems: no fragments from 
                                                
1The ancient evidence assembled by Deichgräber (1965) knows twenty Empiricists, comparable in number 
to the number of physicians from other major Hellenistic medical sects.  (Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 
460) point out that there is an Empiricist physician “Kallikles” mentioned by Galen unknown to 
Deichgräber’s (1965) collection.  It seems probable that this Callicles is an Empiricist near Galen’s time, 
rather than a Hellenistic doctor.)  Von Staden’s (1989: 445-578) collection of fragments of the 
Herophileans lists nineteen Herophileans.  The medical index of names of physicians in Keyser and Irby-
Massie (2008: 1006-1011) lists eighteen Erasistrateans but only fourteen are known for certain as 
Erasistrateans; see Appendix C footnote 60.  
2 Deichgräber (1965: 333): “Die Zeit des Philinos von Kos ist auf etwa 250 v. Chr. bestimmt durch die the 
Nachricht der +,%!-.-/ [sc. 0 ,!1#2' 14.683K = Empiricist fr. 6 D], daß er persönlicher Schüler des 
Herophilos gewesen ist.”  Von Staden’s (1989: 35-50) dates for Herophilus’ life extend to 260/250 BCE.  If 
Deichgräber’s date for Philinus is correct, he will have been among Herophilus’ last students.  There is an 
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Philinus survive, only testimonia.  This is typical of the primary sources of Empiricism.  
In fact, only one Empiricist text of the Hellenistic period, Apollonius of Citium’s Treatise 
on Hippocrates’ On Joints, is wholly extant.  We do have numerous testimonia and 
verbatim quotations of the Empiricists, collected in Deichgräber (1965), as well as 
testimonia for Empiricist doctrines without ascription to any individual Empiricist author 
in Celsus and Galen who, although somewhat critical of all sects, are more sympathetic to 
the Rationalists than the Empiricists.  Their most important treatises presenting 
Empiricist doctrines are Celsus’ Praefatio to De Medicina and three treatises of Galen, 
On Sects for Beginners, Outline of Empiricism, and On Medical Experience.  On Sects 
for Beginners survives in Greek, Outline of Empiricism in a medieval Latin translation by 
Niccolo of Rheggium, and On Medical Empiricism in a medieval Arabic translation by 
Hunain and Hubaish.3  A reading of the source material must therefore be conscious of 
authorial bias and the textual problems attendent on multiple language translations.   
In spite of the historiographical problems involved in working with Empiricist 
material, Deichgräber (1965) emphasizes the state of preservation of the Empiricist 
methodological fragments: “Aus allem sieht man, wie stark sein Interesse an den Lehren 
dieser Schule ist.  Es ist der wichtigste Faktor in der Überlieferung der empirischen 
Fragmente geworden.”4  Deichgräber had maintained that Empiricist methodology did 
not change from its founding but subsequent scholars have corrected Deichgräber’s 
analysis.5  For example, in On Medical Experience Galen is arguing against the soritic 
                                                
additional testimonium, Erotian 4 = Empiricist fr. 311 D, that Philinus and the Herophilean Bacchius of 
Tanagra (for whom see von Staden (1989: 484-500)) were contemporaries, but this piece of evidence is 
used to date Bacchius rather than Philinus.  In general the earliest history of the Empiricist school is very 
lacunose and Deichgräber’s (1965: 163-68) datings for the earliest Empiricists – Philinus of Cos, Serapion 
of Alexandria, and Glaucias of Tarentum – seem to be based on a rough span of 25 years (i.e. a generation) 
between individuals, with only the dating of Philinus somewhat secure.  Serapion of Alexandria does cite 
Andreas of Carystus, a Herophilean murdered in 217 BCE.  On the basis of his citation of Andreas (Galen 
De compositione medicamentorum secundum locos 13.343-4K = Andreas fr. 29 vS = Empiricist fr. 151 D) 
von Staden (1989: 474) dated Serapion’s floruit to 200 but in a later article (1997a: 941) returned to 
Deichgräber’s dating.  Evidence of citation does not necessarily imply that Serapion is a generation later 
than Andreas: Deichgräber’s dating of Serapion is likely correct.  Yet Deichgräber’s schema of the dates of 
the early Empiricists is of course without evidence (apart from Philinus).  Unfortunately we are not likely 
to do better with the evidence currently at our disposal.   
3 Translations of all three texts are in Frede (1985). 
4 Deichgräber (1965: 5). 
5 See Deichgräber (1965: 253) and Frede’s correction (1987: 93). 
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argument which Asclepiades of Bithynia, a Pneumatist, had leveled against the 
Empiricists.6  The claims Galen makes for the Empiricists in On Medical Experience 
make it clear that the sect of Galen’s time had become considerably less dogmatic about 
denying the role of reason in medicine than at its founding.  Thus any attempt to 
represent the doctrines of the Empiricist school is constrained by our extant sources and 
the fact that the doctrines of the school seem to have changed over time.  If a diachronic 
presentation of the doctrines of the Empiricists to 200 BCE eludes us, we can still recover 
a synchronic presentation of the doctrines of the sect by the time of our first extant text, 
Celsus’ Praefatio.  At the minimum I will therefore aim to present a picture of Empiricist 
doctrine informed by Celsus and the fragments of pre-Celsian Empiricists collected by 
Deichgräber.   
4.1.1 Doctrinal Changes in Empiricism 
But the evidence allows us to go even further than this.  Michael Frede (1987) has 
convincingly argued that changes in the doctrine of the Empiricists ought to attributed to 
Heraclides of Tarentum, fl. 75 BCE.7  In a well-known passage on the resetting of the hip 
                                                
6 Although I have not seen Walzer’s (1944) edition of On Medical Experience and have used only Frede 
(1985), chapter 19 of On Medical Experience = Frede (1985: 80-1) seems to be an insertion of later 
tradition (perhaps Arabic?) because chapter 18 would flow better into chapter 20 without 19.  I have been 
unable to ascertain whether Walzer remarks on this possibility. 
7 Frede (1987: 89-96).  Approved also by Guardasole (1997: 25): “È stato affermato, da parte di studiosi 
moderni che Eraclide introdusse elementi razionalistici nella tradizione empirica; in particolar modo Frede 
ha posto l'accento su un passo di Galeno, nel quale – pur non citando Eraclide la sua fonte – è chiaro egli 
accoglie par la causa dell'affezione la spiegazione fornita da Egetore erofileo nel suo commento al tratto 
ippocratico de articulis. Avrebbe, quindi, tentato una sorta di mediazione tra le due scuola. Questa 
conclusione risponde a verità ma sono necessarie ulteriori precisazioni: la convergenze, peraltro numerose, 
riscontrabili nell'opera di Eraclide con le posizioni di appartenenti alla scuola dommatica sono da spiegare 
altrimenti che con il suo tentativo di far semplicemente da mediatore fra le due tendenze, ma piuttosto con 
il fatto che egli assegnava al ratio una parte precisa nei principî di conoscenza, permettendo cosí un certo 
moderato 'ampliamento dommatico' della dottrina empirica, purché ciò fosse utile per l'arrichimento delle 
possibilità terapeutiche. Inoltre non si deve prescindere mai dalla considerazione che, pur con moderate 
concessioni alla dottrina razionale, per il Tarantino il centro dell'attività medica fu sempre e solo 
l'esperienza. possiamo affermare che alla base dell'intiera sua attività di ricerca ci fu unicamente il 
progresso della scienza medica e, di conseguenza, il bene dell'uomo.”  I am not sure how Guardosole 
intends to disagree with Frede’s position, since Frede meets her reservations that Heraclides remains 
ultimately an Empiricist and thus values experience above all: Frede’s view is that Heraclides values reason 
as a positive force only insofar as it contributes to therapy, Guardosole’s “purché ciò fosse utile per 
l'arrichimento delle possibilità terapeutiche.” 
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bone (a medical possibility not entirely understood until the 19th century) Galen quotes 
Heraclides, who argues that resetting the hip is possible: 
3%4& 56 47481!& µ9 µ:8$&8 µ;#<8 (µ=>;?:81! 5&@ 1< [µ9] 5&$%)A%?!& 1< 
%B8:C48 8$D#48 )#<' 198 E41F>;8 14D ,%C*4B 1<8 µ;#28, G-844D%&8 (8 1H 
E!?2>4B 1#2)I 198 G)2J!%&8 )4&4Fµ$84&. 4K -@# L8 M))4E#N1;' E!O P&4E>Q' 
G8:-#!R!8 (µ=4>N', S1& 56 T&>21&µ4', +K/8.#, U;>$F', V2>)&', 
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5&!>!µ=N8$&8 µ9 5&@ )!81<' G)4%)!%µ<8 -*8$%?!& 14D 8$F#4B, G>>@ E!O 
G)4C!>A%?!& E!O %B%1#:J$%?!& )N>&8, ()$&59 14D14 ];1$Y8 (%1& C#/%&µ48, 
G>>Z 4K )!81$>[' E4&828. 
 
However many think that the femur when set does not stay in place on account of 
the fact that the tendon holding the femur to the socket of the hip separates, they 
do not know in a general way when they make their claim. For Hippocrates and 
Diocles would not have written up their settings, as did Philotimus, Euenor, 
Neleus, Molpis and Nymphodorus and certain others [if this were not possible].  
We established the fixture in the case of two boys.  Frequently at least the joint on 
the end slips again and there is no need to determine this event by reason, but 
since the bone sometimes stays fast it is necessary to suppose that some 
separation of the tendon does not always happen but sometimes it relaxes and 
again tightens – since to investigate this is useful but not entirely necessary.8 
 
Heraclides argues against those who claim that the hip cannot be reset; one of these 
critics we know to be Hegetor the Herophilean, a Rationalist doctor of the mid-second 
century BCE discussed below in 4.3.4.  Hegetor’s claims against reduction of the hip 
concern inferences drawn from anatomy, a claim of deductive reason.  Heraclides’ 
response to Hegetor and Rationalist critics shows many features encountered in other 
Empiricists authors: an appeal to personal experience, arguments to authority, the 
contrast between reason and experience, and the notion of the useful.  Still, Frede (1987) 
notes that Heraclides also offers a conditional deductive inference: if the femur can 
sometimes be reset (as Heraclides knows from personal experience and from the report of 
earlier doctors), perhaps the tendon which holds the femur in the hip socket does not 
invariably tear but simply slackens so that the bone becomes dislocated, then tightens 
again allowing the bone to be reset.  Heraclides “draws an inference from the observable 
                                                
8 Heraclides apud Galen Comm. In Hipp. De Artic. 18A.735-6K = Empiricist fr. 175 D = Heraclides fr. 43 
Gu. 
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facts to an alternative theoretical account of what happens”;9 Heraclides’ theoretical 
account concerns non-observable phenomena, going beyond the usual Empiricist purview 
of observable causes.  Furthermore, Frede argues that Heraclides does not thereby adopt 
his theoretical account as a superior theoretical account to that of the Rationalist critic; 
for Heraclides the account remains an instrumental, provisional account of natural 
phenomena and not a condemnation of reason (>2-4').  Heraclides’ addendum “to 
investigate this is useful but not entirely necessary” importantly captures the nuance in 
his Empiricist position: “Heraclides means to say that it is positively useful to have 
theoretical views of some kind, positively useful, but not necessary.”10  Frede therefore 
distinguishes between seeing a positive value in reason, a position which later Imperial 
period Empiricists called ()&>4-&%1&E9 )$Y#! “epilogistic experience”,11 and valuing 
theoretical entities per se.  He finds that Heraclides sometimes did value theoretical 
entities in so far as they might be useful to “advance the state of the art.”12  Whether 
Heraclides did in fact invent the process of epilogismos, a productive reasoning about 
temporarily non-evident things that later Empiricists such as Theodas fl. 125 CE and 
Menodotus fl. 125 CE recognize, Frede’s reading demonstrates that some Empiricists 
attributed a positive value to reason earlier than previously supposed.   
Although Celsus seems mostly to bypass this doctrine of Heraclides in his account 
of the Empiricists, his own favored mediation between Empiricists and Rationalists has 
surprising affinities with Heraclides’ position. 
igitur ut ad propositum meum redeam, rationalem quidem puto medicinam esse 
debere, instrui uero ab evidentibus causis, obscuris omnibus non ab cogitatione 
artificis, sed ab ipsa arte reiectis. incidere autem uiuorum corpora et crudele et 
superuacuum est, mortuorum discentibus necessarium, nam positum et ordinem 
nosse debent, quae cadauer melius quam uiuus et uulneratus homo repraesentat. 
sed et cetera quae modo in uiuis cognosci possunt, in ipsis curationibus 
uulneratorum, paulo tardius sed aliquanto mitius, usus ipse monstrabit. 
 
                                                
9 Frede (1987: 91). 
10 Frede (1987: 92). 
11 Galen Subfiguratio empirica 4 = Empiricist fr. 10b p.50.3 D, where the context is the reason or 
justification used in “transition from the similar”.  Galen attributes ()&>4-&%1&E9 )$Y#! to Theodas of 
Laodicea (fl. 125 CE), on whom see Deichgräber (1965: 214-15). 
12 Frede (1987: 93).   
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Therefore, to return to my subject, I think that medicine ought to be rationalist but 
constructed from evident causes, with all hidden causes rejected not from the 
consideration of the practioner but from the art itself.  Moreover to cut into bodies 
of the living is cruel and superfluous, [but] it is necessary for learners [to cut into 
the bodies] of the dead, for they ought to know the position and arrangement, 
which a cadaver shows better than a living and wounded man.  But as for the rest 
which can only be known in the living, need itself will show in the very cures of 
the wounded, a little slower but somewhat more gently.13 
 
Celsus constructs a via media between the two medical camps of Rationalists and 
Empiricists.14  He agrees with the Empiricists that vivisection is cruel and unnecessary 
and that only evident causes ought to be admitted into medicine.  He agrees with the 
Rationalists that dissection is necessary to understand anatomy, the arrangement and 
position of interior body parts.  Celsus’ position on causality is careful to insist on the 
potential practical value of considering hidden causes, seemingly opposed to evident 
causes.  (The distinction is founded on a Hellenistic philosophical divison between 
)#25;>4& !,1*!& and W5;>!& !,1*!&, a contrast between visible and invisible causes.)  
Celsus’ claims about causality seem very close to Heraclides’ position that “to investigate 
[invisible causality] is useful but not entirely necessary.”  Nevertheless, Celsus claims 
this position as his own. 
Frede finds it surprising that Celsus’ own position in the Praefatio is aligned with 
Heraclides’: “clearly Celsus could not present this as his own view of the matter, as 
opposed to that of the Empiricists, if something like it already had been the standard 
Empiricist view.”15  Yet Mudry (1982), the standard commentary on Celsus’ Praefatio, 
argues that Heraclides’ book )$#O 1Q' (µ)$&#&EQ' !^#:%$.' was Celsus’ source for 
discussion of Empiricist doctrines.16  If Heraclides did attribute positive value to reason, 
                                                
13 Celsus Praefatio 74-5. Latin citations from Celsus Praefatio are from the text of Mudry (1982). 
14 For Celsus’ self-fashioning in this regard, see von Staden (1994). 
15 Frede (1987: 94).  
16 Mudry (1982: 73, 84, 115-16).  In this evaluation Mudry is following a long line of commentators back 
to the position of Sepp (1893).  Sepp’s argument concerned Celsus’ philosophical inclination in general and 
includes Celsus’ position vis-à-vis Empiricism, Skepticism, and Methodism, among others.  Sepp’s 
argument stands for Celsus’ interest in skepticism generally but the evidence he brings to bear on his thesis 
that Heraclides of Tarentum is the Quelle of Celsus’ Praefatio is slim.  Sepp (1893: 7) can offer no more 
evidence than the claim that Heraclides was the first to use the name Empiricist: “Es lässt sich aber auch 
warhrscheinlich machen, dass Celsus seiner Geschichte der Empirie einen Empiriker zu Grunde gelegt 
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it would be difficult, as Frede argues, for Celsus to present an account of Empirical 
knowledge at odds with his source and, further, for Celsus himself to present a view as 
his own which he took from the reforming Empiricist.17  While the impasse in 
Quellenforschung of Celsus is still unrecognized,18 Frede’s case against Heraclides of 
Tarentum being Celsus’ source for Empiricist doctrine implies that Celsus’ source 
adopted an Empiricist position different from Heraclides: regardless of whether the 
source post-dated Heraclides, he will have presented a view of Empiricist doctrine more 
traditional than the innovative Heraclides.  For this reason, Celsus presents a view of 
Empiricist doctrine whose ideas ante-date Heraclides, that is, largely a collection of 
second-century BCE views.    
4.1.2 Sectarian Self-Fashioning 
A Hellenistic medical sect is a group of individuals with a set of common beliefs 
and practices.  Yet as Frede’s analysis of Heraclides of Tarentum showed in 4.1.1, the 
                                                
habe.  Denn es fällt auf, dass er den Empirikern, statt sie, wie die introductio des Ps. Galen, durch Philin an 
Herophilus anzuknüpfen, neben den andern, als logisch bezeichneten, Sekten eine völlig unabhängige 
Stellung anweist.  Dies war der Standpunkt, welchen Heraklid von Tarent einnahm, dem Celsus auch sonst, 
trotz gelegentlichen Tadels, viel häufiger folgt, als er angibt.  Denn obwohl Heraklid nach Galen anfags 
selbst, ebenso wie sein Lehrer Mantias, zu den Herophileern gehört hatte, trat er doch nachn seinem 
Übergange zur Empirie als heftiger Gegner derselben [so des Bachius, Andreas, Zeno] auf und rief durch 
seins Kampschrift gegen des Herophilus Pulslehre eine langdauernde literarische Fehde hervor.  Er ist es 
auch, der in seiner Schrift über die empirische Lehre, die Galen in 7 Büchern commentiert hat, zum 
erstenmale den Namen Empiriker gebraucht, um die Schule des Serapion und Glaucias, welche der Empirie 
den Vorzug gaben, damit zu bezeichnen.  Celsus und der gleichlautende Bericht der subfiguratio empirica 
knüpfen deshalb beide, letztere, ohne weitere Vorgänger zu nennen, den Namen Empiriker an seine 
Person.”  Sepp (1893: 8) cites Celsus Praefatio 10 for his claims: aliquanto post Heraclides Tarentinus et 
aliqui non mediocres viri secuti ex ipsa professione se empiricos appellaverunt.  
Yet Sepp is mistaken that Heraclides was the first to use the term (µ$&#&E2' to describe himself 
and his style of medicine.  In a Herculaneum papyrus, P.Herc. 1012, Demetrius Lacon the Epicurean 
philosopher fl. 100 BCE attacks an Empiricist, Apollonius the Elder, fl. 175 BCE and names him 
(µ)$&#&E2' (Empiricist fr. 164 D).  It seems likely that the name (µ)$&#&E2' goes back to an early 
Empiricist, perhaps Serapion of Alexandria, Zeuxis, Glaucias of Tarentum, or Apollonius the Elder.  It is 
unfair to criticize Sepp at length since he did not have source collections for the Hellenistic medical sects 
(i.e. Deichgräber (1965) on the Empiricists, von Staden (1989) on the Herophileans, Garofolo (1988) on 
Erasistratus).  The source collections of Hellenistic medical sects demand at least that scholars reevaluate 
the evidence to which we have clung for a century. 
17 Von Staden (1994) on Celsus’ own views adds little directly to the problem, although he does point out 
that Celsus cites very few Empiricists including Heraclides outside of the Praefatio.  This would 
complicate, rather than simplify, the theories of Celsian Quellenforschung. 
18 See Stok (1993, 1994), von Staden (1999a, 1999b). 
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doctrines internal to the medical sects changed over time.  What is common to members 
of a sect or !"#$%&'?  Von Staden (1982) attempts to answer the question of what unites 
the members of a sect; he argues that the Empiricists are united on the main issues 
whereas the Herophileans are not.19  He offers, as an example of the Herophilean 
disagreements, the many definitions and redefinitions of the pulse given by eight 
different Herophileans. 
[E]ach Herophilean strove for a fresh and more viable definition of the essential 
nature of the pulse, attempting at the same time to meet objections raised to his 
precursors’ formulations.  What might, from a modern perspective, look like 
sophistic quibbling over minor differences concerning a definition, to most of the 
participants in this revisionary process was anything but a mere exercise in 
particidal and fratricidal eristic.  Rather, it was a search for a correct 
understanding of the essential nature of a major diagnostic tool and, 
simultaneously, a reaffirmation of the value and relevance of theoretical 
investigations for the clinician.  What unites almost all followers of Herophilus is 
in fact precisely their interest not only in clinical but also in scientific or 
‘theoretical’ medicine, and this is, of course, also what distinguishes them most 
sharply from their chief rivals in the early period, the Alexandrian Empiricists, 
who radically reject anatomy and physiology as irrelevant for clinical purposes.20 
 
If the Herophileans disagree about what the pulse is, it is not because they find no value 
in it.  Each individual physician reified their sectarian predecessors’ definition of the 
pulse as an expression of their commitment to the value of the pulse for theoretical 
Herophilean medicine.  Von Staden can further show that Herophileans engaged in 
pharmacology and Hippocratic exegesis even as they abandonded Herophilus’ procedures 
and innovations in dissection: pharmacology and Hippocratic exegesis are areas within 
medicine expressing Herophileans’ commitment to their methodological views.   
Von Staden’s broad sense of what constitutes a sect is correct: the general area of 
action of physicians manifests a belief in certain kinds of methodological procedures.  A 
Greek medical sect is thus an ideological group: individuals united by common beliefs in 
the value of particular kinds of scientific methodologies and domains of study.  The 
Herophileans are united in the value of causation and they work in the most common 
                                                
19 Von Staden (1982: 82, 85-93). 
20 Von Staden (1982: 87-88). 
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domains in the Hellenistic period of pharmacology, surgery, and Hippocratic exegesis. 
The Empiricists too work in these same areas yet they strive to distinguish themselves 
from the Herophileans, as we will see in 4.3.3-5.  Nonetheless, the Empiricists’ broad 
agreement on the values of certain domains and methodologies does not preclude their 
disagreement about how to pursue those questions of scientific knowledge and healing.  
There is no unanimous agreement among the Empiricists on particular questions anymore 
than there is unaminous agreement among the Herophileans. 
As an ideological group a Hellenstic medical sect combines the two elements of 
Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’, discussed in chapter 1.2.3: (1) the example of puzzle-solving that 
scientists operate with in their daily investigations, and (2) the metaphysical commitment 
that accompanies the puzzle-solving exemplar.  The sect is a social group of scientists 
ideologically united by their approach.  The sect has several paradigmatic puzzle-solving 
examples.  For example, Herophilus’ description and use of the pulse in prognosis and 
therapy as described in chapter 2 is an outstanding exemplar of puzzle-solving for 
Rationalists.  As will be shown in 4.2.2, the Empiricists have many particular examples 
of problem-solving in two legs of their therapeutic tripod, (µ)$&#*! and ^%14#*!.  Both 
sects also have beliefs about the ideological consequences of their puzzle-solving 
exemplars, Kuhn’s second sense of ‘paradigm’: the methodological commitment to a 
particular areas within the domain of medicine.   
There are therefore two types of self-fashioning occurring in the Hellenistic 
medical sects.  First, there is self-fashioning internal to the sect.  Herophileans argue 
against Herophileans; Empiricists argue against Empiricists: the difference between 
members of the same sect expresses the search for the correct application of their 
methodological procedures while imitating a puzzle-solving exemplar.  Second, there is 
self-fashioning of sect against sect.  Herophileans argue against Empiricists; Empiricists 
argue against Herophileans: the difference between members of different sects expresses 
the sect’s ideological commitment to their methodological procedures in contradistinction 
to other scientific approaches.   
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I will therefore examine the two aspects of Empiricist self-definition separately.  
Chapter 4.2 considers internal self-definition within Empiricism; chapter 4.3 considers 
the debate between Empiricism and their rationalist critics. 
4.2 POSITIVE EMPIRICISM 
4.2.1 Sign-Association 
The early Empiricists believed in limited causal chains within the visible realm.  
The methodological positions that Celsus ascribes to the Empiricists and Heraclides’ 
methodological positions build on a distinction between evident and hidden causes “with 
all hidden causes rejected not from the consideration of the practioner but from the art 
itself.”21  The Empiricists limited knowledge of nature to the realm of the visible, the so-
called evidens.22  Outside of this visible realm medicine has no sure knowledge of nature 
and its workings; within the visible realm the Empiricists admited causae evidentes into 
their therapeautic evaluation: the terms causae obscurae and causae evidentes thus 
distinguish between causal agents within the sensible and perceptible realm and those 
not.23   Therefore the Empiricists are not aetiological nihilists, for they claimed to identify 
                                                
21 Celsus Praef. 74. 
22 evidens from the roots ex and vid-.  
23 Previous commentators, debating what causes the Empiricists sanction, have sought to give a particular 
name associated elsewhere only with Rationalist causal theory to Celsus’ causae evidentes.  Celsus glosses 
causae evidentes in Praef. 18 evidentes uero has [sc. causas] appellant in quibus quaerunt initium morbi 
calor attulerit an frigus, fames an satietas, et quae similia sunt.  I argue that the visual element is meant by 
causae evidentes.  
Mudry (1982: 87-88) claims that the Celsian distinction is equivalent to the causal distintinctions 
in Galen’s treatises on casuality: “Sur le modèle du grec )#25;>4& !,1*!&, Celse appelle évidentes les 
causes qui sont de l’ordre du phénomène et peuvent donc être appréhendées par les sens. Les causes que 
Celse énumère plus bas sous ce nom (praef. 18; 52) coïncident avec les causes dites procatarctiques dont 
Galien donne des exemples dans le traité qu’il leur consacre. La cause procatarctique appartient comme la 
cause synectique à la tripartition des causes introduite dans la médecine par Athénée d’Attale. Alors qu’il 
vient de signaler l’identité de la cause obscure et de la cause synectique, Celse ne mentionne pas l’identité 
de la cause évidente et de la cause procatarctique. Mais il attribue à la cause évidente la meme fonction que 
Galien à la cause procatarctique, qui est de précéder et de déclencher la maladie.”  Hankinson (1998b: 24) 
argues that procatartic causes, at least for Galen, are part of things responsible for bringing the containing 
cause into focus: “part of what distinguishes an antecedent ()#4E!1!#E1&E28) from a preceding 
()#4;-4Fµ$848) cause is that the former must be open to inspection, or evident in the sense of the 
Empiricists, whereas the latter operates inside the body but is not yet the containing (%B8$E1&E28) cause of 
the final event.”  Mudry therefore wishes to construe causae evidentes as a synonym for !,1*! 
)#4E!1!#E1&EN, causes that are open to inspection and contribute to the contributing cause.   
Hankinson (1992: xxviii), moreover, connects Celsus’ statement with the Empiricist doctrine of 
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visible and obvious disease agents and believe in limited causal chains.  The early 
Empiricists held a limited view of the possibility of reason.  Heraclides’ advance 
therefore is to extend reason to cover causae obscurae, such as the slackening of the hip 
tendon. 
The Empiricists grappled with a notion of medicine confined solely to the visible 
world.  As Celsus says, 
Differre quoque pro natura locorum genera medicinae et aliud opus esse Romae, 
aliud in Aegypto, aliud in Gallia. quod si morbos hae causae facerent quae 
ubique eaedem essent, eadem remedia quoque ubique esse debuisse. saepe etiam 
causas apparere, ut puta lippitudinis, uulneris, neque ex his patere medicinam. 
quod si scientiam hanc non subiciat euidens causa, multo minus eam posse 
subicere quae in dubio est. 
 
[The Empiricists] also contend that kinds of therapy differ depending on the 
nature of the places and that there is need for one kind at Rome, a different in 
Egypt, a different in Gaul.  But, <they say,> if these causes which are everywhere 
the same cause diseases, there ought to be the same remedies everywhere too. 
                                                
%B85#4µ/, the collection of information relevant to each case.  In a later work Hankinson (1998a: 321) 
argues that the Empiricists include antecedent causes (Mudry’s !,1*! )#4E!1!#E1&EN) in the syndrome: 
“[C]all them causes if you wish … as long as the term is not taken to connotate any commitment to the 
existence of some arcane causal truth of the matter. Empiricists and Rationalists, then, largely agree 
(against the Methodists) about the importance of those events classed by the Rationalists as antecedent 
causes; they disagree about what can be said as to why they are important. The Empiricists allow 
antecedent causes into his syndrome; but he does not thereby commit himself to believing that they really 
are causes.” 
Yet the Galenic evidence of the Empiricist causal theory does not hinge on the Rationalist 
distinctions of causality but only the distinction between visual and non-visual.  In On Sects for Beginners 
Galen offers an example of two patients, each bitten by a rabid dog, and how each sect offers to treat him: 
the Empiricist, unlike the Methodist, distinguishes the dog bite from other bites because it is relevant that a 
rabid dog (as opposed to a snake) bit him; Galen calls this recognition of the rabid dog’s role the %B85#4µ/ 
which in turn he defines as 1< -@# )#4$&#;µ:848 W?#4&%µ! 1[8 %Bµ)1.µN1.8 ()O 14D )B#:114814' [sc. 
the circumstances of age, strength, season, place, etc.]  _ %B85#4µ98 E!>$Y8 $,%O8 $,?&%µ:84& Galen de 
sectis ad eos qui introdunctur 7.3-5 Helmreich = 1.72 K.  Furthermore in Subfiguratio empirica chapter 7 
Galen discusses the differences between Empirical %B85#4µ/ and Rationalist %B85#4µ/: et nimirum nihil 
prohibebat neque hoc empericam quidem diffinitionem dicere esse propriam rationem rei consistentem 
<ex> his que evidenter insunt ei, eam vero que dogmaticorum propriam quidem esse non tamen ex his que 
evidenter apparent. Empiricist fr. 10b D = Deichgräber (1965: 62-63.26) = Frede (1985: 32-3). 
It is difficult to believe that Celsus intends to have the Empiricists distinguish between different 
causal agents by what they contribute to the causal chain.  Furthermore, it would be a reversal of his usual 
practice for Celsus to intend his Empiricist technical terminology to imply the distinctions of Rationalist 
terminology.  It is more consistent to believe that Celsus’ use of causae evidentes is meant to follow the 
Empiricist position.  In this usage then, causae evidentes covers those examples of !,1*! that begin within 
the visible realm without intending to distinguish between possible contributions to the containing cause.  
Insofar as this is causal theory, it is not the causal theory of Galenic antecedent or proceeding causes; it is a 
causal theory dependent solely upon a visible element. 
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Often also the causes are clear, as in inflammation of the eyes, or a wound, but 
not even from these is a treatment clear.  But if the evident cause does not yield 
this knowledge, so much the less can <a cause> which is in doubt yield 
knowledge of treatment.24 
 
Mudry (1982) points out that the Empiricists here depend on skeptical arguments about 
causality: “Ils se servent en cela de l’argument sceptique rapporté par Sextus Empiricus 
(M. 9, 246 sqq.) qui réfute la notion de cause en se fondant sur la diversité des effets 
qu’une seule et même cause serait supposée produire … cet argument vise à nier la 
notion meme de l’inférence causale.”25  The Dogmatists used S85$&`&' “indication” to 
signify an indication of the type of cause that had led to disease and thus the kind of 
treatment needed.  The Empiricists in Celsus’ description were aiming at the Rationalists’ 
doctrine of causality: since the same outcome has different treatment in different places, 
the causal agent cannot be the same; therefore S85$&`&' is no guarantee of the therapy 
needed.  But the Empiricists were not etiological nihilists.  Early Empiricists such as 
Serapion of Alexandria fl. 225 BCE and Glaucias of Tarentum fl. 175 wrote books on the 
so-called tripod of the Empiricists, a methodological program for medicine dependent on 
particular kinds of sign-association discussed in 4.2.2.  The phrase ‘etiological nihilists’ 
suggests a disavowl of all types of sign inference; rather, the Rationalist sources only say 
that the earliest Empiricists disavowed the Rationalist notion of (85$*`$&'.  From its 
outset Empiricism conducted its positive program entirely within a semiotics of the 
visible which was not dependent on the Rationlist notion of (85$*`$&'. 
The positive doctrine of the Empiricists was contingent on the logical necessity of 
the visible; it was equally contingent on a notion of physis.  Although it may seem to be 
in the realm of the visible, the Empiricists rejected knowledge gained from the body 
through dissection.  They did not object that knowledge of the internal organs is 
unnecessary but rather that it is impossible to achieve.  To have knowledge of the internal 
organs in dissection one must cut apart the dead body.  But, the Empiricists said, the fact 
that the body is dead means that there has been a shift in category: if the goal is to gain 
                                                
24 Celsus Praef. 30-31.   
25 Mudry (1982: 120-1). 
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knowledge of the functions of the body, how will we gain knowledge from a functionless 
body?  The dead body cannot be studied as a goal to the function of the live body.26  As 
Mudry (1982) notes, “la nécessité de l’observation anatomique in uiuo est une idée 
commune à l’ensemble de la médecine hellénistique, sans distinction d’écoles. Elle 
dérive de Platon et d’Aristote pour qui le cadavre humain n’est plus vraiment 
l’homme.”27  Furthermore, the Empiricists’ rejection of dissection as a category error of 
the Rationalists explains why the Empiricists did not engage in the comparative anatomy 
of dissecting animals, as had been done in Aristotlean treatises and Galen too would do: 
this too was a category error between living function and dead structures.28   
The Empiricists rejected vivisection too.  Celsus claims that Herophilus and 
Erasistratus practiced vivisection on condemned criminals from the Ptolemaic prisons.29  
Opening the body of the live patient offers access to view natural functions, both interior 
and exterior.  Despite the hermeneutic possibilities of cutting open a live body, the 
Empiricists rejected vivisection with both an ethical and epistemological argument.  First, 
on moral grounds, they argued that it is cruel to cut into living people.30  Second, from an 
epistemological point of view, the Empiricists claimed that the qualities of the interior of 
the body, when put on open display, are changed out of fear, pain, and many other 
afflictions.31  It is unlikely that the Empiricists meant to assert some sympathetic nature 
of the internal organs, such as softer organs are more susceptible to the interruption of 
                                                
26 Celsus Praef. 42-43.  The key term is quale… tale  – a qualitative shift from vivo homine to moriente and 
mortuo. 
27 Mudry (1982: 106-7). 
28 The pig at least figures in both [Hipp.] On the Heart and Gal. Ana. Am., the account of the laryngeal 
nerve.  Von Staden (1989: 179) argues that Herophilus may have dissected a cow’s brain to see the rete 
mirabile, a feature which does not occur in human anatomy but does in pigs, sheep, goats, and oxen.  At 
any rate, the dissection of animals has a long tradition in the history of Greek medicine. 
29 Celsus Praef. 23.  Von Staden (1989: 144-153) has convincingly argued that Celsus’ report is 
trustworthy.  He emphasizes how the pioneer environment of Greek colonists in Alexandria could have 
given support to sanctioned breaking of taboos of previous society; and how the later Egyptianization of 
Alexandrian and Ptolemaic life may have revived fears and taboos of violating the human body, dead or 
alive.  The most persuasive comparative evidence is Galen’s testimony that Mithridates VI and Attalus III 
tried antidotes to known poisons on condemned criminals; cf. von Staden (1989: 147.n18). 
30 Celsus Praef. 40 id uero quod restat etiam crudele, uiuorum hominum aluum atque praecordia incidi. 
31 Celsus Praef. 41 nam colorem, leuorem, mollitiem, duritiem similiaque omnia non esse talia inciso 
corpore qualia integro fuerint quia, cum corporibus inuiolatis, haec tamen metu, dolore, inedia, cruditate, 
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nature.  At the very least the point stands, that interior function might be impaired by the 
unnatural action of vivisection.  Whether the Rationalists felt this was a strong argument 
or merely an ad hoc justification, no Rationalist source seems willing to have pursued the 
matter against the Empiricists.32  
 Therefore the Empiricists limited their practice within a semiotics of the visible 
and natural.  There are many types of signs possible within this epistemological domain: 
sign as natural bond, sign as association, sign as logical necessity.  The major account of 
ancient sign theory comes from Sextus Empiricus, who distinguishes between the 
commemorative sign, a)4µ8;%1&E<8 %;µ$Y48, and indicative sign, (85$&E1&E<8 %;µ$Y48: 
“They call the commemorative sign that which having been evidently co-observed with 
the signified, together with its occurrence when the signified matter is non-evident, leads 
us into a recollection of what was co-observed with it but is now not manifest.”33  The 
commemorative sign appears as a link between two evident things: itself and the evident 
signified.  The observation of the commemorative sign is therefore not the as-yet-
unobserved-mark of the signified but the recollection, a)2µ8;%&', of the signified.  The 
indicative sign, by contrast, is “as they say, that which has not been evidently co-
observed with the signified, but from its own nature and constitution signifies that of 
which it is a sign.”34  The indicative sign is a mark standing in for the signified, whether 
seen or unseen; there is a natural relation between the indicative sign and its signified. 
But the Empiricists rejected out of hand the idea of signs as logically necessary, 
the notion of the causal chain.  For if a sign was logically necessary, it was necessary that 
something give rise to it.  This regress may lead back to a causal agent not within the 
                                                
lassitudine, mille aliis mediocribus affectibus saepe mutentur, multo magis uerisimile esse interiora, quibus 
maior mollities, lux ipsa noua sit, sub grauissimis uulneribus et ipsa trucidatione mutari. 
32 The Rationalists in Celsus’ Praefatio seem unashamed of the reports of vivisection and even argue for it 
(23-26).  Mudry (1982: 109) argues that the Rationalists refer to vivisection in a historical sense only, the 
work of Herophilus and Erasistratus.  Nonetheless, it is possible to see Celsus’ presentation here as part of 
the Empiricist critique of Rationalists, historical fact embellished for the presentation of the scandalous 
attitude of the Rationalists toward dissection, which is the real target of Empiricist critique.  It is possible 
that Hegetor the Herophilean fl. 120 BCE, discussed below in 4.3.4, did try to dissect human bodies in 
imitation of Herophilus.  Still the evidence is very slim that anyone in the Hellenistic period after 
Herophilus and Erasistratus did try to dissect human bodies.  
33 Translations are by Allen (2001: 109) from Sextus PH 2.100-1. 
34 Translations are by Allen (2001: 109) from Sextus PH 2.100-1. 
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realm of the visible and natural; and thus when the Empiricists rejected the process of 
causality and notion of a logically necessary sign, they rejected the indicative sign, 
(85$&E1&E<8 %;µ$Y48.  
 The Empiricists espoused a positive doctrine of sign-association, which Michael 
Frede (1990) has called ‘memorist’.  In Sextus’ terms, this is the doctrine of the 
commemorative sign.  The commemorative sign does not stand for its signified but only 
associates with it in the memory of the observer.  The act of observing the 
commemorative sign and recollecting the signified is not so much knowledge and 
reasoning per se as association.  Yet the Empiricist embrace of the commemorative sign 
seems at odds with having knowledge.  Could doctors merely associate commerative 
signs with their signifieds as a reliable basis for knowledge?  The Empiricial response 
will be that there is no secure and reliable sign other than the commerative. 
4.2.2 The Empiric Tripod 
The methodological means by which Empiricists obtained medical knowledge 
was called the tripod.  In the three legs of the 1#*)4B' of Serapion of Alexandria fl. 225 
BCE, (µ)$&#*! “experience”, ^%14#*! “research”, and X 14D bµ4*4B µ$1N=!%&' 
“transition of the similar” are the means by which medical knowledge is obtained.35  Von 
Staden (1975) has convincingly argued that (µ)$&#*! in Empiricist doctrine does not 
mean experiment but refers to the passive observation of nature.36  This may come in the 
form of happenstance or a natural event.  Von Staden offers the examples of a headache 
cured, respectively, by an accidently cut forehead or by a nosebleed.  In neither case is 
the cure for the headache a process of trial and error but rather an event with attendent 
circumstances.  The tracing of the connection between the event – the cut forehead or the 
nosebleed – and the cure – the disappearance of the headache – is the work of sign-
association.  Note that von Staden’s example of (µ)$&#*! implies !K14R*! “self-
                                                
35 Von Staden (1975: 188).  The Empiricists regarded Serapion of Alexandria as the inventor of the tripod 
but in fact debated among themselves the extent to which he used X 14D bµ4*4B µ$1N=!%&'; see 
Deichgräber (1965: 164-5).  Serapion’s book was called P&@ 1#&[8; a later Empiricist, Glaucias of 
Tarentum fl. 175 BCE wrote a book called c#*)4B'.  What relationship Serapion had to Philinus of Cos, 
the first known Empiricist, is unclear. 
36 Von Staden (1975: 187-192). 
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inspection”: the visual element comes to the fore.  Galen, a Rationalist, says that 
Empiricists equate (µ)$&#*! with X -@# 1[8 )>$%1NE&' E!O d%!F1.' e.#!µ:8.8 
1/#;%&' “for experience is observation of things seen to happen in a similar manner on 
multiple occasions”.37  That is, it is not enough that the association between the sign – the 
cut forehead or the nosebleed – and the signified – the cured headache – happen only 
once, but it must happen multiple times and be observed by the doctor.  It was a matter of 
notorious dispute just how often an event needed to happen for the inference to the 
signified to count as experience;38 but, whatever the frequency, the procedure of 
observation and association between visible sign and signified is clear.  From the basic 
tool of (µ)$&#*!, correlation of events, the Empiricist gained most of his understanding of 
medicine. 
The Empiricist attitude toward knowledge of anatomy belongs under (µ)$&#*! 
too.  Celsus’ presentation of the Empiricists, for instance, rejects dissection and 
vivisection but admits the possibility of investigating interior anatomy from a patient’s 
chance wound: 
Si quid tamen sit quod adhuc spirante homine conspectui subiciatur, id saepe 
casum offerre curantibus. Interdum enim gladiatorem in arena, uel militem in 
acie, uel uiatorem a latronibus exceptum, sic uulenarari ut eius interior aliqua pars 
aperiatur, et in alio alia.  Ita sedem, positum, ordinem, figuram, similaque alia 
cognoscere prudentem medicum non caedem sed sanitatem molientem, idque per 
misercordiam discere quod alii dira crudelitate cognorint. 
 
If, however, there is something which can be observed while the patient still 
breathes, chance offers it to the doctors.  For sometimes a gladiator in the arena, 
or a soldier on the battle-line, or a traveler attacked by robbers is so wounded that 
some interior part is exposed, and in another man a different part is exposed.   In 
this way the wise doctor learns the location, position, arrangement, shape, and 
other things likewise while practicing not slaughter but health, and he learns 
through mercy what others learned by savage cruelty.39 
                                                
37 Von Staden (1975: 190). 
38 Galen’s On Medical Experience sets out the soritic argument of Aesclepiades against the Empiricists on 
the very matter of just how often an event needed to happen for the inference to count as experience and 
thus be used as the basis for treatment.  Galen for his part rejects Aesclepiades’ argument but the point 
remains that opponents of Empiricism took the notion of frequency seriously.  The Empiricists of course 
took frequency seriously but refused to be drawn into the debate about the precise number of times an event 
must reoccur. 
39 Celsus Praef. 43. 
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Mudry (1982) comments on this passage: “Tout en rejetant catégoriquement la 
vivisection, les empiriques admettent pourtant que la connaissance de certaines 
particularités des organs internes, celles qui ne sont pas altérées par l’effet des blessures, 
peut être utile au médecin (la dissection, qui ne fait connaître que des organs morts, est 
exclue).”40  In so far as some knowledge of internal anatomy may be useful for treatment, 
the Empiricists accept the possibility of such associative-signs.  However, Mudry points 
out that the Empiricists do not suggest another direct route to anatomical knowledge in 
place of dissection.41  Just as in Celsus’ presentation, the Empiricists adopted a technique 
of 1#!Bµ!1&E9 ?:! “wound observation”: the passive observation of the interior of the 
body when exposed by happenstance or a natural event.  Again, this knowledge per se is 
really the connection of the sign of the interior organ with the wound or impairment in 
the patient’s functioning.  The association of exterior wound and interior organ may have 
been a rarely observed occurance, but if it was visually observed, there was no reason 
why the assocation between the organ and the effect of the wound should be excluded 
from the doctor’s (µ)$&#*!. 
Now ^%14#*! “research”, the second leg in the Empiricist tripod, was the 
aggregate collected experience of previous physicians – cures and their attendant visible 
circumstances that have been written down.  (µ)$&#*! required the observation and 
inspection of the individual physician but clearly no physician could possibly observe all 
attendent circumstances for the same disease, much less for all diseases.  Thus ^%14#*! 
served as a supplement to the individual Empiricist’s own experience, the record of other 
physician’s experiences of the tracing of associated signs and signifieds.  These other 
physicians do not necessarily need to be Empiricists, although Galen records that 
Empiricists debated about this point.42  Naturally not all ^%14#*! was reliable but the 
Empiricists are not without recourse to judge the truth or falsity of previous doctors’ 
                                                
40 Mudry (1982: 137). 
41 Mudry (1982: 107): “Il est révélateur à ce propos que les empiriques, qui refusent la dissection, 
n’envisagent pourtant pas d’autre méthode d’investigation anatomique que la connaissance directe.” 
42 Empiricist fr. 10b D = Deichgräber (1965: 66). 
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^%14#*!: the primary criterion was always be one’s own (µ)$&#*!.43  We should take 
seriously the notion of a research program in ^%14#*!; yet it is not so much the Empirical 
sect but the individual physician who aimed to expand his knowledge.  The greater the 
individual doctor’s accumulated associations between signs and signifieds the better 
understanding the individual physician had of the case at hand.  Empiricist ^%14#*! was 
always at the employ of the individual doctor. 
The third leg of the tripod is, in its full form, X G)< 14D bµ4*4B µ$1N=!%&' 1H 
bµ4*I, “transition from the similar to the similar”.  This is the most disputed element of 
Empirical doctrine; the Empiricists themselves debated whether it was rightly attributable 
to Serapion and whether it might be rightly used by a strict Empiricist.  Hankinson 
(1998a) has pointed out that the effectiveness of this notion of transition depends on the 
extent to which a doctor might construe this notion – whether it might embrace causality, 
reason, or the non-visible.44  Hankinson shows that the Empiricists used transition in a 
heuristic manner, part of the element of discovery rather than justification.45  Galen’s 
Outline of Empiricism shows Empiricists using transition from the similar on elements 
that are visually similar – a hand and a foot – or similar in location – in the belly – or 
similar in their effects – such as quince and medlar on diarrhea.46  All these elements can 
be understood to be similar in either a visual or natural way.  However, Galen’s 
Empiricist in Outline of Empiricism warns against transitioning from elements based on a 
shared common property.  For example, in the case of drugs it is not simply enough that 
aloe and copper flakes are astringent in taste for the Empiricist to mark them as similar.  
The doctor had to consider what is called toti proprietati que est in ipsa, the entire 
individuality of an item.47  There are cases we know from associative experience where 
astringency is the property we are looking for, as in the case of a scarred wound, and 
                                                
43 Empiricist fr. 10b D = Deichgräber (1965: 65.28-69.28) = Frede (1985: 36-39). 
44 Hankinson (1998a: 312-13). 
45 Hankinson (1998a: 311). 
46 Empiricist fr. 10b D = Deichgräber (1965: 70.20-31) = Frede (1985: 37). 
47 Empiricist fr. 10b D = Deichgräber (1965: 72.15-7), which he backtranslates as G>>@ )#4%:C$&8 
GE#&=[' 1<8 84D8 f>g 1h (8 !K1!Y' ,5&21;1&.  Frede (1985: 38) offers “put one’s mind to the peculiar 
character of the taste as a whole.”  
 
 160 
transition from aloe to copper is not a problem; but there are other cases where the 
astringency of aloe and copper flakes are not the same as the astringency of an apple, as 
in cases of dysentery.  We may attempt to transition from treating the dysenteric patient 
with an apple to a compound of copper flakes, but both (µ)$&#*! and ^%14#*! show that 
the astringency of the copper flakes will not cure the dysentery.  The Empiricist’s 
hesitation to consider some feature as designating a class – all astringent drugs – is a 
mark of how attuned to individual detail Empiricists could be by refusing the logical 
inferences that come with classes of objects.  Furthermore, the appropriateness of 
transitioning from one element to another is itself justified only by its effectiveness, the 
!K14R*! of (µ)$&#*! “the self-inspection of one’s experience”. 
It is then clear how an Empiricist could decide how to treat a disease by the three 
elements of the Empiric tripod.  So much then for knowledge of the past.  But how could 
an experientially reasoning person have future knowledge?  More to the point, how could 
an Emipiricist doctor predict the course of disease? 
Empiricists prefer to talk about this [knowledge of prediction] in subjective terms, 
in terms of expectation (elpis) and confidence (pistis). Memory produces a certain 
expectation in us: we may be more or less confident that the person is going to 
develop cramps. Depending on whether our expectation is fulfilled or not, its 
degree will be higher or lower in future similar cases. If we have a certain kind of 
experience, we will have strong enough an expectation to be fully confident in the 
belief that this person is going to have cramps. But this belief is not a matter of 
inference, or a matter of some rational insight into the connection between having 
a certain complexion and going to develop cramps; we may have no idea what the 
connection is, or whether in fact there is any connection.48 
 
The subjective experience of a physician is therefore of critical importance in Empirical 
medicine.  An individual doctor’s personal experience is composed of the many 
associative signs he has observed and the amount of research he has read and considered.  
It is between these two legs of the tripod that the Empiricist must create his own 
expectation of the future and test them by the third leg of the tripod. 
                                                
48 Frede (1990: 246). 
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4.2.3 The Doctor’s Independent Authority 
 The Empiricist doctor was constantly at work.  There were commerative signs to 
be noticed, there were historiai to be read.  Now the Empiricist could not just passively 
absorb this information.  He had to associate the commerative signs and the historiai to 
transition from similar to similar if his therapy was to be effacious.  Galen’s picture of the 
Empiricists is of an active physician: 
4K -@# 5O' µ2848 0 1#O' G>>@ E!O )>$&%1NE&' µ&µ;%Nµ$84& 1< )#2%?$8 
iJ$>Q%!8, $j1’ ()O 1[8 !K1[8 )!?[8 1< !K1< )4&4D8 $a#*%E481$' d' ()O 1< 
)4>k 198 14&!F1;8 µ8/µ;8 ?$l#;µ! E!>:%!81$' m5; )&%1<8 X-4D81!& E!O 
µ:#4' 1Q' 1:C8;'. d' 56 )4>>@ ?$.#/µ!1! 14&!D1’ n?#4*]$1’ !K14Y', ,!1#&E9 
µ68 o8 1< %Fµ)!8 W?#4&%µ! E!O b G?#4*%!' ,!1#2'. 
 
For having imitated the previous help not only twice or three times but often, then 
discovering the same effect for the most part in the same diseases they call such a 
memory a datum and think that it is already trustworthy and part of the techne.  
After many such data have been gathered by them, medicine is the entire 
collection and the doctor is the one collecting them.49  
 
The Empiricist doctor was very far from an inactive and passive physician; rather, the 
Empiricist constantly tried to associate and improve his ability to diagnose the illness and 
predict disease from his own experience.  The Empiricist doctor was only as good as his 
ability in his constant tracing of associations.   
 It has long been recognized that Empiricist critiques of Rationalism draw 
extensively on the contemporary skepticism of the New Academy.50  From a certain point 
of view, skepticism challenges most sources of authority and instead re-authorizes the 
subject as the judge of truth and falsehood.  The reauthorization of the subject’s cognitive 
ability is an epistemological move that places the primary onus and responsibility on the 
individual skeptic.  The epistemological responsibility the skeptic adopts for himself 
complements the demands the commerative-sign theorist places on himself to associate 
new and old signs.  For doctors who demand of themselves the ability to associate ever 
more signs, the reauthorization of the individual subject’s epistemological judgement that 
                                                
49 Galen de sectis ad eos qui introdunctur 2, 1.67K = 3.9-15 Helmreich = Empiricist fr. 15 D.  Frede’s 
(1985: 4) translation of ?$l#;µ! as theorem is an over-translation in my opinion. 
50 See von Staden (1975), Frede (1985: xx-xxxiv), Stok (1993), Hankinson (1998b: 36-43).  
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skepticism offers is attractive.  We should therefore see in Empiricist doctrines a 
reaffirmation of the independent role of the individual doctor.   
 The positive doctrine of sign-association that Empiricism offers set the individual 
person of the physician in the central role.  The goal of these tracing of associations was 
not to build a systematic understanding of nature but rather to provide the doctor a route 
to successful therapeutics.  In short, then, Empiricism aimed to provide the healing 
physician with tools for his healing practice.  From the Empiricist point of view, the 
quarrel between schools was about the type of role that the doctor plays: the Empiricists 
emphasize the doctor as clinician and healing practioner in contrast to the Rationalist 
emphasis on the doctor as researcher and scientist. 
 There is strong evidence that the Empiricists were concerned with the therapy of 
the individual patient and his circumstances.  The Empiricists were distinguished 
particularly in the clinical branches of medicine, namely therapeutics and pharmacology.  
Deichgräber’s (1965) collection of fragments for the earliest Empiricists finds books on 
therapeutics ascribed to numerous individual Empiricists: Serapion of Alexandria fl. 225 
BCE wrote ?$#!)$B1&EN in 3 books,51 Apollonius of Citium fl. 90-70 BCE wrote 
?$#!)$B1&EN in 2 books,52 Heraclides of Tarentum fl. 75 BCE wrote 1[8 (E1<' 
?$#!)$B1&EN in at least 4 books and 1[8 (81<' ?$#!)$B1&EN in at least 4 books.53  
Deichgräber (1965) collects material on pharmacology from numerous early Empiricists, 
some of which may belong in unattested books titled ?$#!)$B1&EN.   Philinus of Cos fl. 
250 BCE wrote drug recipes for headaches, asthma, and productive pus.54  Serapion of 
Alexandria fl. 225 BCE wrote drug recipes for lesions, tumors, patients with pus and 
stomach disorders.55  Glaucias of Tarentum fl. 175 BCE wrote on complex bandages 
types56 and drug recipes for stomach ills, lung problems, and skin pustules.57  Ptolemaeus 
                                                
51 Empiricist frr. 145-148 D. 
52 Empiricist frr. 278-80 D. 
53 For Heraclides’ External Therapeutics see Empiricist frr. 174-75 D = Heraclides fr. 42 Gu; for 
Heraclides’ Internal Therapeutics see Empiricist frr. 179-187 D = Heraclides fr. 48-56 Gu. 
54 Empiricist frr. 135-37 D. 
55 Empiricist frr. 150-52 D. 
56 Empiricist frr. 155-56 D. 
57 Empiricist frr. 157-160 D. 
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of Cyrene fl. 100 BCE wrote drug recipes for headaches;58 Zophyrus of Alexandria fl. 
100 BCE wrote antidotes for poisons;59 Diodorus fl. 60 BCE wrote pharmacological 
recipes for joint pain, skin diseases, and spleen trouble;60 Lycus of Naples fl. 60 BCE 
wrote drug recipes for snake bites.61  Heraclides of Tarentum fl. 75 BCE was particulary 
famous for his pharmacological books and wrote at least four different works on the 
subject.62  Clearly therapeutic interests are well attested for the pre-Celsian Empiricists.  
Galen preserves a general account of Empiricist therapeutics in his magnum opus 
on therapeutics. 
E!*14& E!O )!#’ !K14Y' 14Y' (µ)$&#&E4Y' X C.#O' 5&4#&%µ4D )$Y#! E!1:-8.%1!&· 
-#NJ4B%& -@# (8 14Y' )$#O J!#µNE.8 a)4µ8/µ!%&8· Sµ)>!%1#4' )#<' 
p)!>2C#.1!' E!O )!Y5!' E!O -B8!YE!'· 7!%* 1$ 1<8 >&=!8.1<8 ()O 1[8 
14&4F1.8 JF%$.8 q>E; E4Y>! µ;568 SC481! %Fµ)1.µ’ q1$#48 G8!1#:J481! E!O 
)>;#4D81!. )21$#48 5’ a-#@ 1@ 14&!D1! %lµ!1’ (%1O E!O 5&@ 14D14 5$Y1!& 
µ$1#*.' `;#!&8281.8 J!#µNE.8, 0 W>>; 1&' !,1*! 14D %Bµ=!*84812' (%1&8, 
4KE ()*%1!81!&. E!O -@# !r E!O )#<' 1@ -$#481&E@ %lµ!1! -$-#!µµ:848 
$a#/%$&' q1$#48 JN#µ!E48, W>>4 5: 1& )#<' 1@ 5B%$)4F>.1! E!O \C?l5; 1[8 
e>E[8, E!O )4>>4k' W>>4B' 5&4#&%µ4k' (8 s)!%& 14Y' ?$#!)$B1&E4Y' 
a)4µ8/µ!%& -#NJ4B%&8, (` t8 d' 4u28 1$ )#<' 198 ,5&21;1! 1Q' 
?$#!)$B4µ:8;' JF%$.' (`$B#*%E4B%& 1< %B84Y%48 JN#µ!E48. s)!81$' -@# 4^ 
5&4#&%µ4O E!1@ 1@' 1:C8!' G)< 14D E4&84D )$&#[81!& 1< 75&48 C.#*]$&8· E!O 
f%I)$# W8 1&' )>$*. 5&4#*%;1!&, )>;%&!*%1$#48 GJ&E8$Y1!& 14D ,5*4B, 14D14 5’ 
!K1< 1< GE#&=[' 75&48, 4v1$ -#!JQ8!& 5B8!128 (%1&8 4v1$ >$C?Q8!&· 5&< E!O 
1[8 (µ)$&#&E[8 14Y' µN>&%1! 1[8 S#-.8 1Q' 1:C8;' J#481*%!%& E!O %C$5<8 
s)!%& 14Y' 54-µ!1&E4Y' dµ4>2-;1!& 1< µ;5$µ*!8 4u28 1’ $j8!& -#!JQ8!& 
?$#!)$*!8 GE#&=[', G>>@ 1< >$Y)48 $,' 1<8 %14C!%µ<8 1Q' 14D ENµ84814' 
JF%$.' 4^ µ68 (E 1Q' eEN%14B 1[8 ?$#!)$B281.8 4,E$*!' 1#&=Q', 4^ 5’ (E 14D 
>4-&E[' 1$1$C8A%?!& J!%O C#Q8!& )#4%1&?:8!&· 4K5$O' 5’ !K1[8 4w1.' o8 
$KC$#9', d' s)!814' q>E4B' E4*>4B JN#µ!E48 x8 SC$&8 ()!--:>>$%?!& 
%!#E.1&E28. 
 
Although even among the Empiricists themselves trial and error without 
qualification is recognized, for they write in their works on drugs ‘a salve for the 
soft-skinned and children and women’, and they know that frankincense has no 
different outcome for hollow ulcers of such natures than nourishing and filling 
<drugs>.  Whether such bodies are wet and therefore need drying drugs 
moderately or there is some other cause for its happening, they do not know.  For, 
once again, you will find a different drug written for aged bodies, and they write 
                                                
58 Empiricist fr 167 D. 
59 Empiricist fr. 267 D. 
60 Empiricist frr. 252-55 D. 
61 Empiricist fr. 259 D. 
62 The titles of Heraclides’ pharmacological books were )#<' y81&4C*5! (at least 2 books), )#<' 
y%1B5Nµ!81! (1 book), )$#O ?;#*.8 (1 book), zBµ)2%&48 (1 book).  Deichgräber (1965) collects these 
fragments as Empiricist frr. 203-46 D = Heraclides fr. 1-38, 61-70 Gu. 
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another for bodies hard to cicatrize and tuberous with ulcers and many other 
qualifications in all their therapeutic works, from which they discover the 
appropriate drug as far as possible for the individuality of the nature being treated.  
For all the qualifications in all parts of the techne attempt to separate the 
individual from what is common: by whatever degree one defines it further, one 
reaches more closely to the individual, and the individual itself cannot precisely 
be written nor said.  Therefore it is agreed by particularly those of the Empiricists 
wise in the practice of the techne and nearly all the Rationalists that no therapy 
can be written precisely but – as regards the remainder for the educated guess 
[%14C!%µ<8] of the nature of the patient – some say that there is need to add from 
the proper practice of each of the physicians but others that treatment must be 
crafted from reason.  No one of them is so suitable that in every hollow ulcer one 
can promise one flesh-producing63 drug.64 
 
Galen highlights here the individuality of patients in Empiricist therapeutics.  Since each 
patient was unique and his circumstances different (Galen expresses the patient’s 
circumstances in typically Rationalist terms, in terms of individual JF%$&'), drugs as a 
class did not have their appropriate effect unless matched to the appropriate 
circumstances of the patient.  The Empiricist books on therapy stressed the individual 
circumstances of the patient.  This was part of the Empiricist program to reauthorize the 
individual physician’s experience in his tracing of associations: what works for one 
patient may not work for another.  The Empiricist physician had to place the individuality 
of the patient always at the center of his practice.  This is done through the procedure of X 
C.#O' 5&4#&%µ4D )$Y#! “trial and error without qualification”.  The knowledge that 
Empiricists have of the therapy of their patient does not come from a priori knowledge of 
physis, but rather from the repeated application of the experience of treatment: it is a 
procedure which aims to hit upon the appropriate result. 
Since as a general matter Empiricists valued the individuality of the patient and 
wrote widely on therapeutics and pharmacology, it seems likely that the healing ability of 
                                                
63 See Majno (1975: 176) for more on the concept of ‘ulcers’ – in our medical language, a flesh wound 
grown so inflamed and pus-filled that the skin structure and often the muscular tissue underneath has been 
eaten away and made hollow – and how Greek physicians tried to cure them: “They [greasy ointments] 
were supposed to make the flesh grow, and so strong was the belief that it required a special verb, 
sacrophyésai or ‘making-the-flesh-grow.’  Nature was doing it, of course, in those days as well as today; 
but some still think they are doing it.” 
64 Galen de Methodo Medendi 10.181-82K = Empiricist fr. 112 D.  I print Deichgräber’s (1965: 151-52) 
improvements to Kühn’s text. 
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the physician was a primary Empiricist concern.  This is not an accident; it is in direct 
opposition to contemporary developments in early Hellenistic medicine.  Herophilus and 
Erasistratus, the founders of the major Hellenistic Rationalist sects, secured wide 
anatomical knowledge through dissection and likely vivisection.  Further, as the 
treatment of Herophilus’ pulse theory in chapter 2.4.3 argued, their subsequent 
physiology was bound up with a new vision for medicine regarding the exploration of the 
interior of the body.  The Rationalist emphasis on knowledge about physis over healing 
offered the impetus for Empiricist critiques of Rationalism.   
The traditional view of the origin of medical Empiricism emphasizes the factor of 
knowledge. Frede (1990) summarizes the traditional viewpoint offered primarily by the 
Galenic treatises on Empiricism for the genesis of the Empirical school.  
This vision of a medical practice, firmly grounded in theoretical insight into the 
nature of the reality underlying the phenomena of disease, had lost a great deal of 
its original appeal by the time we come to the third century B.C.  By that time 
there was an abundance of theories, unfortunately all in conflict with one another 
… Unfortunately these disputes did not lead to a resolution of the points of 
contention, but only to more sophisticated reformulations of the old positions … 
It could also easily seem that all these disputes did little or nothing to advance the 
ability of the doctor to cure patients, to increase the knowledge he could rely on in 
actual practice.  Empiricism arose as a reaction to this situation.  The empiricists 
decided that the quest for a medical theory which supposedly one day would 
supply medical practice with a firm basis had, at least so far, proved futile and 
perhaps was fundamentally mistaken, because reason does not have the power to 
provide us with such theoretical knowledge.65 
 
For Frede the genesis of the Empirical school is the skeptical epistemological arguments 
that the Empiricist advances against the Rationalist.  Perhaps this is in fact true; it is 
certainly the Rationalist point of view.  But when “these disputes did little or nothing to 
advance the ability of the doctor to cure patients,” the doctor’s role as a care-giver has 
disappeared in the Rationalist investigation of physis.  Where, after all, is the role of the 
doctor’s interaction with the patient in Herophilean anatomical dissection or Erasistratean 
physiological experiments?  This is the polemic that the Empiricists directed against the 
                                                
 
65 Frede (1990: 229). 
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Rationalists.  We esteem the Rationalist practices of third century BCE because they 
resemble what we expect from our medical science – experiment, investigation.  The 
Rationalist investigation of physis may have been intended to secure “a medical practice, 
firmly grounded in theoretical insight into the nature of the reality,” but in the 
investigation of physis the Herophilean or Erasistratean has become a research scientist, 
not a caregiver.  Yes, the Empiricists disagreed with the Rationalist program of medical 
knowledge, but this dispute between Empiricists and Rationalists went beyond their 
symmetrical dispute about how the doctor achieves knowledge: the cultural role of the 
physician is also at stake. 
Galen records a revealing anecdote about the increasing distance of the doctor 
from the patient in the beginning of the third century BCE in a passage discussing the 
behavior and professional etiquette of the physican. 
S8&4& µ68 -@# !K1[8 (%CN1.' $,%O8 G=:>1$#4& 14&4D14* 1&8$' {81$', 4u48 b 
|$F`*' J;%&8 a)< }!EC$*4B -$-#NJ?!& ~!>>&N8!E1! -$-48:8!& 1<8 
#4J*>$&48 (8 14Y' y)4µ8;µ48$Fµ!%&8 #4J*>4B 1$ E!O 1[8 G)< 1Q' 4,E*!' 
!K14D· 84%4D814' -N# 1&84', [$j1Z]66 $,)2814' 1H ~!>>&N8!E1&· “1$?8/`4µ!&”, 
J!%O8 !K1<8 ()&J.8Q%!& 125$ 1< S)4'· “$, µ9 %$ Ä;1Å E!>>*)!&' (-$*8!14.” 
e1:#I 5: 1!K1< 14D1Z $,)281& JN8!&· “EN1?!8$ E!O ÇN1#4E>4', f)$# %:4 
)4>><8 Gµ$*8.8.” 
 
For some of them are exceedingly stupid – some people being of this sort, as 
Zeuxis says that Callianax the Herophilean was portrayed to have been by 
Bacchius in Memoirs of Herophilus and Those from His House: for when some 
sick person said to Callianax “I’m going to die”, they said that he replied with the 
following verse: “Unless Leto of beautiful children bore you.” And they say that 
he said to another person saying the same thing: “Patrocles too died, who was 
much better than you.”67 
 
Bacchius and Callianax were Herophileans, likely direct students of Herophilus, the 
exemplar of the research-scientist physician, and both likely lived and worked in 
Alexandria in the first half of the third century BCE.68  Callianax showed careless 
insensitivity toward his patients, each of whom fears that he is dying.  Callianax cited 
                                                
66 del. von Staden (2006: 31.n72).   Perhaps $j1Z might be part of the direct quotation of the story or 
sequence in Zeuxis’ or Bacchius’ book.  Certainly von Staden is right to point out that the particle does not 
make sense within the context of Galen’s passage. 
67 Gal. In Hipp. Lib. VI Epid. Comm. 17B.145K = 203.18-26 Wenkebach = Empiricist fr. 357 D = 
Callianax fr. 1 vS = Bacchius fr. 78 vS. 
68 For Bacchius see von Staden (1989: 484-500); for Callianax see von Staden (1989: 478-9). 
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lines from an unknown tragedian and the Iliad in a misguided attempt to reassure his 
patients of his intellectual knowledge.69  While the demonstration of wide knowledge in 
science and literature is typical of the Alexandrian intelligenstia,70 this particular event 
was too much even for Callianax’s Herophilean colleague Bacchius, who calls Callianax 
stupid.  Bacchius’ condemnation of Callianax’s behavior implies that not all 
Herophileans had as inept a bedside manner as Callianax.  I suggest that the Empiricist 
Zeuxis fl. 200 BCE, discussed further below in 4.3.5, draws attention to the excesses of 
Callianax’s attitude: demonstration of literary competence does not demonstrate one’s 
caregiving abilities and in this case even harms them.  Perhaps Zeuxis argued that if even 
Bacchius, a Herophilean, agrees that Callianax’s behavior was uncouth, Rationalists at 
large ought to agree with the Empiricists that caregiving and professional decorum are 
more important in being a doctor than spurious knowledge.71 
 What motivated a Greek to train and practice as an Empiricist?  Surely it was 
these elements of a positive doctrine – a re-authoriziation of the role of caregiver, a re-
authorizing of the primacy of vision in knowledge, a reassertion of the uniqueness of the 
patient and his circumstances – and a complimentary skepticism of the numerously 
posited natural forces and the taboo practice of dissection.  All in all, Empiricism was a 
reassertion of very traditional cultural elements in the Greek intellectual tradition of the 
5th century BCE.  From the Empiricist point of view, it is the Rationalists who are the 
scientific radicals. 
                                                
69 While it is possible that Callianax intended to demonstrate his understanding of the human conditions, 
i.e. we are mortal unlike the gods, his clumsy choice of allusions does not inspire the patient’s confidence 
that Callianax will sympathetically treat his mortal state.  
70 See Netz (2009a: 174-229). 
71 Pace von Staden (2006: 32). Von Staden (1989: 479) ties this anecdote to the increasing literacy of the 
Herophileans: “It might also be indicative of a growing emphasis on high literacy and philology within the 
Herophilean school – a trend to which Pliny later attributes the decline of the Herophilean schoool.” 
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4.3 RATIONALISTS AND EMPIRICISTS IN DEBATE 
4.3.1 Writing the Sect Debate 
In chapter 4.1.2 I argued that Hellenistic medical sects express self-fashioning 
both in differences within a sect and in differences between sects; in chapter 4.2 I set out 
positive Empiricism.  In 4.3 I will read the debate between select Rationalists and 
Empiricists of the third and second centuries BCE as the self-fashioning of one sect 
against another sect in the areas of pharmacology, surgery, and the markings in the case 
histories of Hippocrates’ Epidemics III. 
Writing a history of the dispute between select Empiricists and Rationalists in the 
third and second centuries BCE is only one part of the history of medicine from this 
period.  There are good reasons not to read all Hellenistic medicine in terms of sect 
affiliations:72 not all doctors working in the Hellenistic period belonged to sects, as 
Appendix D shows;73 focusing on the physicians that belonged to sects prioritizes literary 
evidence over inscriptions, papyri, and other sources and thus paints a picture with only 
part of the evidence;74 and it creates an impression of medical orthodoxy instead of 
doxical heterogeneity.75  These caveats warn against taking the debate between 
Empiricists and Rationalists as the history of medicine in the Hellenistic period. 
                                                
72 Von Staden (1982, 1989, 1997a, 2006) has consistently resisted this move throughout his career. 
73 Appendix D is a list of all doctors known by name to have lived and worked without being members of 
any sect in the third century BCE.  For further bibliography see Peremans and van’t Dack (1950-81), Fraser 
(1972: 1.369-76), Mastrocinque (1995), Samama (2003), and Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008).  The evidence 
compiled in Appendix D knows seventy-one physicians, the last seventeen of whom come from a single 
curse-tablet.  Arbitrarily excluding the curse-tablet in order to give a lower bound of the ratio between sect 
and non-sect physicians, twelve physicians of Appendix C in the third century BCE belong to sects 
compared to the fifty-four of Appendix D who do not; this is roughly a ratio of 1:4.  But the actual ratio 
between sect doctors and non-sect doctors is even higher: first, the evidence from the curse-tablet should be 
included; and second, evidence of sect doctors is overwhelmingly manuscript evidence, whereas evidence of 
non-sect doctors comes largely from documentary evidence such as inscriptions and papyri.  Further 
documentary evidence will of course enlarge the numerical divide even further.  As an upper bound, the 
ratio of sect doctors to non-sect doctors in the third century BCE might be as high as 1:7. 
74 Nutton (2004: 128-56) is the best overview of medicine in the Hellenistic period with a balanced picture 
of evidence from literary and sub-literary sources. 
75 Von Staden (1997a: 958-59): “The agonal heterogeneity charateristic of ancient science and medicine 
manifests itself both in ‘schools’ and outside ‘schools’ or ‘sects’.  It finds expression, for example, (a) in 
the doctrinal diversity represented by the existence of rival schools or circles (interschool agon), (b) in the 
agonal rivalry of viewpoints visible at certain moments within an individual ‘school’ (synchronic intra-
school agon), (c) in the revisionist dynamic characteristic of the history of certain ‘schools’ over several 
generations (diachronic or generational intra-school agon), and very significantly, (d) in the existence of 
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Although these reasons caution against reading all of Hellenistic medicine within 
the framework of the quarrel between the sects, much of sectarian medicine can and 
ought to be read precisely within that framework.  In 4.1.2 I defined a medical sect as an 
ideological group: each sect has ideological commitments to the value of a different 
scientific methodology whereby their external disagreements express their commitment 
to that domain of medicine or scientific methodology.  Not to write the debate between 
sects as a history of external sect self-fashioning neglects the ideological component of 
medical sect history. 
A further difficulty confronting the writing of this ideological history is the exact 
nature of the dispute between Empiricists and Rationlists.  Frede (1990) has summarized 
the ancient evidence: 
What is in question in this dispute first of all is: what is it about a case of 
knowledge that makes it a case of knowledge, rather than mere belief? The 
rationalists claim that it involves insight and understanding, and – as a rule – 
some kind of inference or proof, in short some achievement of reason. The 
empiricists deny this; for them to know something is just to have observed it and 
to remember it in the appropriate way, to have the kind of experience of it, and 
with it, which makes us say that we know it. And technical knowledge for them in 
principle is no different from this; it just involves a rather complex and 
specialised kind of experience.76 
 
According to Frede the debate is an argument about the tools by which doctors advance 
to knowledge.  The protagonists are associated with a certain set of terms: the 
Rationalists proclaim the necessity of reason; the Empiricists uphold experience at the 
expense of reason.  It is difficult to go far into the debate without using these terms drawn 
from ancient accounts of the debate – >2-4', (µ)$&#*!, 1/#;%&', S85$&`&' “reason, 
                                                
numerous individuals who had no sectarian affiliation (even if they attracted their own circle or were 
trained in the circle of a certain physician) … Second, and closely related, such historiographical resistance 
could be achieved only if the havoc wreaked upon all subsequent medical historiography by the 
doxographical schematisations of the Hellenistic Empiricists is fully recognised.  Brilliant though their 
theory of scientific method and their epistemology were, in ‘doxography’ and ‘historiography’ the 
Empiricists’ thoroughly misleading division of the world into evil (‘rationalists’, who, as a single, 
doctrinally identifiable ‘school’ or ‘sect’ in fact never existed) and good (Empiricists, who did exist as a 
doctrinally identifiable, single school) set an enduring historiographic trap, which the Methodists modified 
somewhat before Celsus, Galen, and others stepped into it, thereby perpetuating the reductive 
schematisations that obscure the full heterogeneity, ferocious independence, and motley individualism 
characteristic of Greek and Roman medicine.”   
76 Frede (1990: 225-26). 
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experience, observation, indication” – at which point the redefinition and nuance offered 
of the key terms by modern scholarship is overwhelmed by the repetition of the simple 
antithesis reason vs. experience.   
While the antithesis reason vs. experience describes the epistemological ground 
of the debate, the internal self-fashioning of the Empiricists adds another tenor to the 
debate.  In the usual cast of the debate between medical sects the Empiricists are cast as 
reacting against the Rationalists, critics carping philosophical reservations against a 
scientifically superior program.  Yet the usual formulation the Empiricists criticized the 
Rationalists denies to the Empiricist a positive progam of scientific exploration.77 What 
motivated doctors to train and practice as Empiricists?  The Empiricist movement was 
reasonably successful and long-lasting over four or five centuries; it cannot have held a 
negative and antagonistic stance toward its rivals as its sole doctrine.  In 4.2 I argued that 
Empiricism self-fashioning was an ideological program meant to authorize individual 
physicians to treat and provide therapy for the unique circumstances of their patients.  
                                                
77 My argument is that Empiricist treatises are not purely anti-Rationalist.  But Mudry (1982: 113) argues, 
for example: “nous savons que, dès les débuts de l’empirisme (vers 250 avant J.-C.), ses représentants se 
sont attachés à fonder leur doctrine et à attaquer le dogmatisme dans des traités au caractère habituellement 
polémique et agressif.”  Mudry describes the >2-4' G81&E!1;-4#;1&E2', “qui consiste dans la presentation 
de la doctrine empirique en meme temps que dans la refutation, par le procédé de la contradiction point par 
point, des positions dogmatiques,” known as, “[une] méthode que Galien décrit et dont il reproche aux 
empiriques l’emploi systématique qu’ils en font dans leur écrits.”  Mudry suggests that both the )#<' 1@' 
!^#:%$&' of Serapion and the )$#O 1Q' (µ)$&#&EQ' !^#:%$.' of Heraclides of Tarentum were structured in 
this way; in fact he suggests that the method of point by point contradiction “s’inspire directement de la 
méthode ordinaire de ces traités empiriques.”  Mudry is probably right to see Serapion’s treatise as an 
anticategoretic work at least from the title known as ad sectas = )#<' 1@' !^#:%$&' from Caelius Aurelianus 
and Galen (Deichgräber unhelpfully does not add Galen’s testimony about Serapion’s title, )#<' 1@' 
!^#:%$&' cf. Empiricist fr. 1 D, in his collection of Serapion testimonia frr. 144-153 D); see also von Staden 
(1982: 78) on Serapion’s )#<' 1@' !^#:%$&'.  But I am not persuaded that Heraclides of Tarentum’s )$#O 
1Q' (µ)$&#&EQ' !^#:%$.' was an anticategoretic treatise.  Deichgräber’s (1965) collection of the directly 
attested fragments of both of these books is very thin: Empiricist fr. 144 D is an off-hand reference in 
Caelius Aurelianus to Serapion’s )#<' 1@' !^#:%$&'; and there are no directly attested fragments from 
Heraclides’ )$#O 1Q' (µ)$&#&EQ' !^#:%$.'.  Deichgräber (1965) Empiricist fr. 1 is Galen’s list of his books 
written )$#O 1[8 14Y' (µ)$&#&E4Y' 5&!J$#281.8, in which Galen states that he has written two books on 
Serapion’s )#<' 1@' !^#:%$&' and a synopsis in eight books on Heraclides’ )$#O 1Q' (µ)$&#&EQ' !^#:%$.', 
itself seven books long. See also Deichgräber’s (1965) respective introductions to the individual fragments 
of Serapion and Heraclides, in which he suggests that these works were Quellen for certain Galenic works.  
I prefer to base our scholarly evaluations first on attested material.  In fact, Galen’s list of his works in 
Empiricist fr. 1 D indicates nothing about the contents of these works; and Galen’s propensity for 
longwindedness notwithstanding, eight books would be a long synopsis of a work which was exclusively 
an anticategoretic treatise.  Empiricist doctrine and Empiricist methodological works – if Serapion’s and 
Heraclides’ treatises were of this sort – were not solely designed to contradict Rationalist points. 
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Empiricist theory in the multiple legs of the tripod was a positive program of visible sign-
association, as argued in 4.2.1-2.  The driving force behind Empiricist research and 
investigation into nature was the continual tracing of associations that associative-sign 
theory demands.  Furthermore, in 4.2.3 I argued that Empiricism emphasizes the role of 
the doctor as care-giver against the Rationalist presentation of the doctor as a researcher 
into physis.  The criticims of the Rationalists ought to be seen as an integral element of 
the Empiricist program but not its driving force. 
4.3.2 The Asymmetry of the Sect Debate 
The debate between sects is asymmetrical.  The Empiricists are arguing from a 
methodological position of sign-association, advocating for the doctor’s role as a care-
giver for the individual patient.  The Rationalists, on the other hand, are arguing for a 
methodological position in which knowledge of physis promises a successful therapy of 
disease.  The Rationalists, Celsus says in his Praefatio, agreed that knowledge of the 
body’s interior is necessary. 
haec necessaria esse proponunt: abditarum et morbos continentium causarum 
notitiam, deinde euidentium; post haec etiam naturalium actionum; nouissime 
partium interiorum. 
 
[The Rationalists] claim that the following things are necessary: knowledge of 
hidden and containing causes, then evident causes; after these also <knowledge> 
of natural functions; finally <knowledge> of interior parts.78   
 
For the Rationalists in Celsus’ presentation, the hidden and containing causes79 of the 
body were the most important causal elements in disease aetiology.  These are the causes 
which cannot be understood through observation alone; rather, doctors must have 
recourse to theoretical speculation to explain the causal origin of disease. The 
Rationalists also believed that the natural functions of the body are important to 
                                                
78 Celsus Pref. 13.  
79 Mudry (1982: 86) suggests that Celsus’ abditae causae represents the Greek W5;>4& !,1*!&, for the 
adjective W5;>! Cicero Aca. 2.54 renders as incerta while Caelius Aurelianus translates W5;>4& !,1*!& as 
occultae causae.  The Latin translation occultus appears to become the standard medieval translation of the 
term W5;>4': Deichgräber’s Latineinisch-Grieschisch index (1965: 389-393) lists no occurrences of term 
abditus but glosses obscurus with W5;>4'.  Mudry (1982: 86) is right that the term continentium causarum 
“traduit fidèlment” the Greek %B8$E1&E!O !,1*!&.  
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understand health and disease: bodily natural functions include not only the action of the 
visible muscles in the limbs, but also the action of interior organs of the body.  Therefore 
the Rationalist doctor must know the interior parts of the body, in contrast to the 
Empiricists.80  The stability of each sect’s internal self-definition sect starts from a 
different understanding of the patient’s body; only within each sect is there agreement 
about whether knowledge of the body’s interior is possible and necessary. 
 The debate between Rationalists and Empiricists is about whether knowledge of 
the body’s interior is necessary for medicine: the problematization of the concept of 
bodily interiority.  Since scientific debate about an issue is ended when a fact becomes set 
in the blackbox, the blackbox signifies scientific closure according to ANT: yet within 
the sect debate closure exists only within each individual sect, not between sects.81  The 
Rationalist sect attempted to construct a blackboxed fact about the body’s interior; the 
Empiricist sect attempted to deconstruct it.  The Empiricists attempted to construct a 
blackboxed fact that physis is unknowable and superfluous for treatment; the Rationalists 
attempted to deconstruct it.  The Rationalists therefore try to place the anatomy and 
physiology of the body to the center of the debate while the Empiricists operate with a 
body whose structure and workings are removed from the debate.  Since the asymmetry 
of the sect debate concerns a first-order question of science, the debate crosses the entire 
domain of ancient medicine: pharmacology, surgery, and Hippocratic exegesis.82 
4.3.3 Pharmacology  
The first text is a treatise On Venomous Animals attributed in manuscript tradition 
to Dioscorides, the herbalist, although scholars since Sprengel in 1830 reject the 
ascription.83  The treatise is divided into a long methodological introduction on the nature 
                                                
80 Mudry (1982: 95-96) “Bien qu’elle soit exposée à l’intérieur du développement sur les causes obscures, 
la doctrine dogmatique commande également l’attitude de ceux qui la professent à propos des fonctions 
physiologiques dont ils jugent la connaissance nécessaire à l’exercise de la médecine.  Aussi, en rejetant la 
méthode fondée sur la spéculation, les empiriques rejettent-ils explicitement les deux aspects qu’elle revêt 
dans la médecine dogmatique.” 
81 On scientific closure see chapter 5.2. 
82 For ANT see chapter 1.4.  The science of each sect can be seen as its own scientific network, with its 
own chain of associations, hence the asymmetry of the debate between sects. 
83 Von Staden (1975: 197.n53) notes Stoic and Aristotelian vocabularly. 
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of causes and a listing of herbal cures for various poisonous bites.  Touwaide (1992) 
argues that the two sections ought to be considered separately.84  He argues that the 
methodological introduction, our interest here, is best considered not as “un exposé 
d’auteur, mais une compilation des avis qu’eurent les diverses écoles médicales d’époque 
romaine.”85  The discussion includes the views of Rationalists, Empiricists, and 
Methodists.  The introduction has certain similarities to the remaining fragments of a 
doctor Philumenus, On Venomous Animals, c. 2nd century CE.  Touwaide does not give a 
definite date for the methodological introduction but suggests that Ps.-Dioscorides and 
Philumenus share a common Hellenistic source, rather than that Philumenus is the source 
of Ps.-Dioscorides: Touwaide suggests that the source is the Herophilean Apollonius 
Mys.86  Whether the shared source is Apollonius Mys fl. 50 BCE it is enough for my 
argument to suppose that Ps.-Dioscorides reflects the attitude and some of the arguments 
of the Hellenistic source.  I will argue below that the methodological proem of Ps.-
Dioscorides dates to the 2nd/3rd centuries CE. 
1< 56 EB#&l1!148 É;1:48 (%1O, 1@ µ:#; 1Q' ,!1#&EQ' 4KCO 1!Y' E!1!%1N%$%& 14D 
%lµ!14' 5$Y8 5&g#Q%?!&, G>>@ JB%&4>4-$Y8 5&@ 1< %;µ$&.1&E<8 ,5*Ñ qE!%148 
1[8 W>>.8, d' (8 14Y' 4,E$*4&' 12)4&' a)45$*E8Bµ$8. )#<' 14F14B' µ68 4r8 4K 
)>$*48! É;1:48. (E$Y84 56 µA>>48 )!#!%;µ$&.1:48, f1& E!>$Y1!& µ68 
G8!&1&4>2-;1! 1@ G)< 1[8 ,4=2>.8 ]Ö.8 E!O 1@ G)< 1[8 ?!8!%*µ.8 
%Bµ=!*8481! J!#µNE.8. 5&@ 14D12 -$ E!O )!#!1;#;1&EQ' 1B-CN8$&87 
G8!>4-;1&EQ' 1$ 1:C8;' )#4%)$%4F%;' G)2#;µ!, E!?’ Ü8 59 b >2-4' 
)$)*%1$B1!&· 4K56 -@# (8 1H E!?N)!` 14D12 (%1&8 G>;?:'· G>>’ G$O 1< 
)!#:>E48 E!O µ;5$µ*!8 C#$*!8 ()* 1&8! 1[8 S#-.8 )!#$C2µ$848, 5B%12C!%148, 
E!O 1$>:.' G8!&1&4>2-;148 a)N#C$&<8>88 E!1@ 1@' ,5&21;1!'· 14D14 5’ ()O 1[8 
?!8!%*µ.8 J!#µNE.8 E!O 1[8 ,4=2>.8 ]l.8 $,.?<' G)4=!*8$&8. 1< µ:814& 
                                                
84 Touwaide (1992: 331-3). 
85 Touwaide (1992: 332). 
86 Touwaide (1992: 292n.12): “Mis un réexamen de la question nous a conduit à penser que notre traité est 
independent de celui de Philoumenos, utilisant peut être plus probablement une même source que celui-ci 
ou qu’un des modèles de celui-ci, source que dans l’état actuel de nos travaux, il est encore trop tôt pour 
identifier, quoique dans des loca similia des deux texts, le nom d’Apollônius apparaisse chez Philoumenos 
…”  On Apollonius Mys see von Staden (1989: 540-54). 
87 seccluserim.  1B-CN8$& G8!>4-;1&EQ' creates hiatus, which Ps.-Dioscorides avoids.  I suggest that a 
scribe mistakenly introduced 1B-CN8$& to account for the genitives. De Lacy’s (1981: 52-55) discussion of 
hiatus in Galen includes the dipthongs -4&, -!&, -$& among examples of questionably allowable hiatus.  But 
the examples he cites use hiatus to connect syntactically joined elements.  Here 1B-CN8$& has dropped in 
among the elements of a genitive absolute.  For this reason 1B-CN8$& ought to be suspected. 
88 inservi. This sentence and the next ought to be in indirect discourse, as befits the claim of the Empiricist 
that Ps.-Dioscorides will reject.  According to van der Eijk’s (2000: 1.286) apparatus, manuscript M reads 
a)N#C$&8, which all subsequent editors (including van der Eijk) reject. 
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GE!1N>;)128 (%1&8, 4K1’ G8!&1&4>2-;148· E!O µA>>28 1&' b#µlµ$84' G)’ 
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G5/>.8· 
 
The most important point must be stated: that the parts of medicine ought not be 
divided by the conditions of the body, but reasoning about nature on each part of 
all parts individually ought to occur on account of semiotics, as we show in the 
appropriate place. Therefore more does not need to be said on these matters. But 
rather <one> thing must be noted in addition, namely what properties from 
venomous animals and from fatal drugs are called that-for-which-no-cause-can-
be-assigned [G8!&1&4>2-;1!]. For this reason aporia occurs when a techne 
chances to be empirical and analogistic, therefore reason is to be trusted in.  For 
not even in only one case is this true, but – [they say] – the superfluous is always 
that presenting no use to some treatment, is hard to hit upon, and no cause can be 
completely assigned in its individual properties; this [they say] often happens in 
fatal drugs and venomous animals. Surely89 what is useful for work and offers 
starting point for therapy is neither ungraspable nor without cause.  Rather, 
starting from it would confirm how to have expectation and freedom [to speak] 
about the understanding of the hidden things [G5/>.8].90 
 
Ps.-Dioscorides entered into the Hellenistic debate about causality as a full-throated 
Rationalist, punning on the Empiricists’ point of rejection of reason.  Where the 
Empiricists treat experience with confidence, pistis, Ps.-Dioscorides claimed that when 
iatrike becomes empirical, b >2-4' )$)*%1$B1!& “reason is to be trusted in”, so logos 
becomes worthy of pistis.  Ps.-Dioscorides continued with the Empiricists’ claim: the 
superfluous knowledge of hidden things91 offers no use to practical medicine, is difficult 
to achieve, and no cause regarding the individual properties of its substances can be 
assigned, such as happen in fatal drugs and venomous animals.  
 The key term in this passage is G8!&1&4>2-;148, which LSJ defines as “for which 
no cause can be assigned.”92  This adjective occurs rarely, only in 5 authors in the TLG 
corpus: Ps.-Dioscorides, Bolus (physician of 2nd/3rd CE), Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 3rd 
                                                
89 I see in µ:814& a progressing to a new argument, Ps.-Dioscorides’ argument against the Empiricist claims 
he has been listing.  See Denniston (1950: 407), µ:814& 3.ii. 
90 [Dioscorides] de iis, qui virus ejaculantur, animalibus 26.46-48 K.  My translation differs in many points 
from van der Eijk (2000: 1.287) = Diocles fr. 177 vdE. 
91 The term superfluous, 1< )!#:>E48, in Ps.-Dioscorides’ argument corresponds to the superfluous, 
superuacuam, in Celsus’ description of Empiricist doctrine, Celsus Praef. 36. 
92 LSJ s.v. 
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CE), Claudius Ptolemy (fl. 150 CE), and Eustathius (fl. 11th CE) who quotes Alexander.  
Excluding Eustathius, the word only occurs in authors of the 2nd and 3rd centuries CE.  (It 
is perhaps noteworthy that the word does not appear anywhere in the extant corpus of 
Galen, who was active at this time and very interested in causality.93)  Ps.-Dioscorides’ 
use of the rare and chronologically defined term G8!&1&4>2-;148 would suggest that On 
Venomous Animals dates to 2nd – 3rd centuries CE.  Alexander, in a passage on causality 
in De fato, defines it: “The cause of these things [sc. of magic spells] is agreed by all to 
be unclear, wherefore they call them G8!&1&4>2-;1!.”94  That is to say, there is some 
cause recognized for the action of magic, but no human knowledge can determine what it 
is.  In Ps.-Dioscorides, the Empiricist claimed that even the causes of ,5&21;1$', specific 
properties themselves, are beyond human causal knowledge.  In the case of drugs and 
venoms, the specific properties must be from the pharmaka themselves.95  The Empiricist 
denies that knowledge of the hidden compounds in pharmaka can predict their effect in a 
chain of causality crossing the boundary between hidden and evident causes.  Thus Ps.-
Dioscorides uses the term G8!&1&4>2-;148 in a similar manner to Alexander of 
Aphrodisias.  For Ps.-Dioscorides’ Empiricist the term G8!&1&4>2-;1! recognized the 
epistemological conditions which confront any study of specific causality, the inability to 
cross from hidden to evident.   
Ps.-Dioscorides rejected the Empiricist claim that pharmacological properties do 
not signify the causal chain passing from hidden to evident causes and that knowledge of 
these causes is superfluous for medicine.  In particular, Ps.-Dioscorides fastens onto the 
notion of a starting point in medicinal therapy and treatment, GJ4#µ!*. It seems as if Ps.-
Dioscorides is taking Empiricist tropes and inverting them.  The Empiricists emphasized 
therapy, so Ps.-Dioscorides argued that knowing the individual characteristics of drugs is 
a good starting point for therapy.  These starting points can lead us to speak clearly and 
freely about W5;>! “hidden things”. Whereas in discussion of the interior of the body 
                                                
93 A TLG search for the search string G8!&1&4>2-;1* in the Galenic corpus yields no hits. 
94 Alex. de Fato 174.24 14F1.8 -@# bµ4>4-$Y1!& µ68 a)< )N81.8 W5;>4' $j8!& X !,1*!, 5&< E!O 
G8!&1&4>2-;1! >:-4B%&8 !K1N.  
95 Compare the above quoted passage from Ps.-Dioscorides )!#!%;µ$&.1:48, f1& E!>$Y1!& µ68 
G8!&1&4>2-;1! 1@ G)< 1[8 ,4=2>.8 ]l.8 E!O 1@ G)< 1[8 ?!8!%*µ.8 %Bµ=!*8481! J!#µNE.8. 
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W5;>! might be the situation and function of the internal organs, W5;>! in pharmacology 
are the functions of the drugs themselves: the very chain of causality the Empiricists 
denied could be traced across the divide from evident to hidden causes. 
Ps.-Dioscorides continued making his argument against the Empiricists by 
quoting from the works of Diocles and Erasistratus, specificially those works dealing 
with causality and pharmacology.  His summary of Erasistratus pays particular attention 
to genus: “First they are not ungraspable in genus: because there is a property destructive 
and variable of the underlying substrates and of these in genus, [Erasistratus] does not 
describe a therapy by species, through which these things are counteracted and 
accomplished.”96   Ps.-Dioscorides stated that Erasistratus classed drugs by the properties 
of their genus alone, not by species, since there was some power common to all species 
of the genus.  In the earlier discussion in 4.2.2 of transition from the similar, in which 
aloe, copper flakes, and an apple are astringent, Galen’s Empiricist refused to consider all 
astringents drugs as a class on the a posteriori basis that not all are equally effective in 
different sorts of diseases: aloe, for example, is astringent in one case but not in another.  
By contrast, the Rationalist Ps.-Dioscorides was inclined to treat pharmacological 
properties at the most general level, because there is a J?!#1&E9 E!O 1[8 a)4E$&µ:8.8 
G>>4&.1&E9 [sc. 5F8!µ&'] “destructive and variable property of the substrates” which is 
                                                
96 The entire quotation of Erasistratus is very puzzling and it seems as if there are several lacunae in the 
text.  The section translated above reads )#[148 µ68 E!1@ -:84' 4KE GE!1N>;)1N $,%&8· f1& µ68 -@# 
5F8!µ&' a)N#C$& J?!#1&E9 E!O 1[8 a)4E$&µ:8.8 G>>4&.1&E9, E!O 14F1.8 E!1@ -:84', 4K µ98 E!1’ $j54' 
a)4-#NJ$& ?$#!)$*!8, 5&’ á' 1!D1! Gµ=>B81:48 E!O E!1$#-!%1:48 [Dioscorides] de iis, qui virus 
ejaculantur, animalibus 26.49 K = Empiricist fr. 25 D = Erasistratus fr. 35 Ga, who prints a different text. 
Garofolo (1988: 72): “Rilevante [to the Arabic translation of this passage] è l’omissione del titolo 
dell’opera )$#O !,1&[8, in accordo con il Laurentianus [MS]. Il solo empirico noto che quadra con l’epocha 
di Erasistrato è Philinos (Sprengel); ma il termine può designare i medici che rifiutano la teoria, senza 
formare perciò un movimento.”  Garofolo does not say which work of Erasistratus this text might come 
from if the title )$#O !,1&[8 is rejected.  But Wellman’s index scriptorum (1908: 71) suggests that the 
fragments of Erasistratus in the extant excerpts of Philumenus might have come from Erasistratus’ book 
)$#O 5B8Nµ$.8 E!O ?!8!%*µ.8.  Touwaide’s (1992) argument that Philumenus and Ps.-Dioscorides share a 
common source instead of Ps.-Dioscorides depending directly on Philumenus therefore suggests that this 
quotation from Erasistratus might come from )$#O 5B8Nµ$.8 E!O ?!8!%*µ.8 instead of an otherwise 
unattested book )$#O !,1&[8.  Garofolo (1988:  160-64) collects the fragments of Erasistratus’ )$#O 
5B8Nµ$.8 E!O ?!8!%*µ.8 but the only source to provide explicit evidence of the name of Erasistratus’ 
book is Ps.-Dioscorides.  It would be strange if Ps.-Dioscorides knew Erasistratus’ )$#O 5B8Nµ$.8 E!O 
?!8!%*µ.8 but invented a text )$#O !,1&[8 for this passage.  As above, it is simply enough that Ps.-
Dioscorides reflects the vocabulary and attitudes of a Hellenistic source, even if Quellenforschung cannot 
determine whether Erasistratus is the true basis of Ps.-Dioscorides. 
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relevant when dealing with venomous animals and fatal drugs.  Ps.-Dioscorides’ 
Rationalist argument against the Empiricists centers around causality and theories of 
category: if W5;>! led to similar effects, then they must have a similar property.  It is 
knowledge of these classes of pharmacological W5;>!, the function of their genus, which 
Ps.-Dioscorides regarded as essential medical knowledge of pharmacology; knowledge of 
classes and their functions therefore provide the starting points to therapy.  In this way 
therapy, the Empiricist concern, is seen to depend on knowledge about causality, classes 
of W5;>!. 
4.3.4 Surgery 
If some Rationalists like Ps.-Dioscorides argued against Empiricist teaching by 
emphasizing the indicative semiotics of the causal chain, other Rationalists argued 
differently.  Apollonius of Citium’s Treatise on Hippocrates’ On Joints preserves a 
lengthy quotation from the Herophilean doctor Hegetor.  Apollonius provides a terminus 
ante quem for Hegetor’s dating, implying that Hegetor worked either in the 2nd or early 
1st century BCE.97  
?!BµN]. 56 ()O 14Y' 198 )4>B?#F>;148 G8!14µ98 (8!-E!>&]4µ:84&' 
#4J&>$*4&', µN>&%1! 56 ()O -/14#&. (8 -@# 1H Ç$#O !,1&[8 )$#O µ;#4D 
(`!#?#/%$.' 4w1.' (µ:µ8;14 1@ a)41$1!-µ:8! 5&!%!J[8· “5&@ 1* 56 4KE 
()&=N>>481!& ];1$Y8 W>>;8 1&8@ (µ=4>98 1Q' 14D µ;#4D E$J!>Q' )!#@ 1@' 
8B8O E!1!)$)1.EB*!', E!?’ à8, f1!8 (E):%g, (µ=>;?$Y%! µ:8$&, 4^ µ2848 !K1h 
1h 1#&=h )#4%C#lµ$84&, ?$.#4D81$' (E 14D G8@ >2-48 (µ=!>>2µ$8! E!O 
µ:8481! 1/8 1$ EN1. %&!-28! E!O 198 14D =#!C*484' E$J!>/8, S1& 56 G-E[8! 
E!O -28B E!O 1[8 5!E1F>.8 qE!%148 E!O %C$5<8 1@ )>$Y%1! 1[8 $,?&%µ:8.8 
(E)*)1$&8 W#?#.8; 4K568 -@# SC481$' !a14Y' ()&>4-*%!%?!&, 5&@ 1* )41$ µ2848 
14D14 1[8 W#?#.8 (E)$%<8 E!O )N>&8 (µ=>;?68 4K 5F8!1!& µ:8$&8, 1H 56 
)>$48NE&' ()O 1[8 >4&)[8 W#?#.8 -&84µ:8I )#4%C#;%Nµ$84& à`4B%&8 E!1N 1& 
)&?!8<8 ()O 1< 84µ*%!&, µ/ )41$ a)N#Cg =$>1*.8 (µ=4>/, E!?’ Ü8 5B8/%$1!& 
µ:8$&8 1< W#?#48, (C2µ$84& 14D E!1@ 1< )>$Y%148 ()O 1[8 >4&)[8 
%Bµ=!*84814'. $, 56 ()$82;%!8 198 !,1*!8 (` G8!14µQ', 5&21& %Bµ=:=;E$8 (E 
1Q' E$J!>Q' 14D µ;#4D 8$D#48 (E)$JBE:8!&, _ (µJF$1!& $,' µ:%;8 198 
E41F>;8· 4â µ:84814' µ68 G5F8!128 (%1&8 (E)$%$Y8 1<8 µ;#28, 5&!%)!%?68 56 
4KE (85:C$1!& %FµJB%&8 >!=$Y8, µ9 -$-$8;µ:8;' 56 1Q' %BµJF%$.' G5B8!1$Y 
)N>&8 E!1@ Cl#!8 µ:8$&8 1< W#?#48, ä%1$ J!8$#A' 1Q' !,1*!' -$84µ:8;' 
G)4%1Q8!& E!?2>4B 14D (µ=N>>$&8 (E)$%281! µ;#<8 E!O µ9 E!1!E4>4B?$Y8 
G5B8N14&' ()&=4>!Y'.”  
                                                
97 Von Staden (1989: 513) “About the date of Hegetor we cannot be sure.”  Von Staden does not offer a 
date, but Frede’s (1987) argument about Heraclides of Tarentum’s response to Hegetor = Empiricist fr. 175 
D (explored above in chapter 4.1.1) makes it likely that both Heraclides and Apollonius were responding to 
a recent author or a near contemporary. 
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I am amazed at the Herophileans who embrace the notorious dissection, especially 
Hegetor. For in On Causes he speaks thus about the dislocation of the thigh bone 
making clear the subject at hand: “And why do they not try to seek some other 
setting of the head of the thigh bone besides those I’ve rejected, so that whenever 
it dislocates it remains set in place? Those who only employ experience itself 
perceive by an analogy <joints> that are set in and remain in place, [I mean] the 
lower jawbone and the head of the arm and moreover the elbow and knee and 
each of the fingers and nearly the majority of joints which usually dislocate.  For 
they can’t explain to themselves why this joint alone, when dislocated and again 
set, cannot remain in place.  And when they apply that-which-has-happened-
frequently in the case of the remaining joints, they will come to think it 
reasonable that there will not be a better setting so that the joint will remain in 
place, because they hold to what happens for the most part in the remaining joints.  
But [they would know] if they considered the cause from anatomy, that the 
ligament happens to process out of the head of the thigh bone which is inserted 
into the middle of the joint socket.  When it remains, it is impossible for the thigh 
bone to dislocate; but when it is sundered it cannot be fused.  And since a fusion 
has not happened, it is again impossible for the joint to remain in place. 
Therefore, once the cause is clear, avoid in general setting a dislocated thigh and 
do not proceed in impossible attempts.”98 
 
Hegetor, like Ps.-Dioscorides, mocked the Empiricists, referring to them never in name 
but only by the first element of the Empiricist tripod: 4^ µ2848 !K1h 1h 1#&=h 
)#4%C#lµ$84& “those who only employ experience itself”.  He claimed that knowledge 
of anatomy shows that it is impossible to reset a dislocated hip, although the joint of the 
hip is similar to “the elbow and knee and each of the fingers.”  The Empiricists, Hegetor 
implied, transitioned from similarity to similarity based on the joint as a shared part; but 
they had no understanding of why analogical reasoning does not work in the case of the 
hip joint.  Hegetor’s criticism of the Empiricists deliberately ignored their focus on 
individual circumstances: it is not the nature of the thing that Empiricists use in transition 
from the similar but rather similarity in location and effect, as was shown in 4.2.2.  
Hegetor’s exaggerations of the Empiricists’ methodologies add rhetorical lustre to his 
polemic. 
 For his own part Hegetor believed in the usefulness of anatomy to medicine. He 
                                                
98 Hegetor apud Apollonius of Citium In Hipp. Art. Comm. 3.23, 78.24-80.14 Kollesch and Kudlien (1965) 
= Empiricist fr. 276 D = Hegetor fr. 3 vS. 
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argued that it is in fact impossible to reset a dislocated hip due to the processes of the 
femur bone.  He claimed that the ligament connecting the femur to the hip joint will 
normally prevent dislocation; but if the ligament is severed, the hip cannot be reset 
because the ligament will not fuse like bone.  Everything in Hegetor’s discussion 
revolves around the existence and position of the ligament connecting femur and hip 
socket.  Since this ligament does not exist in other joints – like the hands and fingers – 
doctors had better understand its role in the dislocation of the hip.  In contrast to Ps.-
Dioscorides who focuses on semiotics of pharmaka as a class, Hegetor ignores semiotics 
and causality to open up the body directly.  The problem with the Empiricists is that they 
did not know about bodily interiority and tried to avoid it, Hegetor claimed, whereas what 
medicine needs is to consider anatomy. 
   I find it difficult to decide whether Apollonius’ 198 )4>B?#F>;148 G8!14µ98 
ought to be translated as “the notorious anatomy” or “the notorious dissection,” which I 
have chosen.99  Whether Hegetor practiced dissection in imitation of Herophilus, 
G8!14µ98 earns Apollonius’ opprobrium for its active investigation into the interior parts 
of the body.  It is tempting to speculate that Hegetor’s insistence on G8!14µ98, the cited 
book title )$#O !,1&[8, and Hegetor’s assumed opponents, the Empiricists, imply that 
Hegetor’s book was a ideological polemic about how dissection contributed direct 
knowledge to causes of wounds and injuries, such as hip dislocation.   
The polemical tone Hegetor adopts shows the asymmetry of debate between 
Hellenistic sects.  By exaggerating and ridiculing Empiricist methodological principles, 
Hegetor the Rationalist emphasized knowledge in his critique.100  Still, Hegetor’s 
insistance that a dislocated hip cannot be reset is a triumph of reasoning but is 
discomforting to a patient.  His conclusion, “avoid in general setting a dislocated thigh 
                                                
99 Kollesch and Kudlien (1965: 79) translate “Anatomie” but G8!14µ/ can equally refer to dissection, as I 
have translated. 
100 Von Staden (1989: 513): “His allusion, in part ironic, to the Empiricists’ facile recourse to analogy, to 
their anti-aetiological stance and their consequent failure to discover the causes of particular disorders, to 
their use of ‘what happens more frequently’ (i.e. their use of statistical differentiation at the expense of 
causal theory), and his own insistence that only an understanding of causes (in this case based on anatomy) 
could resolve certain apparently insoluble problems which beset the practising surgeon – all these are clear 
reveberations of this protracted Alexandrian feud between Empiricists and ‘rationalists’ such as the 
Herophileans.” 
 180 
and do not proceed in impossible attempts,” is a warning to the physician to not practice 
what is impossible.  The apparent lack of concern for the patient in this warning leaves a 
cultural opening for Empiricist rebuttal. 
 As was said in 4.1, almost no Empiricist works are extant except for one, 
Apollonius of Citium’s fl. 90-70 BCE101 Treatise on Hippocrates’ On Joints.102  
Although it is not an anticategoretic treatise, Apollonius does occasionally take sides in 
the debate between Hellenistic schools.  Immediately after his quotation of Hegetor, 
Apollonius attempts a rebuttal. 
(8 14F14&' b -/1.# 4K µ2848 )$)>N8;1!&, G>>@ E!O 14k' J&>&!1#4D81!' 
f%48 (J’ e!B1H 5&:%1#$J$8· S1& 56 E!O 1[8 a)< M))4E#N14B' (8 1H Ç$#O 
W#?#.8 $,#;µ:8.8 4K5!µ[' E$E#N1;E$8, G>>@ E!O G)< G84µ4>2-.8 198 
()&C$*#;%&8 (8 14Y' )#4E$&µ:84&' $K;?:%1$#48 %B8*%1!1!&· "8! 56 µ9 
)4>B-#!J[µ$8, E$J!>!&l5$&' 1@' )#<' !K1<8 a)4µ8/%$&' )4&;%2µ$?!.  4^ -@# 
!K1h µ28g 1h 1#&=h )#4%C#lµ$84&, µ:8481$' ()O 1[8 (µ)$*#.' 
)!#!1$1;#;µ:8.8, 4v?’ bµ4>4-/%4B%&8, f1& E!?2>4B µ;#<' (`!#?#/%!' 
E!1!#1&%?$O' )N>&8 (E)*)1$&, 4v1$ )N>&8 (µ=4>98 )!#/%481!&,)416 14D 
)#4E$&µ:84B µ9 E#!1;?:814'. $, 56 14D14 G>;?:' (%1&8, f)$# E!O =4F>$1!&, 
4K5’ L8 4w1.' (-$8/?;%!8 4^ 1h )!#!1;#/%$& %B-C#lµ$84&, G>>’ _8 1#2)48 
E!O 1@ ()O 1[8 <>4&)[8> W#?#.8 !K14Y' 1$?$l#;1!&, 4w1.' E!O 1@ ()O µ;#4D 
,5*.' )!#!E4>4B?4D81! E!1$&>QJ?!& )&?!828 (%1&8, ä%1$ µ9 =4B>$F$%?!& 
<!K>14k' 1h -8lµg ];14D81!' =$>1*48! (µ=4>/8, µ:8$&8 56 ()O 14D 
?$.#;?:814' (µ)$*#.'. f1& 56 µ;#<' (`!#?#/%!' E!O (81$?$O' )N>&8 E!1’ 
G8N-E;8 (E)*)1$&, 4v1$ 1< -&82µ$848 4v?’ X 1[8 G#C!*.8 ^%14#*! 14D14 
)$#&:C$&. $, -N# 1&8& E!O W>>I, )$#O 1[8 W#?#.8 ()&µ$>6' -:-48$8 E!O 
M))4E#N1$&· 4w1.' 56 J&>!>/?;' a)N#C.8 E!O 1@ ()O 1[8 >4&)[8 ,5&lµ!1! 
5&!%!J[8 4K568 )$#O µ;#4D 5$5/>.E$8, f1& 4KE L8 5F8!&14 E!?2>4B 
E#!1$Y%?!&, G>>’ (E 1[8 (8!81*.8 (E)$)8$BµN1.E:8 ).' ()O 1[8 14D µ;#4D 
(µ=4>[8, ä%1$ E!O \#-!8&E98 ()*84&!8 )4&/%!%?!&. 
 
                                                
101 The dating of Apollonius is vexing.  He refers to Hegetor in the body of the treatise, as we have seen, 
but his introduction provides the best evidence of his time frame: here he refers to a =!%&>$D Ç14>$µ!Y$ 
who ordered him to write the text.  From the rough date of Apollonius’ language this Ptolemy is one of four 
possibilities from two generations: of the first generation Ptolemy IX Lathyrus or Ptolemy X Alexander I 
(both variously ruling 107-81 BCE); of the second generation Ptolemy XII Auletes, who began ruling in 80 
BCE, or Auletes’ brother Ptolemy of Cyprus who ruled 81-58 BCE.  In his introduction Apollonius also 
mentions his teacher, Zopyrus of Alexandria, and a witness of Zopyrus’ competence, Posidonius.  Kudlien 
(1962: 427) believed that this Posidonius was Posidonius of Apamea, the Stoic, but Kidd (1988: 92-93) 
denies this.  Deichgräber (1965: 206) gives Apollonius a floruit of 70 BCE but Nutton (2004: 142) gives a 
more conservative floruit of 90 BCE.  Schoene’s (1896: xxiv-xxv) Teubner edition of Apollonius argues 
for a date between 81-58 BCE at the court of Ptolemy of Cyprus.  I incline toward the traditional date c. 70 
BCE but cannot decide whether Apollonius’ dedicatee is Ptolemy XII Auletes or Ptolemy of Cyprus. 
102 See Deichgräber (1965: 206-9) for the few other fragments and testimonia about Apollonius beyond the 
Commentary.  I translate the title )#!-µ!1$*! with “treatise” because, as von Staden (2006: 15.n3) points 
out, Apollonius’ treatise is not really a commentary in the later lemmatized sense of Galen’s Hippocratic 
commentaries, for which the usual titles are (`;-/%$&' or a)4µ8/µ!1!. 
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In these things Hegetor not only raves but also has confused friends of 
medicine103 as much as he is able. Still he has in no way overcome what was said 
by Hippocrates in On Joints, but constructs his dissection in the previous passage 
rather sillily from un-agreed-upon points. In order that we not write too much, we 
will make summary notes against him. For those employing only experience 
itself, remaining on what has been observed empirically, neither agree that in 
                                                
103 This is an important passage for the question of patronage and court science.  For J&>&!1#:. LSJ s.v. 
offers “to be an amateur doctor”, simply a wrong translation for this passage; Kollesch and Kudlien (1965: 
81) are closer when they translate “die an der Medizin Interessierten”; Smith (1979: 213) translates “friends 
of medicine” correctly.  We should understand in this word an allusion to Apollonius’ opening letter to 
Ptolemy, ?$.#[ J&>&N1#.' 5&!E$*µ$828 %$, =!%&>$D Ç14>$µ!Y$ E1>. I see that you are disposed in a way 
friendly to medicine, King Ptolemy etc. Apoll. In Hipp. Art. Comm. 1.1, 10.1 Kollesch and Kudlien (1965).  
Ptolemy is a friend of medicine; he is only interested in it insofar as he is Apollonius’ patron.  The 
compound J&>&!1#:. is paralleled by the nominal phrase 14Y' 4,E$*4&' 1[8 µ!?;µN1.8 friends of 
mathematics in Archimedes On the Sphere and Cylinder 4.18-19 Heiberg.  Netz’s (2004a: 34) commentary 
on the Archimedes passage is instructive: “There is another, much more peripheral readership: ‘…those 
who are friendly toward mathematics,’ and it is with them that Archimedes say that he has decided to 
‘share.’ In other words, Dositheus [Archimedes’ correspondent] is one of the ‘friends.’ He is no 
mathematician according to Archimedes’ standards.”  The point in both the Apollonius and Archimedes 
passages is the rhetorical move of the protagonist within the group presenting ‘insider information’ to a 
friend outside the group.  By communicating this insider information publicly, the scientific author both 
claims true understanding of the information of the scientific field and offers himself as a guide to the field 
for the lay public: he is poised to mediate appropriately between inside and outside.   
But in the context of Apollonius’ treatise the lay public does not exist: the person outside medicine 
to whom Apollonius is communicating his information is his patron, King Ptolemy.  Which royal Ptolemy 
is meant remains unclear; see footnote 101.  (The epithet =!%&>$F' is appropriate for both kings and 
princes of this period; see Fraser (1972: 2.586-87.n239) with reference to Pfeiffer’s Kallimachosstudien.)  
Apollonius turns the scientific dispute between Herophileans and Empiricists into a social issue: the 
Herophileans, like Hegetor, will confuse and lead astray (5&:%1#$J$8) patrons who sponsor medicine (14k' 
J&>&!1#4D81!'), like Ptolemy.  (Whether Ptolemy managed to read three books into a very technical and 
boring work illustrated with pictures to understand Apollonius’ social strategy in this passage is a question 
better left to historical psychologists.)  In the dichotomy of social relationships between the scientific inside 
and royal outside, Apollonius is internally trying to gain traction in his dispute with the Herophileans by 
bringing Ptolemy’s superior social standing to bear against Hegetor and the Herophileans.  For the royal 
patrons on the outside, Apollonius’ aim was to place the Herophileans outside the ‘real’ scientific 
community and thereby to denigrate the social standing of the Herophileans as possible clients for royal 
patrons.  Nonetheless Apollonius’ strategy was unsuccessful: a younger contemporary of Apollonius, 
Dioscurides Phacas fl. 75-31 BCE, a Herophilean, became the court physician to Ptolemy XII Auletes and 
his children, Ptolemy XIII and Cleopatra VII.  On Dioscurides Phacas see von Staden (1989: 519-522).  
It is unclear to what extent we can imagine Ptolemy ‘judging’ the dispute between Apollonius and 
Hegetor as exponents of the Empiricists and Herophileans.  Biagioli’s (1993: 73-90) remarks on the attitude 
of Baroque Italian patrons toward their scientific champions suggest that patrons aimed less for a finality to 
debate than for the notion of aristocratic ‘good sport’, with appropriate give and take in the manner of 
chivalric duels.  Lloyd’s work stressing the variety of opinions held by Greek scientists (1979, 1983, 1987, 
1990) suggests that there is a corresponding lack of closure to debate in Greek science.  Yet Galileo’s 
patrons, the Medici, and other 16th-17th century CE Italian aristocratics are caught up in Baroque codes of 
comportment, an attitude not applicable to the Hellenistic monarchs of 323-31 BCE.  To push the analysis 
of Apollonius’ patronage further requires more thinking about the values of (in)dependence and tradition 
and about the status of craftspeople and entertainers at Hellenistic courts.   
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general a thigh dislocated and set right again dislocates, nor disregard a setting 
again when the previous did not take.  If what he wants were true, those using 
observation could not be [as they are] but, in the same way they understood the 
situation in the case of the remaining joints, so too is it reasonable that particular 
consequences in the case of the thigh bone be understood.  Therefore those who 
seek by reason do not want a better setting to be understood but remain in their 
practice on the theorized point.  Neither the fact nor the report of the ancients 
presents this [claim], that the thigh, when dislocated and set in, falls out again by 
necessity. For if it was known to this one <person> or another, it would be a 
concern for Hippocrates too. And being such a lover of truth and making clear his 
particular views on remaining subjects he has explained about the thigh that in no 
way one could not overcome it in general, but contrawise he was [so] inspired 
somehow in the case of settings of the thigh bone that he made an instrumental 
solution.104 
 
Apollonius stood firmly on Empiricist ground and reiterated the need for experience in 
medicine.  The text continually emphasizes Empiricist (µ)$&#*!: (µ)$*#.' “empirically”, 
)!#!1/#;%&' “experience”.  Apollonius refused to consider Hegetor’s speculative claim 
that there is a ligament in the hip socket which, when cut, prevents resetting of the joint.   
 Furthermore, Apollonius rejected Hegetor’s view because theoretical views failed 
to improve treatment.  It is interesting to see an Empiricist making an argument about 
progress: unlike the Rationalist promise of medical progress grounded in knowledge of 
physis, Apollonius’ vision of progress is improved therapy.  In the rhetoric of scientific 
progress Empiricism fastened on therapy, Rationalism on knowledge: the debate between 
sects was asymmetrical even in their views of scientific progress.  The Rationalists, 
Apollonius insisted, “do not want a better setting to be understood but remain in their 
practice on the theorized point.”  A better setting of the dislocated femur is an improved 
therapy for the patient but the denial of the theoretical possibility offers no therapeutic 
progress.   
In addition to the expected Empiricist focus on experience and therapy, 
Apollonius repeatedly invoked Hippocrates’ views and observations against Hegetor.  He 
                                                
104 Apollonius of Citium In Hipp. Art. Comm. 3.23, 80.14-82.6 Kollesch and Kudlien (1965) = Empiricist 
fr. 276 D.  I understand Kollesch and Kudlien’s translation of the phrase f1& 4KE L8 5F8!&14 E!?2>4B 
E#!1$Y%?!& “daß man vielleicht seiner nicht völlig Herr werden könne” to mean that the patient regains use 
of his formerly dislocated limb; I think this is a wrong translation.  Compare also the translation of Smith 
(1979: 213-14). 
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used Empiricist language: X 1[8 G#C!*.8 ^%14#*! “the report of the ancients” where 
^%14#*! “report”, the second leg of the tripod, refers to the recorded observations of 
earlier doctors.  Frede (1987) suggests that Apollonius’ insistence that a dislocated hip 
does in fact reset may be drawn from the reports of his earlier contemporary, Heraclides 
of Tarentum, who had also taken issue with Hegetor’s views, as we have seen in 4.1.1 
above.105  (Heraclides listed seven previous physicians, including Hippocrates, who 
recorded their ^%14#*! that they had successfully reset a dislocated hip joint.)  Apollonius 
said that Hippocrates did not record that a dislocated hip joint could not be reset, as 
Hegetor claimed.  Smith (1979) has memorably doubted Apollonius’ Empiricism: 
“Apollonius may have been an Empiric, but more likely he stepped forth as a 
Hippocratean.”106  While it is true that Apollonius nowhere identifies himself as an 
Empiricist, there are many indications that he was an Empiricist and, simultaneously, a 
Hippocratean.  Apollonius continuously invoked the contrast between Rationalists – 
<!K>14k' 1h -8lµg ];14D81!' “those who seek by reason” – and Empiricists – 4^ -@# 
!K1h µ28g 1h 1#&=h )#4%C#lµ$84& “those employing only experience itself”, 4^ 1h 
)!#!1;#/%$& %B-C#lµ$84& “those using observation”.  Apollonius aligned Hippocrates 
with the Empiricists against the Rationalists, for Hippocrates has recognized that the 
dislocated femur can be reset and even devised an instrument to accomplish that.  By 
aligning Hippocrates with the Empiricists, Apollonius explicitly brought a respected 
ancient authority over to the Empiricist side in the dispute between medical schools and 
thereby aligned the Empiricist vision of medicine with Hippocrates.  These are 
ideological moves appropriate to a debate between medical sects. 
 A philological element in Hippocrates’ text has become a social dispute in 
Apollonius’ hands.  Hippocrates was not simply a traditional authority for Apollonius: he 
was also an Empiricist authority and, perhaps, an early Empiricist.  Galen recorded that 
some Empiricist doctors did claim that Hippocrates was an Empiricist.107  In 4.2.3 I 
                                                
105 Frede (1987: 94). 
106 Smith (1979: 215). 
107 Gal. In Hipp. Art. Comm. 18A.524 (8 ã [Galen’s commentary on Hippocrates’ Anatomy] -8l%g 198 
G8!&%CB81*!8 1[8 (µ)$&#&E[8 ,!1#[8 14>µ;%N81.8 M))4E#N1;8 E!>$Y8 (µ)$&#&E28. = Empiricist fr. 
310 D. 
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argued that Empiricism shared elements reminiscent of 5th century BCE intellectualism 
with its focus on a re-authoriziation of the role of caregiver, a re-authorizing of the 
primacy of vision in knowledge, a reassertion of the uniqueness of the patient and his 
circumstances.  Since Empiricism was as much a cultural argument about the role of the 
doctor in medicine as an intellectual movement about the manner by which a doctor 
advance to knowledge, it is not surprising that Empiricists would try to appropriate 
Hippocrates, the great doctor of 5th century BCE science.  The Empiricist claim that 
Hippocrates was an Empiricist is a serious claim, not because it is verifiably true or 
false,108 but because of the cultural argument the Empiricists were thereby making 
against the Rationalists.  The Empiricists argued that physicians ought to be healers and 
caregivers, just like Hippocrates was; and Hippocrates established medicine.   
4.3.5 Sects, Symbols, and Motives: The ^%14#*!  1[8  C!#!E1/#.8  Reconsidered 
There is a further example that shows how a philological argument about 
Hippocratic texts became a social controversy between sects in the asymmetry of 
Empiricist and Rationalist sect arguments, respectively, about the doctor’s role as a 
caregiver and methodological knowledge of physis: the philological controversy called 
the ^%14#*! 1[8 C!#!E1/#.8 demonstrates the Empiricist appropriation of Hippocrates 
as a proto-Empiricist. 
Near the end of the third or the beginning of the second century BCE manuscripts 
of Hippocrates’ Epidemics III appeared in circulation that had strange markings in them 
(C!#!E1Q#$'), such as  AB+åç, at the end of case histories.109  The markings were a 
combination of normal letters and symbols perhaps representing combinations of letters.  
A controversy almost immediately developed as to what they meant and whether they 
were original to the text or interpolations; the Herophileans Zeno fl. 175 BCE,110 Zeno’s 
                                                
108 The Hippocratic Corpus has many voices.  See Smith (1979: 204-14) for the argument that Hippocrates 
can neither be shown to be a Rationalist nor Empiricist. 
109 Scholarship on the ^%14#*! 1[8 C!#!E1/#.8 includes Fraser (1972: 1.376-77), Smith (1979: 199-202), 
and von Staden (2006) all with reference to further bibliography. 
110 For an overview and fragment collection see von Staden (1989: 501-505). 
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presumably Herophilean followers,111 and Heraclides of Erythrae fl. 25 BCE112 and the 
Empiricists Zeuxis fl. 200 BCE,113 Apollonius the Empiricist fl. 175 BCE,114 Apollonius 
Byblas fl. 150 BCE,115 and Heraclides of Tarentum fl. 75 BCE all took part.  The fracas 
finally ended when the Herophilean Heraclides of Erythrae (fl. 25 BCE) agreed with the 
Empiricists that the symbols were inauthentic: the fact that the controversy only ended 
when Rationalists agreed with the Empiricists shows the ideological basis to the 
dispute.116  What motivated the Empiricists to declare the symbols inauthentic?  The 
positive self-fashioning of the Empiricist research program, shown in 4.2, stressed the 
legs of the Empiric tripod: (µ)$&#*! “experience” and ^%14#*! “research”.  Empiricist 
physicians use previous physicians’ reports of their (µ)$&#*! to supplement their own 
experience; thus Hippocratic texts offer ^%14#*! to Empiricist physicians.  The 
employment of previous records demands accurate reporting and transmission of 
previous records: if the accuracy of the text is in doubt, controversies about medical 
practice can suddenly become controversies about philological transcription and 
interpretation.  I argue that the protracted dispute about the strange markings in the 
manuscripts of Epidemics III was such a case. 
                                                
111 Galen credits Zeno with a literal army of followers but does not give their school affiliation.  Since the 
early Empiricists attacked Zeno’s views on the markings it seems safe to assume that the followers must 
have at least been Rationalists, if not strictly Herophileans. 1[8 (E 14D |;8.8$*4B %1#!14):54B Gal. In 
Hipp. Lib. Epi. III. Comm. II. 90 17A.625 K = 93.10 Wenkebach = Zeno fr. 6 vS. 
112 For an overview and fragment collection see von Staden (1989: 555-558). 
113 For an overview see von Staden (2006: 30-40); for the fragment collection see Deichgräber (1965: 209).  
Deichgräber dated Zeuxis’ floruit to “um Christs Geburt”, a date corrected by Kudlien (1972). 
114 For an overview and fragment collection see Deichgräber (1965: 171). 
115 For an overview and fragment collection see Deichgräber (1965: 172). 
116 Von Staden (2006) has drawn attention to the controversy in the context of Hippocratic lexicography in 
the 3rd and 2nd centuries BCE.  He has stressed (2006: 45) that in the context of Hippocratic lexicography 
and exegesis Empiricist authors sometimes attack each other and defend Herophileans and vice versa, and 
that, comparatively speaking, Empiricist commentators rarely appropriate Hippocrates as a proto-
Empiricist: “The rareness of such exegetical acts of ‘empiricizing’ Hippokrates, along with the Empiricists’ 
frequent, overt agreement with the exegeses offered by the so-called ‘rationalist’ commentators, strongly 
cautions one against framing the history of Hellenistic Hippocratic commentaries mainly in terms of 
‘school rivalries.’”  I take von Staden’s point that a blanket assumption of Hippocratic exegesis in terms of 
either Rationalist or Empiricist is not justified, but I will argue that the dispute must be considered in terms 
of the two types of sectarian self-fashioning set in 4.1.2.  A reading of the controversy of the markings 
(C!#!E1Q#$') which focuses on the type of reading Empiricists gave to Hippocrates will accord with the 
positive picture of the Empiricist program from chapter 4.2. 
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 Galen’s commentary on Epidemics III contains the best account of the history of 
the markings (C!#!E1Q#$').  It is worth quoting in extenso: 
And now I will state the entire story of the markings, since this seems to my 
friends and comrades to be better all at once here. What I am going to say has 
been said by Zeuxis in the first book of his Commentaries on the book at hand. It 
would probably be better, just as I am accustomed to do in such circumstances, to 
send those wanting to know this history to that book, but since Zeuxis’ 
commentaries, no longer circulating, are rare, on that account they thought it good 
that I detail these things making my beginning from Mnemon. Well some say that 
Mnemon, taking the third book of the Epidemics from the great library in 
Alexandria to read it, returned it after he interpolated in it those markings with 
black ink in equal letters.  Some say that he had brought the interpolated book 
from Pamphylia, and they say that the king of Egypt at that time [viz. Ptolemy III 
Euergetes] was so very keen on books that he ordered even the books of all 
landing travelers to be brought to him and, after writing these on new sheets, he 
gave what had been written to their masters, whose books upon landing had been 
brought to him, and he placed what he had acquired into the libraries, and the title 
of these was Those from the ships.  They say that one such thing was found, the 
third book of the Epidemics entitled Those from the ships according to the 
corrector Mnemon of Side. Some say that it was not entitled according to the 
corrector but simply the name of Mnemon, since the servants of the king gave the 
name of any of those landing with their books as a title to those books being set 
off in the storehouse. For they were not accustomed to bear them into the 
libraries, but rather to set them in some houses in heaps.  [Galen next digresses to 
retell the story of Ptolemy Euergetes’ acquisition of the Athenian state copies of 
the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides to illustrate his 
bibliomania.]  So Mnemon, either he himself acquired the book or taking it from 
the library interpolated it, appears to have done this for the sake of gain.  For 
saying that he alone understood what the marks meant, earned payment for his 
interpretation of them. And if this is so, it is more reasonable that the book set off 
in the library had been prepared by him. For the business of interpretation would 
be much more worthy of belief, if some book of the royal library had the marks. It 
would be suspicious if he had brought the book from home. I would not hesitate 
to say even the proofs written by Heraclides of Tarentum and Heraclides of 
Erythrae that the marks were interpolated, if I did not think that this would be 
clear to those with sense and I hastened quickly to avoid such wordiness.117  
 
Galen writes after the controversy has drawn to a close and seemingly fallen into 
oblivion, thanks to the judgment of Heraclides of Tarentum, the Empiricist, and 
                                                
117 Galen In Hipp. Lib. Epi. III Comm. II 17A.605-608K = 78.27-80.19 Wenkebach = Empiricist fr. 343 D 
= Heraclides of Erythrae fr. 5 vS. 
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Heraclides of Erythrae, a Herophilean, that the markings were inauthentic.  Zeuxis’ book, 
likely a commentary on Epidemics III, preserved the best account of the genesis of the 
markings.  According to this Empiricist, they came to Alexandria from a manuscript copy 
of a certain Mnemon, an obscure doctor Galen describes as “Pamphylian by birth, from 
the city of Side, of the sect of Cleophantes” (Erasistratus’ brother).118  As Galen retells 
Zeuxis’ story, Alexandria at the time collected material from all travelers and copied it by 
royal order.  In Galen’s accusation Mnemon may have altered a library copy of the 
Epidemics in exchange for payment for interpretation. 
 Whatever their origins, the symbols found a defender of their claim to Hippocratic 
authenticity in the Herophilean Zeno (fl. 175BCE).  Zeno wrote “no small book” about 
the markings.  He apparently claimed that the markings served as mnemonic device for 
Hippocrates to remember each case history.  Zeno understood each symbol as an acrostic 
representing a new word in a sentence summarizing the case at hand.  Galen preserves an 
explanation of Zeno’s interpretation of each type of letter and symbols of letter 
combinations. 
Well then he [Zeno] thinks, as I said, of all <letters> the pi having the line 
through the middle [i.e.  A] always means )&?!828 [it is reasonable]. And at the 
end either the letter B appears written or ?, the one meaning a-$*! [health], the 
other ?N8!14' [death], and before these the number of days in which the patient 
was sick or died. All the marks between these are via letters, which mean the first 
letters of the words, except for the delta marked-off below. What meaning each of 
these has, I will make clear. Therefore as I mentioned, in respect to those things 
written before the end of the marks, by which we said death or health was meant, 
means the number of days; as for the rest, however many between these and the 
beginning are written, I will make an account.  The ! seems to mean G)4J?4#N 
[destruction] or G)l>$&! [destruction], the - -2848 [seed] or -484$&56' 4r#48 
[seedy urine], the delta marked-off below (they call it marked-off whenever it has 
a perpendicular line below, just like &, written in the following way B) either 
5&N##4&! [diarrhea] or 5&!Cl#;%&' [evacuation] or in composition whatever 
emptying they want them to mean, the $ ()4C/ [restraint] or q5#! [location], the ] 
]/1;µ! [inquiry], the ? ?N8!14' [death], as was said before, the & ^5#[' [sweat], 
the E E#*%&' [crisis] or E4&>&!E9 5&N?$%&' [colic disposition], the µ µ!8*! [mania] 
or µ/1#! [womb], the 8 8$21;' [youth] and 8:E#.%&' [necrosis], the ` `!8?9 
C4>/ [yellow bile] and `:848 1& E!O %)N8&48 [something strange and rare] and 
`B%µ2' [itching] and `;#21;' [dryness], the 4 {5B8!& [pains] or 4r#48 [urine], 
                                                
118 Galen In Hipp. Lib. Epi. III Comm. II 17A.603K = 77.19-20 Wenkebach. 
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(some say when it has the B above, then it means urine itself, written as they are 
accustomed to write 4w1.' [thus]), the ) )>Q?4' [amount] or )1F$>4' [spit] or 
)D# [fire] or )F#$14' [fever] or )8$Fµ484' )N?4' [affliction of the lung], the ) 
having the & in the middle of it, just as was said before, means )&?!828 [it is 
reasonable], the É ÉF%&' [flow] or ÉY-4' [cold], the % %)!%µ2' [spasm] or 
%14µNC4B )N?4' [affliction of the gullet] or %12µ!14' ENE.%&' [affliction of the 
mouth], the 1 12E4' [birth], the B a-$*! [health] or a)4C285#48 [the abdomen 
below the diaphragm], the J J#$8Y1&' [phrenitis] or J?*%&' [destruction], the C 
C4>/ [bile] or C4>[5$' [bilious], the R RD`&' [chill], the . iµ21;' [rawness].119 
 
For Zeno the letter and symbol sequence consists of a single sentence meant to 
summarize the result of the case (restoration to health or death), the length of the disease 
before the result, and the cause of the disease. Each other letter which was not the number 
of days Zeno took to be an acrostic of a word representing various diseases, places on the 
body, and typical Hippocratic qualities.  Each sequence of markings begins with the  A 
which Zeno took to represent the beginning of the indirect statement which summarized 
Hippocrates’ views of the essentials of the case, )&?!828 “it is reasonable that”.  For 
example, Epidemics III.7 had the symbol sequence  AB+åç, which Zeno interpreted 
to stand for )&?!828 (%1& 1[8 5&!C#4Bµ:8.8 ()&%C$?:81.8 \-54!*!8 G)4?!8$Y8 “It is 
                                                
119 Galen In Hipp. Lib. Epi. III Comm. II 17A.611-613K = 82.15-83.13 Wenkebach. Von Staden (1989) 
does not record this passage among the fragments of Zeno, perhaps in accord with his editorial principles 
that only passages naming the author will be recorded.  But I take the subject of X-$Y1!& to be Zeno because 
Galen has already explained that it is his system of explaining the marks that is at stake and that Zeno 
thought the pi with the extra vertical meant )&?!828. Wenkebach’s note ad loc. cites the previous passages 
in Galen’s commentary: Zeno is Galen’s subject in his lengthy explanation of the reading of the sequence 
AB+åç at 17A.600K = 75.23 Wenkebach = Zeno fr. 5 vS.  I see the dé SJ;8 as Galen’s reference to the 
earlier mention of Zeno and suggest including this passage among Zeno’s fragments as Zeno fr. 5b vS.  
X-$Y1!& µ68 4r8, dé SJ;8, p)N81.8 1< 198 5&@ µ:é4B -#!µµ98 SC48 )$Y, é;µ!Y848 G$O 1< )&?!828. 
1$>$B1!Y48 5’ m14& 1< B -#Nµµ! J!*8$1!& -$-#!µµ:848 0 1< ?, 1< µ68 a-$*!8, 1< 56 ?N8!148 é;µ!Y848, 
Sµ)#4é?$8 5’ !K1[8 b 1[8 Xµ$#[8 G#&?µ2é, (8 !ué (82é;é$8 0 G):?!8$8 b ENµ8.8. 4^ 5’ (8 1H µ$1!`k 
14F1.8 C!#!E1Q#$é s)!81$é µ:8 $,é& 5&@ 1[8 -#!µµN1.8, è é;µ!*8$& 1@ <)#[1!> é14&C$Y! 1[8 J.8[8, 
)>98 14D EN1.?$8 G)$é1&-µ:84B 5:>1!. 1*8! 56 5&N84&!8 qE!é14é !K1[8 SC$&, 5;>lé.. µ$µ8;µ:8.8 4r8 
Xµ[8, f1& 1@ )#< 14D 1$>$B1!*4B 1[8 C!#!E1/#.8, aJ’ 4â ?N8!148 0 a-$*!8 SJ!µ$8 5;>4Dé?!&, 
-$-#!µµ:8! 1<8 G#&?µ<8 1[8 Xµ$#[8 é;µ!*8$&, )$#O 1[8 W>>.8, fé! µ$1!`k 14F1.8 1$ E!O 1Qé G#CQé 
-:-#!)1!&, )4&/é4µ!& 1<8 >2-48. 1< µ68 ! 54E$Y 5;>4D8 G)4J?4#@8 <0> G)l>$&!8, 1< 56 - -2848 0 
-484$&56é 4r#48, 1< 5’ G)$é1&-µ:848 5:>1! (E!>4Dé& 5’ G)$é1&-µ:848, f1!8 \#?98 -#!µµ/8, 4"!):# 
(é1&8 ê, EN1.?$8 SCg, 1#2)I 14&H5$ -$-#!µµ:848 B) [^5#[1!] 0 5&N##4&!8 0 5&!Cl#;é&8 0 éB8$>281& 
JN8!& E:8.é&8 X81&84D8 é;µ!*8$&8 =4F>481!&, 1< 56 $ ()4C98 0 q5#!8, 1< 56 ] ]/1;µ!, 1< 56 ? ?N8!148, 
dé )#4$*#;1!&, 1< 56 & ^5#[1!, 1< 56 E E#*é&8 0 E4&>&!E98 5&N?$é&8, 1< 56 µ µ!8*!8 0 µ/1#!8, 1< 56 8 
8$21;1! E!O 8:E#.é&8, 1< 56 ` `!8?98 C4>98 E!O `:848 1& E!O é)N8&48 E!O `Béµ<8 E!O `;#21;1!, 1< 56 4 
\5F8!é 0 4r#48, (S8&4& 5: J!é&8, f1!8 ()&E$*µ$848 W8.?$8 SCg 1< B, 121$ é;µ!*8$&8 1< 4r#48 !K12, 
-#!J2µ$848 dé $,l?!é& 1< 4w1.é -#NJ$&8,) 1< 56 ) )>Q?4é 0 )1F$>48 0 )D# 0 )B#$1<8 0 )8$Fµ484é 
)N?4é, 1< 56 )$Y (8 e!B1H µ:é48 SC48 1< &, E!?21& )#4$*#;1!&, 1< )&?!8<8 5;>4Y, 1< 56 É[ ÉFé&8 0 ÉY-4é, 
1< 56 éY-µ! é)!éµ<8 0 é14µNC4B )N?4é 0 é12µ!14é ENE.é&8, 1< 56 1 12E48, 1< 56 B a-$*!8 0 
a)4C285#&48, 1< 56 J J#$8Y1&8 0 J?*é&8, 1< 56 C C4>98 0 C4>[5$é, 1< 56 R RD`&8, 1< 56 . iµ21;1!. 
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reasonable that she died on the eighth day, the excretions having been retained”.120  Zeno 
likely argued that the symbols helped Hippocrates remember the particulars of the cases 
without lengthy explanations: the Epidemics were valuable because of the specificity of 
their empirical information and yet simultaneously difficult to set to memory on that 
account.   
 Zeno’s claims were opposed by several Empiricists rather quickly.  The sequence 
of Empiricist authors – Apollonius the Empiricist, Apollonius Byblas, Zeuxis – wrote in 
the early to mid second century BCE, very close to Zeno’s defense of the markings’ 
authenticity.  Zeuxis’ summary of the controversy was in fact so authoritative that it 
remained the standard reference for Galen, over three hundered years later.  Galen 
records the progression of the controversy in his discussion of Epidemics III.8. 
For after Zeno wrote no small book about the marks, as I said earlier, next 
Apollonius the Empiricist wrote in opposition a second book greater than his, then 
later again Zeno wrote against him, so Apollonius surnamed Byblas wrote after 
these things and he not only refuted Zeno’s book about the marks (Zeno was 
already dead) that they were revised but even made a so-called super-refutation 
[)!#$`:>-C48] about them against Zeno.  For since he [Zeno] was not able to 
interpret well what had been revised by Mnemon but among them was at a loss 
for reasonable arguments and changed the marks for the benefit of interpretation, 
Apollonius made his counter-argument, claiming that no copy121 found in the 
royal library or in the storehouse of books from the ships or in the edition made 
by Bacchius had the marks, as Zeno wrote in the case of the present youth 
according to the report.122 
 
The two Apollonii, both Empiricists, wrote books against Zeno.  Whatever criticism 
Apollonius the Empiricist (fl. 175 BCE) wrote against Zeno (perhaps simply a long 
argument that the markings were inauthentic), Apollonius Byblas’ (fl. 150 BCE) book 
eclipsed Apollonius the Empiricist’s book in importance as a refutation of Zeno.  
Apollonius Byblas’ case against Zeno depended on two points: that the markings did not 
appear in other editions of Epidemics III and that Zeno had changed the markings from 
                                                
120 Galen In Hipp. Lib. Epi. III Comm. II 17A602K = 77.1-2 Wenkebach = Zeno fr. 5 vS. 
121 Reading <4K568 G81*-#!J48> with von Staden (2006: 21n.25) in preference to Wenkebach’s <4K568 
=&=>*48>. 
122 Galen In Hipp. Lib. Epi. III Comm. II 17A.618-619K = 86.16-87.16 Wenkebach = Zeno fr. 6 vS = 
Empiricist fr. 342 D. 
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what did appear in Mnemon’s copy.  Apollonius Byblas scoured three different places for 
manuscripts to compare Zeno’s text of the markings in Epidemics III with those 
elsewhere: he consulted manuscripts in the library at Alexandria and the storehouses 
which held material taken from landing ships, just as in Galen’s retelling of Zeuxis’ story 
above.123  He also consulted Bacchius the Herophilean’s edition (SE54%&') of Epidemics 
III, although what exactly SE54%&' might mean is in some doubt.124  Apollonius Byblas 
enlisted the respected writings of Bacchius, a fellow Herophilean of Zeno, against Zeno.  
Apollonius Byblas found the markings in none of these texts in Alexandria and for this 
reason denied that the markings were authentic to the Hippocratic text.  
 Apollonius Byblas’ second argument against Zeno was that Zeno had changed the 
markings from Mnemon’s original book.  Presumably then Mnemon’s book or an 
account of Mnemon’s markings was available to Apollonius Byblas (was it in Zeuxis’ 
history of the markings?) to check against Zeno’s presentation.  In fact it does appear that 
there were variae lectiones of the markings after the case history of Epidemics III.7.  The 
modern text of Epidemics III.7 reads 
X EB8!-C&E9, X )!#@ 1@ y#&%1&[84', ë )#[148 G)< ->l%%;' m#`!14· G%!J9' 
J.8/· ->[%%! (#B?#/· ()$`;#N8?;. 1h )#l1g, J#&El5;'· ()$?$#µN8?;. 
1#*1g, ÉY-4'· )B#$1<' \`F'· 475;µ! a):#B?#48, %E>;#<8 1#!C/>4B E!O %1/?$4' 
(` GµJ41:#.8· WE#$! RBC#@, )$>&58N· )8$Dµ! µ$1:.#48· )41<8 5&@ É&8[8 
(C$Y14· E!1!)*8$&8 4KE n5F8!14· 5&!C.#/µ!1! E!O 4r#! ():%1;. 1$1N#1g, 
)N81! )!#.`F8?;. ):µ)1g, G):?!8$, EB8!-C&E/. 
 
Throat cold at the house of Ariston [al. Biton], which began from the tongue: the 
voice was unclear, the tongue red, he dried out. On the first day shivering, he got 
warm. On the third day cold, a sharp fever, a slightly red swelling, hardness of the 
throat and both sides of the chest, cold and pale digits. Air elevated. He retained 
drink in his nose, he couldn’t drink. Excretions and urine blocked. On the fourth 
day everything peaked. On the fifth day he died, a throat cold. 
 
                                                
123 From this piece of evidence it would seem that Apollonius Byblas lived in Alexandria and had access to 
all these books at the library and elsewhere.  Nonetheless, Ps.-Galen $,%!-.-/ 0 ,!1#2' 14.683K = 
Empiricist fr. 6 D explicitly names both Apollonii as Antiocheans, Apollonius the Empiricist and 
Apollonius Byblas; he also says they were father and son.  I do not want to suggest that the 
Rationalist/Empiricist dispute can be read as an Alexandria/Antioch proxy agon of the Ptolemaic and 
Seleucid kingdoms.  Rather it seems that many Empiricists came from Alexandria or visited there and some 
Rationalists lived in Antioch, such as Apollophanes of Selecuia, Erasistratean and court physician to 
Antiochus III the Great (see Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 117-18)), or visited Antioch, if the stories 
about Erasistratus’ stay at the Seleucid court are true.   
124 See von Staden (2006: 22-25). 
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Galen records that the text of Epidemics III.7 was in some doubt, with some people 
saying that the patient died on the fifth day, others on the seventh day, and still others on 
the eighth.  Artemidorus Capito, a Hippocratic editor the generation before Galen, 
removed mention of the days altogether, while Galen himself read that the patient died on 
the fifth day.125 
I am indeed amazed, as I said, that although the more exact copies have the fifth 
day and although the copy and the letter itself agrees with the writing, as I showed 
a little before, Zeno himself understands the eighth day to have been written and 
those opposing him have said nothing about this and that [they opposing him] 
about the markings refute him on the grounds that he altered the second letter, 
making it a marked-off delta, although this writing is not the case in the third 
book of the Epidemics, but that after the first marking a ! was written, just as they 
say.126 
 
“Those opposing Zeno” is probably a reference to Zeno’s Empiricist critics, at the very 
least Empiricists who had Mnemon’s book or a record of its readings; whether they were 
the Apollonii is unproven but plausible.  Zeno’s Empiricist critics claimed that 
Mnemon’s markings were not  AB+åç (as Zeno claimed) but  Aí+åç.  Thus Zeno 
had altered Mnemon’s writing so that the sequence  AB+åç made medical sense.  
(Galen himself found a still different class of markings, as he indicated in reference to the 
days:  Aí+Eç.)  It is not clear what Mnemon’s sequence  Aí+åç ought to mean in 
reference to the case history of Epidemics III.7.  The letter rho in Zeno’s explanatory 
system ought to stand for either a disease, a quality, or a body part relevant to the case: 
É*' “nose”, ÉY-4' “cold”, and ÉF%&' “flow” are possible candidates but none are relevant 
to the case at hand, a man who died of a swollen throat.  (Galen in fact spends some time 
dismissing the medical possibility that he died of a cold or from problem with his nose: 
his point is that Hippocrates states twice that the problem was the throat cold, 
EB8!-C&E/.)   
 Both of Apollonius Byblas’ arguments against Zeno’s interventions depend on a 
                                                
125 Galen justifies his reading on both philological and medical grounds In Hipp. Lib. Epi. III Comm. II 
17A.594-600 = 72.1-75.22 Wenkebach. 
126 Galen In Hipp. Lib. Epid. III Comm. II 17A.602-603 = 77.3-24 Wenkebach = Empiricist fr. 341 D = 
Zeno fr. 5 vS. 
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strong sense of textual conservatism.  If the markings are authentic Zeno ought not to 
have altered the letter sequence; if they are authentic, the letters ought to be preserved in 
other copies of Epidemics III.  But Zeno’s case for the markings’ authenticity fail both of 
these criteria: the letters were in no other copies of the Epidemics III nor did Zeno 
preserve the letter forms which Mnemon’s book had.  At stake for Apollonius Byblas is 
the accuracy of copies of Hippocrates’ ^%14#*!.  (Galen’s argument is quite different; he 
argues primarily for the markings’ inauthenticity on medical grounds.)   
Empiricist textual conservatism in Hippocratic exegesis is the consequence of 
Hippocrates’ empiricism.  The authenticity of Hippocrates’ ^%14#*! matters: Hippocrates’ 
reports of his (µ)$&#*! is worthy of study and emulation by Empiricist physicians and, 
insofar as Hippocrates’ (µ)$&#*! is worthy of study, he has already been co-opted as an 
Empiricist physician.  Empiricist commentators are not searching for Hippocrates’ 
empiricism; they are studying it.  Recall that ^%14#*! refers both to the transmitted report 
of earlier physicians and the present doctor’s investigation into these reports as an 
attempt to supplement his own experience.  In Hippocratic exegesis then Empiricists have 
changed the emphasis and understanding of the second leg of the Empiricist tripod, the 
^%14#*!: the Empiricists have ranged from the investigation of Hippocrates’ empiricism 
to the bare report of it.  Both senses of ^%14#*! are present in the Empiricists’ 
understanding of Hippocrates.127  In the controversy about the markings, then, the 
investigation of the reasons why patients lived or died – a medical argument – becomes 
replaced by the report of why the text says they did so, a philological argument.  
 The rereading of the debate between Rationalists and Empiricists has brought to 
the fore a number of the strategies used by each sect in their asymmetrical debate.  The 
Rationalists continued to view the debate in terms of causality and knowledge.  Ps.-
Dioscorides argued that there was need to know the properties of pharmaka as a class to 
understand better the causal chain of the body.  Hegetor argued that knowledge of the 
internal anatomy of the body was needed to understand the causes of injury and disease.  
Zeno, the Rationalist commentator of Hippocrates’ markings, emended the markings to 
                                                
127 LSJ s.v. I.1 and II.  
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give them medical sense.  The Empiricists, by contrast, adopted a strategy of cultural 
traditionalism against the Rationalists about the doctor’s role in medicine in addition to 
their epistemological critique of the Rationalists.  Apollonius of Citium argued that his 
(µ)$&#*! and the ^%14#*! of Hippocrates show that Hegetor’s logic is false: a dislocated 
hip bone can be reset.  The Empiricist authors who interpreted Hippocrates aimed to 
preserve the ^%14#*! of Hippocrates through textual conservatism and thereby understand 





Chapter 5:  Conclusions 
This chapter levels possible presentist criticisms against the methodology of this 
study.  It considers which categories from sociological studies of modern science are 
applicable to ancient science.  It summarizes the results of the entire study and suggests 
avenues for future research.  
5.1 PRESENTISM IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENCE  
The present enters the past in many ways.  Historians must be on their guard 
against writing a history of the present using materials of the past.1  In the history of 
science two of the most common forms of presentism, the act of imputing contemporary 
objects, categories, and ideas to a historical moment where they did not exist, are 
Whiggism and the confusion between actors’ and observers’ terms.  I take Whiggism in a 
broad sense in the historiography of science: any historiographic principle by which 
historians give or explain chronological sequence to undated historical material according 
to its ‘scientific progress’ or, conversely, explain a known dated sequence on the 
assumption that ‘scientific progress’ is occurring.  In the historiography of science 
confusion between actors’ and observers’ terms includes issues not only about the term 
‘science’ but also about modern ways of viewing nature. 
To explain the terms of Whiggism I begin with a comparative example from 
modern history of science studies where the relative dates of the evidence are known.  
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s (2007) Objectivity, one of the most feted history of 
science studies of the last decade, traces the historically contingent development of 
scientific objectivity.2  Their opening pages describe a 19th century British physicist 
                                                
1 I once heard this quote attributed to Michel Foucault but cannot find the reference.  Is it merely an 
academic boogeyman, the warning of each generation of faculty advisors to their students? 
2 But see Forman (2010: 172 n.36) for a critical notice: “The fate of objectivity in postmodernity is 
inseparable from the distain of disinterestedness.  Of this one finds no recognition in Lorraine Daston, Peter 
Galison, Objectivity, Brooklyn, N.Y.: Zone Books 2007, but, instead, a panglossian multiplication and 
accumulation over time of “epistemic virtues” in parallel with “political virtues such as freedom and 
solidarity” (p. 363, 367).  If, however, objectivity is the constant companion of solidarity, then the 
continuing collapse in contemporary societies of every form of social solidarity argues, rather, that the fate 
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peering into a microscope to study the appearance of individual milk drops impacting a 
glass plate. 
He lit his laboratory with a powerful millisecond flash—poring over every stage 
of the impact of a liquid drop, using the latent image pressed into his retina to 
create a freeze-frame “historical” sequence of images a few thousandths of a 
second apart.  Bit by bit, beginning in 1875, the British physicist Arthur 
Worthington succeeded in juxtaposing key moments, untangling the complex 
process of fluid flow into a systematic, visual classification … For Worthington 
himself, the subject had always been, as he endlessly repeated, a physical system 
marked by the beauty of its perfect symmetry … For years Worthington had 
relied on the images left on his retina by the flash.  Then, in spring 1894, he 
finally succeeded in stopping the droplet’s splash with a photograph. Symmetry 
shattered. Worthington said, “The first comment that any one would make is that 
the photographs, while they bear out the drawings in many details, show greater 
irregularity than the drawings would have led one to expect.” But if the 
symmetrical drawings and the irregular shadow photographs clashed, one had to 
go … For two decades, Worthington had seen the symmetrical, perfected forms of 
nature as an essential feature of his morphology of drops. All those asymmetrical 
images [he had drawn] had stayed in the laboratory—not one appeared in his 
many scientific publications.  In this choice he was anything but alone—over the 
long course of making systematic study of myriad scientific domains, the choice 
of the perfect over the imperfect had become profoundly entrenched.  From 
anatomical structures to zoophysiological crystals, idealization had long been the 
governing order. Why would anyone choose as the bottom-line image of the 
human thorax one including a broken left rib?  Who could want the image of 
record of a rhomboid crystal to contain a chip? What long future of science would 
ever need a “malformed” snowflake that violated its six-fold symmetry, a 
microscopic image with an optical artifact  of the lens, or a clover with an insect-
torn leaf?  But after his 1894 shock, Worthington instead began to ask himself—
and again he was not alone—how he and others for so long could have only had 
eyes for a perfection that wasn’t there.3 
 
After nineteen years of study by eye alone Worthington moved from seeing a uniform 
appearance of the impacted milk drops to in 1894 seeing at once by photography an 
irregular and changing impacted milk drop.  Worthington valued systematic symmetry 
over other depictions until confronted with photographic evidence; he published only 
drawings of symmetrical splashes and kept the asymmetrical drawings in his laboratory.  
                                                
of the “epistemic virtues” cannot be rosy – not to mention what passes for objectivity in societies still today 
premodern, and on that dreadful basis still semi-solidary.” 
3 Daston and Galison (2007: 11-15). 
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So when was Worthington doing science in 1893: in the morning when he looked into his 
microscope and drew an asymmetrical splash? in the afternoon when he drew a 
symmetrical splash?  Or was he doing science when he published the symmetrical 
drawings and propagated an image of natural regularity?  Was he doing science in 1895 
when he trusted machines instead of his eyes?  In short, does doing science mean only 
that progress in some form is occurring? 
Daston and Galison are able to problematize immediately the historical 
development of the judgment of one modern scientist because they have dated evidence 
from notebooks and from publication papers.  Imagine now the historiographical 
conundrum if they lacked dated evidence for which came first, the regular impacts or the 
irregular impacts.  Would Worthington have published the asymmetrical drawings, 
keeping the symmetrical drawings in the laboratory, and thereby have propagated an 
image of natural irregularity and complexity?  Would he have then claimed in 1894 that 
technology vindicated his eyes?  In my alternate history the story of Worthington’s 
impacted milk drops is a story of increasing improvement in scientific seeing and a lack 
of order and regularity in nature: in this alternate history, science is progress in 
technology.  Worthington himself thought that the milk drops showed regularity in nature 
and he expected technology to vindicate the symmetrical patterns he saw by eye; the 
story of the milk drops was both the increasing revelation of order in nature and the 
improvement of seeing technology: for Worthington before 1894, science was progress in 
the revelation of regular natural order.  Yet Daston and Galison’s story is complete only 
when the known historical development in seeing technology interrupts expected patterns 
of order and regularity in nature: for Daston and Galison, science is objective progress in 
seeing.    
How might the theories of historians of modern science impact the interpretation 
of ancient science?  The counterfactual about the loss of datable evidence is a very real 
problem in the historiography of ancient science. Chapters 2 and 3 showed that both 
Herophilus and Archimedes addressed a certain technical problem multiple times in 
multiple ways.  In the absence of dated evidence past scholarship has tried to date the 
different attempts by assuming that Herophilus’ and Archimedes’ handling of the 
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technical material improved: these scholars tell a story of improved ‘ways of seeing.’  
And thus their interpretation of the ancient material implicitly incorporates a 
historiography of theoretical progress.  But the story of Worthington’s milk drops shows 
that assumed progress as a historiographic principle can take multiple forms and 
implicitly incorporates a definition of science as progress into history.  
The thrust of this study has attempted to address the historiographical problem of 
the sequence of multiple solutions by the same scientific author from the standpoint of 
literary theory, namely how texts relate to other texts.  Chapter 1.3.1 inscribed the literary 
relationship between texts in anthropologic terms: the actors’ category intertextualityA 
marks the ancient scientific author’s ability to allude to predecessor texts; the observers’ 
category intertextualityR marks the ability of the reader figured as the modern historian to 
collate and compare predecessor texts.   By using intertextualityR as an interpretative 
principle chapter 2.2 held in abeyance the question of chronological priority of  the 
fragments of Herophilus’ pulse theory while emphasizing both the continuity and 
difference of Herophilus’ work.  By using intertextualityA as an interpretative principle 
chapter 3.2 showed how Archimedes controlled the reader’s ability to read predecessor 
texts into the mechanical way of seeing of the Ephodos.  Herophilus’ multiple attempts to 
time the pulse attributed more empirical phenomena to the pulse as a materio-semiotic 
object: this is a story of an increasing revelation of order in nature.  Archimedes’ mutiple 
attempts to measure the parabola’s area contributed to the particular kind of the Ephodos’ 
mechanical ‘way of seeing’: this is a story of improved seeing technology.  ‘Scientific 
progress’ results from the emergence of new objects and approaches in science; and the 
scientific progress told in chapters 2 and 3 comes from Herophilus and Archimedes, not 
the modern historian. 
Daston and Galison’s book raises concerns not only about implicit teleology but 
category differences in different historical epochs: it raises a number of questions about 
nature and ways of seeing nature.  The book can be viewed as an extended argument that 
the mental categories with which modern scientists operate are historically contingent, 
imprinted from a certain cultural moment: for example, at some point objectivity became 
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a scientific virtue and came into its present shape of being.4  To speak dialectically, 
modern scholars are accustomed to think of ‘nature’ as something immutable, a given, 
and to think of ‘culture’ as a changeable object.  Yet this categorical divide itself can be 
shown to be the product of a specific cultural moment, at least in modern European 
thought around the turn of the 18th to 19th centuries.5  The concept of ‘nature’, what is 
given, has a history, just as much as ‘ways of seeing nature’ (of which objectivity is a 
part) have a history. 
Can we therefore speak about ‘science’ in Greco-Roman antiquity?  If ‘nature’ 
and ‘ways of seeing nature’ have histories, it is not clear that scholarship can claim to 
speak about ‘science’ and its object, ‘nature’, in Greco-Roman antiquity: doing so 
imputes modern categories and values to ancient conceptions of nature and natural 
investigations.  To speak of ‘science’ in antiquity is presentism in the form of confusion 
between actors’ and observers’ categories.  Roger French’s (1994) general introduction to 
the Routledge series ‘Sciences in Antiquity’ (printed only in the volumes Ancient 
Astrology, Ancient Natural History, and Cosmology in Antiquity) strongly denies that one 
can speak of ‘science’ at all in Greco-Roman antiquity, only natural philosophy. 
First, as a practical matter, in a wide survey such as this it is clearly undesirable to 
proceed by means of modern categories … It is more appropriate to use subject 
areas that were recognised in antiquity, in order that some account can be given of 
them that reflects both ancient—rather than modern—categorisation and their 
cultural context … Medicine, for example, (to mention briefly the subjects 
covered by the series) was a vocational rather than liberal discipline, as clearly 
defined in the ancient world as now, for there have always been people who have 
tried to cure disease and maintain health. Mathematics also in a sense defines its 
own subject areas (arithmetic and geometry) in a way that largely coincides in the 
modern and ancient periods (and which also partly coincided with the 
quadrivium). Natural history too is a category recognisable equally to Romans, at 
                                                
4 My best attempt at neutral language in this context is ‘historically contingent’ instead of ‘historically’ or 
‘socially’ constructed.  As will be clear below in 5.2, the phrase ‘historically contingent’ does have social 
constructivist overtones, which is the interpretative tradition to which Daston and Galison (2007) weakly 
belong.  Nonetheless, at the present I intend no more than the uncontroversial genealogical claim that 
scientific ideas come into the mind of scientists at certain historical points. 
5 Beyond the bibliography in Daston and Galison (2007), see also Flemming (2000: 5.n9) with reference to 
Daston (1998).  As a classicist one thinks more readily of the nomos/physis dialectic of Greek intellectuals 
in the 5th century BCE.  The historiographical division between an established, given nature and mutable 
culture exists in both ancient and modern thought. 
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least, as to moderns. Astronomy without its constant companion astrology is 
perhaps a modern category rather than ancient and its separate history is partly a 
construction of scientific historians. Astrology is as recognisable as medicine, 
with a body of practitioners, clients and a technical subject matter, practised in a 
society of which the economic, intellectual, religious and political aspects all had 
a historical role to play … 
A brief, ordinary characterisation of science would surely include most of 
the following: (i) It is objective … (ii) It is non-religious…(iii) It is experimental 
in its verification of its theories, (iv) Science and the research that continues to 
build it are in practice directed to the practical business of manipulating nature …  
(v) Its manipulative nature has strong links to technology, (vi) It has universal 
law-like statements, often mathematical and with Boyle’s law as a paradigm. 
Little of this can be found in the ancient world …  
Some historians have recently recognised that to see science in antiquity 
we have to have a definition of science so broad as to be meaningless. Whether it 
is Aristotle’s ‘all men by nature desire to know’ (he said it in the Metaphysics and 
by any account it is a broad definition) or a ‘systematic knowledge of nature’ we 
are left with something so vague that it can scarcely have a history. Why, after all, 
should we use a modern term to denote ancient usage, when the categories and 
terms of the past are better? … It was argued above that the subject areas of this 
series were recognisable in the ancient world, which means that each was 
practised by more than a single man. The doctors could see medicine as a 
discipline that would grow on the basis of accumulated experience, and so to an 
extent were consciously laying the foundations for the development of an 
autonomous discipline. Aristotle too recognised that natural philosophy was an 
exercise that might by further observations in the future resolve problems obscure 
to him. But they were not laying the foundations of our disciplines. Just as both 
Aristotle and the doctors constructed histories to legitimate their own activity and 
to mark it off from others, so by the same token when they looked to the future 
they saw an extended Aristotelian natural philosophy and a future (let us say) 
Asclepiad medicine. Nothing else would count as the real thing … Using 
‘science’ in the past creates problems because it looks different from philosophy; 
in doing so it also—because of a perceived opposition between science and 
religion—obscures the relationship between philosophy and religion.6 
 
French’s account is an energetic argument against calling anything in Greco-Roman 
antiquity ‘science’.  According to French, we can recognize that the subject matter of 
ancient domains were similar to the subject matter of contemporary science.  Yet the 
essential features of modern science – objectivity, universality, technology – did not exist 
in antiquity.  Alternate modern definitions are no good because they are too broad.  Our 
                                                
6 Cited from Tamsyn (1994a: xii-xxi).  Emphasis in the original. 
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terms of historical description should be those of the historical actors themselves.  These 
historical descriptions are practices of natural philosophy, not our sciences.  Thus, it is 
principally from philosophy that practices of ancient natural philosophy develop and are 
defined. 
 French’s polemic is best summarized in the question: why use a modern term 
when the terms and categories of the past are better descriptors of the past?  At issue is 
how observers construct historical actors’ terms and understand their categories.  French 
would certainly be opposed to the starting points of the present study.  In chapter 1.1 I 
drew the picture of ‘science’ in the Hellenistic period without reference to philosophy; I 
defined ‘science’ in sociological terms and endorsed the application of sociological 
studies of modern science to ‘science’ of the Hellenistic period.  Perhaps it may be 
charged that my methodological choices and the label itself of ‘science’ are presentisms, 
modern categories and concepts smuggled across the historical divide into the readings of 
ancient texts. 
5.2 THICK AND THIN SOCIAL DESCRIPTIONS  
I plead guilty to the charge of presentism in discriminating ‘science’ strictly from 
‘philosophy’.  This has been a deliberate methodological choice.  I believe, with French, 
that philosophy played an integral part in Greco-Roman conceptions of nature and that it 
is impossible to draw a complete picture of science in the Hellenistic period without 
reference to philosophy.7  But the point of investigating Hellenistic ‘science’ without 
reference to philosophy was to learn what ‘science’ contributes to our picture of their 
investigations concerning the natural world.  That is, the present study aimed to gain a 
deliberately one-sided view of what Hellenistic practitioners of ‘science’ thought that 
they were doing in that activity.  The purpose of the presentist discrimination of 
philosophy was to specify more precisely the historically contingent category which we 
are studying. 
                                                
7 For example, Nussbaum (1994) shows the explicit importance of the cultural role of the doctor in 
Hellenistic philosophical schools, even as it presents a one-sided view of the relationship between 
philosophy and science (she does not engage at all with the Hellenistic medicine schools). 
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So French’s point that ancient ‘science’ does not wholly map onto the 
contemporary category remains.  It is easy to show that French’s description of the 
essential characteristics of contemporary science and his corresponding claim that science 
in Greco-Roman antiquity lacks these features are simplistic and tendentious at best, 
outright false and a distortion at worst.8  Ancient science does take an interest in all six of 
French’s essentialist characterizations, even if not everyone would agree that these 
features are essential to ‘science’.  In fact, modern science is no more essentialist than 
ancient science: even intelligent sociological models of science from the 1960s and 1970s 
rarely approximate the contemporary reshuffling of science departments and disciplines 
into research unit groups.9   
Better then to take French’s argument as the representative of a certain kind of 
argument, the essentialist great divide between Ancient and Modern.  To argue against 
this divide, we might evaluate the elements of Greco-Roman science we have seen in this 
study by the essentialist classification of modern science; let us therefore call the 
principles of our science realist and the principles of their science relativist.  We could 
call relativist Herophilus’ names of the pulse, the Empiricist transition to the similar, or 
Archimedes’ mechanical method; we could call realist (and thus appropriate as part ouf 
our science) Herophilus’ distinction between arterial pulsation and muscle spasms or the 
Euclidean style of geometric argumentation.  And yet neither of these broad labels tells 
us observers much about what the Greek authors thought that they were doing with their 
investigations.  When we posit a great divide between us and them we fixate only on the 
gap.  We schematize, we draw generalizations, we worry, as Netz (2004b) has said, about 
the route from A to B at the expense of good analysis of A or B per se.10  A focus on the 
relativism or realism of Hellenistic investigations into nature, or ‘science’, is an extended 
application of applying our own categories, an exercise that tells more about our 
perspective and how we got here than historical actors’ perspective on investigations into 
nature. 
                                                
8 See the review of Lennox (1998: 471-72). 
9 Biagioli (2009: 819).  
10 Netz (2004b: 7). 
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Consider also the philological claim from chapter 1.1 that the Greeks have no 
word for science.  The English word ‘science’ has a long history associated first with 
elements of theological study in the medieval quadrivium and at last exclusively with 
natural and physical sciences in the mid-nineteenth century.11  The term ‘scientist’, on the 
other hand, is only attested in English from 1834.12  It would be ludicrous to use this 
philological evidence to suppose that people did not do science in our contemporary 
sense before the nineteenth century.  Rather, the best conclusion we might draw is that 
people (at least in English) did not, or rather, could not describe themselves as ‘scientists’ 
before the nineteenth century.13  Philological evidence does not stretch very far as 
evidence for social practices; it is only a thin description.14 
I have titled this section “Thick and Thin Social Descriptions” in homage of 
Geertz (1973) because his famous dicta vivify the interpretative principles of my study.   
The concept of culture I espouse, and whose utility the essays below attempt to 
demonstrate, is essentially a semiotic one.  Believing, with Max Weber, that man 
is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture 
to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science 
in search of a law but an interpretative one in search of meaning.  It is explication 
I am after, construing social expressions on their surface enigmatical.15 
  
The prescriptive account of an essentialist study of science is a thin description of the 
actions of scientists and the society in which they live: a set of formal characteristics 
regardless of place, time, or people.  What can a thin description of scientific knowledge 
tell but that Greek science is not our science?  A thick description of science, on the other 
                                                
 
11 OED s.v. 1a, 3a, 5a, 5b. 
12 OED s.v. 1. 
13 The clearest work on historical identities in the discipline of Classics come from gender studies.  Work 
on historical identities in modern societies have also considered descriptive psychology.  I have modeled 
this paragraph on Hacking’s (2002) account of psychological deviance in the nineteenth century. 
14 Lesley Dean-Jones reminds me that ancient Greek has no word for ‘family’ to designate the nuclear 
family: they have words for mother, father, son, and daughter. Yet clearly Greeks recognized a nuclear 
family within the household: the absence of a word for ‘nuclear family’ does not indicate that these 
members of the nuclear family did not perceive themselves as a distinct unit within the oikos.  Analogously, 
the absence of an ancient Greek a word for ‘science’ does not indicate that they failed to recognize some 
investigation of physis crossing the domains of medicine, mathematics, music, mechanics, and so on. 
15 Geertz (1973: 5).  Geertz himself credits Gilbert Ryle for the phrases “thin description” and “thick 
description.” 
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hand, is contextual and interpretative: knowledge production described in both actors’ 
and observers’ terms with an awareness of “the knowing traffic between ancient and 
modern categories of analysis.”16  And so the invocation of sociological models of 
‘science’ to ancient Greek mathematics and medicine is imputing to Greek 
mathematicians and Greek doctors the ability to be the object of sociological study, that 
is, the ability to represent – ideographically, metaphorically, socially – their interpretation 
of the natural world.  The human as a representing animal, I am convinced, is no 
presentism. 
The tenor of this study has been to reject essentialist characterizations of science 
from the start.17  It is clear that French’s account is on the whole a bad argument that 
leads to a fairly misguided debate about labels.  Comparing essentialist characterizations 
of Greek science to essentialist characterizations of modern Western science generates 
more heat than light.18  Here then is an appropriate time to step back from the particulars 
                                                
16 Whitmarsh’s (2001: 4) wonderful tag for scholarship in the field of Classics. 
17 In older philosophy of science literature, essentialist characterizations are called by the technical term 
‘demarcation criterion’, which originates with the work of Karl Popper. 
18 The introduction of Keyser and Irby-Massie’s Encyclopedia of Ancient Natural Scientists (2008: 1) is 
also an essentialist argument: “It is proper to describe the work of the people included herein as “science,” 
with no more risk of anachronism than using any modern term to refer to a corresponding ancient practice, 
because the ancient models of nature, whether correct or not, were indeed attempts at models.  That is, they 
were created and debated as abstracted descriptions of phenomena, intended to give a naturalistic and self-
consistent causal account, of a world viewed as regular or constant in its behavior.  Their methods and aims 
were scientific, even when their theoretical or intellectual achievements are ones we now perceive as 
inaedequate.  Histories of science must be comprehensive, including all abandoned paths, since roads not 
taken seem inevitable only in hindsight.”  Emphasis in the original.  They, unlike French, are concerned to 
close the gap between Ancient and Modern: essentialist features allow our recognition of their science even 
when results differ. It is hard to determine what Keyser and Irby-Massie mean by “modeling”, their 
essentialist feature of science.  On the one hand, modeling may mean no more than descriptions of natural 
phenomena including causal features; on the other hand, modeling may imply that the description is 
representation only, not an objective account.  I argue that both of these senses of modeling as essentialist 
features ultimately fail to capture Greco-Roman science.  First, not all scientists in Greco-Roman antiquity 
were interested in causal explanation or in creating a theoretical account of natural phenomena, as chapter 4 
on the Empiricists showed.  Second, the canonical example from the history of science of a model of 
natural phenomena without commitment to its objective reality is Andreas Osiander’s introduction to 
Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus.  Gingerich (2004) is an interesting qualification of the thesis that De 
Revolutionibus was widely understood merely as a modeling attempt.  Even without reference to 
Copernicus, however, Keyser and Irby-Massie would need a sustained discussion of evidence of scientists’ 
beliefs that they intended no commitment of their models to objective reality.  I do not believe that there is 
evidence for that thesis nor that the thesis would be useful as a motive to explain how Greco-Roman 
scientists act.  Once again, essentialist arguments generate more heat than light. 
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of French’s argument and consider the applicability of non-essential descriptions of 
science to the ancient material.   
I disagreed with French how observers construct historical actors’ terms and 
categories.  Since in this study I conceived of myself as an anthropologist studying 
Hellenistic period scientists, I had some observer’s categories with which I interpreted 
the scientific practices of historical actors: I applied comparative ethnographic categories 
drawn from sociological studies of modern science to the scientific practices of historical 
actors.  Therefore, I now consider sociological characteristics of modern science and 
evaluate the ancient material in these categories. 
This study has cited modern sociology of science literature, much of which is 
social constructivist in nature.19  The philosopher Ian Hacking’s (1999) The Social 
Construction of What? has developed a useful typology of literature about social 
construction in many fields, including natural science.20  The American ‘Science Wars’ 
of the 1990s, crystallized by the hoax of physicist Alan Sokal,21 distinguished between 
scientific realists (Sokal and his allies) and social constructivists (Sokal’s targets).  
Hacking argues that the social constructivists are distinguished by their commitments to 
the contingency of science and explanations of stability external to science.22  Applying 
Hacking’s typology about the contingency of science and explanations of stability 
external to science to consider the possibility of a social constructivist description of 
ancient science, I argue that ancient science was contingent but not stable in the same 
way as modern science. 
The contingency of science is the thesis that the present state of science was not 
inevitable.  Contingency takes many forms: historical, metaphysical, etc.  Historical 
contingency is the category which concerns historical treatment.  Hacking ties 
                                                
19 Latour would not claim that label for ANT because he denies that ‘the social’ is an explanatory category; 
see Latour (2005). 
20 See especially Hacking (1999: 63-99), who classifies himself as a moderate constructivist.  For more up-
to-date bibliographies of social construction see (from Anglo-American philosophy perspectives) Longino 
(2006), Mallon (2008), and also Daston’s (2009: 803-4) bibliography of the 1990s ‘Science Wars’. 
21 See Hacking (1999: 3) for an account. 
22 Hacking (1999) also argues that the participants in the debate further disagree on the role of nominalism 
in science.  Hacking’s thesis is that, philosophically analyzed, the debate between scientific realists and 
social constructivists is another instantiation of the debate between positivists and nominalists. 
 205 
contingency to the notion of progress and development in science: a constructivist 
argument claims that the present scientific order, whatever it is, could have been different 
and still be considered a scientific account of the natural world.  French’s account of 
ancient science cited above employs an argument about the progress of ancient science 
from the point of view of the ancient practitioners: “Just as both Aristotle and the doctors 
constructed histories to legitimate their own activity and to mark it off from others, so by 
the same token when they looked to the future they saw an extended Aristotelian natural 
philosophy and a future (let us say) Asclepiad medicine. Nothing else would count as the 
real thing.”23  Science took a path different from that its ancient practitioners expected; 
and since French aims to emphasize the gap between their science and ours, this indicates 
the falsity of their science.  The implication of French’s argument is that, by contrast to 
the ancient, our science is not contingent: our scientific ideas and theorems, correct and 
valid, could not have been otherwise.24   
But modern science is just as historically contingent as ancient science.  Now it is 
often the aim of genealogical scholarship to describe the historical (and thereby social) 
contingency of cultural artifacts, codes, and descriptions with the implication that, by 
being historically and socially contingent, they are less real, less logically compulsive, 
less objectively so.25  Nevertheless Lorraine Daston, from her perspective as a historian 
of science, has articulated a different view: 
Probably most historians of science these days, if asked about an episode like the 
refinement of precision measurement techniques or the formulation of statistical 
correlation, would answer that such scientific practices are both socially 
constructed and real.  That is, they depend crucially on the cultural resources at 
hand in a given context (mid-nineteenth-century industrializing Prussia, early 
twentieth-century eugenics-obsessed Britain) and they capture some aspect of the 
world; they work.  But they are neither historically inevitable nor metaphysically 
                                                
23 Cited from Barton (1994a: xx).  Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008:1)’s essentialist argument (see footnote 
18) also allows for the contingency of ancient science: “Histories of science must be comprehensive, 
including all abandoned paths, since roads not taken seem inevitable only in hindsight.” Emphasis in 
original. 
24 Here then French offers another essentialist characterization of modern science, again chosen to 
emphasize the divide between Ancient and Modern. 
25 Hacking (1999: 19) charts six increasing degrees of social constructionist attitudes: historical, ironic, 
reformist, unmasking, rebellious, revolutionary.  My reading of Daston and Galison (2007) above in 5.1 is 
that they are ‘historical’ social constructionists. 
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true.  Rather, they are contingent to a certain time and place yet valid for certain 
purposes.26 
 
Now from the realism/relativism dichotomy sketched above, many aspects of 
investigations of nature in Greco-Roman antiquity are not objectively real, i.e. valid 
within our scientific system, but Daston does not say that the results of modern science 
are objectively true, only that “they work” and “are valid for certain purposes.”  This is 
an explicit appeal to her readers’ experience of the force of science in their lives.  Such an 
appeal could be rewritten anthropologically to cover contemporaries’ experience of a 
particular knowledge production within any given culture.  Conceivably then we could 
appeal to the experience of our historical actors that, e.g. Greek mathematics, worked and 
satisfied in some deeply cultural way.  This is to appeal to historical actors’ belief, a 
category that most historians would deny is epistemologically knowable without explicit 
evidence.  It is clearly beyond the scope of the present work to conclude that no such 
evidence exists;27 but in the absence of present research on the topic, it is better for the 
historian to be skeptical about the phenomenological force of Greco-Roman science on 
historical actors’ beliefs.   
Greco-Roman science is historically contingent; its progress could have been 
different.  In chapters 2 and 3 we have seen at least two paths not followed by the ancient 
practitioners of the same domain.  Herophilus’ use of the water-clock to measure pulse 
rates is the path not taken by ancient medical theory of the pulse.28  As I argued in 
chapter 2, the ancient evidence shows that Herophilus employed a normative concept of 
time to measure pulses, expressed both through the application of the water-clock and by 
rhythms based on Aristoxenus’ theory of the protos chronos.  But Herophilus’ normative 
                                                
26 Daston (2009: 813).  I offer Daston’s example from the natural sciences instead of Hacking’s (1999: 
119) example of childhood autism from the human sciences; but they are both saying the same thing. 
27 Certainly a great deal of circumstantial evidence (as opposed to direct evidence) exists from honorific 
inscriptions, official appointments, and legal regulations for the cultural prestige of particular sciences 
(such as medicine and astrology) and for individual scientists like Archimedes and Galen.  
28 Lloyd (1987: 282-84) has argued that Herophilus’ use of the water-clock was part of the ambition to 
represent medical inquiries mathematically, even if the attempt itself fell short of accuracy.  Lloyd’s 
chapter discussing Herophilus, “Measurement and Mystification”, is itself arguing against Alexander 
Koyré’s (1948) thesis that Greco-Roman science ought not to be called ‘science’ because of its lack of 
quantitative reasoning. 
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measurement techniques had mixed success in Greek medicine.  None of Herophilus’ 
sect followers seem to have employed his water-clock; and Galen eventually did away 
with Herophilus’ application of the protos chronos, opting instead for a more descriptive 
analysis of pulse rhythm, as Appendix A shows.  Despite Galen’s radical reformulation 
of Herophilus’ theory, Greek medicine could have been purely Herophilean in its analysis 
of the pulse; there was no metaphysical or historical necessity for the triumph of 
Galenism.  The apparently complete failure of Herophilus’ analysis by water-clock to 
establish and maintain its hold in Greek medicine might in fact be due to social 
limitations of the theory, such as the embeddedness of the Egyptian style of water-clock 
in its local environment. 
Archimedes’ application of mechanics to mathematics is an alternate path for 
mathematics in antiquity.  There is some evidence that Archimedes’ immediate 
Hellenistic successors employed similar analyses in their own mathematical work.  Knorr 
(1986) argued that Dionysodorus’ On the Torus was based on Archimedean principles of 
two-dimensional geometric shapes revolving around centers of weight, just as 
Archimedes does in the Ephodos.29  Eratosthenes’ Letter to Ptolemy III Euergetes, 
preserved by Eutocius, justifies its analysis of mean proportionals through an 
instrumental proof.30  Regardless of whether an instrumental proof is the same as a 
mechanical proof in Greek mathematics,31 Archimedes’ mathematical work with 
mechanical principles seems to parallel a great deal of similar analyses in the late third 
and early second centuries BCE.  At this point it must remain an open question for 
research whether Archimedes’ mechanical treatises provided inspiration for the 
subsequent generation of Hellenistic mathematicians.  Nonetheless, even if Archimedes’ 
mechanical approach was applied successfully in the subsequent generation of 
                                                
29 Knorr (1986: 263-70). 
30 I follow Knorr (1989: 77-153) and Netz (2004b: 294.n153) in holding that the entire letter is genuine.  
Geus (2002: 175-205), who follows Wilamowitz’s (1894) argument that only the final dedicatory poem is 
genuine, seems not to know Knorr’s (1989) contribution to the debate.  Netz’s (2004b: 297.n176) remark 
that “the author assumes we have seen the pillar” dissolves much of Wilamowitz’s confusion about the 
multiple parts of the letter. 
31 See Sefrin-Weis (2010: 228-29) for a possible distinction between διὰ τῶν µηχανικῶν and διὰ τῶν 
ὀργανικῶν. 
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mathematicians, Greek mathematics remained Euclidean, as Pappus and Eutocius 
demonstrate.32 
Hacking’s other classification of social constructivist arguments is the explanation 
of stability external to science.  Social constructivists argue that the causal means by 
which scientific debates come to an end, or have closure, are social factors (group 
coherence, financial hurdles, etc.).  The social constructivist tradition, led sociology-
inspired historians like Steven Shapin, has argued that modern science has social 
mechanisms to achieve closure.  Shapin’s (1994) famous thesis is that the values of 
honesty and mutual trust from social codes of 17th century gentlemen allowed the rise of 
scientific bodies, like the Royal Society, to arbitrate and judge disputes between scientific 
opponents.33  By contrast, premodern science – that is, culturally specific knowledge 
production before the 16th century – had no such social or political mechanisms to allow 
for closure to scientific debates.  Since G.E.R. Lloyd’s work (1979, 1983, 1987, 1990) 
has shown that, apart from mathematics, ancient science was not monolithic but rather 
diverse and varied in that there was no single agreed-upon result or methodology, the 
ancient scientific debate does not have closure in the same way that social constructivists 
claim that modern science has closure.  We observers therefore make a historiographical 
mistake to debate about the stability of ancient science using the modern equivalence of 
stability with closure.   
Since stability as closure is foreign to Greco-Roman antiquity, to speak of the 
stability of successful science in antiquity means almost exclusively to speak in terms of 
social groups.  A thick description of a social group means describing the composition of 
the group, its members’ social relations to each, the group’s continuity in time and space, 
the linguistic and rhetorical practices of the group.  For example, we have seen in chapter 
4.1.2 and 4.3.2 the stability of the Empiricist sect produces an asymmetrical debate with 
                                                
32 Netz (2004a) is a different tracing of the historical contingency of Greek mathematics by diachronically 
following a single mathematical problem from Archimedes to his deuteronomic commentators to medieval 
Arabic mathematicians.  The formal geometric approach of Archimedes gives way to an informal algebraic 
manipulation of medieval Arabic mathematicians. 
33 See Shapin (1994). 
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the Rationalists.  More research is needed to detail a thick description of the various 
scientific social groups in antiquity to explain the stability of their scientific practices. 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS 
The present study has pursued the ethnographic category of newness in science, 
emergence, the opposite of closure.  We have seen that the emergence of new concepts 
and objects in Hellenistic period science can result from the appropriation of one science 
into another; and the resulting object or concept carries with it ideological consequences 
for the domain of the group of scientists into which it is introduced.   
In chapter 1.1 I noted that the ancient Greeks did not have a particular word 
equivalent to modern Western ‘science,’ the activity of investigation; they do however 
speak of physis, ‘the natural order,’ as the object of their investigation.  In an important 
essay, Lloyd (1991b) argues that physis was invented as a regularized category during the 
Classical period in the polemic between natural philosophers (a category including 
scientists and philosophers) and their opponents, traditionalist healers and diviners.  
Nature became naturalized, so to speak.  The historically-contingent physis of 
philosophers and scientists may have been a regular and normativized category but was 
still not a singular one: thinkers on physis disagreed with each other about the appropriate 
methodologies to study physis.  On the grounds of Lloyd’s argument it seems more 
appropriate to speak of ‘sciences’ and ‘natures’ in the Classical period.  Thus the starting 
point of this study has been to assume the division between and within sciences by 300 
BCE.34  The question we posed was: why then do some Hellenistic scientists appropriate 
theories from a foreign field for their science? 
                                                
34 Flemming (2000: 11) has interpreted the scientific world of the Hellenistic period in light of Lloyd’s 
argument: “Nor does physis (or its Latin equivalent, natura) ever escape from the framework of difference 
and dissent in which it was forged.  In the half-millennium between these pioneering thinkers and writers 
[viz. the Classical period philosophers and scientists] and the period of concern in the present study [viz. the 
Imperial period], the terms of these disputes shifted and settled down, but they were never resolved, either 
philosophically or medically.  The diverse philosophical and medical systems and schools that were 
established and variously developed and dissolved in the intervening centuries each had their own 
methodologies and (as far as was then allowed) their own physics, together with the either ethically or more 
corporeally therapeutic programmes with which they were associated.”  Flemming describes associated 
groups of thinkers whose philosophical interests provide the metaphysical framework for their science; the 
lack of philosophical agreement between schools for the most part prohibits interaction between the 
sciences of the various philosophical schools.  Hence to Flemming ‘sciences’ and ‘natures’ are created as a 
 210 
Herophilus and Archimedes appropriate concepts from other scientific domains in 
strategies of naturalization.  The phenomena of Aristoxenian musical rhythm from which 
Herophilus’ materio-semiotic pulse emerges are located in physis.  Archimedes’ 
mechanical way of seeing mathematical objects emerges from multiple discourses but 
marks the mechanical contribution to the process, the science located in physis.  The 
integration of elements from the domain of one science into another forges a new link 
between an area of physis and a scientific domain not traditionally associated with it.  The 
enlarged networked structure of scientific domains increases the sense of natural 
regularity and normativity Lloyd (1991b) pointed to as “the invention of nature.”  
Herophilus and Archimedes are thus expanding their scientific community’s 
understanding of physis beyond its formulation.  Flemming (2000) suggests that the 
essence of nature is its givenness, what is objectively so: “It is this which gives nature its 
inherent causal efficacy and authority, of whatever precise kind and in whatever exact 
quantity.”35  Since what the givenness of nature contains is historically contingent, 
Herophilus’ and Archimedes’ strategies of naturalization mark a deeper understanding of 
the Greek cultural sense of physis as a regularized category.  The emergence of new 
science in the Hellenistic period via naturalization marks connections between previously 
separate areas of physis.  Thus some category of ‘science’ did exist in Greek thought of 
the Hellenistic period which crossed several knowledge domains and this concept of 
‘science’ was a certain kind of knowledge production concerning the natural world. 
Yet this aspect of ‘science’ remains limited in its conception and application in 
the Hellenistic period.  Both Archimedes and the Empiricists, as described in chapters 3.3 
and 4 respectively, ultimately reject the ideological consequences of connections within 
physis.  I argued in 1.2 that their rejection is founded on a scientific methodology which 
does not aim for greater certainty: I suggested that there were separate causal explanatia 
for scientific aim and scientific methodology in Hellenistic period science.  Since 
naturalization as a methodological strategy was not accepted by all social groups in 
                                                
result of philosophical orientation toward physis.  Flemming’s description of Hellenistic period science 
corresponds to French’s demand for an account of Greco-Roman science derived from philosophy. 
35 Flemming (2000: 17). 
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Hellenistic science, Hellenistic science as a whole did not achieve closure about whether 
naturalization was an appropriate methodological strategy.   Closure in Hellenistic 
science, as suggested in 5.2, existed only within particular social groups.  Therefore the 
separate historical explanatia of scientific aim and scientific method exist only within 
particular social groups in Hellenistic period science.  There is a need to analyze specific 
conditions. 
The Empiricists, for one, rejected naturalization as a strategy because they held a 
skeptical philosophy that nature was ultimately unknowable.  Perhaps more importantly, 
the Empiricists rejected the Rationalist strategy of naturalization because it seemed to 
have neglected the doctor’s care-giver role, as argued in 4.2.3.  The Empiric tripod and 
sign-association emphasize the individual doctor’s authority in treating patients.  The 
Empiricists rejected a naturalist methodology which provides greater certainly in favor of 
a methodology which promotes a cultural definition of the individual scientist. 
This study has therefore analyzed the explanans of scientific methodology within 
individual social groups; it has not attempted to analyze the explanans of scientific aim, 
while assuming its existence.  I suggest that the dichotomy between these two explanatia 
arises from whether the location of the social explanans lies within the social group or 
outside of it.36  In other words, this study has conducted an evaluation of scientific 
methodology, the explanans internal to the social group of scientists.  The explanans of 
scientific aim must lie outside of the social group of scientists in broader culture. 
Since the analysis of this study has been limited to social phenomena within the 
scientific community, further research should consider the social context outside of the 
scientific community when analyzing the phenomena of cross-scientific appropriation. I 
argued in chapter 1.2.3 that the historical actors who introduce new concepts and objects 
into their scientific domain are elite scientists; I also noted in 1.2.3 that Herophilus’ and 
Archimedes’ scientific work was sponsored by Hellenistic monarchs.  I hypothesize that 
Hellenistic courts serve as the social sites of legitimation for emerging science utilizing 
the phenomena of cross-scientific appropriation.  Correspondingly, the Empiricist 
                                                
36 Shapin (1992) is a helpful summary of the sometimes submerged internalism/externalism debate in the 
historiography of science. 
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rejection of the ideological consequences of innovative science might be motivated by a 
social explanans in popular culture outside of the court context.  The whole story of the 
phenomena of cross-scientific appropriation and their resulting ideological consequences 
has not yet been told.   
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Appendix A 
Galen’s Charts of Pulse Differentiae 
 
Galen’s writings shape the way that the historical record of Hellenistic period 
medicine is written.  Our knowledge of pulse theory in Greek medicine is based on 
twelve treatises dedicated to the pulse: Galen’s On Pulses to Beginners, On Differentiae 
of Pulses, On Distinguishing Pulses, On Causes in Pulses, On Prognosis Of Pulses, 
Synopsis on Pulses, On the Use of Pulses, [Galen] On Pulses to Antonius philosopher and 
eager student, [Galen] Medical Definitions, [Rufus of Ephesus] On Pulses, Ps.-Soranus 
On Pulses, and Marcellinus On Pulses.1  Nine of the twelve extant treatises on Greek 
pulse theory come from the Galenic corpus.  Heinrich von Staden’s (1989) collection of 
the fragments of Herophilus collects 44 fragments related to pulse theory, drawn mostly 
from Galen.2  Galen’s interest in pulse-theory therefore shapes our perception of 
Herophilus’ interest and activity in pulse-theory.   
Consider then several different historiographical arguments for how our Galenic 
text may shape knowledge of Herophilus.  First, since Galen often records his admiration 
for Herophilus’ work on pulse theory,3 the Galenic system and account of pulse may be 
an enlargement or extension of Herophilus’ work.  This strategy rightly posits Herophilus 
as the origin of the tradition of ancient Greek medical discourse on the pulse and locates 
Galen within that tradition.  Yet the evidence shows that the ancient tradition of pulse 
theory is hardly monolithic: while Galen possibly follows Herophilus in many respects, 
he is also critical enough of Herophilus for us to suppose that Galenic pulse-theory is not 
simply a revised system of Herophilus’ doctrines.4  Secondly, Herophilus’ doctrines may 
have reached Galen through intermediaries: Galen often transmits Herophilean doctrines 
in connection with the Pneumatist doctor Archigenes (fl. 110 CE) and a later Herophilean 
                                                
1 Schöne (1907: 448). 
2 Thirty-five of the forty-five fragments von Staden (1989) assembles concerning Herophilus’ pulse theory, 
Herophilus frr. 144-188b vS, are from Galen’s pen.   
3 Cf. Herophilus frr. 147, 160, 166 vS.  
4 Cf. Herophilus frr. 173, 176 vS. 
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doctor Aristoxenus (fl. 1-50 CE?).  The 19th century German scholars Hermann Schöne 
and Marcus Wellman developed extensive arguments about Galen’s Quellen for his 
writings on pulse which employ these two physicians as primary witnesses to Herophilus’ 
writings.5  These two earlier physicians may have been reliable witnesses to Herophilus’ 
work but their work is not extant.  Yet even with Quellenforschung a historian cannot 
escape’s Galen’s editorial decisions: our knowledge of Archigenes and Aristoxenus is 
filtered through Galen’s writing.  If we wish to suggest a coherent context in which to 
read the fragments of Herophilus’ work on the pulse, we must be conscious first of 
Galen’s interests and aims in pulse theory.  I will therefore outline Galen’s pulse theory, 
developing by contrast with Galen’s ideas a context for my reading of Herophilus’ 
fragments in chapter 2. 
A serious study of Galen’s pulse theory would constitute a complete monograph;6 
the following is an outline of my own impressions from my reading of On Pulses to 
Beginners, On Differentiae of Pulses, On Distinguishing Pulses, Synopsis on Pulses, and 
On the Use of Pulses.  The overwhelming theme that emerges from Galen’s writings on 
pulse is his interest in classification with an eye to diagnosis and prognosis.7  Galen 
                                                
5 See von Staden (1989: 284n. 156, 286-7) on Wellman’s thesis about Archigenes’ use of Herophilus and 
(1989: 560-2) on Schöne’s arguments about Galen’s appropriation of Aristoxenus’ writings. 
6 The extended treatments of Galen’s pulse theory are Deichgräber (1984), who loosely focuses on Galen’s 
self-presentation in de dignoscendis pulsibus 1, Harris (1973: 397-431), who attempts simply to express a 
composite of Galen’s theory in English and to that end paraphrases many Greek passages, Barton (1994b: 
152-63), who is interested in the social context of scientific prognosis in the Second Sophistic, and Asper 
(2007: 329-351), who is interested in the contrast of authorial voice between Galen’s isagogic pulse 
literature and “System-pragmatie.”  Asper (2007: 356-63), considering stronger and weaker scientific 
authors according to Harold Bloom’s theory of anxiety of influence, interestingly compares the manner in 
which Galen in doxographical sections of his larger treatises promotes his work, suggesting that it is part of 
Galen’s aim to elide the contributions of earlier authors; in Galen’s works on pulse theory Asper suggests 
that the Pneumatist Archigenes is the strong predecessor Galen attempts to overcome.  
7 Hankinson (2008: 16-17) in a recent overview of Galen’s work has a similar view: “[Galen’s] approach 
[to pulse theory] consisted of a rigorous classification of pulse-types, according to their size (the extent of 
the dilation of the vessel, specified in each of the three dimensions if length, breadth, and depth), their 
speed (how rapidly the diastole is accomplished), their strength, the hardness or softness of the vessels 
themselves, frequency (interval between pulses), and whether the pulse is consistent or not, and if not 
whether even in its inconsistency it exhibits some regularity; moreover, recurrent types of pulse are given 
evocative names: the ‘gazelle-like’, the ‘ant-like’, the ‘worm-like’ and suchlike.  Evidently, there is a very 
large number of possible permutations among these variables, although not all of them are diagnostically 
and therapeutically relevant.  But, Galen thinks, it is possible with long practice (which is necessary in 
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describes a classification based on eight generic differentiae between pulses: size of the 
artery’s movement, speed of the artery’s movement, strength of the artery’s movement, 
hardness of artery’s tunic, frequency of arterial beat and pause, the regularity of the 
arterial beat,8 the fullness of the body of the artery, and the ratio of the time of dilation to 
the time of contraction.9  Galen reinforces the classifications of the text with multiple 
charts of species variation within the generic variation.  We should think of the charts as 
an integral component of Galen’s pulse theory.10  As the summary of Latour (1987) in 
chapter 1.4 showed, charts and figures are the reference points for a technical paper: 
“Belief in the authors’ word is replaced by the inspection of ‘figures’.”11  The reader is 
referred to visual presentations under the rhetoric of clarifying the text; nonetheless the 
experimental evidence presented in Greek science is not intended to discriminate between 
theories but solely to support the author’s viewpoint.12  In the case of Galen’s pulse 
theory, the text of On Differentiae of Pulses includes arterial movement in three 
dimensions, binary poles of qualitative measurements (a third space is saved for the 
normative mean), and a temporal duration of the artery at motion and at rest.13  The charts 
are predicated on these options and no other.14  The charts embody the categories of 
                                                
order to hone one’s sense of touch to detect minute variations: Galen tells us how he trained himself to be 
able to perceive the faint trace of the arterial systole, which others had said was indiscernible) and 
experience to discern which particular pulses are associated with what physical conditions, how they vary 
with age, gender, physical condition and season, how they are affected by emotional states and how various 
environmental and ingestive factors typically affected them, which in turn leads to being to use them as 
early warning signs of determinate unhealthy states.” 
8 These six in Galen de pulsibus ad tirones 2-7, 8.455-59K. 
9 These additional two in Galen de pulsuum differentiis 1.3, 8.501K. 
10 So also Asper (2007: 347): “Das Kernstück seiner Lehre, die Zuordnung der 27 einfachen Pulse zu ihren 
Merkmale nach drei Diastasenklassen wird in der Form eines διάγραµµα gegeben.” 
11 Latour (1987: 47). 
12 The important contributions to the debate are von Staden (1975), Lloyd (1979: 221-25, 1991a).  
13 Galen de pulsuum differentiis 1.3, 8.500-501K. 
14 Asper’s (2007: 347-8) description of the charts is therefore correct as a rhetorical description: “Die 
Tabelle entlastet dabei den Text.” Asper’s (2007: 337-343) distinction between “Primärdiskurs” and “Meta-
Disurks” of de pulsuum differentiis (books 1 and 2-4, respectively) is an important rhetorical divide.  
However, the rhetorical features Asper (2007: 348) identifies with the charts – “Der Text kann vollständig 
dekontextualisiert werden and wird damit autonom” – lead to important conceptual consequences in pulse 
theory itself.  A decontextualized description of a pulse from Galen’s chart may remove the name of the 
pulse (e.g. µέγας, µικρός) and its neighboring descriptions but it leaves the differentiae with which the 
pulse is located in the chart unquestioned: the Galenic categories of dimensionality or binary qualitative 
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Galenic discourse about the pulse. 
After summarizing the contents of one chart Galen remarks on the uselessness of 
attempting to name all the combinations when a description itself is enough to classify 
the pulse-type.15  The charts and Galen’s attitude toward names proper suggest that he 
regards the species information of various charts sufficient to identify a pulse.  Galen’s 
classification is therefore deliberately exhaustive: a physician needs no more than the 
eight generic differentiae and the enumerated species to classify and identify a pulse; all 
possible sphygmological phenomena are accounted for and can be located within the 
dialectical matrix of Galen’s charts.   
Furthermore it is part of Galen’s self-presentation to oppose elements of his 
method to Herophilus’.  In a long and important chapter at the end of book 3 of On 
Distinguishing Pulses Galen considers the question of rhythm of the pulse, the 
comparison of the time of the dilation to the time of the contraction.16  Rhythm requires 
speaking accurately of time and having a sense of time in regards to pulse requires 
perception of the entirety of the motion of the artery; but the problem, as Galen sees it, is 
that the entirety of the arterial motion is not perceptible: the first parts of motion of the 
dilation and the final parts of the contraction are imperceptible.17  Nevertheless, if only 
the final part of the dilation can be perceived, that provides an ability to infer 
(συλλογισµός) its quantity, namely the quantity of the interval between dilation and 
contraction.18  Yet this too is not assured since there are further complications due to the 
type of pulse: for example, in vehement pulses (σφοδροῖς σφυγµοῖς) squeezing an artery 
moderately allows a recognition of its initial parts of motion but not of its interval.  The 
combination of practical problems and theoretical need leads Galen to suppose that only 
in vehement pulses can we actually speak accurately of rhythm, a solution which is 
                                                
measurement remain attached as formative descriptions.  Therefore the rhetorical divide of “Primärdiskurs” 
and “Meta-Disurks” is still only a measure of the self-reflection that Galen intends the reader to carry to 
the subject of the text, not necessarily the self-reflection that Galen himself brings to the text.   
15 Galen de pulsuum differentiis 1.4, 8.507-8K.  See text 1 below. 
16 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.902-16K.  Translated as text 4 below. 
17 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.903K. 
18 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.903-4K. 
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unsatisfactory.19   
Galen presents his solution to the problem of rhythm at the very end of the book 3 
of On Distinguishing Pulses in another chart.20  Each dilation and contraction is measured 
relatively, from whatever part of it can be perceived by touch.  The Galenic doctor rates 
the dilation fast, moderate, or slow and does likewise for the contraction; the combination 
of both arterial motions are then located among those on the chart.  The doctor thus 
avoids the problem that Galen initially identified: to measure the entirety of arterial 
motion is to measure the ratio of time length of each dilation and contraction.  But in 
Galen’s method there is no need to measure the entire motion of the dilation and 
contraction, since any perceptible part is taken to stand for the whole.  Given an even and 
regular pulse, the chart is applicable for any pulse except the dullest, the parts of whose 
contraction are not perceptible. 
Galen lists three different possible solutions to the problem of rhythm, depending 
on whether the doctor believes that the contraction is perceptible to touch.21  These 
solutions Galen also dismisses, because they either ignore dilation or limit the usefulness 
of rhythm by taking the perceptible part of dilation in relation to all the remaining parts, 
namely contraction and the two rests.  Galen gains no aid from the tradition of pulse-
theory because Herophilus’ words on rhythm are unclear. 
αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Ἡρόφιλος πολλαχόθι µὲν ῥυθµῶν εἰς τὰς προγνώσεις µνηµονεύει, 
χαλεπὸν µὴν ἐξευρεῖν τί ποτε καὶ λέγει τὸν ῥυθµὸν, ἆρά γε τὸν λόγον τοῦ τῆς 
διαστολῆς µόνον χρόνου πρὸς τὸν τῆς συστολῆς µόνης, ἢ καὶ αὖ τὸν τῆς 
ἑποµένης ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν κινήσεων ἠρεµίας προσνέµει. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τοῖς 
ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ κληθεῖσιν Ἡροφιλείοις ὁµολογεῖται, τί ποθ’ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν φρονεῖ γε 
ὄντως. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ λέξις αὐτοῦ θάτερον ἐνδείκνυται σαφῶς οὔθ’ ἡ τῶν 
πραγµάτων φύσις ἱκανὴ πιστώσασθαι. 
 
Herophilus himself many places mentions rhythms for the purpose of prognoses 
yet it is difficult to discover just how he means ‘rhythm’, whether at least as the 
ratio of the time-unit of the dilation alone to the time-unit of the contraction alone 
or does he attribute moreover the <time-unit> of the following rest to each of the 
motions.  For this reason there is not even agreement among those called 
Herophileans after him, in regards to whatever he at least really thought about 
                                                
19 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.907K. 
20 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.914-6K.  
21 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.909K. 
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these things.  For neither do his words indicate clearly which of the two nor does 
the nature of the matter suffice for confirmation.22  
 
Herophilus aims to use rhythm in pulse doctrine for prognosis.  Galen wants to consider 
rhythm for the purposes of prognosis but believes the terminology of the Herophileans of 
beats and parts is more confusing than illuminating.23  But since Herophilus’ words on 
rhythm do not help to determine whether to include or exclude the rests accompanying 
dilation and contraction and thereby what numerator and denominator the ratio of the 
pulse-rhythm ought to be, Galen puts tradition aside to develop his charts.  
Galen thus presents himself as a reviser of the Herophilean tradition of pulse 
rhythms which is founded on a musical terminology of “up-beats” and “down-beats” in 
rhythm.  Like Herophilus, the originator of the Greek pulse tradition, Galen accepts that 
‘rhythm’ is an acceptable category to describe the pulse and that the purpose of the 
description is its use for prognosis.  Galen nonetheless problematizes the tradition: Was 
there a rest between the beats?  If so, did Herophilus feel them too?  Yet not the entirety 
of dilation and contraction can be felt in every pulse.  Galen claims that the categories 
embodied in his charts solve the problems inherent in Greek pulse tradition. 
Therefore I give here a selection of the most important evidence about Galen’s 
categories of the pulse: Galen’s pulse charts.  In On the Differentiae of Pulses Galen 
offers four charts of pulse differentiae in three different sections of text; in On 
Distinguishing Pulses Galen offers a further chart.  I print first the chart of the 
differentiae in Greek according to Kühn’s edition and then a translation of the 
surrounding context of text and the chart within the text.   
 
Text 1: Galen de pulsuum differentiis 1.3-1.4, 8.500-508K  
 
Chart: 
α´ µακρὸς πλατὺς ὑψηλὸς µέγας 
β´ µακρὸς πλατὺς σύµµετρος  
γ´ µακρὸς πλατὺς ταπεινὸς  
δ´ µακρὸς σύµµετρος ὑψηλὸς  
                                                
22 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.911-2K = Herophilus fr. 173.4-12 vS. 
23 Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.912K. 
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ε´ µακρὸς σύµµετρος σύµµετρος ἰσχνὸς 
ϛʹ µακρὸς σύµµετρος ταπεινὸς ἰσχνὸς 
ζ´ µακρὸς στενὸς ὑψηλὸς  
η´ µακρὸς στενὸς σύµµετρος ἰσχνὸς 
θ´ µακρὸς στενὸς ταπεινὸς ἰσχνὸς 
ι´ σύµµετρος πλατὺς ὑψηλὸς ἁδρὸς    | 505 
ια´ σύµµετρος πλατὺς σύµµετρος  
ιβ´ σύµµετρος πλατὺς ταπεινὸς  
ιγ´ σύµµετρος σύµµετρος ὑψηλὸς  
ιδ´ σύµµετρος σύµµετρος σύµµετρος µέσος 
ιε´ σύµµετρος σύµµετρος ταπεινὸς  
ιϛʹ σύµµετρος στενὸς ὑψηλὸς  
ιζ´ σύµµετρος στενὸς σύµµετρος  
ιη´ σύµµετρος στενὸς ταπεινὸς ἰσχνὸς 
ιθ´ βραχὺς πλατὺς ὑψηλὸς ἁδρὸς 
κ´ βραχὺς πλατὺς σύµµετρος ἁδρὸς 
κα´ βραχὺς πλατὺς ταπεινὸς  
κβ´ βραχὺς σύµµετρος ὑψηλὸς ἁδρὸς 
κγ´ βραχὺς σύµµετρος σύµµετρος ἁδρὸς 
κδ´ βραχὺς σύµµετρος ταπεινὸς               | 506 
κε´ βραχὺς στενὸς ὑψηλὸς  
κϛʹ βραχὺς στενὸς σύµµετρος  
κζ´ βραχὺς στενὸς ταπεινὸς µικρὸς 
 
Translation:  
| 500 1.3 Since the body of the artery is concave and long and spherical, and moves 
entirely in a double motion composed from opposite parts, either it collapses into itself 
from every direction or dilates in every direction, and this doubled motion is called pulse, 
it is necessary that two rests occur in it in each case: one is after the moment of dilation 
before contraction begins, the second is after the moment of contraction before dilation 
begins.  The touch of experts recognizes these two rests and reason proves nothing less.  
For before the previous motion ceases, the artery would not begin the opposite motion.  
Indeed ceasing is to hold position and be at rest.  Therefore there is rest between the 
motions.  Therefore it is entirely necessary that there be some time-unit of the motions 
themselves particular to each, | 501 and a time-unit of the rests, again particular to these.  
Since the artery has three dimensions, just as any other body – length and breadth and 
depth – it is entirely necessary that in each of the dimensions there be some quantity of 
dilation and contraction.   It is further necessary that it have tension, either weak and 
faint, or readily and strongly active; and that the tunic itself of the artery either be soft or 
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hard, but that the internal width either be empty somehow or full; and that in all these 
things there occurs at some time a regularity and at some time an irregularity; and that 
there be some ratio of the time-unit of the dilation to that of the contraction; and that 
beyond these no other differentia can occur in one pulse.  For it is necessary to examine 
the time-unit of the motions or the rests, or the quantity of the dimensions through which 
they move, or the quality of the activity, or [the quality] of the tunic of the artery or of its 
concavity, or [the quality] of how comparable things are relative to each other (they can 
obviously be the same kind of things) – [so] all these things have been said and | 502 
nothing is left out of the account in any way but all these differentiae of the genera in one 
pulse have now been said.  There are two more so-called systematic differentiae 
according to which pulses are comparable with each other, and we mean regularity and 
irregularity, and order and disorder. 
1.4  The differentiae by species are many more than each of the genera, which we already 
covered, having begun from the genus according to motion itself.  For it is necessary that 
the motion either be moderate and natural or have become somehow faster or somehow 
slower, so that all the differentiae of pulses are three according to genus: fast, which 
happens as the artery moves in little time; slow, as the artery moves in much time; and 
moderate, as the artery moves in moderate time.  The differentiae of pulses according to 
the quantity of dilation are nine in number considered according to one dimension in each 
of three dimensions.  According to the length of the artery, what is moderate in it and 
what exceeds its length or falls short: | 503 the pulse that exceeds is called long, the pulse 
that falls short is called short.  According to the breadth there is the moderate in it and the 
two immoderates: the pulse over the moderate is called broad and the pulse opposite it is 
narrow.  Likewise in the dimension by depth there will be the moderate pulse, the lofty 
pulse, and the lowly pulse.  These nine differentiae of pulses considered in one 
dimension, and the differentiae of pulses in the three dimensions together are twenty-
seven.  You will understand these things clearly from the chart, for one will be both long 
and broad and lofty; let it have been written first of all.  Another will be both long and 
broad and moderate in depth; let it have been written second.  Another will be long and 
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broad and lowly; let it have been written third.  Following them all the remaining pulses 
will be recognized by similar means, since two of the original dimensions will remain the 
same as the third, the last changes: e.g. so the fourth will be long and moderate in breadth 
and lofty; the fifth will be long and moderate in breadth and moderate in depth; the sixth 
will be long and moderate in breadth and lowly; and then the other three again, the first 
dimension staying long, | 504 the second dimension staying narrow, and the third 
changing three times.  These are nine, the first dimension remaining long in respect to 
length, the other two changing variously.  There will be a subsequent nine, as the first 
dimension remains moderate in length and the rest change.  And again nine more, as the 
first dimension remains short in respect to length, the rest changing. 
 
1 long broad lofty                        great 
2 long  broad moderate 
3 long broad lowly 
4 long moderate lofty 
5 long moderate moderate                weak 
6 long moderate lowly                      weak 
7 long narrow lofty  
8 long narrow moderate                weak 
9 long narrow lowly                      weak  | 505 
10 moderate broad lofty                       strong 
11 moderate broad moderate 
12 moderate broad lowly 
13 moderate moderate lofty 
14 moderate moderate moderate                medium 
15 moderate moderate lowly 
16 moderate narrow lofty 
17 moderate narrow moderate 
18 moderate narrow lowly                     weak 
19 short broad lofty                       strong 
20 short broad moderate                strong 
21 short broad lowly                      
22 short moderate lofty                       strong 
23 short moderate moderate                strong 
24 short moderate lowly                                    | 506 
25 short narrow lofty 
26 short narrow moderate 
27 short narrow lowly                      small 
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There are these twenty-seven pulses in quantity occurring in three dimensions at the same 
time.  Two of them have names agreed upon by everyone, the first and the last in the list.  
The one is called great, the other small, but all the rest have no amount.  For neither the 
so-called weak nor strong pulses make clear one kind of thing of those from the chart but 
they are classed by many generically.  For in those cases where the dimension in length 
surpasses to the two remaining, they call all these weak.  In those cases where the 
remaining surpasses this dimension, they call them strong on the other hand.  Therefore 
both the fifth and the sixth pulse in the chart, and still in addition to them the eighth and 
ninth and the 18th are called weak, opposite them as strong are the tenth pulse in the chart 
and the nineteenth and the twenty | 507 -second and the twenty-third.  These names are 
more generic and common to many.  They already call these same pulses alternately, 
light [lepton] for weak and thick [pachyn] for strong.  Nor do we have a name proper for 
the pulse moderate in three dimensions, which alone in the twenty-seven is natural [kata 
physin].  We make this clear by speech, either saying that the pulse is moderate in the 
three dimensions, or is medium of great and small, or is natural [kata physin] in the 
quantity of dilation, or however in a different way we hope that what is said will be clear.  
Therefore it occurs to me to be amazed at those clever only in names, who always seek 
what <name> it is necessary to call some pulse – unless they should cease from strife for 
this reason, when they see that many pulses do not have a particular name and that this 
doesn’t hurt their teaching [didaskalian] so long as they are still able to make clear their 
meaning in a description [logō].  Well then, for some to name a pulse short and narrow 
and lowly is like saying that there is a bipedal animal.  In this case here the description 
[logos] is “bipedal animal” but the name of the thing [pragmatos] of which | 508 the 
description is is “man”, so also in pulses the name is “great”, but its description [logos] is 
“long and broad and lofty.”  And again the description of another pulse is short, broad, 
and lowly but it has no name.  Yet we will speak again about these matters. 
 




α´ ταχὺς βραδὺς 
β´ ταχὺς ταχὺς 
γ´ ταχὺς σύµµετρος 
δ´ βραδὺς βραδὺς 
ε´ βραδὺς ταχὺς 
ϛʹ βραδὺς σύµµετρος 
ζ´ σύµµετρος βραδὺς 
η´ σύµµετρος ταχὺς 




α´ ταχὺς ταχὺς βραδὺς  
β´ ταχὺς ταχὺς ταχὺς  
γ´ ταχὺς ταχὺς σύµµετρος  
δ´ ταχὺς βραδὺς βραδὺς  
ε´ ταχὺς βραδὺς ταχὺς  
ϛʹ ταχὺς βραδὺς σύµµετρος  
ζ´ ταχὺς σύµµετρος βραδὺς  
η´ ταχὺς σύµµετρος ταχὺς  
θ´ ταχὺς σύµµετρος σύµµετρος  
ι´ βραδὺς ταχὺς βραδὺς  
ια´ βραδὺς ταχὺς ταχὺς | 534 
ιβ´ βραδὺς ταχὺς σύµµετρος  
ιγ´ βραδὺς βραδὺς βραδὺς  
ιδ´ βραδὺς βραδὺς ταχὺς  
ιε´ βραδὺς βραδὺς σύµµετρος  
ιϛʹ βραδὺς σύµµετρος βραδὺς  
ιζ´ βραδὺς σύµµετρος ταχὺς  
ιη´ βραδὺς σύµµετρος σύµµετρος  
ιθ´ σύµµετρος ταχὺς βραδὺς  
κ´ σύµµετρος ταχὺς ταχὺς  
κα´ σύµµετρος ταχὺς σύµµετρος  
κβ´ σύµµετρος βραδὺς βραδὺς  
κγ´ σύµµετρος βραδὺς ταχὺς  
κδ´ σύµµετρος βραδὺς σύµµετρος  
κε´ σύµµετρος σύµµετρος βραδὺς  
κϛʹ σύµµετρος σύµµετρος ταχὺς  
κζ´ σύµµετρος σύµµετρος σύµµετρος | 535 
 
Translation: 
| 530 1.15 Therefore having said sufficiently that, of the pulses unequal in one part, 
whenever they make their irregularity equal, there are six differentiae total and that we 
have not found any of these kind ending either from the slowest motion to the fastest or 
from the fastest to the slowest, let us speak about the unequal pulses already making their 
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turning [sc. from slow to fast or vice versa]: in these there clearly seem to be sometimes 
two, sometimes three differences of motion.  For me sometimes a fourth difference 
appeared dimly.  Perhaps someone training at length and attending to the matter and 
practicing his touch might be able to recognize four differences. | 531 But now we will 
speak about those things that occur clearly and often both to me and to those who have 
honed their skill regarding pulses, whenever the motion of the artery makes either two or 
three perceptible differences: for if there are two differences, there will be six figures of 
combinations; if three, there will be twenty-four combinations.  Why then since there are 
three pulses in each of the differing motions – swift, slow, and moderate – do I not say 
that there are nine differentiae from their combination but six, you may learn if you 
recognize that, by supposing that the same pulse happens twice (no rest coming between 
them), it makes one equal whole.  For this reason three of the nine combinations no 
longer qualify <as pulses> in which there is not still an unequal pulse, but rather <there 
is> an equal pulse, whether fast or slow or moderate, as is clear in the chart.  For the 
second pulse in it and the fourth and the ninth become equal, the second is fast, the fourth 
is slow, and the ninth is moderate.  If there is some difference of these <speeds> in 
relation to themselves – the fast to the fast, or the slow | 532 to the slow – let it be ignored 
at present.  For it will present a greater unclarity.  But in the case of the same <speeds> 
and those <speeds> equal to each other let the present discourse come to an end. 
 
1 fast slow 
2 fast fast 
3 fast moderate 
4 slow slow 
5 slow fast 
6 slow moderate 
7 moderate slow 
8 moderate fast 
9 moderate moderate 
 
And so, if, supposing three motions differing with each other and changing pulses in each 
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of the three <motions>24, you would conjugate them, | 533 there will be twenty-seven 
figures and three of them will necessarily coincide in equality.  This too is clear in the 
chart. 
 
1 fast fast slow  
2 fast fast fast  
3 fast fast moderate  
4 fast slow slow  
5 fast slow fast  
6 fast slow moderate  
7 fast moderate slow  
8 fast moderate fast  
9 fast moderate moderate  
10 slow fast slow  
11 slow fast fast  
12 slow fast moderate | 534 
13 slow slow slow  
14 slow slow fast  
15 slow slow moderate  
16 slow moderate slow  
17 slow moderate fast  
18 slow moderate moderate  
19 moderate fast slow  
20 moderate fast fast  
21 moderate fast moderate  
22 moderate slow slow  
23 moderate slow fast  
24 moderate slow moderate  
25 moderate moderate slow  
26 moderate moderate fast  
27 moderate moderate moderate | 535 
 
Therefore since three <pulses> are the same in these columns (the second in the chart, 
and the thirteenth and twenty-seventh), the second will be fast, the thirteenth will be 
slow, and the last will be medium.  Twelve other pulses coincide with the first chart.  For 
two <of them> would be the same to the first pulse from the first chart, the first and the 
fourth from the second chart, the first has more speed, the fourth more slowness.  The 
                                                
24 Reading καθ᾽ ἑκάστην αὐτῶν τῶν τρεῖς σφυγµούς ὑπαλλάττων. 
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same as the third [from the first chart] are the third and the ninth, the third has more 
speed, the ninth more moderation.  The same as the fifth [from the first chart] are the 
eleventh and the fourteenth, the eleventh has more speed, the fourteenth has more 
slowness.  The same as the sixth [from the first chart] are the fifteenth and the eighteenth, 
the fifteenth has more slowness, the eighteenth has more moderation.  The same as the 
seventh [from the first chart] are the twenty-second and the twenty-fifth, the twenty-
second has more slowness, the twenty-fifth has more moderation.  The remaining two 
from the second chart, the twentieth and twenty-sixth, are the same as the eighth from the 
first chart, the twentieth has more speed, the twenty-sixth has more moderation.  There 
would be controversy here, if there were two different motions in the dilation, because 
some would set all such pulses into the earlier | 536 chart, yet others would calculate their 
magnitudes and thus, if they were equal, set them into the earlier chart, but if one pulse 
was double, into the second chart.  I would try to judge the battle if I had hope for some 
gain.  But since it suffices to define them to this degree, namely that sometimes one of 
the motions is carried from a greater distance, sometimes the other, or even both evenly, 
let someone mentioning this set the aforesaid pulses into whichever of the charts he 
wishes in order that he may know what meaning each motion has.  That the remaining 
twelve pulses from the second chart, which are unequal in every respect, share nothing in 
common with those in the first chart is obviously clear; to which the very fact of their 
inequality is added – not as if the twelve other <pulses> would share [this] with the first 
chart if they were not unequal, for they are, but rather <it is obvious> that they make 
clear their inequality in the three differentiae of movement, the others having only two 
differentiae, and, to one counting in the order from the first, | 537 they are fifth and 6th 
and 7th and 8th and 10th and 16th and 19th and 21st and 23rd and 24th. 
 
Text 3: Galen de pulsuum differentiis 2.8, 8.615-617K 
 
Chart: 
α´ µακρὸς πλατὺς 
β´ µακρὸς σύµµετρος 
γ´ µακρὸς στενὸς 
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δ´ πλατὺς σύµµετρος 
ε´ σύµµετρος σύµµετρος 
ϛʹ στενὸς σύµµετρος 
ζ´ βραχὺς πλατὺς 
η´ βραχὺς σύµµετρος 
θ´ βραχὺς στενὸς 
 
Translation: 
| 615 For this reason we resolved the entire nature [physin] of the pulses into the 
differentiae composing its nature, naming the one differentia according to the quantity of 
the dilation, another according to the quality of the beat, another according to the quality 
of the tunic, and the others which have been said correspondingly.  Then again we sought 
the simple concepts in them in order that, what ratio the differentia in quantity of the 
dilation has to the pulse’s whole nature nature composed of all its parts, we would 
likewise discover something else to that very nature25 has some similar ratio.  For as that 
genus is a combination of the entire nature of the pulse, so again the genus itself fills each 
of the dimensions.  To conceive simultaneously of two dimensions is not necessary for 
the filling out of the entire pulse nor for the one dimension in regard to the quantity of the 
dilation. Therefore discourse about these things is superfluous and we have well passed 
by them, but Archigenes has treated them poorly, rending them apart as if a dog, and 
speaks of six conjugations, | 616 and passed by the rest, which are twenty-one.  For it is 
necessary that all the differentiae of each of the dimensions be joined to each of the 
differentiae of the rest, so that there is a conjugation of nine differentiae in each of the 
two dimensions and all together are twenty-seven.  I record one conjugation, from which 
it is possible to learn about the remaining <conjugations>. 
 
1 long broad 
2 long moderate 
3 long narrow 
4 broad moderate 
5 moderate moderate 
                                                
25 Reading τι παραπλασίον <λόγον> ἔχον ἄλλο. 
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6 narrow moderate26 
7 short broad 
8 short moderate 
9 short narrow            | 617 
  
So in this chart we made nine conjugations, combining the three differentiae according to 
length with the three differentiae according to breadth.  Again, there would be another 
chart in the same manner having the three differentiae of depth joined with the three 
differentiae of length, and also a third chart in which the three differentiae of breadth will 
be joined with the three differentiae of depth.  And it is obvious that there will be nine 
conjugations in each of them.  Consequently there are twenty-seven conjugations.  
Therefore it has already become clear that, when even those two were imagined, 
Archigenes passed over many, just as in even all the rest. 
 
Text 4: Galen de dignoscendis pulsibus 3.3, 8.909-916K. 
Chart: 
διαστολὴ διαστολὴ διαστολὴ 
   
ταχεῖα σύµµετρος βραδεῖα 
ταχεῖα σύµµετρος βραδεῖα 
ταχεῖα σύµµετρος βραδεῖα    | 915 
   
συστολὴ συστολὴ συστολὴ 
   
ταχεῖα ταχεῖα ταχεῖα 
σύµµετρος σύµµετρος σύµµετρος 
βραδεῖα βραδεῖα βραδεῖα 
 
Translation: 
                                                
26 So Kühn’s text.  However we would logically expect the columns of the fourth through sixth rows of the 
chart to be reversed as follows: 
δ´ σύµµετρος πλατὺς 
ε´ σύµµετρος σύµµετρος 
ϛʹ σύµµετρος στενὸς 
The translation correspondingly would be 
4 moderate broad 
5 moderate moderate 
6 moderate narrow 
I cannot explain why the columns in these rows are reversed. 
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| 909 Therefore, since there are those three opinions about the rhythms in pulses, those 
from the second opinion will confess that they can say nothing against the aforesaid 
difficulties, those from the first and third opinions may seem to be well off, the first 
because they compare the time-unit of the manifest motion to every remaining [time-unit] 
of what they call rest, the third because they compare the time-unit of the manifest 
motion together with the time-unit of the rest with them against the remaining time-unit, 
having made the beginning of the contraction a limit of the composition of the previous 
two time-units.  It is worthy of each to wonder – for the first group, if they speak only 
about the events of the contraction, | 910 forgetting to speak about the dilation.  For in 
dull pulses we showed that the quantity of the interval in the dilation is knowable by 
inference [sullogismos] but that the time-unit of the motion is indistinguishable, since 
only the ends external to the motion come to perception.  I do not know how they claim 
to compare the time-unit of dilation to all the rest, for the perceptible part of its time-unit 
is very small, unless they wish in some way to compare this very thing alone to all the 
rest.  The rhythm for them would thus be the ratio of the manifest time of the motion in 
dilation to all the rest.  If they mean this, they claim it is possible in some way but not 
useful at least, since no prognosis is able to made from such a rhythm in which the time-
unit of the manifest part of the contraction is compared to all the rest, [namely] to that 
composed from the time-unit of the external rest and <the time-unit>27 of the contraction 
and, as a third part, the time-unit of the internal rest and, as a fourth part, [the time-unit] 
of the non-manifest part of the dilation.  In addition to the fact that nothing useful can be 
taken from this teaching, still | 911 these doctors confuse the understanding of rhythm, as 
if someone pretending to be a musician claimed that rhythm is not a ratio of the time-unit 
of up-beat to the time-unit of down-beat but the manifest part of the up-beat to every 
remaining time-unit.  Like to them those from the third school are mistaken, thinking it 
better than the previous group to attribute alone the time-unit of the external rest to the 
time-unit of dilation, insofar as they forget that the time-unit of the contraction is 
                                                
27 Reading καὶ <τοῦ> τῆς συστολῆς. 
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indistinguishable to perception in dull pulses and thus are likewise tripped up.  In the 
third place they qualify in addition something remarkable, that the primary impulse of the 
contraction is entirely perceptible, although this is not perceptible in the case of dull 
pulses.  Therefore in all these things necessarily many difficulties occur in sects 
[haeresesi] in the differentiation of rhythms and for this reason I think that those after 
Herophilus did not try to write something for prognosis from rhythms.  Herophilus 
himself many places mentions rhythms for the purpose of prognoses yet it is difficult to 
discover just how he means ‘rhythm’, whether at least as the ratio of the time-unit of the 
dilation alone to the <time-unit> | 912 of the contraction alone or does he attribute 
moreover the time-unit of the following rest to each of the motions.  For this reason there 
is not even agreement among those called Herophileans after him, in regards to whatever 
he at least really thought about these things.  For neither do his words indicate clearly 
which of the two nor does the nature of the matter suffice for confirmation.  Therefore if 
we preserve one of the two opinions, following the musicians, we will attribute time-units 
of the rests to the time-units of the preceding motions; and if [we preserve] the need for 
prognosis, comparing motion to motion, we will examine the time-units of the rests 
individually.  Since it is necessary to eliminate one of the two, either to eliminate the 
thought of the name or to overturn the purpose, we are stuck in a difficult-to-handle 
conundrum.  Nevertheless, since it seems necessary to pick one of them, prefer what is 
useful for prognosis, despising the name from the musicians.  For what will we harm by 
making prognoses from proportion in respect to the time-unit during the motions though 
we do not have a name peculiar to it?  The art is harmed not in a situation when we are at 
a loss for names but in situations where we cannot make prognoses. Let it be | 913 
therefore for practical purposes that rhythm is established in the ratio of the time-unit of 
movements, since we will separately make an inquiry in regards to Herophilus’ opinion.  
But when we do this, the difficulty still seems to remain, since not every time-unit of the 
dilation can be known, except in the most vehement pulses, nor is the beginning of the 
contraction perceptible in all cases.  How therefore was Herophilus first to establish some 
time-unit in relation to sense-perception, in which he, by measuring all the rest, claimed 
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that they consist either of two or three or more, or are of perfect units and not-subject-to-
increase, as they themselves call them, or units decreased a little or a great degree or the 
greatest degree?  For in the case of all pulses he seems to write as though precisely 
distinguishing the time-units either of the motions alone or also of the rests with them – 
for it makes no difference at least to the present difficulty – or if not in the case of all 
<pulses> but in those in which it is possible, in these alone must he be thought to write 
such things.  So we will perhaps examine this separately later some time.  Now the task is 
not to investigate Herophilus’ opinion but to discover what is both true and useful, | 914 
we must try to indicate the following clearly, how the matter was discovered as we 
worked in the procedures themselves.  It goes as follows: comparing the quality of the 
motion in the dilation to the quality of the motion in the contraction we discover nine 
primary differentiae which are clarified in the chart, and in each differentia there are 
many others inexpressible in theory but more or less distinguishable during the 
observations themselves.  What meaning each differentia has we will make clear in On 
Prognosis.   But now we will first subscribe the chart, since it will be readily clear to 
those trained in the first book of On Differentiae of Pulses.  Following we will say in 
what way again many differentiae exist differing from each other in quantity, even if they 
are of the same kind. 
dilation dilation dilation 
   
fast moderate slow 
fast moderate slow 
fast moderate slow  | 915 
   
contraction contraction contraction 
   
fast fast fast 
moderate moderate moderate 
slow slow slow 
 
Therefore since the first differentiae written in the chart have a fast motion, it indicates 
that the motion in dilation is spurred on to the greatest degree, and the motion in 
contraction is greater by a small degree than the moderate and medium motion, or on the 
 232 
other hand that the motion in dilation is greater by a little, and that the motion in 
contraction is much greater or both are greater by a little or both by a lot, or the one by a 
little, the other by a lot, or less by a little or by a lot, or however else.  The variety is 
obvious.  It is not possible to say either that this seems not to happen, or that it has no 
meaning.  For indeed it happens and very much has meaning.  For us it sufficed to make 
prognoses from this distinction, since we had no need of primary time-units, both whole 
in their parts and enlarged.  That such a distinction needs no entire | 916 motion but can 
become clear to anyone through a chance part of it, except if it should be unequal (for 
then the part is not equal to the whole).  Moreover not even in very dull pulses is it 
possible to employ this method.  For it is not possible in the case of these pulses to 
recognize the first beginning of the contraction, not any part of it is worthy of record. 
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Appendix B 
Archimedes Ephodos 426-438 
 
 I print here the first 16 columns of the Archimedes Palimpsest’s text of 
Archimedes’ Ephodos, just until the beginning of the second proposition.  Since the 
palimpsest is the unique witness to the Ephodos, there are two challenges: to establish the 
precise reading of the unique witness and then to emend the text.  I am therefore 
primarily concerned to provide a readable text based on a transcription of the palimpsest 
as free from doubt as possible, while retaining as much of the formatting of the 
palimpsest as possible.  My text is a composite and reconstructed text, not a transcription 
of the palimpsest. 
The text of the Ephodos comes from a single manuscript, the well-known 
Archimedes Palimpsest.28  First read by J.L. Heiberg in Istanbul in 1906, the palimpsest 
primarily contains Archimedean treatises; for Floating Bodies, Stomachion, and Ephodos 
it is the unique Greek text.  Heiberg read the manuscript in situ and took many 
photographs as evidence for his second edition of Archimedes (1910-15); he refers to it 
as codex C in his (1913) apparatus.  At some point soon after Heiberg’s second visit in 
1908 the manuscript was lost to scholarly study until 1998 when it was purchased at 
auction by an anonymous owner, who has allowed scholars to examine and study it.  
Reviel Netz and collaborators are preparing a new edition of the Ephodos; his team’s 
transcription of the palimpsest has been publically available online since October 2008. 
The palimpsest has fared badly since Heiberg examined it, suffering the loss of several 
leaves and increased physical deterioration due to mold.  On the other hand, 
technological advances have added new readings to Heiberg’s edition of the text. 
Since I have not seen the palimpsest, my foundational text is the Netz et al. (2008) 
transcription, which notes words or endings abbreviated by the palimpsest per symbolum.  
I take the Netz et al. (2008) transcription to be the most accurate transcription of the 
manuscript whenever transcribed readings are in dispute.  Thus at line 285 I write in the 
                                                
28 See Netz and Noel (2007) for a history of the codex. 
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apparatus ἐ<κ>δοθεῖσαν scripsi : ἐδοθεῖσαν Netz : ἐκ̣δοθεῖσαν Heiberg – whereby I mean 
that Netz et al. (2008) has accurately read the palimpsest’s ἐδοθεῖσαν to Heiberg’s (1913) 
reading ἐκ̣δοθεῖσαν and therefore I emend Netz et al.’s (2008) transcription (which 
happens to be Heiberg’s (1913) transcribed reading). Therefore, where I prefer Heiberg’s 
(1913) readings, it is because he transcribes the reading demanded by sense. 
 Still I recognize that the deterioration of the manuscript in the nearly full century 
since Heiberg read it is a factor in establishing a witness: if Netz et al. (2008) dot or 
supplement readings where Heiberg (1913) claims to read the manuscript without 
problem, I print no dots nor angle brackets.  Readings given in the apparatus without 
Latin comment refer solely to the transcriptions of the palimpsest; I refer to the 
palimpsest as C when both the readings of Heiberg (1913) and Netz et al. (2008) agree 
and to those individual publications when their transcribed readings disagree; and I note 
where Netz et al. (2008) and Heiberg (1913) differ on the reading of letters and the length 
of the line.  
I err on the side of bibliographic fullness in recording emendations in the 
apparatus.  Unlike previous writers on the Ephodos, I attempt to reconstruct Archimedes’ 
Doric dialect from the Koine of the palimpsest.  My goal in reconstruction has been both 
to harmonize the Ephodos text with J.L. Heiberg’s reconstructions of other Archimedean 
texts for which there was manuscript evidence in Doric and to offer a plausible account 
of several manuscript corruptions.  
The Ephodos is one of the few Archimedean treatises transmitted purely in Koine.  
With only a single manuscript as the source for the text, Heiberg (1913) did not attempt 
to restore Doric forms in the Ephodos.  Knorr (1989) points out that Heiberg (1910-15) 
takes a lower frequency of Doric forms to be evidence for a higher degree of ancient 
editorial activity and this would put Ephodos in the mostly heavily edited group of texts: 
Measurement of the Circle, On the Sphere and Cylinder, and Equilibrium of Planes.29  
The communis opinio is that these texts were the school texts of late antiquity and the 
early Byzantine period (the focus of late ancient commentators like Eutocius), a 
                                                
29 Knorr (1989: 808). 
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surprising place to find the Ephodos, which demands much more mathematical skill of 
the reader.  But the Theodosius φιλόσοφος who wrote a commentary on it according to 
Suda θ 142 is Theodosius of Bithynia fl. 100 BCE, known for his Spherics, and not a 
Byzantine writer.30  Moreover, it seems unlikely if Ephodos was part of the school texts 
of late antiquity and the early Byzantine period that only one palimpsested manuscript 
would have survived. 
I suggest that the text was edited into Koine in antiquity when Theodosius 
published a commentary on the Ephodos.  Modern scholarship has developed a certain 
artificial polarity between ὑποµνήµατα and συγγράµατα to mean, respectively, a 
continuous line-by-line commentary and a monograph treatise on thematic elements, 
often called περί-literature for the form taken by titles.  Pfeiffer (1968) is a typical 
viewpoint,31 although the evidence is hardly unanimous as Harding (2006) points out.32  
Deas (1931) made the useful suggestion, ignored by Harding’s survey, that ὑπόµνηµα εἰς 
means a line-by-line commentary, as opposed to ὑπόµνηµα followed by the genitive.33  
By Deas’ distinction the citation of Suda θ 142, ὑπόµνηµα εἰς τὸ Ἀρχιµήδους 
ἐφοδι<κ>όν, would imply that Theodosius wrote a line-by-line commentary on the 
Ephodos.  Such a detailed commentary does offer the opportunity to intervene deep 
enough into the text that Theodosius could have simply translated the Doric into Koine.  
Beyond the change in dialect, there is no clear indication that Theodosius’ commentary 
has intruded upon the text of the Ephodos in the palimpsest.34 
 I can distinguish at least two stages of transmission by the errors in the 
manuscript, mostly from dittography.  There are errors arising from the translation of 
Archimedes’ Doric into Koine and further errors arising from the transmission of the 
Koine text.  Following are a list of representative mistakes of each kind of transmission.  
Scribal errors in the translation from Doric to Koine: 
                                                
30 See OCD3 s.v. Theodosius (4). 
31 Pfeiffer (1968: 213-8, 278). 
32 Harding (2006: 14-19). 
33 Deas (1931: 76-8). 
34 While there are the possible remnants of two Doric aorist forms, εἴπαµεν (Doric would be εἴπαµες), at 
Netz et al. (2008: 47r2.17, 47r2.19), it is better to see in εἴπαµεν the aorist late Koine form. 
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113 ∆ΕΚΑΠΕΠΕΙϹΜΕΝΟϹ — the leftmost vertical of Π was seen as Ι in dittography 
and written ∆Ε/ΚΑΙ/ΠΕΠΕΙϹΜΕΝΟϹ 
150 ΕΧΟΥϹΑϹTΟΝ — seen without the final sigma and written ΕΧΟΥϹΑ/TΟΝ  
234 ΟϹΑΙΚΑΑΧΘΩϹΙΝ — seen with dittography as ΟϹΑΙ/ΑΙ/ΚΑ/ΑΧΘΩϹΙΝ and 
written ΟϹΑΙ/ΕΑΝ/ΗΧΘΩϹΙΝ  
282-3 ΕΙΜΕΝΕΤΑΞΟΜΕϹ — seen as dittography of Ε as ΕΙΜΕΝ/ΤΑΞΟΜΕϹ and 
written with haplography ΕΙΝΑΙ/ΤΑΞΟΜΕΝ 
Scribal errors in the transmission of the Koine: 
226 ΙϹΗΗΗΤΘ — seen as dittography of Η and written with haplography ΙϹΗ/Η/ΤΘ 
231 ΠΡΟϹΗΤ — written with dittography ΠΡΟϹ/ΤΗΝ/ΗΤ 
 The palimpsest is written in scriptio plena except when the prepositions κατά and 
ἀπό precede word-initial vowels (lines 76, 147, 161, and 238) and I have continued this 
in my reconstruction of the Doric text.  I have attempted to reconstruct Doric forms only 
in accord with Heiberg (1879) and Heiberg (1910-15) and have not consulted any 
contemporary Syracusan inscriptions or coins for comparison.35  I have rewritten the 
following types of words and morphologies into Doric in accord with the forms given by 
Heiberg: articles, pronouns, prepositions, εἰ, ἄν, 1st declension endings, 3rd declension 
genitive singulars, 3rd declension genitive plurals, 3rd declension dative plurals, 3rd 
declension accusative plurals, forms of εἰµί, 3rd person active plurals, 1st person active 
plurals, subjunctives of athematic verbs, present participles of athematic verbs, present 
active infinitives of athematic verbs, perfect active infinitives, -α in stems and personal 
endings for Koine -η except following liquids (but ἄλλαλος, παραλλαλόγραµµος, and 
forms of λαµβάνω retain -α), 3rd person active futures, futures of stems ending in 
dentals, and uncontracted forms of contract verbs (except for ε+ε which remains 
contracted as ει). 
Archimedes’ Doric forms a bridge to Koine, freely mixing older Doric and 
contemporary Koine morphologies and including some Koine syntactical constructions, 
e.g. periphrasis of εἰµί and participle standing for the present (passim) and the parallelism 
                                                
35 Heiberg (1879: 69-94) is the most explicit discussion of Archimedes’ Doric dialect. 
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of finite verb and participle (74-5).  There are several forms, both Doric and Koine, 
which Archimedes seems to have used interchangeably; and in these cases I have retained 
the Koine forms of the palimpsest in the absence of further manuscript evidence.  
Heiberg treated both manuscript εἰς and ἐς as Archimedean forms; I have retained the 
Koine εἰς of the palimpsest throughout.  I have retained the ἐστί of the palimpsest 
throughout and made no attempt to change some forms into ἐντί, a usage of the plural for 
singular that Archimedes sometimes employs.  Moreover, in the absence of more 
evidence, I have left the ending of all feminine participles (except the aorist passive) as  
–ουσα; Heiberg treated both manuscript –ουσα and –οισα as Archimedean forms.  I 
differ, however, with Heiberg in one place where he tolerated both Koine and Doric 
forms: I have changed all forms of ἐάν, εἰ ἄν, and ἤν into the Doric form αἴ κα on the 
basis of the scribal mistakes of 113 and 234.  I have left the title in Koine because, as I 
argue in chapter 3.1.1, I believe that Archimedes’ original title was ΕΦΟ∆ΟϹ and a later 
editor, perhaps Theodosius of Byzantium who wrote the commentary (doubtless in 
Koine) on the Ephodos in the 2nd century BCE, added the rest of the manuscript title. 
 I have made two diagnostic conjectures, the type advocated by West (1973), “that 
is, a conjecture which, while no one can feel confident that it is right, serves the purpose 
of indicating the kind of sense that is really required or the kind of corruption that 
occurred.”36  I intend the following to be diagnostic conjectures: 
62B <αι κυλίνδρου, ἕτερον δὲ ἐπιφανεί> — At least one line has dropped out here; I 
suspect the lacuna was a short one, rather than several lines.  The line I substitute is the 
shortest possible and could have fallen out through homeoteleuton. 
282-3 <ἐ>τάξο|µες — Almost everyone is unhappy with the manuscript reading 
τάξο|µεν.37  Most scholars have wanted to see a verb of searching and sometimes taken 
                                                
36 West (1973: 58). 
37 Rufini (1961: 111-12n.19) is representative of many scholars when he translates “ne ricercherò la 
dimonstrazione geometrica” and explains “La parola che nel testo corrisponde al verbo ‘ne ricercherò’ è il 
verbo τάξοµεν.  Reinach dubitò che fosse questa una lezione giusta; ma Heiberg nella 2a edizione la 
conferma come esatta, e traduce suo loco proponemus (cioè, a suo luogo ne daremo) come se Archimede 
avesse avuto l’intenzione di ripetere, in questa lettera, la dimonstrazione già esposta nell’opuscolo citato. 
Ora, mi pare difficile sostenere questo; credo invece che con quel verbo egli abbia semplicemente voluto 
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τάξοµεν in this sense; or they have rightly understood the word to mean “arrange” and, 
after Heiberg-Zeuthen (1907), believed Archimedes listed his previous proofs at the end 
of the treatise.  I suggest a different sense is needed and, with Arendt (1914), believe that 
the word governs not the geometrical proofs but is a continued statement about the 
mechanical method.  The addition of <ἐ> to the manuscript τάξοµεν is a simpler solution 
paleographically than Arendt’s (1914) change back to a present participle.  
The left-most numbers are my continuous reference numbers in the apparatus; the 
numbers under the column number refer to individual lines on that column.  Heiberg’s 
(1913) page numbers and notations of the mathematical structure are marked on the right. 
I print Heiberg’s diagram for Ephodos proposition 1 for the reader’s benefit, even 
though it is not a critical edition of the diagram in the palimpsest.  
I print at the end a literal translation of the first 16 columns which, following the 
translation practice of Netz (2004a), aims “to remove all barriers having to do with the 
foreign language itself, leaving all other barriers intact.”38 
                                                
indicare l’opportunità e la necessità di ricercare una dimonstrazione geometrica. Con la traduzione che ho 
preferito credo di non essermi allontanato letterale e insieme di aver superato l’accennata difficoltà.” 
38 Netz (2004a: 3). 
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de apparatu critico  
 
Libris usus sum his: 
Arendt = Arendt (1914) 
Heiberg = Heiberg (1913) 
Netz = Netz et al. (2008) 
Reinach = Reinach apud Heiberg (1913) 
 
 
Sigla varia indicavi haec: 
 [  ]   textum exclusendum 
    ̣̣     textum dubium 
<  >  textum supplemendum 
{  }   litterae nequent legi 
  /     paragraphum novum praeeunte Heiberg 






















   
      46r col. 2                                                        
1 ΑΡΧΙΜΗ∆ΟΥϹ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΜΗ-                                                    426 
2 ΧΑΝΙΚΩΝ ΘΕΩΡΗΜΑΤΩΝ ΠΡΟϹ  
3 ΕΡΑΤΟϹΘΕΝΗΝ. ΕΦΟ∆ΟϹ   
4 Ἀρχιµήδης Ἐρατοσθένει εὖ πρά-  
5 ττειν. / ἀπέστειλά τοι πρότερον  
6 τῶν εὑρηµένων θεωρηµάτων  
7 ἀναγράψας αὐτὰς̣ τὰς προτά- 
8 σιες φάµενος εὑρίσκειν ταύτας  
9 τὰς ἀποδείξιας, ἃς οὐκ εἶπα  
10 ἐπὶ τοῦ παρέοντος· ἦσαν δὲ τῶν ἀ- 
11 πεσταλµένων θεωρηµάτων  
12 αἱ προτάσεις αἵδε· τοῦ µὲν 
13 πρώτου· αἴ κα εἰς πρίσµα ὀρθὸν πα- 
14 ραλλαλόγραµµον ἔχον βάσιν 
15 κύλινδρος ἐγγραφῆι τὰς µὲν  
16 βάσιες ἔχων ἐν τοῖς ἀπεναν- 
17 τίον παραλλαλογράµµοις, τὰς  
18 δὲ πλευρὰς ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τε̣σ-̣ 
19 σάρων ἐπιπέδων ἐφαπτοµέ- 
 
3 ΕΡΑΤΟΣΘΕΝΗΝ. ΕΦΟ∆ΟΣ Netz apud quem autem punctum in tituli fine certe intelligendum : 
Ἐρατοσθένην ἔφοδος. Heiberg apud quem deficit punctum inter verba || 5 τοι dorice scripsi : σοι C || 7 
αὐτὰς̣ Netz : αὐτῶν Heiberg || 7-8 προτά|σιες dorice scripsi : προτά|σεις C || 9 ἀποδείξιας dorice scripsi : 
ἀποδείξεις C       εἶπα scripsi cf. Archimedis Arenarius 216.21 εἴπαµες : εἶπον C || 10 παρέοντος dorice 
scripsi : παρόντος C || 12-13 τοῦ µὲν | πρώτου Heiberg : τοῦ µὲν | 
€ 
Α πρώτου Netz || 13 αἴ κα dorice 
scripsi : ἐὰν C || 13-14 πα|ραλλαλόγραµµον dorice scripsi, et scribendum aut certe intellegendum 
τετράγωνον dixit Heiberg cf. linea 23 : πα|ραλληλόγραµµον C || 16 βάσιες dorice scripsi : βάσεις C || 17 
πα|ραλλαλόγραµµον dorice scripsi : πα|ραλληλόγραµµον C || 18-19 τε̣σ|̣σάρων Netz : τ̣ο̣ῦ̣ | π̣ρ̣ι̣σ̣µ ̣α̣τ̣ο̣ς̣ 






















      43v col. 2 
1 νας, διὰ δὲ τοῦ κέντρου τοῦ κύκλου,  
2 ὅς ἐστι βάσις τοῦ κυλίνδρου, καὶ µι- 
3 ᾶς πλευρᾶς τοῦ τετραγώνου τοῦ  
4 ἐν τῶι κατεναντίον ἐπιπέδωι  
5 ἀχθῆι ἐπίπεδον, τὸ ἀχθὲν ἐπί- 
6 πεδον ἀποτεµεῖ τµᾶµα ἀπὸ  
7 τοῦ κυλίνδρου, ὅ ἐστι περιεχόµε- 
8 νον ὑπὸ δύο ἐπιπέδων καὶ ἐπι- 
9 φανείας κυλίνδρου, ἑνὸς µὲν  
10 τοῦ ἀχθέντος, ἑτέρου δὲ ἐν ὧι ἁ  
11 β̣άσις ἐστὶν τοῦ κυλίνδρου, τᾶς <δὲ> µε- 
12 ταξὺ τῶν εἰρηµένων ἐπιπέ- 
13 δων, <ὥστε> τὸ ἀποτµαθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ  
14 κυλίνδρου τµᾶµα ἕκτον µέρος  
15 ἐστὶ τοῦ ὅλου πρίσµατος.  
16 τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου θεω̣ρήµατος ἁ πρότασις  
17 ἅδε ὅτι αἴ κα εἰς κύβον κύλινδρος 
 
20 lineae nihil legit Heiberg || 21 ὅς corr. Heiberg : ὅ C || 25 ἀποτεµεῖ corr. Heiberg : ἀποτέµη Netz : 
ἀποτεµῆ Heiberg       τµᾶµα dorice scripsi : τµῆµα C || 29 ἁ dorice scripsi : ἡ C || 30 τᾶς dorice scripsi : 
τῆς C      <δὲ> scripsi : <δὲ ἐπιφανείας τῆς> suppl. Heiberg || 32 <ὥστε> addidi : <δὲ> ante ἀποτµηθὲν 
suppl. Heiberg       ἀποτµαθὲν dorice scripsi : ἀποτµηθὲν C || 33 τµᾶµα dorice scripsi : τµῆµα C || 35 τοῦ 
δὲ ἑτέρου Heiberg : 
€ 
Β τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου Netz || 35-6 ἡ πρότασις | ἥδε ὅτι ἐὰν Netz, a me dorice rescriptum : ἡ 























      46v col. 1 
1 ἐγγραφῆι τὰς µὲν βάσιες ἔχων  
2 ποτὶ τοῖς κατεναντίον παραλλα- 
3 λογράµµοις, τὰν δὲ ἐπιφάνειαν  
4 τῶν λοιπῶν τεσσάρων ἐπιπέ- 
5 δων ἐφαπτόµενος, ἐγγραφῆι <δὲ> καὶ                                                 428 
6 ἄλλος κύλινδρος εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν κύ- 
7 βον τὰς µὲν βάσιες ἔχων ἐν ἄλλοις  
8 παραλληλογράµµοις, τᾶι ̣δὲ ἐπι- 
9 φανείαι τῶν λοιπῶν τεσσάρων  
10 ἐπιπέδων ἐφαπτόµενος, τὸ πε- 
11 ριλαφθὲν σχῆµα ὑπὸ τᾶν ἐπι- 
12 φανειᾶν τῶν κυλίνδρων, ὅ ἐστιν  
13 ἐν ἀµφοτέροις τοῖς κυλίνδροις,  
14 δίµο̣ιρ̣όν ἐστι τοῦ ὅλου κύβου. / συµ- 
15 βαίνει δὲ ταῦτα τὰ θεωρήµατα  
16 διαφέρειν τῶν πρότερον εὑρη- 
17 µένων· ἐκεῖνα µὲν γὰρ τὰ σχή- 
18 µατα τά τε κωνοειδέα καὶ   
19 σφαιροειδέα καὶ τὰ τµάµατα, 
 
37 βάσιες dorice scripsi : βάσεις C || 38 ποτὶ dorice scripsi : πρὸς C || 38-9 παραλλα|λογράµµοις dorice 
scripsi : παραλλη|λογράµµοις C  || 39 τὰν dorice scripsi : τὴν C || 41 ἐφαπτόµενος Netz, approbante 
Reinach : ἐφαπτοµένην Heiberg       <δὲ> addidi || 43 βάσιες dorice scripsi : βάσεις C || 44 
παραλλαλογράµµοις dorice scripsi : παραλληλογράµµοις C || 44-5 τῆι̣ δὲ ἐπι|φανείαι Netz, a me dorice 
rescriptum : τὴν δὲ ἐπι|φανείαν Heiberg || 46 ἐφαπτόµενος C : ἐφαπτοµένην scr. Heiberg || 46-7 
πε|ριλαφθὲν dorice scripsi : πε|ριληφθὲν C || 47 τᾶν dorice scripsi : τῶν C  || 47-8 ἐπι|φανειᾶν dorice 
scripsi : ἐπι|φανειῶν C || 54 κωνοειδέα dorice scripsi : κωνοειδῆ C || 55 σφαιροειδέα dorice scripsi : 






















      43r col. 1 
1 τὰ αὐτά̣ τε ποτὶ ἄλλαλα καὶ ποτὶ  
2 κώνων καὶ κυλίνδρων συνε- 
3 κρίναµες, ἐπιπέδοις δὲ περι- 
4 εχοµένωι στερεῶι σχήµατι οὐ- 
5 δὲν αὐτῶν ἴσον ἐὸν εὕρηται,  
6 τούτων δὲ τῶν σχηµάτων τὸ µὲν <περιεχόµενον> 
7 δυσὶν ἐπιπέδοις καὶ ἐπιφανεί- 
      <αι κυλίνδρου, ἕτερον δὲ ἐπιφανεί>-  
8 αι̣ς κυλίνδρων, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν  
9 ἐπιπέδοις περιεχοµένωι στερε- 
10 ῶι σχήµατι ἴσον εὑρίσκεται.   
11 τούτων δὴ τῶν θεωρηµάτων  
12 τὰς ἀποδείξιας ἐν τῶιδε τῶι βι- 
13 βλίωι γράψας ἀποστέλλω τοι. /  
14 ὁρῶν δέ τυ, καθάπερ λέγω, σπου- 
15 δαῖον καὶ φιλοσοφία̣ς ̣προεστᾶ- 
16 τα ἀξιολόγως καὶ τὰν ἐν τοῖς  
17 µαθ̣ηµάτεσσιν κατὰ τὸ ὑποπίπτον 
 
56 lineae nihil legit Heiberg        ποτὶ ἄλλαλα … ποτὶ dorice scripsi : πρὸς ἄλληλα … πρὸς C || 57-8 
συνε|κρίναµες dorice scripsi : συνε|κρίναµεν C || 58 ἐπιπέδοις corr. Heiberg : ἐπιπέδων C || 61 τὸ µὲν 
Netz : τῶν Heiberg       <περιεχόµενον> addidi quod, etsi non scriptum esset, certe intelligendum || 62B 
lineam novam inservi et <αι κυλίνδρου, ἕτερον δὲ ἐπιφανεί> addidi || 63 ἑκάτερον scr. Heiberg : ἕκαστον 
C          αὐτῶν Netz : ἑ̣ν̣ὶ̣ τῶν̣ Heiberg || 64-5 ἐπιπέδοις περιεχοµένωι στερε|ῶι σχήµατι scripsi : ἐπιπέδωι 
περιεχοµένωι στερε|ῶι σχήµατι Netz : ἐπιπέδοις περιεχοµένων στερ|εῶν σχηµάτων scr. Heiberg : 
ἐπιπέδωι περιεχοµένωι στερ|εῶι σχήµατι Heiberg || 67 ἀποδείξιας dorice scripsi : ἀποδείξεις C || 68 
ἀποστέλλω scripsi, Heiberg dicente praesens fortasse scribendum ac non excudente hoc : ἀποστελῶ C     
τοι dorice scripsi : σοι C || 69 τυ dorice scripsi : σε C || 70 προεστᾶ|τα dorice scripsi : προεστῶ|τα C || 71 























      46v col. 2 
1 θεωρίαν τετιµηκότα ἐδοκίµα- 
2 σα γράψαι τοι καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ βιβλί- 
3 ον ἐφοδιάσας τρόπου τινὸς ἰδιό- 
4 τητα, καθ᾽ ὅν ἐπιπορευοµένωι 
5 ἐσσεῖται λαµβάνειν ἀφορµὰς εἰς  
6 τὸ δύνασθαί τινα τῶν ̣ἐν τοῖς  
7 µαθηµάτεσσιν θεωρεῖν διὰ τῶν  
8 µηχανικῶν. τοῦτο δὲ πέπ<ε>ισµαι χ̣ρ̣ή- 
9 σιµον εἶµεν οὐδὲν ἧσσον <ἢ> καὶ εἰς τὰν 
10 ἀπόδειξιν αὐτῶν τῶν θεωρη- 
11 µάτων. καὶ γὰρ <τινα τῶν> πρότερον µοι φα- 
12 νέντων µηχανικῶς ὕστερον γε- 
13 ωµετρικῶς ἀπεδείχθη διὰ τὸ  
14 χωρὶς ἀποδείξιος εἶµεν τὰν διὰ τοῦ  
15 τρόπου θεωρίαν· ἑτοιµότερον γάρ  
16 ἐστι προλαβόντι διὰ τοῦ τρόπου γνῶ- 
17 σίν τινα τῶν ζητηµάτων πο- 
18 ρίσασθαι τὰν ἀπόδειξιν µᾶλλον  
19 ἢ µηδενὸς ἐγνωσµένου ζητεῖν.                                                          430 
 
74 τοι dorice scripsi : σοι C || 75 ἐφοδιάσας scripsi : ἐξορίσας̣ Netz : ἐξορίσαι̣ Heiberg || 76 
ἐπιπορευοµένωι scripsi : ἐπιπορευόµενον Netz : σ̣̣οι πα̣̣ρ̣̣εχόµενον Heiberg || 77 ἐσσεῖται dorice scripsi : 
ἔσται C || 79 µαθηµάτεσσιν dorice scripsi : µαθήµασιν C || 80 πέπ<ε>ισµαι corr. Heiberg : πέπισµαι C || 
81 εἶµεν dorice scripsi : εἶναι C        <ἢ> addidi, minime vero intelligenda genetiva αὐτῶν τῶν 
θεωρη|µάτων cum comparativo ἧσσον       τὰν dorice scripsi : τὴν C || 83 γὰρ <τινα τῶν> πρότερον scr. 
Heiberg : γὰρ προτέρων C || 86 ἀποδείξιος εἶµεν τὰν dorice scripsi : ἀποδείξεως εἶναι τὴν C || 86-7 τοῦ | 
τρόπου C : τούτου τοῦ | τρόπου scr. Reinach || 88 προλαβόντι scripsi : προλαβόντα C || 89 τινα C, 
dubito enim an τινα lateat pronomium doricum, ut τιν pro vulgare σε in exemplari dorice scripto 
προλαβόντα … τιν           ζητηµάτων C, necsio an Archimedes hoc verbum scripserit more Doriensium 
antiquiorum, ut ζατηµάτων || 90 τὰν dorice scripsi : τὴν C || 91 ζητεῖν C, necsio an Archimedes hoc 






















      43r col. 2 
1 διὸ καὶ τὰς εὑρήσιες τῶν θεωρη-̣ 
2 µάτων τῶνδε <ὧν> Εὔδοξος ἐξήνεγ- 
3 κε πρῶτος τὰν ἀπόδειξίν  
4 τε τοῦ κώνου καὶ τᾶς πυραµίδος,  
5 ὅτι τρίτον µέρος ἐστὶν ὁ µὲν κῶνος  
6 τοῦ κυλίνδρου, ἁ δὲ πυραµὶς τοῦ  
7 πρίσµατος, τῶν βάσιν ἐχόν- 
8 των τὰν αὐτὰν καὶ ὕψος ἴσον, οὐ  
9 µικρὰν ἀπονείµαι <κα> τις ∆ηµο- 
10 κρίτωι µερίδα πρώτ̣ω̣ι ̣τὰν ἀ- 
11 πόφασιν τὰν περὶ τοῦ εἰρηµέ- 
12 νου σχήµατος χωρὶς ἀποδείξι- 
13 ος ἀποφαναµένωι. ἁµῖν δὲ  
14 συµβαίνει καὶ τοῦ νῦν ἐκδιδο̣- 
15 µένου θεωρήµατος τὰν εὕρεσι̣ν  
16 ὁµοίαν ταῖς πρότερον γεγενῆσθαι·  
17 ἠβουλήθην̣ δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἀνα- 
18 γράψας ἐξενεγκεῖν ἅµα µὲν 
 
92 lineae nihil legit Heiberg       εὑρήσιες dorice scripsi : εὑρήσεις C || 93 τῶνδε scripsi : τούτων C       
<ὧν> ad. Heiberg || 93-4 ἐξήνεγ|κε Netz : ἐξηύρη|κεν Heiberg || 94 τὰν dorice scripsi : τὴν C || 95 τε Netz 
: περὶ ex .ε. τοῦ suppl. Heiberg       τᾶς dorice scripsi : τῆς C || 97 ἁ dorice scripsi : ἡ C || 99 τὰν αὐτὰν 
dorice scripsi : τὴν αὐτὴν C || 100 <ἄν> suppl. Heiberg, a me dorice rescriptum || 101 τὰν dorice scripsi : 
τὴν C || 102 τὰν dorice scripsi : τὴν C || 102-3 τοῦ εἰρηµέ|νου σχήµατος C : τῶν εἰρηµένων σχηµάτων 
exeuntia pluralia fortasse scribenda supposuit Heiberg || 103-4 ἀποδείξι|ος dorice scripsi : ἀποδείξε|ως C 
|| 104 ἀποφαναµένωι ἁµῖν dorice scripsi : ἀποφηναµένωι ἡµῖν C || 105-6 τοῦ νῦν ἐκδιδο|̣µένου 
θεωρήµατος C : τῶν ἐκδιδο|µένων θεωρηµάτων exeuntia pluralia fortasse scribenda supposuit Heiberg || 

























      57r col. 1 
1 καὶ διὰ τὸ προειρηκέµεν ὑπὲρ  
2 αὐτοῦ, µή τισιν δοκέωµες κ̣ενὰν  
3 φ̣ω̣νὰν καταβεβλῆ̣σθαι, ἅµα 
4 δ̣έ̣ κα πεπε̣ι̣σµένο[ι]ς εἰς τὸ µάθη- 
5 µα οὐ µικρὰν συµβαλέσθαι χρεί- 
6 αν· ὑπολαµβάνω γάρ τινας ἢ  
7 τῶν ἐόντων ἢ ἐπιγ[ε]ινοµένων διὰ  
8 τοῦ ἀποδειχθέντος τρόπου καὶ  
9 ἄλλα θεωρήµατα οὔ̣̣πω {. .} ὑ- 
10 ποπεπτωκό<τ>α εὑρήσειν. / γρά- 
11 φοµες οὖν πρῶτον τὸ καὶ πρῶ- 
12 τον φ̣̣ανὲν διὰ τῶν µηχανικῶν,  
13 ὅτι πᾶν τµᾶµα ὀρθογωνίου κώ- 
14 νου τοµᾶς ἐπίτριτόν ἐστιν τρι- 
15 γώνου τοῦ βάσιν ἔχοντος τὰν  
16 αὐτὰν καὶ ὕψος ἴσον, µετὰ δὲ τοῦ- 
17 το ἕκαστον <τῶν> διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου  
18 θεωρηθέντων· ἐπὶ τέλει δ̣̣ὲ̣̣ τοῦ βι- 
19 βλίου γράφοµες τὰς γεωµ<ετρ>ο̣̣<υ>- 
20 {<µένας>                                       }    
21 {                                         <προ>-} 
 
110 προειρηκέµεν dorice scripsi : προειρηκέναι C || 111-2 δοκέωµες κ̣ενὰν | φ̣ω̣νὰν dorice scripsi : 
δοκῶµεν κ̣ενὴν | φ̣ω̣νὴν C || 113 κα scripsi : κ̣αὶ C       πεπε̣ι̣σµένο[ι]ς corr. Heiberg || 114 <ἄν> ante 
συµβαλέσθαι suppl. Heiberg || 115-6 inter ἢ et τῶν signum | deficit Heiberg opinor errore typographico || 
116 ἐόντων dorice scripsi : ὄντων C         ἐπιγ[ε]ινοµένων corr. Heiberg || 118-119 ο<ὔ>πω {. .} 
ὑ|ποπεπτωκό<τ>α Netz : ο̣̣ὔ̣̣π̣̣ω̣̣ ἡ̣̣µῖν̣̣ σ̣̣υ̣̣ν̣̣|π̣̣α̣̣ρ̣̣απ̣̣επτωκότα Heiberg || 119-20 γρά|φοµες dorice scripsi : 
γρά|φοµεν C || 122 τµᾶµα dorice scripsi : τµῆµα C || 123 τοµᾶς dorice scripsi : τοµῆς C || 124-5 τὰν | 
αὐτὰν dorice scripsi : τὴν | αὐτὴν C || 126 <τῶν> suppl. Heiberg || 128 γράφοµες dorice scripsi : 
γράφοµεν C || 128-9 γεωµ<ετρ>ο̣̣<υ|µένας> Netz, quam formam non dorice conversi ut iam palimpsesti 
lectio intelligeatur : τὰς γεωµετρι̣̣|<κὰς> Heiberg || 129 <κὰς ἀποδείξεις ἐκείνων τῶν> suppl. Reinach || 




















      64v col. 1 
1 τ̣̣άσιες ἀπεστείλ̣̣α̣̣µ̣̣έ̣̣ν̣̣<. εὐτύχει.> /  
2 αἴ κα ἀπὸ µεγέθεος µέγεθος ἀ-                                                         post. 1 
3 φαιρεθῆι, <τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ σαµεῖον κέν>-  
4 τρον τοῦ βάρεος <ἦι τοῦ τε ὅλου>  
5 καὶ τοῦ ἀφαιρεοµένου, <τοῦ>                                                               432 
6 λοιποῦ τὸ αὐτὸ σαµεῖον <κέντρον> 
7 ἐστὶ τοῦ βάρεος. / <αἴ κα ἀπὸ µεγέ>-                                             post. 2 
8 θ̣̣εος µέγεθο<ς> ἀφαιρ<ε>θ<ῆι, ἦι δὲ>  
9 µὴ τὸ αὐτὸ σαµεῖον κέντρον  
10 τοῦ βάρεος τοῦ τε ὅλου µεγέθεος  
11 καὶ τοῦ ἀφαιρεοµένου µεγέθεος, 
12 τὸ κέντρον ἐστὶ τοῦ βάρεος τοῦ  
13 λοιποῦ µεγέθεος ἐπὶ τ̣̣ᾶς̣̣ <εὐθείας>  
14 τᾶς ἐπιζ̣̣ε̣̣υ̣̣γ̣̣νυούσα̣̣ς τὰ κέντ̣̣ρ̣̣α̣̣  
15 τ̣̣ο̣̣ῦ̣̣ β̣̣ά̣̣ρ̣̣ε̣̣ο̣̣ς̣̣ τ̣̣̣̣ο̣̣̣ῦ̣̣ τε ὅλου µεγέ<θεος>  
16 <καὶ τοῦ ἀφαιρεοµέ>ν̣̣ο̣̣υ ἐκβεβλη- 
 
131-146 columnam omnem vix legere potuit Netz || 131 τ̣̣άσιες dorice scripsi : τ̣̣άσεις Heiberg                   
<. εὐτύχει.> addidi : <σοι πρότερον.> suppl. Reinach qui similia lineis 5-8 scripsit || 131-2 
ΠΡΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΑ in linea nova inter has lineas scr. Heiberg || 132 αἴ κα … µεγέθεος dorice 
scripsi : ἐὰν … µεγέθους Heiberg || 133 <τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ σηµεῖον κέν> suppl. Heiberg, a me dorice rescriptum || 
134 βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους Heiberg         <ἦι τοῦ τε ὅλου> suppl. Heiberg || 135 ἀφαιρεοµένου 
dorice scripsi : ἀφαιρουµένου C          <τοῦ> suppl. Heiberg || 136 σαµεῖον dorice scripsi : σηµεῖον 
Heiberg        <κέντρον> suppl. Heiberg || 137 βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους Heiberg       <ἐὰν ἀπὸ µεγέ> 
suppl. Heiberg, a me dorice rescriptum || 137-8 <µεγέ>|θ̣̣εος dorice scripsi : <µεγέ>|θ̣̣ους C || 138 <ῆι, ἦι 
δὲ> suppl. Heiberg || 139 σαµεῖον dorice scripsi : σηµεῖον Heiberg || 140 βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους C       
µεγέθεος dorice scripsi : µεγέθο̣̣υ̣̣̣̣ς̣̣ C ||141 ἀφαιρεοµένου µεγέθεος dorice scripsi : ἀφαιρουµένου µεγέθο̣̣υ̣̣̣̣ς̣̣ 
C || 142 βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους C || 143 µεγέθεος … τ̣̣ᾶς̣̣ dorice scripsi : µεγέθους … τ̣̣ῆς̣̣ C        
<εὐθείας> suppl. Heiberg || 144 τᾶς ἐπιζ̣̣ε̣̣υ̣̣γ̣̣νυούσα̣̣ς dorice scripsi : τῆς ἐπιζ̣̣ε̣̣υ̣̣γ̣̣νούση̣̣ς C || 145 β̣̣ά̣̣ρ̣̣ε̣̣ο̣̣ς̣̣ 
dorice scripsi : β̣̣ά̣̣ρ̣̣ο̣̣υ̣̣ς̣̣ Heiberg        µεγέ<θους> Netz, a me dorice rescriptum : <καὶ> Heiberg || 146 <καὶ 


























      57r col. 2 
1 µένας καί <τινος> ἀφαιρεθείσας ἀπ᾽ αὐ- 
2 τᾶς ποτί <τε> τὰν µεταξὺ τῶν εἰρηµέ- 
3 νων κέντρων τοῦ βάρεος τοῦτον  
4 ἐχούσας τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἔχει τὸ βάρος  
5 τοῦ ἀφα<ι>ρεµένου µεγέθεος ποτὶ  
6 τὸ [λοιπὸν] βάρος τοῦ λοιποῦ µεγέθεος. / 
7 αἴ κα ὁποσωνοῦν µεγεθέων τὸ κέν-                                                  post. 3 
8 τρον τοῦ βάρεος ἐπὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς  
9 εὐθείας ἦ<ι>, καὶ τοῦ ἐκ πάντων συγ-  
10 κειµένου µεγέθεος τὸ κέντρον ἐσσεῖται  
11 ἐπὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς εὐθείας. / πάσας                                                        post. 4 
12 εὐθείας τὸ κέντρον ἐστὶ τοῦ βάρεος  
13 ἁ διχοτοµία τᾶς εὐθείας. / παντὸς                                                   post. 5 
14 τριγώνου τὸ κέντρον ἐστὶν τοῦ βά- 
15 ρεος τὸ σαµεῖον, καθ᾽ ὃ α̣̣̣ἱ̣̣̣ ἐκ τᾶν  
16 γωνιᾶν τοῦ τριγώνου ἐπὶ µέσας  
17 τᾶς πλευρὰς ἀγόµεναι εὐθεῖαι  
18 τέµνοντιν ἀλλάλας. / παντὸς πα-                                                   post. 6 
19 ραλλαλογράµµου τὸ κέντρον ἐστὶν  
20 <τοῦ βάρεος τὸ σαµεῖον, καθ᾽ ὃ αἱ>  
21 <διάµετροι συµπίπτοντιν. / κύκλου>                                            post. 7 
 
147 µένας dorice scripsi : µένης C       <τινος> addidi        ἀφαιρεθείσας dorice scripsi : ἀφαιρεθείσης C || 
148 τᾶς ποτί dorice scripsi : τῆς πρός C       <τε> addidi       τὰν dorice scripsi : τὴν C || 149 βάρεος 
dorice scripsi : βάρους C || 150 ἐχούσης corr. Heiberg, a me dorice rescriptum : ἔχουσα C || 151 
ἀφα<ι>ρεµένου µεγέθεος ποτὶ dorice scripsi : ἀφη<ι>ρηµένου µεγέθους πρὸς C || 152 [λοιπὸν] sec. 
Heiberg        µεγέθεος dorice scripsi : µεγέθους C || 153 αἴ κα dorice scripsi : ἐὰν C       ὁποσωνοῦν 
Heiberg: ὁπωσωνοῦν Netz || 154 βάρεος … τᾶς αὐτᾶς dorice scripsi : βάρους ... τῆς αὐτῆς C || 156 
µεγέθεος … ἐσσεῖται dorice scripsi : µεγέθους … ἔσται C || 157 τᾶς αὐτᾶς … πάσας dorice scripsi : τῆς 
αὐτῆς … πάσης C || 158 βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους C || 159 ἁ … τᾶς dorice scripsi : ἡ … τῆς C || 161 
ρεος τὸ σαµεῖον … τᾶν dorice scripsi : ρους τὸ σηµεῖον … τῶν C || 162 γωνιᾶν dorice scripsi : γωνιῶν C || 
163 τᾶς dorice scripsi : τῆς C || 164 τέµνοντιν ἀλλάλας dorice scripsi : τέµνουσιν ἀλλήλας C || 165 
 249 
ραλλαλογράµµου dorice scripsi : ραλληλογράµµου C || 166-7 ex Archimedis De Plan. Aequil. 142.21-22 




















      64v col. 2 
1 τὸ κέντρον τοῦ βάρεος ἐστὶν ὃ καὶ  
2 <τοῦ κύκλου> ἐστὶ κέντρον. / παντὸς                                             post. 8 
3 κυλίνδρου τὸ κέντρον τοῦ βάρεος  
4 ἐστὶν ἁ δ̣̣̣ι̣̣̣χ̣̣̣ο̣̣̣τοµία τοῦ ἄξονος. / παν-                                             post. 9 
5 τὸς π̣̣̣ρ̣̣̣ι̣̣̣σ̣̣̣µ̣̣̣α̣̣̣τ̣̣̣ο̣̣̣ς̣̣̣ τὸ κ̣̣̣έ̣̣̣ν̣̣̣τ̣̣̣ρ̣̣̣ο̣̣̣ν̣̣̣ ἐστὶ τοῦ 
6 β̣̣̣άρεος̣̣̣ ἁ διχοτοµία τοῦ ἄξονος. / παν-                                         post. 10 
7 τὸς κώνου τὸ̣̣̣ κ̣̣̣έντρον ἐστὶν τοῦ βά- 
8 ρ̣̣̣εος̣̣̣ ἐ̣̣̣πὶ τοῦ ἄξονος διαιρεθέντος                                                          434 
9 ο̣̣̣ὕ̣̣̣τ̣̣̣ω̣̣̣ς̣̣, ὥστε τὸ ποτὶ τᾶι κορυφᾶι τµᾶ- 
10 µα τριπλάσιον εἶµεν τ̣̣̣ο̣̣̣ῦ̣̣̣ λοιποῦ. / χρη-                                       post. 11 
11 σ̣̣̣όµεθ̣̣̣α δ̣̣̣ὲ̣̣̣ κ̣̣̣αὶ [ἐν <τῶι> προγεγραµ- 
12 µένωι κ̣̣̣ωνοε̣̣̣ι̣̣̣δῶν̣̣̣] τῶιδ̣̣̣ε̣̣̣ τῶι θεωρή- 
13 µατι· αἴ κα ὁ̣̣̣π̣̣̣ο̣̣̣σ̣̣̣α̣̣̣ο̣̣̣ῦ̣̣̣ν̣̣̣ µ̣̣̣ε̣̣̣γ̣̣̣έ̣̣̣θεα ἄλ- 
14 λο̣̣̣ι̣̣̣ς̣̣ µεγέθεσιν ἴ̣̣̣σ̣̣̣α̣̣̣ τὸ πλῆθος 
15 κ̣̣̣α̣̣̣τ̣̣̣ὰ̣̣̣ δ̣̣̣ύ̣̣̣ο̣̣̣ τ̣̣̣ὸ̣̣̣ν̣̣ αὐτὸν ἔχη̣̣̣<ι> λ̣̣̣όγον τὰ̣̣̣ ὁ̣̣̣-  
16 µ̣̣̣ο̣̣̣ί̣̣̣ω̣̣̣ς̣̣̣ τ̣̣̣ετα̣̣̣γ̣̣̣µενα̣̣, ἦ̣̣<ι> δὲ̣̣̣ τ̣̣̣ὰ̣̣̣ π̣̣̣ρῶτα̣̣̣ 
 
168 βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους C || 169 <τοῦ κύκλου> suppl. Heiberg || 170-183 nihil e lineis legit 
Netz || 170 βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους Heiberg || 171 ἁ dorice scripsi : ἡ Heiberg || 173 β̣̣̣άρεος̣̣̣ ἁ 
dorice scripsi : β̣̣̣άρου̣̣̣ς̣̣̣ ἡ Heiberg || 175 ρ̣̣̣εος̣̣ dorice scripsi : ρ̣̣̣ο̣̣̣υ̣̣̣ς̣̣ Heiberg || 176 ποτὶ τᾶι κορυφᾶι τµᾶ 
dorice scripsi : πρὸς τῆι κορυφῆι τµῆ Heiberg || 177 εἶµεν dorice scripsi : εἶναι Heiberg || 178 <τῶι> 
suppl. Heiberg || 178-9 [ἐν <τῶι> προγεγραµ|µένωι κ̣̣̣ωνοε̣̣̣ι̣̣̣δῶν̣̣̣] sec. Heiberg, supposuit enim haec verba e 
margine irrepsisse || 180 αἴ κα dorice scripsi : ἐ̣̣̣ὰ̣̣̣ν̣̣ Heiberg      µ ̣̣̣ε̣̣̣γ̣̣̣έ̣̣̣θεα dorice scripsi : µ ̣̣̣ε̣̣̣γ̣̣̣έ̣̣̣θη Heiberg || 
























      57v col. 1 
1 µεγέθεα <ποτὶ ἄλλα µεγέθεα> ἐν λόγοις ὁποιοισοῦν, ἢ τὰ               
2 πάντα ἤ τινα αὐτῶν, κ̣̣̣αὶ τὰ ὕστε- 
3 ρα µεγέθεα ποτὶ τὰ ὁµόλογα ἐν  
4 τοῖς αὐτοῖς λόγοις ἦ<ι>, πάντα τὰ  
5 πρῶτα µεγέθεα ποτὶ πάντα τὰ  
6 λεγόµενα τὸν αὐτὸν ἕξει λόγον,  
7 ὃν ἔχει πάντα τὰ ὕστερον ποτὶ 
8 πάντα τὰ λεγόµενα. / ἔστω                                                            prop. 1 
9 τµᾶµα τὸ ΑΒΓ περιεχόµενον  
10 ὑπὸ εὐθείας τᾶς ΑΓ καὶ ὀρθο- 
11 γωνίου κώνου τοµᾶς τᾶς ΑΒΓ,  
12 καὶ τετµάσθω δίχα ἁ ΑΓ κατὰ τὸ ∆,  
13 καὶ παρὰ τὰν διάµετρον ἄχθω ἁ  
14 ∆ΒΕ, καὶ ἐπεζεύχθωσαν αἱ ΑΒ  
15 ΒΓ. / λέγω ὅτι ἐπίτριτόν ἐστιν τὸ ΑΒΓ  
16 τµᾶµα τοῦ ΑΒΓ τριγώνου. / ἄχθω- 
17 σαν ἀπὸ τῶν Α Γ σαµείων ἁ µὲν  
18 ΑΖ παρὰ τὰν ∆ΒΕ, ἁ δὲ ΓΖ ἐπιψαύ- 
19 ουσα τᾶς τοµᾶς, καὶ ἐκβεβλήσ- 
20 <θω> ἁ̣ <ΓΒ καί τετµάσθω τὰν ΑΖ> 
 
184 µεγέθεα dorice scripsi : µεγέθη C       <πρὸς ἄλλα µεγέθη> suppl. Heiberg, a me dorice rescriptum  
      λόγοις corr. Heiberg : τόποις C || 186 µεγέθεα ποτὶ dorice scripsi : µεγέθη πρὸς C || 188 µεγέθεα ποτὶ 
dorice scripsi : µεγέθη πρὸς C || 190 ποτὶ dorice scripsi : πρὸς C || 191 α′. in linea nova ante ἔστω scr. 
Heiberg || 192 τµᾶµα dorice scripsi : τµῆµα C || 193 τᾶς dorice scripsi : τῆς C || 194 τοµᾶς τᾶς dorice 
scripsi : τοµῆς τῆς C || 195 τετµάσθω … ἁ dorice scripsi : τετµήσθω … ἡ C || 195 κατὰ τὸ ∆ Netz : τῶι ∆ 
Heiberg || 196 τὰν … ἄχθω ἁ dorice scripsi : τὴν … ἤχθω ἡ C || 199 τµᾶµα dorice scripsi : τµῆµα C             
|| 199-200 ἄχθω|σαν dorice scripsi : ἤχθω|σαν C || 200 σαµείων ἁ dorice scripsi : σηµείων ἡ C || 201 τὰν … 
ἁ dorice scripsi : τὴν … ἡ C || 202 τᾶς τοµᾶς dorice scripsi : τῆς τοµῆς C || 203 <θω> ἡ̣ <ΓΒ καί τετµήσθω 





















      64r col. 1 
1 <κα>τὰ τὸ Κ, κ̣α̣ὶ ̣<κ>ε̣ί̣<σθω τᾶι ΓΚ> ἴσα  
2 ἁ ΚΘ, καὶ νοείσθω ζυγὸς ὁ ΓΘ καὶ  
3 µέσον αὐτοῦ τὸ Κ καὶ τᾶι Ε∆ πα- 
4 ράλλαλος τυχοῦσα ἁ ΜΞ. / ἐπεὶ οὖν                                                   436 
5 παραβολή ἐστιν ἁ ΓΒΑ, καὶ ἐφά- 
6 πτεσθαι ἁ ΓΕ, καὶ τεταγµένως ἁ  
7 Γ∆, ἴσα ἐστὶν ἁ ΕΒ τᾶι Β∆· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν  
8 τοῖς στοιχείοις δείκνυται· διὰ δὴ  
9 τοῦτο, καὶ διότι παράλλαλοί εἰσιν  
10 αἱ ΖΑ ΜΞ τᾶι Ε∆, ἴσα ἐστὶν καὶ ἁ  
11 µὲν ΜΝ τᾶι ΝΞ, ἁ δὲ ΖΚ τᾶι ΚΑ.  
12 καὶ ἐπεί ἐστιν ὡς ἁ ΓA ποτὶ ΑΞ, οὕ- 
13 τως ἁ ΜΞ ποτὶ ΞO, [τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ 
14 λῆµµα δείκνυται,] ὡς δὲ ἁ ΓΑ ποτὶ  
15 ΑΞ, οὕτως ἁ ΓΚ ποτὶ ΚΝ, καὶ ἴσα  
16 ἐστὶν ἁ ΓΚ τᾶι ΚΘ, ὡς ἄρα ἁ ΘΚ  
17 ποτὶ ΚΝ, οὕτως ἁ ΜΞ ποτὶ ΞΟ. 
 
204 <κα>τὰ τὸ Κ, κ̣α̣ὶ̣ <κ>ε̣ί̣<σθω τῆι ΓΚ> ἴση Netz, a me dorice rescriptum : <θω ἡ ΓΒ ἐπὶ τὸ Κ, καὶ 
κείσθω τῆι ΓΚ> post lineam 202 scr. Heiberg || 205 ἡ ΚΘ Netz, a me dorice rescriptum : <ἴση ἡ ΚΘ> scr. 
Heiberg || 206 τῆι Ε∆ Heiberg, a me dorice rescriptum : τὸ Ε∆ Netz || 207 ράλλαλος … ἁ dorice scripsi : 
ράλληλος … ἡ C || 208 παραβολή interpolationem notavit Heiberg, Archimedes enim scripserat 
ὀρθογωνίου κώνου τοµά        ἁ dorice scripsi : ἡ C || 208-9 ἐφά|πτεσθαι Netz : ἐφά|πτ̣εται Heiberg || 209 ἁ 
dorice scripsi : ἡ C       ΓΕ Netz : ΓΖ Heiberg        ἁ dorice scripsi : ἡ C || 210 ἴσα … ἁ … τᾶι dorice scripsi 
: ἴση … ἡ … τῆι C || 212 παράλλαλοί dorice scripsi : παράλληλοί C || 213 τᾶι … ἴσα … ἁ dorice scripsi : 
τῆι … ἴση … ἡ C || 214 τᾶι … ἁ … τᾶι dorice scripsi : τῆι … ἡ … τῆι C || 215 ἁ dorice scripsi : ἡ C        ΓA 
corr. Heiberg : Γ∆ C        ποτὶ dorice scripsi : πρὸς C || 216 ἁ … ποτὶ dorice scripsi : ἡ … πρὸς C        ΞO 
corr. Heiberg : ΞΘ C || 216-7 [τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ | λῆµµα δείκνυται,] praeeunte Heiberg seclusi : τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ 
| λῆµµα δείκνυται Netz : [τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν | λήµµατι δείκνυται] Heiberg  || 217 ἁ … ποτὶ dorice scripsi : ἡ … 
πρὸς C || 218 ἁ … ποτὶ … ἴσα dorice scripsi : ἡ … πρὸς … ἴση C || 219 ἁ … τᾶι … ἁ dorice scripsi : ἡ … τῆι … 



























      57v col. 2 
1 καὶ ἔστι τὸ Ν σαµεῖον κέντρον  
2 τοῦ βάρεος τᾶς ΜΞ εὐθείας, ἐ- 
3 πείπερ ἴσα ἐστὶν ἁ ΜΝ τᾶι ΝΞ,  
4 αἴ κα ἄρα τᾶι ΞΟ ἴσαν θέωµες τὰν  
5 ΗΤ <περὶ> κέντρον τοῦ βάρεος αὐτᾶς τὸ  
6 Θ, ὅπως ἴσα <ἦι> ἁ ΤΘ τᾶι ΘΗ, ἰσορ- 
7 ροπήσει ἁ ΤΗ τᾶι ΜΞ αὐτοῦ µε- 
8 νούσαι διὰ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθότως  
9 τετµᾶσθαι τὰν ΘΝ τοῖς ΤΗ ΜΞ  
10 βάρεσιν, καὶ ὡς τὰν ΘΚ ποτὶ ΚΝ,  
11 οὕτως τὰν ΜΞ ποτὶ [τὴν] ΗΤ· ὥσ- 
12 τε τοῦ ἐξ ἀµφοτέρων βάρεος κέν- 
13 τρον ἐστὶν τοῦ βάρεος τὸ Κ. ὁµοί- 
14 ως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι κα ἀχθῶσιν  
15 ἐν τῶι ΖΑΓ τριγώνωι παράλλα- 
16 λοι τᾶι Ε∆, ἰσορροπησοῦντιν αὐ- 
17 τοῦ µενούσαι[ς] ταῖς ἀπολαµβα- 
18 νοµέναις ἀπ᾽ αὐτᾶν ὑπὸ τᾶς  
19 τοµᾶς µετενεχθείσαις περὶ  
20 <κ>έ̣<ν>τ̣ρ̣ο̣ν ̣τ̣οῦ βά<ρεος τὸ Θ>. καὶ  
21 <ἐσσεῖται τοῦ ἐξ ἁπάντω>ν̣ <β>α̣- 
 
221 ἔστι Netz : ἐ̣π̣ε̣ὶ̣ Heiberg     σαµεῖον dorice scripsi : σηµεῖον C || 222 βάρεος τᾶς dorice scripsi : 
βάρους τῆς C || 222-3 ἐ|πείπερ Netz : ἐ̣σ̣τ̣ι̣ν̣ | ἐπειπ̣ε̣ρ̣̣ Heiberg || 223 ἴσα … ἁ … τᾶι dorice scripsi : ἴση … ἡ 
… τῆι C || 224 αἴ κα … τᾶι … ἴσαν θέωµες dorice scripsi : ἐὰν … τῆι … ἴσην θῶµεν C       τὰν scripsi : τὸ 
Netz : τ̣ὴ̣ν̣ Heiberg || 225 ΗΤ scripsi : ΝΤ Netz : ΤΗ Heiberg       <περὶ> κέντρον scripsi : κέντρον Nezt :  
κ̣α̣ὶ̣ κέντρον Heiberg       βάρεος αὐτᾶς dorice scripsi : βάρους αὐτῆς C || 226 ἴσα dorice scripsi : ἴση C      
<ἦι> suppl. Heiberg       ἁ … τᾶι dorice scripsi : ἡ … τῆι C || 227 ἁ dorice scripsi : ἡ C      ΤΗ Netz : ΤΘ̣Η 
Heiberg      τᾶι dorice scripsi : τῆι C || 227-8 µε|νούσαι dorice scripsi : µε|νούσηι C || 229 τετµᾶσθαι τὰν 
dorice scripsi : τετµῆσθαι τὴν C || 230 τὰν … ποτὶ dorice scripsi : τὴν … πρὸς C || 231 τὰν … ποτὶ dorice 
scripsi : τὴν … πρὸς C       [τὴν] seclusi || 232 βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους C || 233 βάρεος dorice scripsi 
: βάρους C || 234 κα dorice scripsi : ἂν corr. Heiberg : ἐὰν C || 235-6 παράλλα|λοι dorice scripsi : 
παράλλη|λοι C || 236 τᾶι dorice scripsi : τῆι C       Ε∆ corr. Heiberg : Η∆ C       ἰσορροπησοῦντιν dorice 
 254 
scripsi : ἰσορροπήσουσιν C || 237 µενούσαι[ς] corr. Heiberg || 238 αὐτᾶν … τᾶς dorice scripsi : αὐτῶν … 
τῆς C || 239 τοµᾶς dorice scripsi : τοµῆς C        περὶ Netz : ἐ̣π̣ὶ̣ τ̣ὸ̣ Heiberg || 240 <κ>έ̣<ν>τ̣ρ̣ο̣ν ̣τ̣οῦ 
βά<ρους τὸ Θ>. καὶ Netz, a me dorice rescriptum : lineae nihil legit Heiberg || 241 <ἔσται τοῦ ἐξ 
ἁπάντω>ν̣ <β>α̣ mihi dixit Netz ipse, a me dorice rescriptum : <ἔσται τοῦ ἐκ πάντων τῶ>ν̣ <β>α̣ Netz : 





















      64r col. 2 
1 ρέων κέντρον τοῦ βάρεος τὸ Κ.  
2 καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκ µὲν τᾶν̣ ἐν τῶι ΖΑ<Γ>  
3 τριγώνωι <τὸ ΖΑΓ τρίγωνον> συνέστακεν, ἐκ δὲ τᾶν  
4 ἐν τᾶι τοµᾶι ὁµοίως τᾶι ΟΞ λαµ- 
5 βανοµενᾶν συνέστακε τὸ ΑΒΓ  
6 τµᾶµα, ἰσορροπήσει ἄρα τὸ  
7 ΖΑΓ τρίγωνον αὐτοῦ µένον τῶι  
8 τµάµατι τᾶς τοµᾶς τεθέν- 
9 τι περὶ κέντρον τοῦ βάρεος τὸ Θ  
10 κατὰ τὸ Κ σαµεῖον, ὥστε τοῦ ἐ- 
11 ξ ἀµφοτέρων κέντρον εἶµεν 
12 τοῦ βάρεος τὸ Κ. τετµάσθω δὲ  
13 ἁ ΓΚ τῶι Χ, ὡς τριπλασίαν  
14 εἶµεν τὰν ΓΚ τᾶς ΚΧ· ἐσσεῖται ἄρα  
15 τὸ Χ σαµεῖον κέντρον τοῦ βάρεος                                                         438 
16 τοῦ ΑΖΓ τρίγωνου· τοῦτο γὰρ δείκν<υ>ται 
 
242 ρέων dorice scripsi : ρῶν C      κέντρον corr. Heiberg : κέντρων C       βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους 
C || 243 τᾶν̣ dorice scripsi : τῶν̣ C       ΖΑ<Γ> Netz : Γ̣Ζ̣Α̣ Heiberg || 244 <τὸ ΖΑΓ τρίγωνον> scripsi : 
<τὸ ΓΖΑ τρίγωνον> suppl. Heiberg       συνέστακεν … τᾶν dorice scripsi : συνέστηκεν ... τῶν C || 245 τᾶι 
τοµᾶι ….τᾶι dorice scripsi : τῆι τοµῆι … τῆι C        ΟΞ Netz : Ξ̣Ο̣ Heiberg || 245-6 λαµ|βανοµενᾶν 
συνέστακε dorice scripsi : λαµ|βανοµένων συνέστηκε C || 247 τµᾶµα dorice scripsi : τµῆµα C || 248 
µένον τῶι Heiberg : µενόντων Netz || 249 τµάµατι τᾶς τοµᾶς dorice scripsi : τµήµατι τῆς τοµῆς C || 250 
βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους C || 251 σαµεῖον dorice scripsi : σηµεῖον C         τοῦ scripsi : τοὺς Netz : 
τ̣ο̣ῦ̣ Heiberg || 252 εἶµεν dorice scripsi : εἶναι C || 253 βάρεος … τετµάσθω dorice scripsi : βάρους … 
τετµήσθω C        δὲ Nezt : δ̣ὴ̣ Heiberg || 254 ἁ dorice scripsi : ἡ C       ὡς τριπλασίαν scripsi : ὡς 
τετραπλασίαν Netz : ὥ̣σ̣τ̣ε̣ τρι̣πλασίαν Heiberg || 255 εἶµεν τὰν … τᾶς … ἐσσεῖται dorice scripsi : εἶναι 
τὴν … τῆς … ἔσται C || 256 σαµεῖον … βάρεος dorice scripsi : σηµεῖον … βάρους C || 257 τοῦ ΑΖΓ 
τρίγωνου scripsi : τὸ ΑΖΓ τρίγωνον Netz : το̣ῦ̣ ΑΖΓ̣ τρίγωνου Heiberg       τοῦτο γὰρ δείκν<υ>ται Netz 






















      66r col. 1 
1 ἐν τοῖς ἰσορροπικοῖς. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἰ- 
2 σορρόπεον τὸ ΖΑΓ τρίγωνον αὐ- 
3 τοῦ µένον τῶι ΒΑΓ τµάµατι κατὰ  
4 τὸ Κ τεθέντι περὶ τὸ Θ κέντρον  
5 τοῦ βάρεος, καί ἐστιν τοῦ ΖΑΓ τρι- 
6 γώνου κέντρον βάρεος τὸ Χ, ἔστιν  
7 ἄρα ὡς τὸ ΑΖΓ τρίγωνον ποτὶ 
8 τὸ ΑΒΓ τµᾶµα κείµενον περὶ τὸ  
9 Θ κέντρον, οὕτως ἁ ΘΚ ποτὶ ΧΚ.  
10 τριπλασία δέ ἐστιν ἁ ΘΚ τᾶς ΚΧ· τρι- 
11 πλάσιον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ΑΖΓ τρίγωνον  
12 τοῦ ΑΒΓ τµάµατος· ἔστι δὲ καὶ  
13 τὸ ΖΑΓ τρίγωνον τετραπλάσιον  
14 τοῦ ΑΒΓ τριγώνου διὰ τὸ ἴσαν εἶµεν  
15 τὰν µὲν ΖΚ τᾶι ΚΑ, τὰν δὲ Α∆ τᾶι  
16 ∆Γ· ἐπίτριτον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ΑΒΓ τµᾶ- 
17 µα τοῦ ΑΒΓ ̣τριγώνου. [τοῦτο γοῦν  
18 φ̣ανε̣ρόν.] figura 
 
258 ἐπεὶ corr. Heiberg : ἔσται C || 258-9 ἰ|σορρόπεον dorice scripsi : ἰ|σόρροπον C || 260 τµάµατι dorice 
scripsi : τµήµατι C || 262 βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους C || 263 βάρεος dorice scripsi : βάρους C || 264 
ποτὶ dorice scripsi : πρὸς C || 265 τµᾶµα dorice scripsi : τµῆµα C || 266 ἁ … ποτὶ dorice scripsi : ἡ … πρὸς 
C || 267 ἁ … τᾶς dorice scripsi : ἡ … τῆς C || 269 τµάµατος dorice scripsi : τµήµατος C || 271 ἴσαν εἶµεν 
dorice scripsi : ἴσην εἶναι C || 272 τὰν … τᾶι … τὰν … τᾶι dorice scripsi : τὴν … τῆι … τὴν … τῆι C || 273-4 
τµᾶ|µα dorice scripsi : τµῆ|µα C || 274-5 [τοῦτο γοῦν φ̣ανε̣ρόν.] praeeunte Heiberg seclusi : τοῦτο γοῦν 
φα̣<νε>ρόν. Netz : [τοῦτο ο̣ῦ̣ν̣ φ̣ανε̣ρ̣όν ἐ̣σ̣τ̣ι̣ν̣.] Heiberg || 275 figura post lineam 275 figura mathematica 








Illustration 12: Heiberg Diagram for Ephodos 1.39
                                                
















      71v col. 1 
1 / [Τ]τοῦτο δὴ διὰ µὲν τῶν νῦν εἰρηµένων                                       prop. 2 
2 οὐκ ἀποδέδεικται, ἔµφασιν δέ  
3 τινα πεποίηκε τὸ συµπέρασµα  
4 ἀληθὲς εἶµεν· διόπερ ἁµὲς ὁ- 
5 ρῶντες µὲν οὐκ ἀποδεδειγµέ- 
6 νον, ὑπονοέοντες δὲ τὸ συµπέ- 
7 ρασµα ἀληθὲς εἶµεν, <ἐ>τάξο- 
8 µες τὰν γεωµετρεοµέναν ἀ- 
9 πόδειξιν ἐξευρόντες αὐτοὶ ̣τὰν  
10 ἐ<κ>δοθεῖσαν πρότερον. / ὅτι δὲ πᾶ- 
11 σα σφαῖρα τετραπλασία ἐστὶν τοῦ  
12 κώνου τοῦ βάσιν µὲν ἔχοντος 
 
276 β′. in linea nova ante τοῦτο scr. Heiberg       [Τ] seclusunt omnes : Ττοῦτο C || 279 εἶµεν dorice 
scripsi : εἶναι C       ἁµὲς dorice scripsi : ἡµεῖς C || 281 ὑπονοέοντες dorice scripsi : ὑπονοοῦντες C || 282 
εἶµεν dorice scripsi : εἶναι C || 282-3 <ἐ>τάξο|µες futurum doricum ex ἐτάζω scripsi : ἐτάζο|ντες scr. 
Arendt : τάξο|µεν C || 283 τὰν γεωµετρεοµέναν dorice scripsi : τὴν γεωµετρουµένην C || 284 ἐξευρόντες 
C : ἐξευρόµες scr. Arendt        αὐτοὶ̣ C : αὐτοῦ scr. Arendt        τὰν dorice scripsi : τὴν C || 285 






| 426 Archimedes’ On Mechanical Theorems to Eratosthenes. [or] Approach. 
 
Archimedes to Eratosthenes, greetings. 
I sent you earlier <the enunciations> of the discovered theorems after copying the 
enunciations themselves, saying that [you should] discover those proofs, which I did not 
state at that time.  The enunciations of the sent theorems were these: <enunciation> of the 
first <theorem>: if into a right prism having a parallelogram40 as a base a cylinder is 
inscribed, having its bases in opposite parallelograms and touching in respect to the sides 
<of the prism> the remaining four planes, and through the center of the circle, which is a 
base of the cylinder, and <through> one side of the square in the opposite plane a plane is 
drawn, the drawn plane will cut off from the cylinder a section, which is bounded by two 
planes and a surface of a cylinder – the one the drawn plane, the other the plane in which 
the base of the cylinder is, and the surface between the aforesaid planes – so that the 
section cut off from the cylinder is a sixth part of the whole prism.  Of the second 
theorem the enunciation was this: that if into a cube is inscribed a cylinder having its 
bases at opposite parallelograms and touching in respect to its surface the remaining four 
planes | 428 and also another cylinder is inscribed into the same cube41 having its bases in 
opposite parallelograms and touching in respect to its surface the remaining four planes, 
the figure bounded by the surfaces of the cylinders, which is in both cylinders, is two-
thirds of the whole cube.  
Those theorems happen to differ from the ones discovered previously; for in 
respect to the latter figures, the conoids and spheroids and their segments, we compare 
the same things to each other and to cones and cylinders, but none of them has been 
found to be equal to a solid figure bounded by planes.  But of these figures the first 
bounded by two planes and a surface of a cylinder and the other by surfaces of cylinders, 
                                                
40 As Heiberg (1913: 427.n1) notes, Archimedes writes παραλλαλόγραµµον here but he obviously intends 
the bases to be squares from Ephodos 25.  We should understand the opaqueness as the Archimedean 
concern for the generality of the initial presentation.   
41 The usual rhetorical contrast between αὐτός and ἄλλος. 
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each of them is found equal to a solid figure bounded by planes.  The proofs of these 
theorems I send you, having written them in this book. 
Seeing that you, just as I said42, are learned and remarkably preeminent in 
philosophy and have appreciated happenstance43 contemplation in mathematics, I thought 
it good to write to you and to furnish in the same book a characteristic of a certain 
manner, for one traversing along which it will be possible to supply starting points for the 
ability to contemplate some of the things in mathematics through mechanics.44  This, I am 
persuaded, is useful for nothing less than for the proof of the theorems themselves.  For 
certain of those things that earlier appeared clear to me mechanically later were proven 
geometrically45 on account of the fact that the contemplation via this way is without 
proof.  For it is easier for one anticipating through this way a certain recognition of the 
technical problem to supply the proof | 430 more than to seek it though nothing is known.  
Wherefore in respect to the discoveries of these theorems of both the cone and the 
pyramid whose proof Eudoxus first published, [namely] that the cone is a third part of the 
cylinder and the pyramid of the prism, the <bounding figures> having a base the same 
and equal height, no small part might one assign Democritus who first declared the result 
about the aforesaid figure without proof.46  And for me it happens that the discovery of 
the theorem now being published47 happens to have been like the earlier ones.  I did wish 
                                                
42 Presumably in the previous letter to Eratosthenes.  
43 ὑποπίπτειν is an Archimedean word expressing casual indifference to the seriousness of mathematics, 
as if Archimedes were a dilettante.  It appears again in Ephodos 118-9 and On the Sphere and Cylinder 2.7. 
44 The metaphorical context of this sentence is clearly that of a journey: ἐπιπορευοµένωι, ἀφορµὰς, 
ἐφοδιάσας, θεωρεῖν.  Archimedes refrains from direct reference to ὁδός, the central concept of the 
metaphor, instead preferring such vague language such as τρόπου τινὸς ἰδιότητα. 
45 Arendt (1914: 293) points out that our expectation as first-horizon readers is that only the area of the 
parabola in Quadrature of the Parabola has been proven in the way Archimedes describes, despite his use 
of the plurals. 
46 Diels-Kranz Fragmente der Vorsokratiker Democritus A164-5. Dijksterhuis (1987: 314n.3): “It has 
struck students that Archimedes uses the singular here, whereas he first referred to theorems on the cone 
and the pyramid.  It does not, however, seem likely that any inferences can be made from this.” 
47 Dijksterhuis’ (1987: 314n.3) note on scholarly befuddlement about Archimedes’ use of the singular to 
apply to both of Democritus’ efforts seems equally applicable to the propositions about the cylinder-hoof 
and bicyclinder, since most scholars are equally phlegmatic about the distinction between singular and 
plural.  Heiberg (1913: 431) suggests emending to τῶν νῦν ἐκδιδοµένων θεωρηµάτων in his apparatus but 
does not print it in his main text.  Reinach (1907) translates a plural in his French but appends a note (1907: 
916n.2): “Le texte dit: “ce théorème”, peut-être, comme me le fait observer M. R. Prévost, parce que le 
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to publish it, describing the manner, both because of having spoken about it before, in 
order that I not seem to anyone to have spread an empty rumor, and at the same time 
being convinced that it would contribute no small usefulness to mathematics.  For I 
suppose that some either of those living or of our descendents will discover other not yet 
suspected theorems through the proven48 manner.  Therefore I first write what first 
became clear through mechanics, that any segment of a section of an orthogonal cone is 
four-thirds of a triangle which has the same base and an equal height, and after this each 
of the things considered by the same manner.  At the end of the book I write the 
geometrized49 … enuciations I sent.  Farewell. 
                                                
second théorème n’est, au fond, qu’un corollaire du premier.”  Reinach’s (1907) suggestion seems strained.  
Mugler (1971: 84) translates a plural but prints the singular (his Greek text is a reprint of Heiberg’s (1913) 
text).  
48 If this refers to the mechanical method as seems likely, the use of ἀποδεικνύναι challenges the strict 
division we would like to construct between the appearance of a result via the mechanical method and the 
soundness of proof in the geometrical method. A move to rescue the division might emend to 
ἐπιδειχθέντος.  But the text should be retained because it runs contrary to expectations.  In spite of his 
philological concern for the proper meaning of words, Knobloch (2000: 92) ignores the problem when he 
translates τοῦ ἀποδειχθέντος τρόπου as “the method made evident.”  
49 Dijksterhuis (1987: 315n.4), working from Heiberg’s (1913) text, assumes that the geometric ‘proofs’ 
referred to are those for the cylinder hoof and the bicylinder.  This seems to be the communis opinio.  Older 
commentators assume that other proofs are present at the end of the treatise; see chapter 3.3.3. 
The reading of the last word is still an open question because both Netz et al. (2008) and Heiberg 
(1913) dot their reading of the final letter, ο̣̣ and ι̣̣ respectively, before the lacuna, a gap of at least two lines 
when Heiberg examined the text in 1906-08 and since grown to include several lines on the next folium. 
Netz et al. (2008) read nothing beyond the omicron in γεωµ<ετρ>ο̣̣<υ|µένας> for line 19 on 57r1 (line 20 
begins at -<µένας>) and read nothing on 64v1 until line 4, in the middle of the first axiom.  Heiberg’s 
(1913: 430.24-26) text continues τὰς γεωµετρι̣̣<κ̣̣ὰ̣̣ς̣̣ ἀ̣̣π̣̣ο̣̣δ̣̣ε̣̣ί̣̣ξ̣̣ε̣̣ι̣̣ς̣̣ ἐ̣̣κ̣̣ε̣̣ί̣̣ν̣̣ω̣̣ν̣̣ τ̣̣ῶ̣̣ν̣̣> | <θ̣̣ε̣̣ω̣̣ρ̣̣η̣̣µ ̣̣ά̣̣τ̣̣ω̣̣ν̣̣ ὧ̣̣ν̣̣ τ̣̣ὰ̣̣ς̣̣ 
π̣̣ρ̣̣ο̣̣>| 64v1 τ̣̣άσεις ἀπεστείλ̣̣α̣̣µ ̣̣έ̣̣ν̣̣ <σ̣̣ο̣̣ι̣̣ π̣̣ρ̣̣ό̣̣τ̣̣ε̣̣ρ̣̣ο̣̣ν̣̣> (this passage illustrates Heiberg’s (1913) strange 
editorial practice of dotting letters he supplements in angle brackets).  In his apparatus ad loc. Heiberg 
(1913) notes that his supplement was inspired by Théodore Reinach “suppleui praeeunte Theodoro 
Reinach”.  Heiberg (1913) seemingly refers to Reinach (1907), but I find nothing in that work which bears 
on this point.  I do not print Reinach’s suggestions because I believe that his line 130 is too short at 21 
characters, when most lines of the Ephodos text in the palimpsest are between 25-30 characters. 
Heiberg-Zeuthen (1907: 324), written before Reinach (1907), translates “am Schluß des Buches 
legen wir die dar die geometrische [Beweise der genannten Lehrsätze]…”, which is supplemented as if 
Heiberg-Zeuthen (1907) understood τὰς γεωµετρι<κὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν εἰρηµένων> | <θεωρηµάτων …>.  
Archimedes refers to τὴν γεωµετρουµένην ἀπόδειξιν at Ephodos 283-4=Netz et al. (2008: 
71v1.8)=Heiberg (1913: 438.20), which is possibly why Heiberg supplied ἀποδείξεις in his edition (1913: 
430.24-5) here at the lacuna.  Other possibilities for the attributed noun if it is accusative include the 
obvious ἀποδείξεις, θεωρίας, προτάσεις.  Taking τὰς as genitive would be to understand it as a Doric 
form, of which dialect there are no other surviving traces in the Ephodos.  (I do not know if the grave 
accent on α can be read in the palimpsest or is supplied.)   
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If from a magnitude a magnitude is taken away and the same point is the center of 
the weight of both the whole and | 432 of the <magnitude> taken away, the same point is 
the center of the weight of the remaining <magnitude>.   
If from a magnitude a magnitude is taken away and the same point is not the 
center of the weight of both the whole magnitude and the magnitude taken away, the 
center of the weight of the remaining magnitude is upon the straight line joining the 
centers of weight of both the whole magnitude and the <magnitude> taken away after 
<the straight line> has been extended, with also a certain <straight line> having been 
taken away from it and having to the <straight> line between the aforesaid centers of the 
weight that ratio which the weight of the magnitude taken away has to the weight of the 
remaining magnitude.50 
If the center of the weight of howeverso many magnitudes are upon the same 
straight line, the center of the weight of the magnitude composed of all <magnitudes> 
will be upon the same straight line.51 
The center of the weight of any straight line is the point of bisection of the straight 
line.52 
The center of the weight of any triangle is the point at which the straight lines 
drawn from the angles of the triangle to the middle of the sides cross each other.53 
The center of the weight of any parallelogram is the point at which the diameters 
coincide.54 
The center of the weight of any circle is <the point> which is also the center of 
the circle. 
The center of the weight of any cylinder is the point of bisection of the axis. 
The center of the weight of any prism is the point of bisection of the axis. 
                                                
50 Proved in Equilibrium of Planes 1.8, 138.19-140.15. 
51 Assumed in Equilibrium of Planes 1.4, 128.11-130.3. 
52 Proved in Equilibrium of Planes 1.4, 128.11-130.3. 
53 Proved in Equilibrium of Planes 1.14, 158.8-162.12. 
54 Proved in Equilibrium of Planes 1.10, 142.21-146.2, for which there are two proofs. 
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The center of the weight of any cone is upon | 434 the axis divided so that the part 
near the vertex is triple that of the remaining <part>. 
I employ also this theorem: if however many magnitudes equal in multitude to 
other magnitudes when ordered likewise two by two have the same ratio and the first 
magnitudes, either all or some of them, are to other magnitudes in however many ratios 
and the latter magnitudes are to the corresponding <magnitudes> in the same ratios, all 
the first magnitudes will have the same ratio to all the <magnitudes> being enunciated 
that all the latter magnitudes have to all the <magnitudes> being enunciated.55 
Let there be a segment the ΑΒΓ, bounded by a straight line, the ΑΓ, and a section 
of an orthogonal cone, the ΑΒΓ, and let the <straight line> ΑΓ have been cut at the 
<point> Δ, and parallel to the diameter let have been drawn the <straight line> ΔΒΕ, and 
let have been joined the <straight lines> ΑΒ, ΒΓ.   
I say that the segment ΑΒΓ is four-thirds of the triangle ΑΒΓ. 
Let have been drawn from the points Α, Γ first the <straight line> ΑΖ parallel to 
the <straight line> ΔΒΕ, and second the <straight line> ΓΖ tangent to the section, and let 
have been extended the <straight line> ΓΒ and let it have cut the <straight line> ΑΖ at the 
<point> Κ, and let the <straight line> ΚΘ lie equal to the <straight line> ΓΚ, and let be 
imagined <as> a balance the ΓΘ and <let it be imagined> that the <point> Κ remains 
stationary and <let there be imagined> parallel to the <straight line> ΕΔ an arbitrary 
<straight line>, the ΜΞ. 
| 436 Therefore since the ΓΒΑ is a parabola56 and the <straight line> ΓΕ is tangent 
and the <straight line> ΓΔ is an ordinate, the <straight line> ΕΒ is equal to the <straight 
                                                
55 Proved as the first proposition in On Conoids and Spheroids.  Netz, Saito, and Tchernetska (2001: 19-
20) translate this postulate differently: “If however many magnitudes have the same ratio (equal <to them> 
by multitude), two by two, with other magnitudes similarly ordered, and the first magnitudes – whether all 
or some of them – are to other magnitudes in however many ratios, and the latter magnitudes are in the 
same ratios to other magnitudes, respectively, <then> all the first magnitudes to all the <magnitudes> they 
stand in ratio to, have a ratio that all the latter magnitudes have to all the <magnitudes> they stand in ratio 
to.”  I see in λεγόµενα the technical use of λέγειν in enunciation of the mathematical proof. 
56 παραβολή here, as Heiberg (1913: 437n.1) notes, is a later interpolation for Archimedes’ older 
terminology, ὀρθογωνίου κώνου τοµά. 
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line> ΒΔ, for this is proved in the <Conic> Elements.57  So on account of this and the fact 
that the <straight lines> ZA, ΜΞ are parallel to the <straight line> ΕΔ , the <straight 
line> ΜΝ is equal to the <straight line> ΝΞ and the <straight line> ΖΚ <is equal to> the 
<straight line> ΚΑ.  And since as the <straight line> ΓΑ <is> to <the straight line> ΑΞ, 
so the <straight line> ΜΞ <is> to <the straight line> ΞΟ.  And as the <straight line> ΓΑ 
<is> to <the straight line> ΑΞ, so the <straight line> ΓΚ <is> to <the straight line> ΚΝ, 
and the <straight line> ΓΚ is equal to the <straight line> ΚΘ, therefore as the <straight 
line> ΘΚ <is> to <the straight line> ΚΝ, so the <straight line> ΜΞ <is> to <the straight 
line> ΞΟ.  And the point Ν is the center of weight of the straight line ΜΞ, since the 
<straight line> ΜΝ is equal to the <straight line> ΝΞ; therefore if we set equal to the 
<straight line> ΞΟ the <straight line> ΗΤ around its center of weight, the <point> Θ, so 
that the <straight line> ΤΘ is equal to the <straight line> ΘΗ, the <straight line> ΤΗ will 
balance the <straight line> ΜΞ, which will remain stationary, on account of the fact that 
the <straight line> ΘΝ has been cut inversely proportional to the weights ΤΗ, ΜΞ, and as 
the <straight line> ΘΚ <is> to <the straight line> ΚΝ, so the <straight line> ΜΞ <is> to 
the <straight line> ΗΤ.  Therefore the <point> Κ is the center of the weight of the weight 
from both.  Similarily, however many <straight lines> parallel to the <straight line> ΕΔ 
are drawn in the triangle ΖΑΓ they will balance and remain stationary by the <straight 
lines> cut off from them by the section after <the straight lines> have been transferred 
around the center of the weight, the <point> Θ.  And the <point> Κ will be the center of 
the weight of all weights.  And since first the triangle ΖΑΓ has been composed of the 
<straight lines> in the triangle ΖΑΓ, and second the segment ΑΒΓ has been composed of 
the <straight lines> taken in the segment similar to the <straight line> ΟΞ, therefore the 
triangle ΖΑΓ will balance and remain stationary at the point Κ by the segment of the 
section set around the center of the weight, the <point> Θ, so that the <point> Κ is the 
center of the weight of the <weight> of both.  And let the <straight line> ΓΚ have been 
cut by the <point> Χ, so that the <straight line> ΓΚ is triple of the <straight line> ΚΧ; 
therefore | 438 the point Χ will be the center of the weight of the triangle ΑΖΓ.  For this 
                                                
57 Either of Euclid or Aristeaus the Elder. 
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is shown in the Equilibria.58  Since therefore the triangle ΖΑΓ is balanced, remaining 
stationary at the <point> Κ by the segment ΒΑΓ which was set at the <point> Θ, the 
center of the weight, and the <point> Χ is the center of the weight of the triangle ΖΑΓ, 
therefore as the triangle ΑΖΓ is to the segment ΑΒΓ lying around the <point> Θ <as> its 
center, so the <straight line> ΘΚ <is> to <the straight line> ΧΚ.  Therefore the <straight 
line> ΘΚ is triple of the <straight line> ΚΧ; and therefore also the triangle ΑΖΓ is triple 
of the segment ΑΒΓ.  And also the triangle ΖΑΓ is fourfold of the triangle ΑΒΓ on 
account of the fact that the <straight line> ΖΚ is equal to the <straight line> ΚΑ and the 
<straight line> ΑΔ is equal to the <straight line> ΔΓ: therefore the segment ΑΒΓ is four-
thirds of the triangle ΑΒΓ. 
So this was not proven by what was now said but still creates a certain impression 
that the conclusion is true.  Wherefore I, seeing that <the conclusion> is not proven but 
nonetheless suspecting that the conclusion is true, will test [it] in respect to the 
geometrized proof, which was published earlier after I myself discovered it.  




                                                
58 What Archimedean work Equilibria refers to is not perfectly clear: Heiberg (1913: 439n.1) took the title 
to refer to Equilibrium of Planes, but non-extant Archimedean works on the basics of mechanical geometry 
are possible, such as On Balances. 
59 The sixteeth column ends mid-enunciation of the second proposition.  This enunciation is attached 




Prosopography of Physicians with Hellenistic Sect Affiliation  
 
I give here a comparative chronological table of the dates of activity of the 
physicians known from the three main Hellenistic medical sects: the Empiricists, the 





 Herophilus of Chalcedon 
330/320-260/250 BCE61 
Erasistratus of Ioulis 
c.315-240 BCE62 
 Callianax 
fl. 260-240 BCE63 
Strato 
fl. 265-245 BCE64 
Philinus of Cos 
fl. 250 BCE65 
Andreas of Carystus 
fl. 245-217 BCE66 
Apollonius of Memphis 
fl. 250-200 BCE67 
   
                                                
60 Knowledge of the members and fragments of the Erasistrateans is in a state of relative scholarly neglect 
compared to the Empiricists and Herophileans.  The identifications in this column are taken from Keyser 
and Irby-Massie’s (2008) Encyclopedia of Ancient Natural Scientists.  (Compare also Garofalo (1988: 4-
5).)  Yet the dates given in this book ought to be treated with caution since some are demonstrably inflated 
and the identifications in their list of Erasistrateans (2008: 1006-1011) include some physicians known not 
to be Erasistrateans by affiliation, only family members or teachers of Erasistratus.  Such mistaken listings 
and dates include Medeios (2008: 536), Khrysippos of Knidos II (2008: 475), Kleophantos of Ioulis (2008: 
483), and Antigenes (2008: 92); see Appendix D for these figures.  Medeios was the uncle of both 
Kleophantos and Erasistratus and thus not an Erasistratean; Khrysippos of Knidos II is said to have taught 
Medeios, Kleophantos, and Erasistratus and thus cannot have lived or flourished 280-250 BCE as claimed; 
Kleophantos of Ioulis was Erasistratus’ brother and known to have his own students such as Mnemon of 
Side and Antigenes (see Appendix D) but Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008) conflate Kleophantos’ students 
with the Erasistrateans.  I have listed the fourteen Erasistrateans remaining in Keyser and Irby-Massie’s 
(2008: 1006-1011) list according to the dates given but caveat lector until more scholarship is completed 
on the Erasistrateans.  The reader is also cautioned that Keyser and Irby-Massie often give ethnics of the 
cities associated with the individual’s work: this is seriously misleading in the case of Greek colonists to 
Egypt, some of whose families retained their citizenship in their ancestral Greek cities for several 
generations before adopting citizenship in an Egyptian town. I give ethnics only when given in ancient 
source. 
61 Von Staden (1989: 36-50). 
62 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 294-96). 
63 Von Staden (1989: 478). 
64 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 764-65).  This doctor is not the Peripatetic Strato of Lampsacus. 
65 Deichgräber (1965: 163). 
66 Von Staden (1989: 472).  Court physician to Ptolemy IV Philopater. 






Serapion of Alexandria 
fl. 225 BCE68 
Callimachus of Bithynia 
fl. 230 BCE69 
Apollophanes of Seleucia 
fl. 223-187 BCE70 
 Bacchius of Tanagra 
fl. 246-210 BCE71 
 
Zeuxis 
fl. 200-175 BCE72 
Demetrius of Apamea 
fl. 217-100 BCE73 
 
Glaucias of Tarentum 
fl. 175 BCE74 
Zeno 
fl. 175 BCE75 
 
Apollonius the Elder 
fl. 175 BCE76 
 Miltiades 
fl. 250-125 BCE77 
Apollonius Byblas 
fl. 150 BCE78 
  
 Hegetor 
fl. 150-100 BCE79 
Ptolemaeus 
fl. 250 BCE – 100 CE80 
Ptolemaeus of Cyrene 
fl. 100 BCE81 
Mantias 
fl. 165-90 BCE82 
Hicesius of Smyrna 
fl. 120-80 BCE83 
                                                
68 Deichgräber (1965: 164-65).  Von Staden (1989: 474) dated Serapion’s floruit to 200 BCE on the basis 
of his citing Andreas of Carystus (Galen De comp. medicam. secundum locos 13.343-4K = Andreas fr. 29 
vS = Empiricist fr. 151 D) but in a later article (1997a: 941) returned to Deichgräber’s dating. 
69 Von Staden (1989: 481-82). 
70 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 117-18).  Court physician to Antiochus III the Great. 
71 Von Staden (1989: 485). 
72 Kudlien (1972). 
73 Von Staden (1989: 508-09), who suggests that this Apamea is the Apamea in Bithynia, home of the 
Herophileans Herophilus of Chalcedon and Callimachus of Bithynia, rather than the Seleucid Apamea-on-
the-Orontes.  I am therefore inclined to believe that Demetrius of Apamea ought to date earlier in von 
Staden’s given range rather than later, especially since Fraser (1972: 1.307-08) has argued that most 
scientists and intellectuals in Alexandria (the early Herophilean sect was an Alexandrian phenomenon) 
were immigrants or at least of immigrant parents before the expulsion of the intellectuals in 145/4 BCE. 
74 Deichgräber (1965: 168-69). 
75 Von Staden (1989: 505). 
76 Deichgräber (1965: 171). 
77 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 556). 
78 Deichgräber (1965: 172). 
79 Von Staden (1989: 513).  Hegetor probably flourished closer to 100 than 150 BCE because both 
Heraclides of Tarentum and Apollonius of Citium appear to be responding to him as a recent polemicist; 
see chapter 4.3.4. 
80 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 704).  Keyser suggests one reason to include Ptolemaeus under 
Ptolemaic rule is that the name ‘Ptolemaeus’ is more common at that time. 
81 Deichgräber (1965: 172). 
82 Von Staden (1989: 515). Teacher of Heraclides of Tarentum; like Hegetor, probably closer to 100 BCE. 
83 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 396). 
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Zophyrus of Alexandria 
fl. 80 BCE?84 
 Artemidorus of Side 
fl. 90-30 BCE85 
Heraclides of Tarentum 
fl. 75 BCE86 
 Menodorus 
fl. 85-35 BCE87 
Apollonius of Citium 
fl. 90-70 BCE88 
Dioscurides Phacas 
fl. 75-30 BCE89 
Heraclides of Ephesus 
fl. 75-50 BCE90 
Diodorus 
fl. 60 BCE?91 
  
Lycus of Naples 
fl. 60 BCE?92 
Chrysermus 
fl. 50-25 BCE93 
Athenion 
fl. 50-10 BCE94 
 Zeuxis 
fl. 45-30 BCE95 
 
 Alexander Philalethes 
50 BCE - 25 CE96 
Charidemos 
fl. 50 BCE – 120 CE97 
 Heraclides of Erythrae 
fl. 50-1 BCE98 
 
Archibius 
fl. 1 BCE?99 
Apollonius Mys 
fl. 25 BCE – 25 CE100 
 
 Aristoxenus 
fl. 25-50 CE101 
 
                                                
84 Deichgräber (1965: 205). 
85 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 165). 
86 Deichgräber (1965: 172) follows Wellman’s dating; Guardosole (1997: 23) also accepts this date. 
87 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 549). 
88 Deichgräber (1965: 206).  Court physician to either Ptolemy X Alexander I, Ptolemy XII Auletes, or 
Ptolemy of Cyprus.  See chapter 4.3.4 for further discussion. 
89 Von Staden (1989: 519-20).  Court physician to Ptolemy XII Auletes and likely Cleopatra VII. 
90 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 367). 
91 Deichgräber (1965: 203). 
92 Deichgräber (1965: 204). Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 514). 
93 Von Staden (1989: 525-6). 
94 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 178). 
95 Von Staden (1989: 531).  The Herophilean Zeuxis is not to be confused with the Empiricist Zeuxis.  
96 Von Staden (1989: 532). 
97 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 470). 
98 Von Staden (1989: 555). 
99 Deichgräber (1965: 209). Fabio Stok in Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 159-60) redates him to 50-70 
CE, although his grounds for doing so are not clear. 
100 Von Staden (1989: 540). 






fl. 50-1 BCE102 
 
 Gaius 
fl. 50 BCE – 50 CE103 
 
Cassius 
fl. 30 CE104 
Demosthenes Philalethes 
fl. 7 BCE - 50 CE105 
Hermogenes of Smyrna 
fl. 30-70 CE106 
Menodotus of Nicomedia  
fl. 125 CE107 
  
Theodas of Laodocia  
fl. 125 CE108 
  
Aischrion of Pergamum  
fl. 125 CE109 
  
Epicurus of Pergamum 
fl. 150 CE110 
 Martialius 
fl. 150-90 CE111 
Philippus of Pergamum 
fl. 150 CE112 
  
Callicles 
fl. 150 CE?113 
  
Sextus Empiricus 
fl. 200 CE114 
  
Theodosius 
fl. 200 CE115 
  
                                                
102 Von Staden (1989: 564). 
103 Von Staden (1989: 566-67). 
104 Deichgräber (1965: 210).  See especially von Staden (1989: 566-67) on Roman names among 
physicians.  Von Staden (1997a) doubts his Empiricist affiliation, noting that he is never called an 
Empiricist in the ancient evidence. 
105 Von Staden (1989: 575) recognizes him as the last Herophilean. 
106 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 379). 
107 Deichgräber (1965: 212).  Note the jump in time: the first century CE belongs to the Pneumatists and 
Methodists at Rome as the Hellenistic sects decline. 
108 Deichgräber (1965: 214). 
109 Deichgräber (1965: 215). 
110 Deichgräber (1965: 408). 
111 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 535).  The Erasistratean bête noire of Galen known from On Prognosis 
and On My Own Books, his name may be either Martianus or Martialius; cf. Boudon-Millot (2007: 185.n3). 
112 Deichgräber (1965: 408). 
113 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 460) point out that there is an Empiricist physician “Kallikles” 
mentioned by Galen unknown to Deichgräber’s (1965) collection.  He is likely to be a contemporary of 
Galen rather than a Hellenistic physician. 
114 Deichgräber (1965: 216). 
115 Deichgräber (1965: 219). 
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Appendix D 
Prosopography of Physicians without Sect Affiliation  
in the Third Century BCE 
 
I have arraigned the physicians without sect affiliation in the third century BCE in a 
rough chronological order.  I leave to the end of the list those names without more secure 
date than at some time during the third century.  I supply an ethnic only if known. 
 
(1) Chrysippus of Cnidos, d. 278/7 BCE116 
(2) Medeios, fl. 320-270 BCE117 
(3) Amyntas, d. 278/7 BCE118 
(4) Nicias of Miletas, fl. 275-250 BCE119 
(5) Dionysius son of Oxymachus, fl. 300-250 BCE120 
(6) Dieuches, fl. 300-200 BCE121 
(7) Dionysius of Ephesus, fl. 290-250 BCE122 
(8) Xenodemus of Syros, fl. 300-250 BCE123 
(9) Diphilus of Siphnus, fl. 300-250 BCE124 
(10) Metrodorus of Amphipolis, fl. 275-69 BCE125 
 
                                                
116 PP (=Peremans and van’t Dack (1950-81)) 16647. Court physician to Ptolemy Philadelphus? See 
Gorteman (1957: 321-25) for discussion of name, status, and death. More bibliography is given in Keyser 
and Irby-Massie (2008: 475) s.v. ‘Khrysippos of Knidos II’ but their dates are wrong if Gorteman is 
correct. 
117 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 536). The uncle of Erasistratus and perhaps grandson of Aristotle, also a 
student of Chrysippus of Cnidos. 
118 PP 16573. Doctor at the court of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, put to death in 278/7. See Gorteman (1957: 
321-25) for discussion.   
119 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 576-77). Dedicatee of Theocritus Idylls 11 and 13.  He may have been a 
student with Erasistratus; cf. FGrH 1104. 
120 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 260-61). 
121 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 245-46), teacher of Noumenius of Heracleia.  One wonders whether this 
date is not too late: Dieuches is usually grouped with other dogmatic authors, e.g. Phylotimus and 
Mnesitheus, who are mid-to-late 4th century authors, possibly post-dating 323, but not much into the third 
century if it all.  On fourth-century medical authors see van der Eijk (2005a). 
122 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 263). He may be identical to Dionysius son of Oxymachus fl. 300-250 
BCE, no. 5. 
123 Samama (=Samama (2003)) 104. Inscription from Delos. 
124 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 273). 
125 Samama 182. Wellman (1930: 327).  Inscription from Ilion. Honored by Antiochus and Seleucus for 
saving the king from a battle wound. It is unclear whether Metrodorus is a court doctor (as Wellman 
supposed) or an army physician or a local physician.  In favor of Wellman’s thesis, Samama (2003: 474.n6) 
points out that the doctor of Ptolemy III Euergetes, Xe[nophan]tus (see no. 25 below), does not have the 
title archiatros, implying that this court title at least came later. 
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(11) Philippus of Epirus, fl. 270-240 BCE126 
(12) Apollodorus the Theriacus, fl. 280-240 BCE127 
(13) Cleophantus of Ceos, fl. 270-240 BCE128  
(14) Aristogenes of Cnidos, fl. 260-240 BCE129 
(15) Artemidorus, fl. 260-240 BCE130 
(16) Theopompus, fl. 256 BCE131 
(17) Eudemus, fl. 250 BCE132 
(18) Noumenius of Heracleia, fl. 270-230 BCE133 
(19) Eucarpus, fl. 249/8 BCE134 
(20) Antigenes, fl. 250-200 BCE135 
(21) Neileus, fl. 255-215 BCE136 
(22) Mnemon of Side, fl. 250-200 BCE137 
(23) Demetrius, fl. 246 BCE138 
(24) Neon, fl. 242 BCE139 
(25) Xe[nophan]tus of Alexandria, fl. 246-221 BCE140 
(26) Philippus, fl. 240 BCE141 
 
                                                
126 Wellman (1930: 322) cites Celsus 3.21 and says he was a court physician to Antigonas Gonatas.  
Keyser and Massie (2008: 647) deny s.v. ‘Philippos of Macedon’ that Philippos of Epirus and Philippos of 
Macedon are the same. 
127 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 106). Source for Pliny on poisonous animals and perhaps the source of 
Nicander’s Theriaca. 
128 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 483). Brother of Erasistratus, student of Chrysippus of Cnidos, teacher 
of Antigenes and Mnemon of Side. 
129 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 137).  Court physician to Antigonas Gonatas. 
130 PP 16582. Fraser (1972: 1.370). Doctor to Apollonius, finance minister to Ptolemies II Philadelphus 
and III Euergetes, known from the Zenon archive.  
131 PP 16609. 
132 PP 16599. Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 308). Anatomist. Herophilus is his younger contemporary in 
Gal. 18A.7K.  If older than Herophilus, he probably died by mid-century and Keyser and Irby-Massie’s 
flourit is too lengthy. 
133 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 583). Student of Dieuches. 
134 PP 16600. 
135 PP 16575. Cleophantian (that is, he was a member of the sect of Erasistratus’ brother Cleophantus). 
136 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 569). Famous for his improved Hippocratic bench as recorded in Orb. 
Coll. 49.8. 
137 PP 16619. Cleophantian (that is, he was a member of the sect of Erasistratus’ brother Cleophantus). 
Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 559) suggest that his interpolated markings in [Hipp.] Epidemics 3 might 
have been a native script from Side. 
138 PP 16588. Doctor at Oxyrhynchus. 
139 PP 16623. Doctor in favor with the king, father of Agathoboulos (PP 15784) who dedicates a statute to 
Sosibius, the minister of Ptolemy IV. 
140 PP 16624. Samama 393. Fraser (1972: 1.370). Honored by a statue erected by Ptolemy III Euergetes.  I 
print Fraser’s restoration of the name from the stone, accepted also by Samama. 
141 PP 16640, father of Caphisophon.   
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(27) Caphisophon, fl. 240 BCE142 
(28) Philistos of Cos, fl. 241-200 BCE143 
(29) Phanesis, fl. 233/2 BCE144 
(30) Diagoras of Cyprus, fl. 240-220 BCE145 
(31) Chartadas of Berenice, fl. 230 BCE146 
(32) Archippus of Ceos, fl. 230-220 BCE147 
(33) Nymphodorus, fl. 240-220 BCE148 
(34) Hermias of Cos, fl. 219-17 BCE149 
(35) Demetrius, fl. 219/8 BCE150 
(36) Theiodotus, fl. 215/13 BCE151 
(37) Philon, fl. 215/13 BCE152 
(38) Dicaios, fl. 300-200 BCE153 
(39) Melancomas of Megalopolis, fl. 207/6 BCE154 
(40) Philistos of Cos, fl. 204/3 BCE155 
(41) Papias of Laodicea, fl. 250 BCE-90 CE156 
(42) Perigenes, fl. 200 BCE – 50 CE157 
(43) Pythion, fl. 200 BCE158 
(44) Philippus of Cos, fl. 200 BCE159 
(45) Philon of Sicyon, fl. 300-200 BCE160 
                                                
142 PP 16614. Samama 132. Samama (2003: 241.n42) suggests that he was court doctor to Ptolemy III. 
143 Samama 124. Honorific inscription from Cos. Possibly of the same family as Philistos of Cos (fl. 200), 
no. 40. 
144 PP 16570. Native Egyptian doctor in Crocodilopolis. 
145 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 244) date him from 220-180 BCE, since he is listed between 
Erasistratus and Andreas by Dioscorides in de Materia Medica; if so, his date ought to be more 240-220 
BCE since Andreas is dead in 217. 
146 Samama 151. Inscription from Calymna. 
147 Samama 107. 
148 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 584-85). Famous for a mechanical “chest” for dislocations in Orb. Coll. 
49.  One thinks also of his contemporaries Andreas of Carystus and Neileus’ mechanical innovations. 
149 Samama 126 is an honorific inscription from Gortyn; Samama 127 is an honorific inscription on Cos 
from Cnossians; Samama 128 is an honorific inscription from Halicarnassus. 
150 PP 16589.  Doctor at Karanis. 
151 PP 16608. Teacher of medicine. 
152 PP 16642. Apprentice of Theiodotus. 
153 Samama 073. Inscription from Atrax near Larisa. 
154 Samama 057. Inscription from Delphi. 
155 Samama 056. A dedicatory inscription at Delphi for Philistos, who practiced in Delphi. 
156 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 608) suggest a connection with the Autolycus who perished in a 
shipwreck of 201 BCE, implying a flourit of 200 BCE. 
157 Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 635). A mechanic and surgeon; the double combination suggests an 
early date to me. 
158 Samama 160. Inscription from Minoa. 
159 Samama 108, Samama 135. 
160 Samama 012. Doctor at Athens. 
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(46) Xenotimus, fl. 300-200 BCE161 
(47) Anaxippus, fl. 300-200 BCE162 
(48) Hippocrates of Cos, fl. 300-200 BCE163 
(49) Polygnotus of Ceos, fl. 300-200 BCE164 
(50) Idriarchos of Rhodes, fl. 300-200 BCE165 
(51) Nicandros of Halicarnassus, fl. 300-200 BCE166 
(52) Phaidas of Tenedos, fl. 300-200 BCE167 
(53) Noumenios of Soloi, fl. 300-200 BCE168 
(54) Dionysius the Hunchback, fl. 300-200 BCE169 
(55) Philon, fl. 300-200 BCE170 
(56) Nearchus, fl. 300-200 BCE171 
(57) Dikais, fl. 300-200 BCE172 
(58) Theudorus, fl. 300-200 BCE173 
(59) E…es, fl. 300-200 BCE174 
(60) Simylion, fl. 300-200 BCE175 
(61) Tre.. , fl. 300-200 BCE176 
(62) Leon, fl. 300-200 BCE177 
(63) Agias, fl. 300-200 BCE178 
(64) Theodoridas, fl. 300-200 BCE179 
(65) Bakalles, fl. 300-200 BCE180 
(66) Philocles, fl. 300-200 BCE181 
                                                
161 Samama 123. Honorific inscription from Cos. 
162 Samama 130. Inscription from Cos. 
163 Samama 129. 
164 Samama 162.  
165 Samama 156. Honorific inscription from Astypalaia. 
166 Samama 106.  
167 Samama 371. Inscription from Palaiopaphos. 
168 Samama 372. Inscription from Palaiopaphos. 
169 PP 16593. Originally from Kurtos, an Egyptian village, but also called ὁ κυρτός, i.e. “the Hunchback” 
in a pun. 
170 Samama 506. A defixio tablet from Metaponto cursing the ergasterion of seventeen physicians (no. 55-
71) so that they cannot work. 
171 Samama 506.  
172 Samama 506. A woman.  
173 Samama 506.   
174 Samama 506.  
175 Samama 506.  
176 Samama 506.  
177 Samama 506. 
178 Samama 506. 
179 Samama 506. 
180 Samama 506. 
181 Samama 506. 
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(67) …ouchos, fl. 300-200 BCE182 
(68) Terp.. , fl. 300-200 BCE183 
(69) …on, fl. 300-200 BCE184 
(70) Zoilos, fl. 300-200 BCE185 





                                                
182 Samama 506. 
183 Samama 506. 
184 Samama 506. 
185 Samama 506. 
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